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Introduction
Institutions – the rules and norms that guide human interactions – 
enable or impede the structures, mechanisms and measures that 
guide mitigation and adaptation. Institutions, understood as the 
‘rules of the game’, exert direct and indirect influence over the via-
bility of 1.5°C- consistent pathways.
ipcc Special Report 20181
∵
The current relationship between trade and climate change can be aptly de-
scribed as a clash of objective truths with narrow politico- economic interests. 
While the science calls for rapid improvements in transfers of mitigation tech-
nologies among others, existing legal infrastructure prioritising commercial 
and political interests retard that process. It is not altogether novel to hold 
that transboundary economic transactions like trade and investment greatly 
enhance the level and scale of the dissemination of technologies necessary to 
combat climate change. Researches to this effect have been in existence since 
the early 2000s.2 Unfortunately however, this insight has not permeated into 
the institutions regulating such economic transactions. Institutions, being the 
‘rules of the game’ as quoted above, are creations of public international law at 
their very core. Despite this shared root, linkages between different rule- frame-
works regulating international trade on the one hand and climate change on 
the other still remain only in the realm of possibility. One key drawback that 
prevents strong interlinked institutions from developing is that global rules 
can only go so far as the least willing participant is ready to venture. On one 
end, the talk of trade measures for climate technology diffusion is unpalatable 
in the climate domain. James Bacchus recently noted how conflicts of senti-
ments have relegated trade issues to the position of being ‘taboo’ in climate 
 1 Heleen de Coninck and others, ‘Strengthening and Implementing the Global Response’ in 
Valerie Masson- Delmotte and others (eds), Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°C (World 
Meteorological Organization (wmo) 2018) 352 <http:// www.ipcc.ch/ report/ sr15/ > accessed 
15 October 2020.
 2 ipcc, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer (Bert Metz and others 







discussions.3 On the other end, a growing number of trade disputes challenge 
measures touching upon climate change one way or the other.4
Against this backdrop, the present volume offers an alternative narrative, 
putting the need for clean technology diffusion at the forefront, at the same 
time making suggestions to tune the trade law regime to play a complementa-
ry part therein. This is done upon the foundation of a proposed doctrine and 
framework of ‘Common Concern of Humankind’ (hereafter referred to also as 
‘Common Concern’, for short). The notion is itself well- established, especially 
in the field of climate change. While its lingering presence has been interpret-
ed as a clarion call for concerted efforts to be made by all involved parties, 
specifics of the required actions have never been detailed. The proposed doc-
trine facilitates that step. It calls for assuming – (i) responsibilities of good faith 
cooperation by the stakeholders, (ii) diligent measures to tackle a concern 
domestically, and as a last resort, (iii) recourse to unilateral countermeasures 
against negligent non- compliance.5 In brief, the doctrine of Common Concern 
of Humankind is a propositional framework of norms to conceptualise, also re-
spond to the collective action problems regarding global public goods (gpg s) 
of critical importance. To distinguish the proposed normative framework from 
the traditional understanding of ‘common concern of humankind’, a termino-
logical distinction is maintained throughout the work.6
The chief attraction of having a normative structure and specific legal con-
sequences, possibly as a principle of public international law, lies in the pos-
sibility of resolving the conflicts briefly outlined above. It cannot be denied 
that having in place an international law principle that can objectively guide 
suitable responses as new global hazards emerge, is indeed lucrative. Unlike 
the current practice of understanding common concern of humankind by 
 3 James Bacchus, ‘What Is a Climate Response Measure? Breaking the Trade Taboo in Con-
fronting Climate Change’ (Centre for International Governance Innovation (cigi) 2019) 220.
 4 For example, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / 
Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed- in Tariff Program [2013] Panel Report wt/ ds412/ r 
and Add.1; wt/ ds426/ r and Add.1, dsr 2013: i 237; India – Certain Measures Relating to So-
lar Cells and Solar Modules [2016] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds456/ ab/ r; ‘China – Certain 
Measures on the Transfer of Technology: Request for Consulatation by the European Union 
(Revision)’ (2019) wt/ ds549/ 1/ Rev.1; G/ L/ 1244/ Rev.1; ip/ d/ 39/ Rev.1.
 5 For a detailed introduction to the doctrine, see, Thomas Cottier (ed), The Prospects of Com-
mon Concern of Humankind in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2021). The first 
chapter of this book also elaborates the doctrine in the particular context of low- carbon 
technology diffusion.
 6 When referring to the traditional usage of the term, small letters are used, e.g. ‘common con-
cern’ or ‘common concern of humankind’. The proposed enhanced attributes of the concept 










assigning it a reluctant meaning, one that reflects the lack of bold steps in cli-
mate affairs, the doctrine takes a more forward- looking approach. The avenues 
of normative consequences proposed by the doctrine as emerging from the 
expression of Common Concern, are geared towards effective solution of that 
‘concern’. It is pragmatic at its very core, making the case for a new realism, as 
Thomas Cottier suggested.7 While the doctrine in some aspects just states the 
obvious regarding the climate change discipline (e.g. the duty to cooperate, or 
to take adequate response actions domestically), others offer substantial prov-
ocation (e.g. unilateral trade countermeasures) to begin dialogues.
Research in this book will examine the intersections of and linkages be-
tween low- carbon technology diffusion and trade using the doctrine of Com-
mon Concern as the principal theoretical framework. This attempts to serve 
two purposes. One is, as already mentioned, to supply a blueprint of an alter-
native approach to trade and technology diffusion in the climate context. The 
second purpose is to make specific observations on the practical utility of the 
doctrine itself. Therefore, with respect to the problem of trade and low- carbon 
technology (lct) diffusion, the research touches upon, step by step, all the 
normative facets of the doctrine, i.e. (i) cooperation, (ii) homework, and (iii) 
unilateral compliance enforcement through countermeasures.
The first chapter acquaints readers to the factual, conceptual and regulatory 
specifics of the research. It begins with a portrayal of the need for low- carbon 
technology diffusion and the potential role of trade regulation. Upon that 
foundation, the doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind is introduced 
and its potential utility in meeting the technology needs using trade law and 
policy measures is elaborated. The second chapter takes a deep dive into the 
institutional expressions of technology development and transfer in the cli-
mate and the trade regimes. The findings therefrom are then assessed against 
the current empirical understandings of the barriers to low- carbon technolo-
gy diffusion. This leads to a clear understanding of the nature of cooperation 
required to tackle the absence of effective regulation. The conclusions feed 
into the third chapter, which outlines the new narrative of trade cooperation 
and policy measures to facilitate lct diffusion. The principal argument in that 
chapter is that it is possible to fashion factually informed, and mutually benefi-
cial trade measures that would enable the lct s to spread further. Cooperation 
among the wto members, within the organization and also beyond, should be 
geared to bring such measures into effect.
 7 See, Conclusion, Thomas Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ 





Corresponding to the homework aspect of the Common Concern doctrine, 
 chapters 4 and 5 each present a case study of a specific trade measure that can 
facilitate the diffusion of low- carbon technologies in a given context. While 
constraints of space and scope prevent extensive analyses of all possible trade- 
related actions, these two studies provide a glimpse of issues that may arise 
in practice. Chapter 4 examines the implications of an emission pricing mea-
sure coupled with utilisation of the generated revenue for technological im-
provements in the developing countries. This leads to the long- standing and 
unresolved issue of discrimination claims regarding the non- product related 
process and production measures (ppm s). In a similar- structured analysis, 
 chapter 5 looks at the ramifications of easier terms of credits offered by the 
governments for exports involving lct s. This leads to yet another lingering 
issue of amending the wto agreement on subsidies and countervailing mea-
sures. Both chapters look at the proposed measures’ compliance with the exist-
ing wto rules and highlight the possible benefits of a recourse to the proposed 
Common Concern doctrine. Necessary suggestions are made in both cases.
Chapter 6, the final chapter of the volume, delves into a study of the utility 
and the practical applicability of unilateral trade countermeasures deployed 
as part of the Common Concern framework. While it is true that unilateral 
self- help measures for perceived breaches of trade commitments are explicitly 
prohibited under the wto rules, it is also true that in some limited areas (e.g. 
the security exceptions), members enjoy greater freedom to impose restric-
tive measures on others. The chapter also explores the possibility of using the 
Common Concern doctrine to retain the benefits of unilateralism while tam-
ing the opportunistic use of such a power.
In the end, a conclusion summarises the overall findings of the research, in-
cluding the lessons learnt on the utility of the proposed normative framework 
of Common Concern of Humankind. A brief outlook, as part of the conclusion, 






This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
 chapter 1
Climate Technology, Trade, and the Doctrine 
of Common Concern
The urgency attached to the need for diffusion of lct s8 is a consequence of 
its indispensable role in the mitigation of climate change. A habitable climate 
is a global public good.9 Maintaining safe climatic conditions is arguably the 
toughest cooperation challenge ever faced by the international community 
since the World Wars.10 A number of factors contribute to the complexity of 
the climate change problem; for example, its all- encompassing nature, the dif-
ficulty of pinpointing a critical threshold of catastrophic emission, a common-
ly perceived negative effect on the interests of domestic economic growth, 
and the difficulty to represent, also quantify the interests of the future genera-
tions.11 The challenge of finding a package of workable solutions to all these is-
sues goes to the root of the current inability of the international legal system to 
provide an adequate framework of response to contain adverse climate change 
impacts. While there is an international treaty- based body of climate rules, not 
only does it lack sufficient normative strength, but also the level of influence 
it exerts upon other relatively stricter regimes (e.g. international trade regu-
lation) is ambiguous.12 Therefore, the sense of urgency to spread lct s is not 
translated into actual law.
The role of this opening chapter is to lay out a broad factual and theoretical 
background to assess the above. It has two general segments. The first segment 
(sections i & ii) supplies a factual context, in particular, the needed levels of 
 8 For details on the meaning and scope of low- carbon technologies, See section iib at 
p. 14 below.
 9 Scott Barrett, ‘Aggregate Efforts: Global Public Goods That Depend on the Combined Ef-
forts of All States’, Why cooperate? : the incentive to supply global public goods (paperback 
ed, Oxford University Press 2010).
 10 Daniel Cole, ‘Climate Change and Collective Action’ (2008) 61 Current Legal Problems.
 11 Harro van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance :  Consequences and 
Management of Regime Interactions (Edward Elgar 2014)  3– 4; Scott Barrett, ‘Climate 
Treaties and Approaching Catastrophes’ (2013) 66 Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 235; Scott Barrett, ‘Rethinking Global Climate Change Governance’; 
Simon Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’ in 
Stephen Mark Gardiner and others (eds), Climate ethics :  essential readings (Oxford 
University Press 2010).














emission mitigation for a safe climate, also the hazards otherwise. The impor-
tance of low- carbon technology diffusion and the facilitative role of interna-
tional trade in that regard is outlined as well. The second segment (sections iii 
&vi) outlines the legal and theoretical framework, eventually presenting the 
hypothesis that the goal of building a positive coherence between the trade 
and the climate rule system will benefit from the integration of the doctrine 
of Common Concern of Humankind in those systems. Such coherence would 
further enable the deployment of trade policy measures for the diffusion of 
low- carbon technologies.
i Mitigation of Climate Change: Fact vs. Law
As human- induced changes to the earth’s climate were agreed to be a common 
concern of humankind,13 the international community responded by making 
a binding commitment in 1992 to “[a] chieve, […] stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent danger-
ous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.14 Great may it have 
sounded back then, but the hindsight of almost three decades of failed at-
tempts at making a rule system capable to do just that now brings to mind 
brave Achilles’ fabled struggle to catch up with the Tortoise.15 As the scientific 
forecasts of our long- term future keep getting bleaker, the success to build an 
effective framework of rules continue to slip away repeatedly. The initial 1992 
agreement where the commitment was made was a framework arrangement, 
waiting to be fleshed out over time. The first attempt to that end was the Kyoto 
Protocol. Despite its strong obligatory language, the Protocol has been largely 
unsuccessful in bringing forth necessary emission reduction as the large devel-
oped country emitters left the process over time. Coming pages will show that 
the recent Paris Agreement has not yet been of much effect either.
In stark contrast to the rulemaking challenges, climate scholarship is a thriv-
ing field. Scientists report that the risks posed by anthropogenic climate change 
are dynamic and they affect in many different levels. Not only does unabated 
emission of greenhouse gases worsen the natural environment, but it also has 
a further knock- on effect on social and economic ecosystems that depend on 
 13 For an account of the inception of the expression, see p. 29 onwards.
 14 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 (1771 unts 107).
 15 Nick Huggett, ‘Zeno’s Paradoxes’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2019, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University 2019) <https:// 
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those environments. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) 
periodically collects and communicates information on the ‘key risks’16 arising 
out of human- induced climate change.17 These risks are combined together in 
groups to form five broad types of threats, each communicated by the ipcc as 
a ‘reason for concern’.18 These five reasons for concern are – (i) danger to the 
unique and threatened systems, (ii) extreme weather events, (iii) uneven dis-
tribution of impacts, (iv) global aggregate impacts, and (v) large- scale singular 
events. As a depiction of the risk levels, the figure in the next page (Figure 1) 
usefully portrays the immediate necessity of additional mitigation efforts. The 
top panel of the figure shows six different ranges of temperature rise compared 
to pre- industrial levels due to different levels of greenhouse gas (ghg) con-
centrations (in co2- equivalent terms) by the end of this century. The bottom 
panel shows the way each of the reasons for concern worsens with the increase 
of average global temperature. Together it is possible to read the figure as a 
carbon concentration goal for any temperature limitation target (top) and the 
consequences thereof in terms of global risks (bottom).
The figure above shows that in the case of the global average temperature 
rising more than 2oC above the pre- industrial levels by 2100, ‘high’ to ‘very high’ 
 16 The key risks are those that are widely agreed upon by the experts as having the most 
severe adverse consequence for the human and socio- ecological systems. A risk becomes 
‘key’ due to its hazardous consequence or the vulnerability of the systems exposed to it. 
Other factors of consideration to determine ‘key risks’ are: (i) magnitude of the conse-
quence, (ii) probability of the risk to materialise, (iii) irreversibility of impact and (iv) 
limited ability of the impacted.
 17 These risks are- (i) Risk of death, injury, ill- health, or disrupted livelihoods in low- lying 
coastal zones and small islands due to storm surges, coastal flooding, and sea- level rise; 
(ii) Risk of severe ill- health and disrupted livelihoods for large urban populations due to 
inland flooding in some regions; (iii) Systemic risks due to extreme weather events lead-
ing to breakdown of infrastructure networks and critical services; (iv) Risk of mortality 
and morbidity during periods of extreme heat, particularly for vulnerable urban popula-
tions and those working outdoors; (v) Risk of food insecurity and the breakdown of food 
systems linked to warming, drought, flooding, and precipitation variability and extremes; 
(vi) Risk of loss of rural livelihoods and income due to insufficient access to drinking 
and irrigation water and reduced agricultural productivity; (vii) Risk of loss of marine 
and coastal ecosystems, biodiversity, and the ecosystem goods, functions, and services 
they provide for coastal livelihoods; (viii) Risk of loss of terrestrial and inland water eco-
systems, biodiversity, and the ecosystem goods, functions, and services they provide for 
livelihoods. Michael Oppenheimer and others, ‘Emergent Risks and Key Vulnerabilities’ 
in Christopher B Field and others (eds), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability – Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 1069– 1071.









 figure 1  Reason for concern. Figure 19–7, (n 17) ibid 1082
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risks start setting in. The level of ecosystem damage through the extinction of 
large fractions of freshwater, marine and terrestrial species will rise with the 
increasing rate and magnitude of climate change.19 Rising marine temperature 
will also result in the redistribution of global marine resources and loss of ma-
rine biodiversity. Increased acidification of oceans will cause loss of the coral 
reefs and will damage polar ecosystems.20 Frequency of submergence, flood-
ing and erosion will continue to increase in the coastal areas as the sea levels 
will continue to rise well beyond the 21st century.21 The ecosystem impact then 
affects human livelihood, increasing the existing vulnerabilities of the com-
munities.22 As global warming is projected to reduce the surface and ground 
freshwater resources in the subtropical regions, it will make existing water cri-
ses in those regions more acute. An increase of the global average tempera-
ture will reduce the yield of staples; for example, wheat, maize and rice in the 
tropical and temperate regions, worsening the food security conditions.23 Hu-
man health will also be adversely impacted as climate change would intensify 
existing health risks from natural hazards and nutrition loss. All these impacts 
would affect poor and vulnerable locations many times more than other areas. 
Besides, climate change will make poverty reduction slow, and sustainable de-
velopment difficult to achieve for many parts of the globe.24
Limiting the adverse impact of climate change is only possible through mitiga-
tion up to a scale wherein the cumulative anthropogenic emission of greenhouse 
gases does not exceed a certain threshold, known as the carbon budget. According 
to a special report released by the ipcc after the signing of the Paris Agreement, 
for a 50% chance of staying within the 1.5 degrees temperature limit, the remain-
ing carbon budget must be about 580 GtCO2.25 For a 66% probability, the same 
must be only around 420 GtCO2.26 A portion of this budget (about 100 GtCO2) 
would be automatically exhausted by the natural events already triggered, e.g. 
 19 ipcc, Climate Change 2014:  Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and 
III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (RK 
Pachauri, Leo Mayer and Core Writing Team eds, ipcc 2015) 67.
 20 ibid.
 21 Peter U Clark and others, ‘Consequences of Twenty- First- Century Policy for Multi- 
Millennial Climate and Sea- Level Change’ (2016) 6 Nature Climate Change 360.
 22 ipcc, Climate Change 2014 (n 19) 69.
 23 ibid.
 24 ibid 73.
 25 ipcc, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in Valerie Masson- Delmotte and others (eds), 
Special Report:  Global Warming of 1.5°C (World Meteorological Organization (wmo) 



















thawing of the permafrost and methane emissions from the wetlands.27 Almost 
all climate scientists agree that the current annual rate of consumption of the 
carbon budget is around 42(±3) GtCO2, which means that unless it slows down 
significantly, the budget would be fully depleted around the 2050s.
Against the backdrop of such bleak forecasts and after much struggle, the 
international community delivered the Paris Agreement in 2015 – a beacon of 
hope.28 The Agreement is nothing short of a miracle given the level of consen-
sus and ambition it stands for. Just like the 1992 Framework Convention, the 
Paris Agreement showcases a near universal commitment to climate action. 
Taking into account the forebodings from the scientific community, the Agree-
ment updated the global emission mitigation target in the following terms:
This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, 
including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the 
threat of climate change, […] including by:
 a. Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 
2oc above pre- industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the tem-
perature to 1.5oc above pre- industrial levels, recognizing this would 
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change; […]29
Nevertheless, the price for a global agreement on an overall mitigation target 
was paid in the form of legal ambiguities built into the system – so much so 
that it remains possible to fail to attain the abovementioned target and not 
break any strict rules of the agreement at the same time.30 The mitigation 
commitment of each participant country is nationally and thus unilaterally 
determined, albeit subject to an obligation of being progressive over a five 
years cycle.31 Although the parties are encouraged to submit clear, transparent 
and methodologically consistent commitments,32 those submitted in the first 
round vary widely and hence remain beyond any meaningful comparison.33 
 27 ibid.
 28 Paris Agreement 2015 (Report of the Conference of the Parties in its twenty- first session, 
Decision 1/ cp 21, Annex, fccc/ cp/ 2015/ 10/ Add1).
 29 Article 2, ibid.
 30 Richard N Cooper and others, ‘Why Paris Did Not Solve the Climate Dilemma’ in Peter C 
Cramton, David JC MacKay and Axel Ockenfels (eds), Global carbon pricing: the path to 
climate cooperation (mit Press 2017).
 31 Article 4, Paris Agreement (n 28).
 32 Article 4.8, ibid.
 33 This makes tracing of the ‘ambitious’ elements in the ndc s with respect to a common 
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Moreover, detailed guidelines on market- based approaches34 to emission miti-
gation remain up in the air. Further guidance has been detailed in the evolving 
Paris rulebook,35 impact of which will not be witnessed until the second round 
of commitments come in by 2020.36 Given the onset of the global economic 
downturn in the wake of the covid 19 pandemic, mitigation is not a priority 
policy agenda for governments. Moreover, the United States, one of the biggest 
polluters, has already formally communicated its withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement.37
The latest ipcc special report is a reminder that even if all the nationally- 
determined contributions (ndc s) pledged under the Paris Agreement were 
duly realised, the global mean temperature would rise about 3oC higher than 
the pre- industrial period by 2100 and would keep rising.38 This is again con-
firmed by the latest unep Emissions Gap Report. It shows that meeting all 
the conditional and unconditional ndc commitments would still see global 
mitigation fall short by 26– 31 GtCO2 in 2030, compared to the level required to 
reach the 1.5oC target.39 For all except one of the predicted 1.5oC pathways, an-
nual average global emission must remain below 35 GtCO2eq per year, whereas 
the same average emission according to the current global mitigation commit-
ment is between 52 and 58 GtCO2eq.40
Clearly, effective response to the global concern of climate change by reach-
ing the adequate levels of mitigation in time will require efforts going beyond 
the polite suasion of the core climate law system (i.e. the unfccc and the 
 34 Article 6, Paris Agreement (n 28).
 35 Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nationally deter-
mined contributions, referred to in decision 1/ cp.21, paragraph 28 2019 (Meeting of the 
Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, Decision 4/ cma1, 
Annex, fccc/ pa/ cma/ 2018/ 3/ Add1).
 36 For more see p. 64 below.
 37 Michael R Pompeo, ‘On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement’ (U.S. Department of 
State) <https:// www.state.gov/ on- the- u- s- withdrawal- from- the- paris- agreement/ > accessed 
25 October 2020.
 38 ipcc, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ (n 25)  24; Jaime Nieto, Óscar Carpintero and Luis J 
Miguel, ‘Less than 2°C? An Economic- Environmental Evaluation of the Paris Agreement’ 
(2018) 146 Ecological Economics 69; unfccc, ‘Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of 
the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’ (unfccc 2015) Synthesis report fccc/ 
cp/ 2015/ 7 <http:// unfccc.int/ resource/ docs/ 2015/ cop21/ eng/ 07.pdf> accessed 25 October 
2020; unfccc, ‘Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: An 
Update’ (unfccc 2016)  Synthesis report fccc/ cp/ 2016/ 2  <http:// unfccc.int/ resource/ 
docs/ 2016/ cop22/ eng/ 02.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020.
 39 United Nations Environment Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2018 (unep 2019) 23– 25.
















Paris Agreement). It is highly unlikely that over the next decade, rules of the 
existing climate regime would succeed in exponentially increasing the parties’ 
level of commitment and ambition. This rising probability of failure triggers 
the need to look past the traditional limits of the regulatory domain for effec-
tive solutions. Like the saying that one must not put all the eggs in the same 
basket, instead of putting all our hopes on the success of the Paris platform, it 
would only be prudent to explore for additional and complementary avenues 
of effective mitigation options, especially in the regulatory realm governing 
global economic activities.
The domain of the international economic law (iel) is the most fitting area 
to search for effective accompaniments to climate rules. iel is a branch of 
public international law that covers an ever expanding sphere of transbound-
ary public and private economic activities,41 as well as related social issues. 
This field of law is comprised of areas such as trade, investment, monetary 
regulations, taxation, related concerns regarding competition, labour welfare, 
development, and also cross- cutting issues such as multi- level governance 
and global value chains.42 On one hand, some of these activities (e.g. trans-
port emissions) are direct contributors to climate change and therefore must 
be controlled. On the other hand, iel offers powerful tools to discipline the 
behaviour of the different types of actors in the market to curb emissions. Reg-
ulatory reforms and policy measures falling within the scope of the iel can 
complement climate action by creating new opportunities for climate- friendly 
production, consumption, and investment choices. So far the disciplines of iel 
have remained on the sidelines of international climate action, but this must 
change. With this motivation, the current research trains its focus on one par-
ticular part of the iel, i.e. international trade regulation under the umbrella 
of the wto.
To reflect the need for spreading lct s for climate mitigation, the rest of 
the chapter would outline the preliminaries of a coherent trade and climate 
change rule system to that effect.
 41 John Jackson, ‘International Economic Law:  Reflections on the “Boilerroom” of 
International Relations’ (1995) 10 American University International Law Review 
596– 599.
 42 Jeffrey L Dunoff, ‘Subject- matter of International Economic Law’ in Thomas Cottier 
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ii The lcts as an Important Puzzle Piece
A Technology in Mitigation Pathways
Although a variety of predicted emission reduction pathways can successfully 
limit global emission within 1.5oC, all of those require quick adoption of new 
technologies at an unprecedented scale, enabling deep decarbonisation of the 
global economy across all sectors.43 Emission pathways that successfully model 
achievement of the target with limited or no overshoot, are built upon assump-
tions that include rapid and immediate system changes all across the board, 
including changes in production and consumption patterns, as well as interna-
tional cooperation to enhance sustainability and reduce energy demand.
To illustrate, successful emission pathways predict a necessary increase 
in the share of renewables in electricity generation to be around 70– 85% 
by 2050.44 Within the same time period, the share of coal is expected to go 
down to virtually zero. The emission from the industry sector is projected to be 
75– 90% lower in 2050 compared to the 2010 levels.45 According to the ipcc, 
sector- specific transitions can be attained through combinations of existing 
technologies and practices like electrification, product substitution, and tech-
niques of carbon capture and storage. However, deployment of the new tech-
nologies at an unprecedented scale is challenging due to economic, financial, 
and institutional constraints.46 In other ghg emitting sectors like transport, 
buildings, and infrastructure, deep emission cuts require adoption of energy 
efficiency practices, as well as changes in urban and land planning. For exam-
ple, the share of low- emission fuel in the transport sector should rise from the 
current less than 5% to about 35– 65% by 2050.47 Again, such transitions are 
challenged by economic, institutional, and socio- cultural barriers.48
Pathways that attain the 1.5oC target while accounting for an initial phase 
of emission overshoot, are even more dependent on expensive and uncertain 
carbon dioxide removal (cdr) technologies in the later phases. Instead of im-
mediate decarbonisation, such models predict an emission intensive lifestyle 
 43 The sectors are:  energy, industry, buildings and infrastructure, transport, land usage, 
and waste.




 48 An extensive discussion focusing on the market- related barriers preventing low- carbon 

















leading up to 2050. Only by an extensive deployment of cdr technologies 
from that point, negative emission is planned to be reached before other mod-
els, thereby resulting in the attainment of the target. The problem is that de-
layed mitigation allows some of the climate hazards to set in early on– often in 
regions that were not responsible for those emissions, increasing the burden 
of climate adaptation. Also, dependence on non- existing cdr technologies as-
sumes technological breakthroughs, which do not happen regularly.49
Keeping aside the long- term temperature limitation goals, technologies 
play a crucial role even to attain the existing insufficient levels of emission 
reduction commitments registered under the Paris Agreement. According to 
Brandi, 63% of all mitigation contributions pledged by the parties under the 
Paris framework is conditional upon technology transfer.50 unfccc Secretari-
at reports that almost all the developing countries mention technology in one 
form or other in their intended nationally determined contribution (indc s) 
documents.51 More than 100 developing countries mention the need for 
technology- related support to be able to pursue their planned commitment.52
In sum, appropriate technologies and their global dissemination are an 
indispensable component for stepping up current and future climate miti-
gation efforts. In the absence of access to necessary mitigation technologies, 
not only is it impossible to reach the global mean temperature target set in 
the Paris Agreement, but also the sustainability of the Agreement itself will be 
threatened.
B The Concept and Scope of lcts
The term ‘low- carbon technologies’ (lcts), or alternative formulations53 are 
used in this volume to mean “technologies that aim to minimise greenhouse 
gas (ghg) emissions, especially carbon dioxide emissions, relative to those 
 49 Leon E Clarke and others, ‘Assessing Transformation Pathways’ in Ottmar Edenhofer 
and others (eds), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Working Group III 
Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Cambridge University Press 2014) 433.
 50 Clara Brandi, Trade Elements in Countries’ Climate Contributions under the Paris Agreement 
(International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ictsd) 2017)  < https:// 
ictsd.iisd.org/ sites/ default/ files/ research/ trade_ elements_ in_ countries_ climate_ contri-
butions.pdf > accessed 25 October 2020.
 51 unfccc, ‘Technology and NDCs’ <http:// unfccc.int/ ttclear/ tna/ ndcs.html> accessed 25 
October 2020.
 52 ibid.
 53 Alternatively, the expressions ‘mitigation techology’, ‘climate technology’, and ‘clean tech-
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technologies currently in use in a particular context”.54 The notion is some-
what flexible in scope, as it seeks to cover all forms of emission mitigation 
options. The lct s can be final products destined for end consumers, capital 
equipments used for production and processing, and also practical knowledge 
or skills.55 The scope of the notion would therefore comprise of, e.g. tangible 
products, intangible know- hows, and institutional settings.56 Although not a 
treaty term, low- carbon technology is a notion that is frequently employed by 
the researchers. Compared to the term ‘environmentally sound technology’ 
(est) used in the treaty language,57 low- carbon technology is narrower and 
focuses exclusively on climate mitigation. It ought to be noted at this stage 
that this narrow specification is only to maintain analytical rigour. It does not 
convey any explicit or implicit order of importance or prioritisation of climate 
mitigation over adaptation.
To a degree, what falls within the domain of appropriate ‘low- carbon 
technology’ for any country depends upon respective overall environmental 
context (e.g. economic situation, income levels, and position relative to the 
technology frontier).58 The annex at the end of this volume provides a de-
tailed overview of the scope of such technologies as individually identified 
by many developing countries. Although the list is fairly expansive, there is 
a degree of convergence in what countries take to be preferred mitigation 
technology.
The ipcc special report on limiting global warming to 1.5oC sheds useful 
light on the scope of lct s. For example, power generation from solar, and 
 54 David Ockwell and Alexandra Mallett (eds), Low- Carbon Technology Transfer :  From 
Rhetoric to Reality (Routledge 2012) 3.
 55 Jørgen Boldt and others, Overcoming Barriers to the Transfer and Diffusion of Climate 
Technologies (Second Edition, unep Risø Centre 2012) 7; Ivan Nygaard and Ulrich Elmer 
Hansen, ‘The Conceptual and Practical Challenges to Technology Categorisation in the 
Preparation of Technology Needs Assessments’ (2015) 131 Climatic Change 371.
 56 Nygaard and Hansen ibid 374.
 57 Used formally in the unfccc Article 4.5, est s has come to mean “technologies which 
protect the environment, are less polluting, use all resources in a more sustainable 
manner, recycle more of their wastes and products, handle residual wastes in a more 
acceptable manner than the technologies for which they were substitutes, and are com-
patible with nationally determined socio economic, cultural and environmental prior-
ities”. ipcc Working Group iii, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology 
Transfer:  Summary for Policymakers :  A Special Report of IPCC Working Group III 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2000) 52.
 58 To give an example, for a less- developed country, end of pipe carbon capture method 
for a coal- fired power plant may be considered as low- carbon technology. However, this 













wind energy has grown dramatically in recent time. To cope with that, the 
grid systems and storage capacities need to be adapted to the intermittency 
of renewable energy.59 Carbon capture and storage technologies (ccs) are 
important for fossil- fuel dependent power sectors. In the land usage sector, 
soil management through conservation agriculture, livestock management, 
efficient irrigation, and agroforestry reduces emissions overall. The reduction 
in demand for emission- intensive food items (e.g. meat products) is also use-
ful. Better consumption management to reduce food waste and food loss can 
further relieve the pressure on food production.60 To reduce the amount of 
energy consumed by urban buildings, the focus remains upon better designs 
for building heating and cooling, and also on the use of efficient appliances.61 
Management of urban transport needs using efficient mass transit systems, 
lowering dependencies on private cars and modal shifts resulting in a lesser 
need for travel will reduce emissions in that sector, as well as improve urban 
air quality.62 Some domestic aviation can be cut down by high- speed rail con-
nectivity. Also, energy efficiency improvement measures and operational mod-
ifications in the industries can contribute to emission reduction.63 Lowering 
emissions in the industrial sector would be feasible when the required capital 
costs do not raise competitiveness concerns. Energy efficiency improvements 
can result from general purpose technologies (e.g. information technology), 
and also from cross- sector technologies (e.g. motor systems, steam systems, re-
covery of waste heat). Increase in the rate of recycling can also push us towards 
a more circular economy.64
iii International Trade for Low- Carbon Technology Diffusion
A Aspects of the Relationship between Trade and Technology
Technology transfer is often understood only as a legacy claim made by the 
developing wto members to their developed counterparts.65 While this is an 
 59 de Coninck and others (n 1) 324– 5; Thomas Cottier and Ilaria Espa (eds), ‘Introduction 
and Overview’, International Trade in Sustainable Electricity:  Regulatory Challenges in 
International Economic Law (Cambridge University Press 2017).




 64 ibid 335– 6.
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important aspect, it is not the whole picture.66 The often overlooked fact is that 
the act of trading between partners across different markets and related coop-
eration across borders is the biggest conduit for spreading new technologies. 
Trade triggers cross- border transmission of knowledge in both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
forms, the outcome of which is new products or processes finding markets in 
the partner economies.67 Therefore, transfer of technology also includes situa-
tions where multiple stakeholders, both public and private, interact with each 
other creating flows of knowledge, commodities, and services embodying new 
technologies.68 The ipcc lists a number of pathways through which the stake-
holder interactions lead to technology transfer. The list includes, inter alia, di-
rect purchase, licensing, franchising, foreign direct investment, joint ventures, 
subcontracting, research cooperation, export of products and capital goods, 
education and training, exchange of scientific and technical personnel, and 
government assistance programs.69 Each of these pathways are categorised by 
the ipcc as public, private, or community- driven ones, also holding that the 
private- sector driven pathways are the dominant mode of technology transfer.
In this spontaneous process of technology diffusion, the role of interna-
tional trade policy, and regulation is facilitative. Domestic tariff and non- tariff 
measures, as well as global trade rules set the terms of interaction for firms 
engaged in lct transactions across borders. By doing so, trade regulation pro-
vides the overall framework within which transactions– both voluntary and 
compulsory– will take place. Therefore, trade rules are important determiners 
of how a novel technology is taken up by the market actors.
In more theoretic terms, diffusion is a key stage (Figure 2) in a new technol-
ogy’s journey from the drawing board to the market. At that sage, a new tech-
nology spreads along different trade- related pathways (e.g. imports, license 
 66 We discuss the existence and evolution of such legal commitments in the trade and the 
climate regimes extensively in the Chapter 2, Sections ii and iv, below.
 67 Boldt and others (n 55) 12.
 68 ipcc Working Group iii (n 57) 51, 55, 60.
 69 ibid 57; Cristina Tébar Less and Steven McMillan, ‘Achieving the Successful Transfer of Envir-
onmentally Sound Technologies:  Trade- Related Aspects’ (2005) Working Paper 2005– 2 
<https:// www.oecd.org/ environment/ envtrade/ 35837552.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020; 
Przemyslaw Kowalski, Daniel Rabaioli and Sebastian Vallejo, ‘International Technology 
Transfer Measures in an Interconnected World’ <https:// www.oecd- ilibrary.org/ trade/ 
international- technology- transfer- measures- in- an- interconnected- world_ ada51ec0- en> 
accessed 25 October 2020; unctad categorises four avenues of technology and knowl-
edge transfer, namely – trade, licensing, fdi, and movement of people. See, Chapter 2, 
unctad, ‘Transfer of Technology and Knowledge Sharing for Development  – Science, 
Technology and Innovation Issues for Developing Countries’ (United Nations 2014) 












agreements etc.), given that adequate enabling conditions exist. The following 
figure shows that while the ‘technology push policies’ (e.g. R&D funding, in-
centives) ensure that a new technology reaches the deployment stage, wheth-
er it would progress further or not depends on the existence of appropriate 
‘market pull’ measures.70 This is what Gallagher proposes as market formation 
policies for lct s.71 Therefore, to the extent trade rules are concerned, their 
role can hypothetically be to allow, also promote such a push and pull dynamic 
to take place.
Furthermore, economic theory often talks of a ‘technique effect’72 aris-
ing from increased cross- border trade between partners, which may also 
 70 de Coninck and others (n 1) 370; Jeffery Atik, ‘Technology Transfer’ in Thomas Cottier and 
others (eds), Elgar encyclopedia of international economic law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2017) 606.
 71 Kelly Sims Gallagher, The Globalization of Clean Energy Technology: Lessons From China 
(mit Press 2014) 16– 19. More on this can be found in Chapter 2, pp. 83- 84 below.
 72 ‘Trade and Environment – The Impact of Trade Opening on Climate Change’ (World Trade 
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 figure 2  The innovation cycle.  egtt, ‘Recommendations on Future Financing Options for Enhancing 
the Development, Deployment, Diffusion and Transfer of Technologies under the Convention’ 
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potentially influence lct diffusion. It is predicted that the technique effect 
may take place in two ways– one is that increase of income would make 
consumers want products with a lower carbon footprint; the other is that 
the producers would have access to and adopt better production technolo-
gies.73 Overall the technique effect may eventually counteract and nullify the 
growth of the scale of emission due to increased trade. This is the essence of 
an Environmental Kuznets Curve (ekc). Though theoretically sound, differ-
ent factors make an actual finding of technique effect difficult. Torras and 
Boyce argue that technique effect is further dependent on how the income 
benefit due to trade is distributed throughout the economy.74 Fernandez- 
Amador and others also do not find the technique effect in the economy.75 It 
may, therefore, suffice to submit that proactive domestic trade policies can 
help induce low- carbon technology diffusion through triggering the tech-
nique effect.
Domestic trade policies are also a relevant issue to reap the technology 
benefits from the global value chains (gvc s). Cross- border trade in inter-
mediates also involves low- carbon technologies, especially in areas such as 
the manufacturing of solar photovoltaic (pv) products. While it is true that 
developing country firms’ participation in such supply chains open up pos-
sibilities to obtain efficiency improving technologies from the lead firms in 
developed countries, this does not automatically happen.76 The gvc s tend to 
be semi- independent relationship among businesses where climbing up the 
accessed 25 October 2020. Open trade can impact aggregate ghg emissions of an econ-
omy through ‘scale’, ‘composition’, and ‘technique’ effects. Scale effect indicates the 
increase in emission with the economic growth in terms of scale. The composition effect 
indicates that with increasing sectoral efficiency, overall emission level would be influ-
enced by the compositio of the economy. Lastly the technique effect indicates that energy 
efficiency improvement due to trade would lower the level of aggregate emissisons. 
Technique effect is always positive, while the scale effect is otherwise.
 73 Ludivine Tamiotti, World Trade Organization and United Nations Environment 
Programme (eds), Trade and Climate Change: A Report by the United Nations Environment 
Programme and the World Trade Organization (World Trade Organization ; United 
Nations Environment Programme 2009) 51– 53; Octavio Fernández- Amador and others, 
‘Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Economic Growth: An Assessment Based on Production 
and Consumption Emission Inventories’ (2017) 135 Ecological Economics 269, 270– 271; 
van Asselt (n 11) 159; David I Stern, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Environmental Kuznets Curve’ 
(2004) 32 World Development 1419.
 74 Mariano Torras and James K Boyce, ‘Income, Inequality, and Pollution: A Reassessment of 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve’ (1998) 25 Ecological Economics 147.
 75 Fernández- Amador and others (n 73) 274.
 76 unescap, ‘Global Value Chains, Technology Transfers and Innovation’, Asia- Pacific Trade 











chain involves enduring competitive pressures.77 Studies show that develop-
ing countries falling back in terms of capability improvement remain stuck on 
low to medium skill- intensive supply chains.78 While factors such as obtain-
ing foreign investment, domestic trade openness, and better human capital 
improve chances of direct technology transfer within the gvc, those factors 
are themselves dependent on governance reforms, improvement of business 
environments, and efforts to develop the domestic skill base.79 A study explor-
ing vertical integration of Chinese firms in solar pv supply chains was possible 
due to advantageous market policies abroad, mobilization of global talents, 
flexible manufacturing possibilities at home, and availability of domestic in-
dustrial policies.80
Two additional arguments can be put forward to further highlight the im-
portance of trade rules in relation to lct s. One is that supporting the tech-
nological upgradation of exporting countries is important particularly for the 
developed nations to assume full responsibility for their total consumption 
emissions. Fernandez- Amador and others show that a key reason behind the 
developed countries’ successful reversal of the emission trend is the outsourc-
ing of emissions.81 Once the emission inventories of the oecd countries are 
made to account for the full spectrum of consumption emission, the revers-
ing trend vanishes. The authors recommend adoption of consumption- based 
trade regulation by the importing countries to account for the emission leak-
age. Such regulations would also have a technology diffusion benefit as the ex-
porting countries would be further compelled to adopt greater efficiency and 
mitigation technologies.
Another argument is that trade measures are the best option to tackle price 
and incentive distortions in the market operating as barriers to the diffusion 
 77 ibid 149.
 78 Padmashree Gehl Sampath and Bertha Vallejo, ‘Trade, Global Value Chains and 
Upgrading:  What, When and How?’ (2018) 30 The European Journal of Development 
Research 481, 498.
 79 unescap (n 76)  150– 158; Satoshi Inomata and Daria Taglioni, ‘Technological Progress, 
Diffusion, and Opportunities for Developing Countries:  Lessons from China’ in World 
Trade Organization and others (eds), Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and 
workers in a globalized world: global value chains development report 2019 (World Trade 
Organization 2019) 94– 96.
 80 Fang Zhang and Kelly Sims Gallagher, ‘Innovation and Technology Transfer through 
Global Value Chains:  Evidence from China’s PV Industry’ (2016) 94 Energy Policy 191, 
199– 200.
 81 Fernández- Amador and others (n 73); Octavio Fernández- Amador, Joseph F Francois and 
Patrick Tomberger, ‘Carbon Dioxide Emissions and International Trade at the Turn of the 
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of lct. These barriers, commonly grouped as market failures, pose great 
challenges to these technologies’ penetration of the market and becoming 
commercially viable. A known economic phenomenon surrounding a public 
good,82 theoretically market failures affect the diffusion of clean technologies, 
because – (i) potential users of the technology do not bear the full social cost 
of non- adoption, or (ii) appropriate information to make the right choice is 
not present, or (iii) innovators are unwilling to produce ideas that would ben-
efit others.83 Trade measures such as pricing of carbon emission or removal of 
fossil fuel subsidies can correct existing distortions and thereby cure market 
failures. On a level playing field, actors are then easily attracted towards lct s. 
These issues will be further expanded upon in the next chapters.
Before venturing further, one pertinent point ought to be reiterated regard-
ing the scope of this research. This volume focuses on the role of the public 
international law on trade (i.e. wto law) and domestic trade policy measures 
for greater lct diffusion. It is not meant to prejudice the significance of other 
important avenues of technology transfer, e.g. cross- border investments, dif-
ferent forms of partnerships, research and development collaborations, and 
most importantly licensing agreements.84 While each of these avenues plays 
an influential role in clean technology diffusion, current research does not en-
gage with all of those.
In addition, certain caveats should also be kept in notice. When it comes 
to lct diffusion, the efficacy of domestic policies to trigger transfers would 
require complementary actions in non- trade sectors (e.g. education and train-
ing), as well as steps from actors beyond the domestic jurisdictions. Moreover, 
the impact of a trade measure is naturally limited to only trading nations. 
Countries that are not open to trade, especially poor ones, would need support 
and assistance to be integrated into any trade- related scheme of technology 
diffusion. Lastly, trade is a transaction where market size matters. Therefore, it 
is unavoidable that some countries will be better endowed to deploy specific 
 82 Kenneth Gillingham and James Sweeney, ‘Barriers to Implementing Low- Carbon 
Technologies’ (2012) 03 Climate Change Economics 1250019, 1250019– 2. The authors note 
that ‘consumer and producer decision- making in unfettered markets face barriers that 
lead to less market penetration of low- carbon technologies than would be most econom-
ically efficient. We refer to such situations as “market failures.” ’
 83 Adam B Jaffe, Richard G Newell and Robert N Stavins, ‘A Tale of Two Market Failures: 
Technology and Environmental Policy’ (2005) 54 Ecological Economics 164; Adam B 
Jaffe, RG Newell and Robert N Stavins, ‘Technological Change and the Environment’ in 
KG Mäler and JR Vincent (eds), Handbook of Environmental Economics, vol 1 (Elsevier 
Science 2003).








trade tools (e.g. process and production measures) than others. Nevertheless, 
given the fact that the top ghg emitters are large, well- integrated trading na-
tions, the principal argument of the importance of trade in relation to the 
diffusion of lct s remains valid. These issues are again taken up in the third 
chapter.
B The Disconnect between Trade and Climate Legal Regimes
There are some basic differences between the treaty regimes of international 
trade and climate change. The climate change regime tackles the challenge 
of allocating burdens upon individual state actors to produce shared global 
benefits, whereas, the trade regime is more transactional, offering exclusive 
benefits in return for the costs incurred.85 This difference between the regimes 
is also manifested in their orientation towards domestic law. While the wto 
rules seek to ensure that domestically adopted measures do not veer off the 
internationally agreed standards, the domestic commitments are the standard 
setters for the global climate regime. Finally, the core principles underlying the 
regimes prioritise different sets of interests. Similar difference is also observ-
able in the motivation of states animating these legal institutions. To illustrate, 
while non- discrimination is the guiding rule in the trade regime, in climate 
law it is the principle of common, as well as differentiated responsibilities that 
carry the day.
As a result, despite the influential role of international trade transactions 
to facilitate lct diffusion, the distinct rule systems that govern internation-
al trade on one hand and climate change on the other, are disconnected.86 
The trade rules do not proactively respond to the urgency of combatting 
climate change. Also, there is no formal appreciation of the role of the re-
gime in spreading low- carbon technologies.87 In climate law, trade- related 
aspects of technology development and transfer never saw clear enuncia-
tion,88 mainly because of the difficulty in agreeing to a market based ap-
proach. De Coninck and Sagar observed recently that “[m] ost developed 
countries favour an approach that exclusively promotes markets through 
enabling environments, while most developing countries are of the view 
 85 Pauwelyn viewed the multilateral trade regime as an amalgamation of bilateral relation-
ships between states. J Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO 
Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International 
Law 907.
 86 The next chapter addresses this issue in even greater detail.
 87 See Chapter 2 ii D at p. 76 below.
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that support for developing capabilities, regardless of market- conformity, 
is also needed.”89 Institutional idiosyncrasies driven by distinct sets of in-
terests pursued by parties through them contribute to this disconnect. The 
result, as Humphreys surmises, is ‘structural ambiguity’-  a situation where 
the understanding of a term of art (i.e. technology transfer) takes an ambig-
uous, or irreconcilably different meaning in different regimes.90 Over time, 
this entrenches the divergent approaches of the actors and the regimes to-
wards a common problem.
But the lack of connection between the trade and the climate regimes 
does not mean that there are necessarily conflicts. The fear of the wto’s anti- 
environment bias is a thing from the past. The underlying principles in both re-
gimes have lead to repeated attempts in bringing forth a harmonised and com-
plementary coexistence. In the case of the wto, it is manifest from repeated 
allusions to the mutual supportiveness of trade openness and environmental 
protection, giving meaning to sustainable development.91 However, the legisla-
tive part of the institution did not succeed either in making new rules reflect-
ing trade and environment coherence,92 or in initiatives to liberalise trade in 
environmental goods and services. In contrast, progressive interpretation from 
the wto Appellate Body (ab) has developed a predictable jurisprudence to the 
effect that trade measures can be maintained to promote environmental con-
cerns, given that the opportunity exists in law. In the very second dispute heard 
by the ab, it was held that wto laws are not “to be read in clinical isolation 
 89 Heleen de Coninck and Ambuj Sagar, ‘Technology Development and Transfer (Article 10)’ 
in Daniel Klein and others (eds), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2017) 261– 262.
 90 Stephen Humphreys, ‘Structural Ambiguity:  Technology Transfer in Three Regimes’ in 
Margaret A Young (ed), Regime Interaction in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2012).
 91 The parties to the wto maintained that, ‘[...]  the aims of upholding and safeguarding 
an open and non- discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for the protec-
tion of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and must 
be mutually supportive’. ‘Doha Ministerial Declaration’ (wto 2001) wt/ min(01)/ dec/ 1 
para 6.
 92 For details regarding progress on trade and environment cooperation agenda, See, 
Mereille Cossy and Gabrielle Marceau, ‘Institutional Challenges to Enhance Policy Co- 
Ordination – How WTO Rules Could Be Utilised to Meet Climate Objective?’ in Thomas 
Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z Bigdeli (eds), International trade regulation and the 
mitigation of climate change:  World Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 2009); 
Also, Henrik Horn and Petros C Mavroidis, ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements in 











from public international law.”93 Since then, many environmental instruments 
have found a way into the factual considerations serving as the background 
to a better understanding of wto rules,94 in particular, the exception clauses 
therein.
In the climate regime, a desire to avoid conflict with the trade rules appeared 
in the language of the 1992 Framework Convention, holding that “[m] easures 
taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on international trade”.95 While obliging the developed countries to 
mitigate emission, the Kyoto Protocol also urged those countries to do so in a 
manner that minimises the adverse effect on international trade. Taking a dif-
ferent path in the next decade, the issue of reconciliation with the trade rules 
was buried in the latest Paris Agreement.96
Putting all together, a reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that a coher-
ent, constructive relation between trade and lct diffusion rules remain an 
incomplete agenda. Despite fundamental differences, the two regimes exist in 
the shared plane of public international law without significant conflict– not 
because the overlap between the two systems are well managed, but because 
their interactions remain at a bare minimum. The task of coherence building 
between these two regimes should therefore entail predicting the potential ar-
eas of overlap and charting of a path for their integration and co- evolution. 
We take up these tasks in subsequent chapters. The remainder of the current 
 93 United States  – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline [1996] Appellate 
Body Report wt/ ds2/ ab/ r, dsr 1996:i 317.
 94 For example, the ab took note of the Law of the Sea Convention, Biodiversity Convention 
and the Agenda 21, United States  – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products [1998] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds58/ ab/ r, dsr 1998:vii 2755 48– 49; A Panel 
took note of the who classification of asbestos as carcinogenic, European Communities – 
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products [2001] Panel Report wt/ 
ds135/ r, dsr 2001:vii 3305 [8.247]; Another Panel took note of the who Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and 
Sale of Clove Cigarettes [2012] Panel Report wt/ ds406/ r, dsr 2012:xi 5865 [2.29– 2.32, 
7.229– 7.232]; Panel took note of the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation 
Program United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna 
and Tuna Products [2012] Panel Report wt/ ds381/ r, dsr 2012:iv 2013 686; Panel exam-
ined whether the unfccc has direct effect in India, India – Certain Measures Relating to 
Solar Cells and Solar Modules [2016] Panel Report wt/ ds456/ r [7.285– 7.301].
 95 Article 3.5, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 (n 14).
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chapter will focus on the theoretical aspects of the coherence building and the 
impact of the doctrine of Common Concern thereupon.
C Fragmentation, or Regime Interactions
The phenomenon of ‘disconnect’ as outlined above is a result of the fragmenta-
tion of the international legal order. Fragmentation is the natural consequence 
of having multiple specialised rulemaking bodies in a globalising world order, 
with the corresponding absence of a common coordination mechanism.97 In 
international relations literature, it is termed as a ‘regime complex’, referring 
to the fact of increasing density of international institutions that are not in 
a hierarchical relationship in a given area– as a result, creating overlaps and 
potentially giving rise to conflicting rules reflecting different sets of interests.98 
Both disciplines attribute this phenomenon to the path- dependent rulemak-
ing by institutions in a way that ideas, expectations, and interests animated 
in different fora are not aligned to generate a set of core applicable norms.99 
As van Asselt identifies, fragmentation can manifest itself in various ways– as 
that of rules, or institutions.100 With respect to the fragmentation of rules, one 
can further distinguish between that of primary, and secondary norms.101 Frag-
mentation can also be at the point of governance when one takes into account 
the increasing role of non- state actors in making rules.102 The downsides of 
having a fragmented legal order, or a regime complex is that it creates opportu-
nities for forum shopping, leads to loss of legal coherence across rule systems, 
 97 Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International 
Law :  Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law  – Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi’ (unga 2006)  a/ cn.4/ l.682; a/ cn.4/ l.702 
10– 17; Thomas Cottier and others, ‘Introduction:  Fragmentation and Coherence in 
International Trade Regulation: Analysis and Conceptual Foundations’ in Thomas Cottier 
and Panagiotis Delimatsis (eds), The prospects of international trade regulation :  from 
fragmentation to coherence (Cambridge University Press 2011)  9– 12; Joost Pauwelyn, 
‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Online, Oxford University Press) <http:// opil.ouplaw.com/ view/ 10.1093/ law:epil/ 
9780199231690/ law- 9780199231690- e1406> accessed 25 October 2020.
 98 Kal Raustiala and David G Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ 58 
International Organization 277, 295– 6.
 99 Andreas Fischer- Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime- Collisions: The Vain Search for 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law Diversity or Cacophony: New Sources 
of Norms in International Law Symposium’ (2003) 25 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 999.
 100 van Asselt (n 11) 35– 36.
 101 ibid 37.















makes consistent rule implementation difficult, and racks up costs of compli-
ance for poor countries.103
As argued by Biermann and others, fragmentation cannot be avoided in cur-
rent world affairs and it need not necessarily be resented. The authors classify 
forms of fragmentation into synergistic, cooperative, or conflictive depend-
ing on the convergence or divergence regarding the number of participating 
parties, issues covered, and the decision making procedures.104 On one hand, 
there are synergistic fragmentations where the same parties tackle similar 
issues in institutionally different, but well- integrated regimes – for example, 
treaty and protocol relationship.105 On the other hand are conflictive fragmen-
tations where regimes’ memberships, underlying principles, and operating 
procedures hardly overlap (e.g. Convention on biological diversity and the 
trips Agreement of the wto).106
Keohane and Victor have also reached similar conclusions while examining 
the climate change regime complex. Despite the risk of forum shopping, the 
authors hold that a regime complex is not necessarily undesirable, as differ-
ent regimes provide a variety of options to build cooperation among smaller 
groups of actors (i.e. the club approach) in a way that willing participants can 
make desirable rules. Regime complexes also have higher adaptability over 
time.107 The authors hold that for the climate regime complex to be of a benefi-
cial nature, it needs to be coherent, have clearly discernible normative content 
based on scientific information, and be accountable, fair, and sustainable.108
D Paths that Lead to Coherence Building
Given that fragmentation of international legal regimes is an indispensable 
reality, it is worthwhile to pursue an agenda of coherence building. It need not 
be for the appeasement of a postmodern angst,109 or with a view to preserve 
a perceived unified essence of international law.110 Coherence is necessary for 
 103 Raustiala and Victor (n 98) 299– 303; van Asselt (n 11) 40– 42.
 104 Frank Biermann and others, ‘The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A 
Framework for Analysis’ (2009) 9 Global Environmental Politics 14, 19– 21.
 105 ibid 20.
 106 ibid 21.
 107 Robert O Keohane and David G Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2011) 9 
Perspectives on Politics 7, 14– 16.
 108 ibid 16– 17.
 109 Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553.
 110 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Hegemonic Regimes’ in Margaret A Young (ed), Regime Interaction 
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international law to be ‘responsive’– i.e. able to perform the task the law is set 
out for. Here we assume that international law must not be construed as in-
capable to secure the goals states commit to (e.g. containing global tempera-
ture rise) through its apparatus (e.g. treaties). The assumption is important to 
avoid situations of institutionalised paradoxes– outcomes when a regime is ill- 
equipped to deliver upon its key mandates. Coherence across regimes, based 
on shared legal principles, would allow complementarity as one regime can 
gain access to the specialised tools in other regimes to effectively deliver upon 
the aspirations of the international community.
Therefore, with respect to lct diffusion, a coherence building agenda is 
needed to develop a framework that facilitates low- carbon technology flow 
and thereby better mitigation performance all over. To the extent such coher-
ence among different regimes does not exist, it needs to be built up. Keohane 
and Victor suggest that a climate regime complex would be successful if it can 
allow different regime- specific tools to implement the climate goals in a coher-
ent fashion.111 This task of coherence building is of legal nature at its core. It 
further depends on the nature of the foundational norms and their conflicting 
or synergistic interactions. In cases where there are explicit legal norms per-
taining to the same issue, conflict can arise if action prohibited or regulated 
under one regime is permitted, even obliged in another.112 On the opposite, 
synergies can exist when regimes are based on shared principles and working 
towards a common goal. Under both of these circumstances, the fragmenta-
tion is manifest. There can also be a potential fragmentation when a principled 
divergence or convergence among regimes does not actually manifest in con-
flicts or synergies due to the absence of detailed regulation.113 With respect to 
trade and climate regime fragmentation on the issue of lct diffusion, it is of a 
potential nature.
Dispute settlement and techniques of treaty interpretation are of great as-
sistance to resolve explicit, conflicting fragmentations ex post. A tribunal called 
upon to find and apply the law will take recourse to the tools of treaty inter-
pretation and find a resolution of the conflict. Available conflict clauses in the 
treaties or the rules of priority will help to this end. The last resort is the tech-
nique of ‘systemic integration’. Made famous by the International Law Com-
mission (ilc) report on the fragmentation of international law, this approach 
calls for use of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties (vclt) as a tool to integrate systemic objective, by interpreting a norm by 
 111 Keohane and Victor (n 107) 16– 18.









reference to its ‘normative environment’, i.e. general international law.114 The 
technique put forward in the ilc report is that any rule of international law 
exists in a systemic relationship with other laws, and therefore, when facing 
a manifest conflict there is “[…] a need to carry out interpretation so as to see 
the rules in view of some comprehensible and coherent objective, to prioritise 
concerns that are more important at the cost of less important objectives.”115
However, in cases where there are no rules that manifestly conflict, the 
above ex post techniques cannot be put into use, necessitating a search for 
alternatives. As mentioned earlier, the fragmentation between the trade and 
climate regimes is such a situation. As the climate regime is built on soft law 
foundations, formal disputes do not arise there. Under such circumstances, 
preventing fragmentation between regimes becomes a progressive task of 
filling the potential gaps and constructive ambiguities by creating rules and 
approaches based on common and shared values. In contrast with the former, 
this approach is of an ex ante nature. It will involve synergistic rule generation 
based on constitutionalism and multi- level governance.
The term ‘constitution’ implies ‘a sum of basic legal norms which compre-
hensively regulate social and political order of a polity’.116 A constitutionalist 
approach will seek to achieve coherence by establishing a clear system of po-
litical order, governance, and normative values. Regarding issues that are at 
the intersection of two distinct legal regimes, such an approach will put an 
emphasis on identifying the core shared values, which can then be actualised 
through generating a complementary set of rules. Based on the constitutional-
ist foundation, the multi- level governance view envisages the global legal order 
as composed of different interacting governance layers compensating the do-
mestic loss of regulatory freedom by installing the fundamental values in the 
international system with the overall goal of preserving and promoting those 
values.117
It is through this lens that the doctrine of Common Concern of Human-
kind is viewed. The conviction presented here is that the proposed formula-
tion of the doctrine and its implementation can further the work of coherence 
 114 Para 413 Study Group of the International Law Commission (n 97) 208.
 115 Paras 417– 419 ibid 210– 211.
 116 Cottier and others, ‘Introduction: Fragmentation and Coherence in International Trade 
Regulation: Analysis and Conceptual Foundations’ (n 97) 34; Anne Peters, ‘Compensatory 
Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and 
Structures’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 579, 581.
 117 Thomas Cottier and Maya Hertig, ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’ in 
Armin von Bogdandy and Rudiger Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
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building between the trade and climate legal regimes; fostering lct diffusion 
as a result. In performing this task, the function of the doctrine is much like 
the norm of sustainable development; building, also strengthening the regime 
complex of climate change. The following sections elaborate upon the existing 
and the proposed dimensions of common concern of humankind, and its po-
tential application regarding the diffusion of lct s.
iv Common Concern of Humankind: History and Meaning
Shared legal concepts are the foundation on which two regimes can develop 
synergistic interaction.118 The common concern of humankind is a unique no-
tion that has informed the climate regime over time. As will be elaborated be-
low, the recognition of climate change as a ‘common concern’ of ‘humankind’ 
legally elevates the issue to a higher plane of urgency and also invites all stake-
holders to engage in necessary remedial action. This section will provide a 
brief background of the concept and propose a meaning in which the concept 
should be shared across regimes. Suggestions will also be made as to the ways 
in which this notion, when taken as an emerging doctrine, may contribute to a 
coherent interaction between the trade and the climate regime regarding lct 
diffusion.
Further elaboration of the notion of common concern draws upon the theo-
ry of global commons and collective action challenge, as well as takes account 
of related consequences of unregulated negative externalities leading to mar-
ket failures. It seeks to find a new balance between a strengthened reach of 
international law responding to crucial common interests and the tradition-
al regulatory independence of the state under the mantle of permanent sov-
ereignty. By so doing, the doctrine of Common Concern may eventually add 
to the strength of the related norms, such as the jus cogens and sustainable 
development.
A Inception and Evolution of the Notion
The very inception of the phrase ‘common concern of humankind’ is a po-
litically struck settlement in the late 1980s119 at the United Nations General 
Assembly (unga). While on one hand countries were interested in a norm that 
 118 van Asselt (n 11) 55– 58.
 119 UN Doc A/ Res/ 43/ 53, adopted on 6/ 12/ 1988. Paragraph 1 of the resolution “[r] ecognizes 
that climate change is a common concern of mankind, since climate is an essential con-








can point out the global interest in preserving and promoting transboundary 
commons anywhere, an expression was required the usage of which did not 
connote a potential motive of economic benefit.120 The notion of common 
concern hence emerged as a duty- focused expression underscoring the need 
for global action with respect to the issue area, while respecting the sovereign 
domain of states.121 Nevertheless, expression of concern does constrain a sov-
ereign entity from acting in a wayward fashion.122
Since its inception at the unga declaration on climate change, the expres-
sion has influenced a number of hard and soft law instruments.123 Apart from 
climate change, it has been used to mark the importance of protection and 
preservation of biodiversity,124 plant genetic resources for food and agricul-
ture,125 intangible cultural heritage,126 also the relation between environment 
and development.127 The International Law Commission (ilc) vigorously de-
bated whether or not the common concern of humankind can also be con-
sidered as a foundational norm in the area of protection of the atmosphere. 
Eventually, there was a preambular expression of concern, albeit with different 
 120 This was the reason for not using the expression of Common Heritage of Mankind 
with respect to climate change, despite the proposition from Malta in the UN General 
Assembly.
 121 Jutta Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’ in Daniel 
Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (First Edition, Oxford University Press 2007). The author’s comment 
is oft- referred that ‘[t] he concept focuses upon the essence of what renders a given con-
cern “common”, and treads gingerly around both common property regimes and the ter-
ritorial sovereignly of individual states’.
 122 ibid 566. The author further conditioned her position by maintaining that ‘[common con-
cern] signals that states’ freedom of action may be subject to limits even where other 
states’ sovereign rights are not affected in the direct transboundary sense envisaged by 
the no harm principle’.
 123 A comprehensive account of the notions evolution can be found here, Shinya Murase, 
‘Second Report on the Protection of Atmosphere – 67th Session of the International Law 
Commission’ (2015) a/ cn.4/ 681; Also see, Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern 
of Humankind’ (n 7); Earlier influential work include, Laura S Horn, ‘Common Concern 
of Humankind and Legal Protection of the Global Environment’ (PhD Monograph, The 
University of Sydney 2000); A A Cançado Trindade and David J Attard, ‘I Meeting of the 
UNEP Group of Legal Experts to Examine the Implications of the “Common Concern of 
Mankind” Concept on Global Environmental Issues’ (1991) 13 Revista iidh 247.
 124 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted June 5, 1992, entered into force December 
29, 1993) unts vol. 1760 p. 79.
 125 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 2001.
 126 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003.
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wording.128 The reasons behind non- inclusion of the norm in the operative 
part were, inter alia, that there is no state practice to indicate that the term is 
used with a consistent meaning as was suggested by the special rapporteur.129
It is in the growing climate treaty regime that common concern of human-
kind truly found a home. Not only has the expression played an iconic, and 
heralding role to the benefit of the budding treaty regime, but it also has acti-
vated scholarly contemplation for decades afterwards. In 1992, the preamble 
to the UN Framework Convention declared that anthropogenic changes to 
earth’s climate are a common concern.130 The Washington conference of the 
International Law Association (ila) produced an agreed list of principles of 
the climate regime, where the common concern of humankind was provided 
with a similar contextual role.131 The draft Article 2, titled ‘objectives’ reiterates 
the Framework Convention’s position as the earth’s climatic change and the 
adverse effect thereof are a common concern of humankind. Prepared by the 
most noted environmental law scholars, the ila document serves to clarify the 
majority position of the experts in this regard.
The Paris Agreement, as well as the decision of the Conference of Parties 
(cop) containing the Agreement reaffirmed in 2015 that climate change is a 
common concern of humankind. This reiteration was unique in ways more 
than one. It puts to question the wisdom behind the earlier reluctance of the 
ilc in using the expression in relation to the protection of the commons.132 
 128 International Law Commission (ilc), ‘Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty- 
Seventh Session’ (2015) A/ 70/ 10 22– 27. The expression the ilc chose to refer is ‘pressing 
concern of international community as a whole’. It is interesting to note that while the 
ilc was very explicit about the non- normative nature of the expression used, in the next 
sentence it admitted that the commision uses it as a guide for its action, i.e. inclusion of 
new topic in its work program (page 27). For a critical take, see, Cottier, ‘The Principle of 
Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7); Nadia Sanchez Castillo- Winckels, ‘Why Common 
Concern of Humankind Should Return to the Work of the International Law Commission 
on the Atmosphere’ (2016) 29 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 131.
 129 International Law Commission (ilc), ‘Provisional Summary Record of the 3246th 
Meeting, Held 6 May 2015’ (2016) A/ cn.4/ sr.3246 See in particular, the intervention 
by Mr. Murphy; Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International 
Climate Change Law (First Edition, Oxford University Press 2017)  51; Georg Nolte, ‘The 
International Law Commission and Community Interests’ in Eyal Benvenisti and Georg 
Nolte (eds), Community Interests Across International Law (Oxford University Press 2018); 
Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.2.2.2.
 130 Preamble, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (n 14).
 131 Shinya Murase and others, ‘Washington Conference: Legal Principles Relating to Climate 
Change’ (International Law Association 2014) 3– 4.
 132 International Law Commission (ilc), ‘Provisional Summary Record of the 3246th 
Meeting, Held 6 May 2015’ (n 129) 4. One representative at the ilc pointed out that the 












Furthermore, the wording of the preambular paragraph in the Paris Agree-
ment also shows a growing normative import. The introductory text of the 
Agreement mentions:
Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, 
Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, 
promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the 
right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, mi-
grants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situa-
tions and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empower-
ment of women and intergenerational equity,133
Compared to the previous expressions recognising the common concern of 
climate change, the above paragraph differs slightly. It is appended with an 
additional list of issues connected by the obligations of ‘respect, promote, and 
consider’. While on one hand, this could be seen as confusing the scope of the 
expression and diluting its meaning; on the other hand, it could be seen as 
an example of its maturity. A  plain reading suggests the drafters intend the 
expression ‘common concern of humankind’ to trigger climate action, in the 
course of which the ancillary considerations come to play.134
As hinted above, common concern also has a very vibrant life in the schol-
arly literature. International institutions like the UN Environment (unep), 
also other legal experts have been well invested over time in the growth of this 
notion. No prominent treatise on environmental law or climate change law is 
complete without a mention and contemplation on the topic. The existence of 
the concept has also spread beyond the confines of climate law. This chapter 
turns next to specify the scope of the concept of common concern.
B Making of a Common Concern
Though it is already well- accepted that climate change is a common concern 
of humankind, it is nevertheless useful to recapitulate the path that has led to 
admitted that the ilc may have underestimated the utility of the expression, Nolte (n 
129) 54– 55.
 133 Reference to ‘common concern of humankind’ in the Paris Agreement preamble appeared 
in connection with a range of other obligations, including human rights, rights of special 
groups and right to development. Paris Agreement (n 28).
 134 Castillo- Winckels (n 128) 142– 143; Zaker Ahmad, ‘Trade Related Measures to Spread Low- 
Carbon Technologies: A Common Concern Based Approach’ in Thomas Cottier (ed), The 
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this outcome; especially because the exercise elucidates the key attributes of a 
shared problem amounting to a common concern. This then informs the task 
of taking appropriate responses thereto and translating the same into legal 
language. Also when the notion of common concern is sought to be employed 
from one legal regime to another as a shared concept, clarity is necessary not 
only for application but also to delimit the influence of the concept in the oth-
er regime.
Formal designation of an area of shared interest as a common concern of 
humankind is a function of objective and subjective variables. Objectively, the 
attributes of a problem should be definable as a ‘concern’ that is ‘common’. 
Subjectively, the dictates of political expediency would determine whether the 
governments would agree on such a decision. These are detailed below.
The objective variable is literal at the outset, surrounding the meaning of 
the phrase ‘concern’ that is common to ‘humankind’. Based on the translation 
of the notion in several languages, Thomas Cottier concluded that “[c] oncern 
not merely describes a fact, a problem and adverse effects, but equally entails 
a normative component that the matter needs to be addressed”.135 Therefore, 
marking an issue as a common concern does not only underscore an agree-
ment that the issue is worrisome, but also attaches great importance to it, and 
urges the stakeholders to address the matter.136 Through a comparative read-
ing of the relevant preambular recitals of the biodiversity and climate change 
conventions, Duncan French concludes that a subject- matter earns the signifi-
cance of common concern of humankind when there is a large consensus that 
the level and scale of the problem impacts humanity at large, including future 
generations.137 Also, French notes that assigning of concern is important to 
take the issue out of the “conceit of an exclusive domestic domain” and to put 
it as a matter of global interest.138
Another aspect of the objective component is to attempt to glean the essen-
tial characteristics of a common concern by finding a common denominator 
among the range of problems where the notion has been formally invoked. 
In that regard, the starting point is that common concerns arise when global 
 135 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.3.3.
 136 ibid.
 137 Duncan French, ‘Common Concern, Common Heritage and Other Global(- ising) 
Concepts: Rhetorical Devices, Legal Principles or a Fundamental Challenge?’ in Michael 
Bowman, Peter Davies and Edward Goodwin (eds), Research Handbook on Biodiversity 
and Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 345.










common is adversely affected.139 Friedrich Soltau, after consulting a number of 
resources, supplied three fundamental characteristics of common concerns of 
humankind. Those are – first, that the interests in question are transboundary 
and “touch on values or ethics of global significance”; second, that the interests 
are of concern because of the gravity of the threat, or potential irreversibility 
of the impact; third, that it is not possible to safeguard the interests of concern 
without collective action.140 We will see later that the formulation of Common 
Concern of Humankind advanced as a doctrine further develops the objective 
parameters as independently verifiable constructs.141
Turning to the subjective variable, all the issue areas that have received a 
formal designation as a ‘common concern of humankind’ share the seal of 
political approval in common. Not only do the subject- matters falling within 
the current formal scope of the term vary to some extent, but also there are 
pertinent subject- matters that have, despite being logically worthy, not formal-
ly received the designation.142 There also are areas that have expressions that 
resemble common concern either in wording or in effect.143 This suggests that 
the influence of the notion beyond the recognised treaty regimes like climate 
change remains in flux and would indeed benefit from a structured plan of 
growth.
The involvement of the political factor in the establishment of a common 
concern of humankind can limit its import across other regimes where the 
notion is not agreed upon. It is without doubt that in the climate regime com-
mon concern of humankind is a core notion that influences the development 
and operation of particular principles and rules. However, there is only very 
limited possibility that this shared concern and related need for action would 
 139 For example, in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, its not the climate, 
rather the anthropogenic change of it is declared a common concern. Brunnée, ‘Common 
Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’ (n 121) 564– 565.
 140 Friedrich Soltau, ‘Common Concern of Humankind’ in Cinnamon P Carlarne, Kevin R 
Gray and Richard G Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford handbook of international climate change 
law (First edition, Oxford University Press 2016) 207– 208.
 141 See p. 33- 4 below.
 142 Cottier, The Prospects of Common Concern of Humankind in International Law (n 5). Each 
of the chapters from 3 to 8 of this volume deals with specific issue areas that can objec-
tively be considered as common concerns. French (n 137). French notes that desertifica-
tion can be a candidate for being termed as a common concern of humankind.
 143 Judith Schaeli, ‘Marine Plastic Pollution as a Common Concern of Humankind’ in Thomas 
Cottier (ed), The Prospects of Common Concern of Humankind in International Law (n 5). 
Schaeli traces normative consequences similar to that of the common concern in the UN 
Law of the Sea (unclos) convention. However, as the author pointed out, the unclos 
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spontaneously spill over onto other treaty regimes, like for example, the wto 
laws. As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the ability to take trade poli-
cy measures to foster diffusion of lct s can be impacted by such a limitation of 
the notion’s cross- regime influence. The proposed doctrine of Common Con-
cern admits the importance of the process of ‘claims and responses’ – taking 
place among the key stakeholders, eventually garnering political clout.144
C Legal Consequence
Scholars, especially experts on environmental law have at length pored over 
the possible implications of common concern of humankind as a legal expres-
sion. In contrast to the reluctance of the ilc in admitting any legal implica-
tion arising from the designation, most experts writing on the topic agree to 
its having some normative effect. However, as to the extent of the capacity 
of common concern to trigger legal consequences, opinions vary. While some 
note the indeterminacy of the exact content of the expression,145 as well as 
doubt its independent existence in the absence of a treaty framework;146 
there are also optimistic perspectives that see the notion gradually develop-
ing into a legal doctrine or a principle of customary international law.147 This 
section will briefly cover the generally shared view among experts on the legal 
consequences of common concern. Building upon this, the next section will 
elaborate upon the proposed doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind– a 
forward- looking structure advanced by Thomas Cottier and others.148
At the very initial stage, a meeting of experts convened by the unep in 
the run- up to the unfccc convention saw a wide range of views regarding 
the meaning and possible implication of common concern of humankind. It 
was highlighted that the notion could be applied not only to environmental 
problems but also beyond.149 The note from the unep secretariat envisaged 
 144 See p. 46 below.
 145 Patricia W Birnie, Alan E Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the 
Environment (3rd ed, Oxford University Press 2009) 129– 130.
 146 Brunnée, ‘Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern’ (n 121); Daniel 
Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, ‘Climate Change and International Law’, 
International climate change law (First Edition, Oxford University Press 2017) 51– 52.
 147 Thomas Cottier and others, ‘The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change’ 
(2014) 52 Archiv des Völkerrechts 293; Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of 
Humankind’ (n 7); Frank Biermann, ‘„Common Concern of Humankind “: The Emergence 
of a New Concept of International Environmental Law’ (1996) 34 Archiv des Völkerrechts 
426, 446– 450.
 148 Cottier, The Prospects of Common Concern of Humankind in International Law (n 5).
 149 Laura Horn, ‘Climate Change and the Future Role of the Concept of the Common Concern 















an obligation to cooperate stemming from the concept and involving all 
countries.150 The following expert discussion151 posited the expression of 
common concern in the chain of the evolution of common interest in inter-
national law, which saw to reduced domestic jurisdiction and also the emer-
gence of erga omnes obligation.152 It was noted that what would be elements 
of common concern could be detected in different doctrines, e.g. those of 
res communis, international public domain, and public trust.153 Constitutive 
elements of common concern were identified to be – (i) involvement of all 
state, and non- state actors, (ii) long- term temporal dimension with intergen-
erational issues, and (iii) burden- sharing.154 The issues of intergenerational 
equity and equitable burden- sharing in the discharge of a concern was espe-
cially highlighted.155
The unquestionable core implication of common concern of humankind is 
introducing a responsibility to act upon the international community in gen-
eral.156 This responsibility obligates the international community to cooperate 
in response to the concern.157 International cooperation triggered by common 
concern is geared towards the establishment of appropriate institutional and 
normative framework, built upon the principle of equitable sharing of benefit 
and burden.158 Tracing the growth of the climate legal regime towards a decen-
tralised, bottom- up process guided by domestic preferences of the stakehold-
ers, Jutta Brunée argued that instead of enforcing rules in a strictly top- down 
 150 Mostafa K Tolba, ‘The Implications of the “Common Concern of Mankind” Concept on 
Global Environmental Issues’ (1991) 13 Revista IIDH 237, 243.
 151 Participants in the discussion were, inter alia, Judge Manfred Lachs, Professor (later Judge) 
Cançado Trindade, and Professor (later Member of the itlos tribunal) David Attard.
 152 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain); Second Phase 
[1970] icj Rep 1970 3 (International Court of Justice (icj)) 32; Trindade and Attard 
(n 123) 248.
 153 Trindade and Attard (n 123) 248.
 154 ibid 249.
 155 ibid 250.
 156 Alexandre Kiss, ‘The Common Concern of Mankind’ (1997) 27 Environmental Policy and 
Law 244, 246– 247. Kiss maintained that common concern, as a concept supplies the basis 
for the international community to act. Such right and duty of the international com-
munity to be concerned requires to be balanced with national sovereignty. Many years 
later, Shelton echoed the same position,; Dinah Shelton, ‘Common Concern of Humanity’ 
(2009) 5 Iustum Aequum Salutare 33, 38; Michael Bowman, ‘Environmental Protection 
and the Concept of Common Concern of Mankind’, Research Handbook on International 
Environmental Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 503.
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fashion, cooperative facilitation of compliance is the key consequence to be 
drawn from common concern.159
Even though scholars concur that the responsibility arising from a rec-
ognised common concern has an erga omnes character,160 its actual operation 
is difficult in practice. As the responsibility is understood to be commonly held 
by the international community, transforming it to individualised duties upon 
states amenable to be invoked by others is met with scepticism. There is an 
apprehension shared by environmental lawyers, especially those specialising 
in climate change, regarding strictly defined duties. As experience with the 
Kyoto Protocol suggests, strict duties can backfire when stakeholders leave the 
forum in consequence thereof.161 Brunée identifies ´self- help´ measures to be 
potentially reactive, confrontational, and eroding long- term legitimacy of the 
climate governance framework.162 Another problem is that even when there 
is an erga omnes obligation upon individual states, it is difficult to effective-
ly invoke their breach.163 Also, any potential breach will be difficult to settle 
through disputes because breach of duty, even of an erga omnes nature, does 
not mean that the injured party has an automatic access to courts.164
The compilation by the ila of climate law principles and the commentaries 
thereto closely echoes the position outlined above. As mentioned previously, 
the ila document notes the common concern of humankind as a goal, thereby 
giving it an overarching status as a guide. While noting the universal agreement 
that climate change is a common concern of humankind, the commentary de-
clares that “[…] all states have a common responsibility to take appropriate 
measures to address the concern”.165 Furthermore, the common responsibility 
is to be discharged ‘through’ the principles of sustainable development, com-
mon but differentiated responsibility (cbdr), equity, and international coop-
eration. With respect to sustainable development, the commentaries note the 
 159 Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Global Climate Regime:  Whither Common Concern?’ [2012] 
Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity (2 vols.) 721, 731. We revisit this issue in Chapters 3 
and 6.
 160 Shelton (n 156) 39; Horn (n 149) 30.
 161 Amanda M Rosen, ‘The Wrong Solution at the Right Time: The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol 
on Climate Change’ (2015) 43 Politics & Policy 30; Christopher Napoli, ‘Understanding 
Kyoto’s Failure’ (2012) 32 sais Review of International Affairs 183.
 162 Brunnée, ‘The Global Climate Regime’ (n 159) 725.
 163 ibid 724; French (n 137) 352– 354; Zaker Ahmad, ‘State Responsibility Aspects of a Common 
Concern Based Approach to Collective Action’ in Samantha Besson (ed), International 
responsibility : essays in law, history and philosophy (Schulthess, éditions romandes 2017). 
Further discussion on this issue can be found in Chapter 6 below.
 164 Shelton (n 156) 39; French (n 137) 353.



















importance of concerted action on the basis of common concern but propose 
the execution of such action in the broader context of sustainable develop-
ment.166 Similarly, with respect to cbdr, it is submitted that common concern 
is the basis of the common responsibility part of it, while the incontrovertible 
operation of the principle of equitable burden- sharing leads to differentiated 
responsibility.167 We recall these terms of interaction between the key founda-
tional principles in the final section of this chapter while suggesting implica-
tions for lct diffusion.
It is submitted that although the above formulation of the legal implications 
of common concern is neatly squared off with the structure of international 
law in general and the climate regime in particular, it falls short of resolving 
the concern. The case on point is the concern of climate change. At the be-
ginning of this chapter, it was outlined that a climate regime built upon vol-
untary, bottom- up commitments is not strong enough to generate sufficient 
ambition.168 There is a potential in the notion of common concern to be read 
as requiring a specific end goal to be achieved. With respect to climate change 
that goal must be, among others, keeping within a safe carbon budget by the 
end of the twenty- first century. If a facilitative compliance- based regime does 
not lead there, the obligation to resolve the concern should further necessitate 
and justify complementary actions that contribute to reaching that goal. It is 
explained below how the proposed doctrine of Common Concern of Human-
kind may lead us down that path.
v Towards a New Doctrine
Reflecting upon the potential of the common concern norm to evolve further, 
Thomas Cottier and co- authors promoted a well- calibrated set of proposi-
tions to add to the core meaning and consequence of the notion.169 The term 
 166 ibid 6– 7.
 167 ibid 14– 20.
 168 See section i at p. 6 and onwards.
 169 Cottier and others, ‘The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change’ (n 147); 
Thomas Cottier and Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and 
the Emerging Principle of Common Concern’ in Peter Hilpold (ed), The Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P): A new Paradigm of International Law? (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014); 
Thomas Cottier, ‘Improving Compliance: Jus Cogens and International Economic Law’ in 
den Maarten Heijer and Harmen van der Wilt (eds), Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law 2015:  Jus Cogens:  Quo Vadis? (tmc Asser Press 2016); Thomas Cottier and Tetyana 
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‘doctrine of Common Concern’ is used throughout the volume to indicate the 
set of broad procedural and substantive responsibilities to be applicable in a 
clearly defined factual setting as proposed by the author.170 Doctrinal schol-
arship as such, in the tradition of public international law’s founding fathers 
like Vattel or Grotius, plays an important role in the progressive development 
of international law,171 even when not serving as the principal source of law in 
traditional terms.172
In addition to supplying specific thresholds for determining the bound-
ary of a Common Concern, the doctrine further argues that when a matter 
of shared interests finds itself to be of ‘Common Concern’, it must be resolved 
through cooperative means. Beyond this already established duty to cooper-
ate, another avenue of action is the homework responsibility to appropriately 
address concerns within respective jurisdictional boundaries.173 By doing so, 
the doctrine adds another layer of action, which is of due diligence nature, 
making sure that any outcome of cooperation is followed upon by the stake-
holders with necessary implementation steps. Furthermore, compliance with 
a Common Concern is ensured not only in a facilitative process but also with 
unilateral sanctions and countermeasures as the last resort, when necessary 
and appropriate.174
Before venturing further into detailing the different consequences suggest-
ed by the doctrine, some attention is due upon the legal nature of the proposed 
Common Concern norm. The doctrine holds that Common Concern can even-
tually emerge as a principle of law. Legal principles are unique in their bal-
ance between precision and scope of application. The more widely applicable 
a principle is, the more general tends the terms of its framing to be.175 From 
that perspective, although the doctrine of Common Concern would suggest 
Change’ in Panagiotis Delimatsis (ed), Research handbook on climate change and trade law 
(Edward Elgar 2016); Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7).
 170 Specific reference to the doctrine itself or the framework of action thereof is distin-
guished by using the term ‘Common Concern’ in title case.
 171 Alain Papaux and Eric Wyler, ‘Legal Theory as a Source of International Law: Doctrine 
as Constitutive of International Law’ in Samantha Besson and Jean d’Aspremont (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Sources of International Law, vol 1 (Oxford University 
Press 2018)  524– 525 (in print book) <http:// oxfordhandbooks.com/ view/ 10.1093/ law/ 
9780198745365.001.0001/ law- 9780198745365- chapter- 25> accessed 25 October 2020.
 172 As is well known, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, teachings 
of the ‘most highly qualified’ publicists from various nations, may only serve as ‘subsidiary 
means’ of determining the rule of law.
 173 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.6.
 174 ibid s 1.7.














avenues of action, the actual implementation of these avenues with respect 
to specific concerns need to be adapted to the exigencies of each regime the 
doctrine is introduced to. As Cottier mentions:
Conceptualising Common Concern of Humankind as a principle thus 
seeks to expound underlying values, broadly defined rights and obliga-
tions the application of which depends upon a particular context; ac-
cordingly results may vary within the broad framework of the principle. 
We thus should not expect a detailed set of rules commensurate with the 
principle. This does not exclude that the principle and its components 
eventually will produce more detailed and specific rules which may fur-
ther refine its contents and provide enhanced legal security in different 
fields of the law.176
With that being mentioned, following is a brief account of the scope of the 
proposed notion and all three avenues of legal consequences suggested to be 
emanating therefrom.
A A Dynamic Gateway for ‘Common Concerns’
It has been already mentioned that common concern of humankind is an 
identifier for threats on a massive scale that challenge human communities 
and therefore necessitate collective responses. The Common Concern doc-
trine further supplies a structured framework that links the expression to the 
theory of collective action failure to produce global public goods (gpg s)177 for 
identification purposes. The linkage is useful to distinguish true cooperation 
problems (e.g. climate change) from issues of mere coordination between par-
ties (e.g. global standard setting), or issues where effort by one is globally op-
timal (e.g. space research).178 Conceptualisation of the expression along these 
lines enjoys the benefit of combining existing legal scholarly work with similar 
theories in other disciplines, especially economics, resulting in a robust fact- 
based criterion enabling interpretation of the concept in existing and also in 
new circumstances.
Given that the doctrine prescribes for enhanced responsibility for all stake-
holders to resolve a Concern, only exceptional collective action failures merit 
 176 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.3.2.
 177 Cottier and others, ‘The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change’ (n 147) 308– 
309, 313; Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.4.1.
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falling within the scope of its terms. Cottier further suggests that the bound-
aries of Common Concern be linked to a high enough threshold that only the 
extraordinary crises may clear. In this regard, it has been advanced that global 
peace and stability can serve as the bar.179 Global peace, stability, and welfare 
are not understood in the sense of only non- aggression and avoidance of war, 
but as a fundamental precondition necessary to maintain human society.180 
Only the problems that eventually threaten peaceful coexistence and welfare 
globally may be considered as a Common Concern of Humankind.181 This way, 
the authors turn common concern into a dynamic term, the material scope of 
which may expand over time,182 including transboundary resource- related col-
lective action problems, and potentially also economic activities with strong 
international interdependence.183
A well- drawn conceptual boundary of Common Concern helps to liberate 
the notion from being exclusively subject to a political choice made by parties 
under the dictates of expediency. Even when operating on a recognised plane 
of common concern of humankind, i.e. climate change, a designated boundary 
is helpful especially to limit the influence of the concept upon other regimes. 
For example, measures taken in the trade regime can be helpful for climate 
mitigation, adaptation, or necessary transfer of technology. But according to 
the doctrine, a responsibility to take such measures, or to cooperate to that 
effect would only exist to the extent such steps do bear a clear and manifest 
linkage with the defined boundary of the Common Concern.
B Enhanced Legal Consequences
The doctrine advances three distinct, yet interrelated channels guiding the 
stakeholders’ responses regarding all Common Concerns of Humankind.184 
The responsibility to cooperate, coupled with the duty to take appropriate 
domestic measures at home (i.e. homework) arise at the very outset with the 
emergence of a Common Concern.185 In situations where effective cooperation 
 179 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.3.2.4.
 180 ibid.
 181 ibid.
 182 Cottier and Payosova (n 169) 14.
 183 Cottier, ‘Improving Compliance: Jus Cogens and International Economic Law’ (n 169) 350; 
Cottier, The Prospects of Common Concern of Humankind in International Law (n 5). See 
various case studies in that volume.
 184 Cottier and others, ‘The Principle of Common Concern and Climate Change’ (n 147) 314– 
320; Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) ss 1.5- 1.7.

















is unsuccessful or homework is not forthcoming, the doctrine further advances 
a duty to undertake unilateral measures to secure compliance.186
These normative consequences undoubtedly push beyond the traditional 
meaning of common concern of humankind elaborated earlier.187 It happens 
in at least two specific ways. One is the way the doctrine proposes legal con-
sequences arising exclusively out of the legal expression. In the treaty frame-
works already deploying the notion (e.g. climate change or biodiversity), obli-
gations such as cooperation and due diligence co- exist with the expression.188 
The doctrine turns this co- existence into causation, making it possible for the 
consequences to be invoked also in situations where a ‘Common Concern’ ex-
ists in the absence of a treaty. Another way in which the doctrine goes beyond 
its traditional understanding is the way the consequences are formulated. In-
stead of declaring the states’ freedom to take action to resolve Common Con-
cerns, the doctrine binds them under a positive duty. This duty to act lies at the 
heart of the proposed framework, influencing all the three avenues of norma-
tive consequences arising therefrom.189
Even though the doctrine suggests threefold consequences, some primary 
conclusions already indicate that all three aspects may not come into play in 
all the fields of law. The nature of the subject- matter may not always merit for 
efforts along the three avenues. For example, Lucia Satragno’s work on mon-
etary regulation as a Common Concern of Humankind shows that unilateral 
compliance securing measures currently has very little to do in that area.190 The 
following paragraphs elaborate upon the enhanced normative consequences 
and their relevance in international trade regulation and diffusion of lct s.
(i) Responsibility to Cooperate
As mentioned before, collective responsibility towards cooperation interna-
tionally is the undisputed, as well as an indispensable consequence of com-
mon concern of humankind. It is nevertheless important to explicitly mention 
so because international law is punctuated by respect for sovereign equality. 
 186 ibid s 1.7.
 187 See pp 34- 36 above.
 188 With respect to the international climate change law, scholars see ‘no harm’ rule as having 
a customary status. This gives rise to homework obligations like due diligence, and proce-
dural obligations like duty to consult, negotiate and cooperate. For details, see, Bodansky, 
Brunnée and Rajamani (n 129) 40– 43.
 189 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.7.3.
 190 Lucia Satragno, ‘International Monetary Stability as a Common Concern of Humankind’ 
in Thomas Cottier (ed), The Prospects of Common Concern of Humankind in International 
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A duty to cooperate does not ordinarily exist unless provided for in express 
terms. So far, such duties exist within limited frames, e.g. duty to negotiate in 
good faith at the wto, or a duty to settle disputes peacefully. The doctrine of 
Common Concern indicates that a responsibility to cooperate entails engag-
ing in consultation and negotiation in a transparent manner and with good 
faith.191 Such cooperation would eventually result in the building of appropri-
ate institutions to tackle and respond to the concern.192 With respect to cli-
mate change, principles of equity, sustainable development, and differentiated 
responsibility would inform any cooperation approach. The evolving climate 
governance framework amply exemplifies this point.
It should be emphasised that the responsibility to cooperate is not solely an 
obligation of conduct. To be successful, parties to cooperation must do more 
than merely engage. It must result in specification of the appropriate range 
of actions to be taken by the stakeholders at different levels of governance. 
It also means that cooperation itself must not be limited to a specific level or 
certain type of actors. Again, with respect to climate change, it is important 
that cooperation spans across institutions, fostering a coherent response to the 
problem. Cooperation is the basis on which further synergy between the trade 
and the climate regimes can be built up. Chapter 3 of this volume elaborates 
upon the dimensions of cooperation in pursuance of the doctrine of Common 
Concern, focusing on the role of states, and specific to the issue of low- carbon 
technology diffusion.
(ii) Homework Responsibility
Noting that cooperation alone is insufficient to address any shared concern 
successfully, the doctrine further calls for necessary actions to be taken within 
the domestic legal system. Although it is an increment upon current under-
standing of the legal implication of common concern, it is in no way unreason-
able. The common concern of humankind is already understood as limiting 
the policy autonomy of the sovereign entities with respect to an area of shared 
concern.193 This constraint, in itself, is an obligation to make policy choices 
that cater to addressing a concern and not worsening them. For example, with 
respect to climate change, the limitation of not worsening the concern would 
translate into supplying incentives to the renewables industries instead of fos-
sil fuels. The homework obligation as proposed by the doctrine of Common 
Concern offers to change the current mere encouragement to act (right to act) 
 191 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.5.2.
 192 ibid.










following the expression of concern to a positively worded obligation to act in 
response to the problem.
The environmental principles of ‘no harm’ and ‘due diligence’ informs the 
homework obligation to a great extent.194 Harm prevention is akin to the con-
straining function of common concern mentioned above. The principle of due 
diligence conditions the application of any further positive obligation envis-
aged by the doctrine. As a result, appropriate homework measures are required 
to be taken only after consideration of the reality faced by each country, their 
capacity, ability to discharge positive obligations, as well as the availability of 
support.
Within the trade regime, the nature and extent of homework obligations 
would depend on the legal framework actually in place. Thomas Cottier in his 
work highlights two ways of implementing homework obligations– through 
the domestic performance of international obligations, or by adopting autono-
mous measures. In the former case, Common Concern doctrine should inspire 
further trade rulemaking relevant to the area of application (e.g. technology 
diffusion) through a cooperative process. Where there are such rules, home-
work obligation may only entail carrying them out informed by the tenets of 
multi- level governance (the principle of subsidiarity, in particular).195 In the 
absence of detailed regulation, autonomous trade measures are to be taken 
to address a Common Concern. This category of actions, when challenged, 
would possibly fall back on the notion itself for necessary legitimation. In case 
any such action is challenged in a formal dispute, the question would arise 
whether the principle of Common Concern of Humankind and the suggested 
normative implications thereto can be taken to form part of the applicable law. 
This last answer truly depends upon the development and acceptance of the 
doctrinal approach through claims and responses, as the next section would 
elaborate.
It is nevertheless true that matters that touch upon trade, e.g. regulating 
production and consumption, may also indirectly moderate the behaviour of 
trading partners. This is highlighted by Cottier as the extraterritorial impact of 
domestic regulation. Such impacts should be necessary and welcome so long 
as those are not employed to meet protectionist ends. Subsequent chapters of 
 194 The International Court of Justice held that the obligation of prevention arises from 
the due diligence required of a State, Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentiva v Uruguay) ( Judgment) [2010] icj Rep 14 (International Court of Justice); For a 
detailed discussion, see, Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (n 145) 137– 150; With particular refer-
ence to climate change, see, Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 129) 41– 42.
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this volume explore the detailed aspects of the homework obligation. A num-
ber of useful domestic trade policy measures are identified in Chapter  3. 
Thereafter, Chapters 4 and 5 look at specific technology diffusion policy mea-
sures and their relations with trade regulation and the doctrine of Common 
Concern.
(iii) Securing Compliance
While the duty to act influences all the normative aspects of the doctrine, it 
perhaps goes farthest and draws most scepticism in response when applied 
to the aspect of securing compliance unilaterally. The doctrine of Common 
Concern dictates that as a last resort, non- compliance with the proposed nor-
mative framework must be met with unilateral countermeasures. In practical 
terms, it therefore implies that the willing and able actors are under a positive 
obligation to act unilaterally seeking to correct the behaviour of their non- 
compliant counterparts.196
Unilateral countermeasures become obligatory in cases where non- 
cooperation arises from parochial, self- interested motivation. It is not attract-
ed in situations where the failure of an actor to comply with the dictates of 
the doctrine stem from lack of capacity or other reasonable shortcomings. We 
further recall that support and assistance remain essential corollaries to coop-
eration and homework parts of the framework. It is nevertheless true that the 
legitimisation of any such countermeasure would require the state responsi-
bility rules regarding the definition of the injured state to change. The benefit 
of the proposition is that not only does it serve as a final recourse to bring the 
fractious cohorts back to cooperation, it further offers to discipline unilateral 
action, which currently takes place in a grey area of public international law.197
Chapter 6 of this volume discusses that the aspect of compliance enforce-
ment through unilateral countermeasures, like the homework aspect of Com-
mon Concern, would depend on the existing contextual legal framework. It 
would also depend on the actual nature of the breach itself. In case explicit 
regulations inspired by the doctrine are put in place within a treaty frame-
work, a breach thereof would first and foremost require taking resort to the 
mechanism established within such frameworks to address non- compliance. 
Whether a compliance mechanism would accommodate taking of unilateral 
countermeasures as proposed here would depend on the specifics of each sit-
uation. Also importantly, in an era where multilateralism is threatened to be 
 196 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.7.3.










abandoned in favour of populist and mercantilist policies, abundant caution 
is required while advancing a proposition that calls upon the powerful states 
to act unilaterally.
In situations where the primary obligations of cooperation and homework 
have not resulted in express substantive commitments from the parties to a 
treaty framework, the call for compliance using unilateral countermeasure 
would have a smaller scope of legitimacy. However, unilateral steps as such 
would nonetheless be required as part of a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, to in-
duce all the involved parties to come to the negotiations table, also to take dil-
igent homework measures. The legitimacy of this approach would depend on 
the success of the argument that refusals to cooperate and undertake home-
work measures breaches obligations of erga omnes character arising out of the 
Common Concern of Humankind doctrine.
C Forward Evolution
Although the Common Concern doctrine potentially supplies an integrated 
framework to deal with critical collective action challenges with global public 
goods (gpg s) as they arise, it should be noted that it is an evolving process. 
The gradual fostering of Common Concern of Humankind as a norm entailing 
stricter legal consequence would take place through ‘claims and responses’ in 
the international field.198 Nolte similarly mentions that community norms do 
not automatically manifest themselves. Often they are results of claims made 
by an actor, which then gathers salience due to political or other forms of sua-
sion.199 Eventually, some or all aspects of the doctrine may obtain a status of a 
customary or a general principle of international law, of an erga omnes nature.
Principles are flexible instruments that suggest a general standard of con-
duct.200 The positive aspect of construing the doctrine of Common Concern 
as a future principle of international law is that it remains possible to envisage 
its application in a variety of factual settings.201 This adaptability, as previously 
 198 Ibid s 1.3.1.
 199 Nolte (n 129) 103; This is similar to what Finnemore and Sikkink identified as norm entre-
preneurship, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change’ (1998) 52 International Organization 887, 895.
 200 Dworkin (n 175); Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Rule of International (Environmental) Law and 
Complex Problems’ in Heike Krieger, Georg Nolte and Andreas Zimmermann (eds), The 
International Rule of Law:  Rise or Decline? (Oxford University Press 2019).  The author 
maintains that principles like customary principles like harm prevention are not by them-
selves sufficient to tackle complex global challenges. The latter requires development of 
treaty regimes.
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mentioned, comes at the cost of specificity. Principles colour the application 
of rules, or inspire the making of new ones that eventually operationalises the 
expression in the real world. Admittedly, therefore, even when Common Con-
cern of Humankind is considered as a principle of international law, its appli-
cation in a specific setting would probably require new rules, or understanding 
the existing ones in its light. It remains possible for a multilateral or a regional 
treaty regime to adopt the doctrine as a guiding principle in part or full, there-
by turning it into an erga omnes partes.202 In so doing, manifestation of the 
doctrine’s proposition in different regimes would vary.
Unlike international lawyers, international relations scholars, especially 
the social constructivists closely study the evolution of norms. Some insight 
may be obtained therefrom. Finnemore and Sikkink, in their work, indicate 
three key stages in the life- cycle of a norm, namely norm creation, norm cas-
cade, and norm internalisation.203 The authors hold that available literature 
generally concur on two elements for successfully creating a new norm, i.e. 
having norm entrepreneurs and the existence of an organisational platform. 
New norms do not emerge from a vacuum. It is rather the existing ones that 
evolve and take up new meaning. The norm entrepreneurs serve as ‘meaning 
architects’ or suppliers of a new ‘frame’ of interpretation.204 The evolution of 
the doctrine of Common Concern can be contemplated along the same line. 
At the initial stage the norm entrepreneurs need not necessarily be the states. 
Different non- state actors can organise and disseminate the utility of a norm 
at various levels of governance. Eventually, however, state endorsement would 
be necessary for a norm to eventually gather enough salience to be able to pass 
a ‘tipping point’ beyond which it becomes self- reliant.205 That arguably is the 
point when the norm formally enters the domain of hard law.
It remains a hypothesis of this research that this doctrinal structure may as-
sist in generating a more coherent trade and climate regime and in the process 
facilitate diffusion of lct. The following section ventures to outline that process.
vi Application in the Trade- Climate Interface
So far we have concluded that the trade and the climate regimes have key 
differences in terms of subject- matters, goals, and core principles. While the 
 202 Brunnée, ‘The Global Climate Regime’ (n 159) 724.
 203 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 199) 895.
 204 ibid 897.











differences lead to a potential of fragmentation between these two regimes, 
both have the seeds of mutual cooperation planted in them in the form of 
a common subscription to sustainable development.206 Here we initiate ap-
plication of the proposed doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind upon 
the incomplete trade- climate coherence building agenda, on which the subse-
quent chapters will build upon.
We recall that one of the key goals of this research is to introduce the doc-
trine of Common Concern to the multilateral trade regime with respect to the 
latter’s dealings with climate change.207 Trade itself is not a Common Con-
cern of Humankind. It forms part of a shared dialogue under the rubric of the 
Common Concern doctrine only to the extent the wto law and domestic trade 
policy measures have an exclusive role to take the climate agenda forward. The 
doctrine would facilitate better framing of trade- related response measures to 
climate change. The framing would prioritise coherence by balancing the com-
peting values, as well as preserving the alignment of the guiding norms that de-
fine the relationship between the climate and the trade regimes. As we would 
see later with respect to the diffusion of clean technologies, a coherent trade 
and climate change agenda has much more to do with harmonised and com-
plementary actions than merely using trade as a means of threat.208 The act 
of trade is in itself a facilitative and mutually beneficial endeavour. Questions 
of unilateral intervention, if ever arising, would only be to tackle instances of 
egregious non- cooperation.
Also, this research does not deal with the entirety of the space of Common 
Concern of climate change in the trade field. As already detailed, it addresses 
the issue of lct diffusion. Technology development and transfer is not an en-
tirely new issue in the trade regime, especially when the issue touches upon in-
tellectual property protection. As already mentioned, technology transfer can 
take place spontaneously, as well as through implementation of specific North 
to South support obligations. Transfer of technology in general is not seen as 
a Common Concern here. What is a Common Concern of Humankind is the 
inhibition of wide diffusion of low- carbon technologies, particularly to the de-
veloping and the least- developed countries, as it hinders effective, adequate, 
and timely climate mitigation from taking place globally.
Until a principle of Common Concern of Humankind attains a customary 
status under public international law, it can influence rulemaking in other 
 206 See p. 23- 4 above.
 207 There can be other Common Concerns that may have a bearing upon trade rules. See, 
Schaeli (n 143).
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treaty regimes like the wto through express incorporation into the body of 
treaty rules. The doctrine can also be utilised to interpret existing trade reg-
ulation applied with respect to climate change. However, despite originating 
from a recognised principle of climate law, Common Concern is yet to garner 
evidence of use and practice by the states in international relations like the 
principle of sustainable development.
A Terms of Relationship with Key Notions
The doctrine of Common Concern needs to be squared off with the current 
normative basis of synergistic understanding between the two regimes, name-
ly the principle of sustainable development. It is well understood that the prin-
ciple of sustainable development “add[s] colour and texture” to the commit-
ments of the covered agreements of the wto.209 It also sits at the heart of the 
global sustainable development goals (sdg s) endorsed by the United Nations, 
including inter alia, the goal of ensuring sustainable production and consump-
tion patterns (Goal 12),210 and the goal of climate action (Goal 13).211 The ques-
tion is whether the introduction of Common Concern is in any way subversive 
to the state parties’ commitment to the principle of sustainable development. 
Similar attention is also required with respect to reconciling Common Con-
cern with the principle of differentiated responsibility.
The doctrine of Common Concern will only supplement the integrative and 
conciliatory role of sustainable development.212 The role of Common Con-
cern is to introduce a special emphasis on certain issues from the bulk that 
are within the panoply of sustainable development. It is submitted that due to 
the factual circumstances mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, climate 
change indeed deserves a more than equal share of attention compared to the 
 209 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 94) para 153; 
See, for more, Christina Voigt, ‘Delineating the Common Interest in International Law’ in 
Wolfgang Benedek and others (eds), The common interest in international law (Intersentia 
2014); Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi, Sustainable Development in International Law Making 
and Trade : International Food Governance and Trade in Agriculture (Edward Elgar 2015).
 210 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Transforming Our World:  The 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development’ (United Nations 2015) A/ res/ 70/ 1. Goal 12C specifically asks 
to ‘[r] ationalize inefficient fossil- fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption 
by removing market distortions, in accordance with national circumstances, including 
by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies, where they exist, to 
reflect their environmental impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and con-
ditions of developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their 
development in a manner that protects the poor and the affected communities’.
 211 ibid.










other environmental issues, as well as a quicker and stronger response from 
all stakeholders. The Common Concern doctrine carries that sense of urgency 
from the climate change regime and brings it to the trade world. While all the 
environmental issues coming to the trade regime also come under the fold of 
sustainable development, not all of them will be considered as Common Con-
cerns. Therefore the doctrine can be used to create an exclusive narrative com-
manding immediate action to be taken regarding climate change in the trade 
regime. This can be of use to all the sticking climate- related issues, including 
that of lct diffusion.
Respect for differentiated responsibility should also be a part and parcel of 
implementing the doctrine of Common Concern in trade law. The nature of 
differentiated responsibility under climate law is slightly different from the 
special and differential treatment commitments that exist in the wto cov-
ered agreements. The principle of common but differentiated responsibility 
(cbdr) is a mainstay of the climate regime. While earlier the cbdr entailed 
a strict bifurcation of responsibility among the Annex- i countries and others 
as identified in the unfccc, over time it has become more dynamic in nature. 
The doctrine of Common Concern, as well as the wto law and trade policy 
attracted under its fold, must be attendant to the demands of this principle. As 
explained in relation to the homework obligation under the Common Concern 
doctrine, domestic trade policy measures to facilitate climate action must take 
place with appropriate considerations for their impact on developing coun-
tries. It is all the more important when such measures would entail costs upon 
the latter. Appropriate settlements of such concerns are only possible through 
cooperation, which is why equitable consideration plays a core role in the new 
cooperation agenda outlined later.213 However, differentiated responsibility 
should not be taken as an excuse for any actor to shirk off climate responsi-
bility. It would rather be important that the specific needs of the countries are 
communicated and appropriate assistance provided to ramp up global action.
B Implications for Low- Carbon Technology Diffusion
To the extent diffusion of low- carbon technology is a part of the Common 
Concern, not only would the doctrine suggest for adequate steps to be taken 
to deal with any existing barriers preventing such diffusion, but it would also 
call for actions to positively incentivise technology related transactions. This 
research is devoted to that effect. At this moment, it can only be hypothesised 
that obligations arising out of the doctrine, i.e. international cooperation and 
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domestic steps to tackle market barriers, as well as to promote the growth of 
related industries will have a positive impact upon the diffusion of low- carbon 
technologies worldwide. To test it out, awareness of the details of current legal 
and institutional settings, as well as an empirically sound knowhow of the na-
ture of the technology diffusion challenge, is paramount. The next chapter will 
turn to those issues.
vii Conclusion
This inaugural chapter has supplied a succinct account of the research prob-
lem and the theoretical framework, specified the scope of research, and pro-
vided a brief glimpse into the coming analysis. It has been shown that climate 
change is a complex problem, which the current body of rules, including the 
recently concluded Paris Agreement, remain incapable of addressing. Part of 
that inability affects the diffusion of lct s, which is the particular topic of re-
search here. The chapter has also highlighted that various sub- disciplines of 
iel, international trade law for example, provide for avenues through which 
clean technologies are spread across borders. Focusing on international trade, 
it was argued that trade policy interventions are necessary to enhance the 
technique effect of trade opening to lower aggregate ghg emissions, to help 
countries assume responsibility for consumption emissions, and also impor-
tantly, to tackle price and incentive related market imperfections that hinder 
diffusion of clean technologies. However, the reality is that appropriate coher-
ence between trade and climate regimes remain incomplete.
Against this backdrop, the chapter has characterised low- carbon technology 
diffusion in the light of the legal doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind, 
proposing tripartite obligations as emanating from it – (i) duty to cooperate, 
(ii) homework obligations, and (iii) unilateral enforcement through trade 
countermeasures. It is maintained that subject to the fulfilment of the require-
ments of state practice, the doctrine can become a future customary principle, 
or be incorporated into a treaty regime. It is also found that the Common Con-
cern doctrine can make progress upon the incomplete agenda of coherence 
between the trade and climate regime by supplementing the already applica-
ble principle of sustainable development, and side by side maintaining respect 
for differentiated responsibility. To the extent that the diffusion of lct s suffer 
from trade- related obstacles, it comes under the umbrella of Common Con-
cern and obtains benefit from the novel framing introduced by the doctrine.
 
© Zaker Ahmad, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004446090_004
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
 chapter 2
Rules and Facts on Low- Carbon Technology 
Diffusion
This chapter supplies an in- depth factual understanding of the market- related 
determinants of low- carbon technology (lct) diffusion, as well as the relevant 
developments in the climate and the trade legal regimes to date. In doing so, 
it facilitates a better understanding of the possible linkages between interna-
tional trade and lct diffusion, also the implications of using the Common 
Concern doctrine in that regard. It begins with a brief, yet illuminating account 
(Section i) of the origins of technology transfer as a political agenda in the 
form of early attempts to negotiate a technology transfer code. Following the 
failure of the code negotiations, the unique expression of technology devel-
opment and transfer is traced through the evolving, predominantly soft law 
framework of the climate regime (Section ii). It is then joined by a sweeping 
survey of empirical studies from various sources – to clearly understand and 
establish the role of markets, and economic instruments in facilitating lct dif-
fusion (Section iii). Against the backdrop of this legal and empirical surveys, 
the chapter finally indulges into an assessment of the trade rules and practices 
pertaining to technology development and transfer (Section iv), helpful to lat-
er highlight the possible areas of action in the next chapter. Summary analyses 
appear at the end of each section, which then feed into the conclusion at the 
end of the chapter. The main contribution of this chapter is in supplying an up- 
to- date and comprehensive regulatory and factual account – useful not only 
to substantiate later arguments, but also to update the reader on the current 
developments.
i The Origin of the Polemics on Technology Transfer
Technology transfer originally emerged as a claim made by the developing to 
the developed countries in the backdrop of the global South’s attempts to cre-
ate a New International Economic Order (nieo) in the post- world war ii era. 
Although unsuccessful to generate a binding international agreement, it had 
a lingering impact on the subsequent developments in different legal regimes, 
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technology transfer as a negotiation agenda is educative of the points where 
states’ views mingle and stray.
A Unsuccessful Code Negotiations
The fundamental basis of the demands for technology transfer made by the newly 
decolonised and other developing countries emerging from the second world war 
was based on the premise of economic development being a right, coupled with 
the understanding that access to modern scientific and technological knowledge 
is an indispensable component to attain the desired quality of growth.214 There-
fore, the claim was essentially of fairness, i.e. the developing country firms should 
be able to access necessary technologies from their developed counterparts on fair 
terms. The wording of the UN General Assembly Resolution215 regarding the nieo 
in 1974 followed by a Charter216 of Economic Rights and Duties of States reflect-
ed this sentiment. For example, Article 13 of the Charter mentioned that “[e] very 
State has the right to benefit from the advances and development in science and 
technology for the acceleration of its economic and social development”.217 The 
same provision also called upon the developed countries to “[…] co- operate with 
the developing countries in the establishment, strengthening and development 
of their scientific and technological infrastructures and their scientific research 
and technological activities so as to help to expand and transform the economies 
of developing countries”.218
What made the approach contentious was the perceived difficulty in gain-
ing access to modern technologies. The prevalent business practices were con-
sidered as posing obstacles to that end. Under the spotlight were practices like 
the charging of very high fees for transfers, terms in licensing agreements pre-
venting competition, the practice of packaged transfers, etc.219 Moreover, the 
 214 The reformist agenda, as Roffe and Tesfachew term the period during 1960s and 1970s. 
See, Pedro Roffe and Taffere Tesfachew, ‘The Unfinished Agenda’ in Surendra J Patel, 
Pedro Roffe and Abdulqawi Yusuf (eds), International Technology Transfer : The Origins 
and Aftermath of the United Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct (Kluwer Law 
International 2001).
 215 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order’ (United Nations 1974) Resolution A/ res/ 3201 (S- vi).
 216 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States’ 
(United Nations 1974) Resolution A/ res/ 3281 (xxix).
 217 ibid 13.
 218 ibid.
 219 Countess P. Jeffries, ‘A Preliminary Evaluation of the Proposed Text’ in Surendra J Patel, 
Pedro Roffe and Abdulqawi Yusuf (eds), International Technology Transfer : The Origins 
and Aftermath of the United Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct (Kluwer Law 















use of intellectual property rights protections (e.g. patents) by the technology 
supplier firms to prevent working, wider diffusion, and use of the technology 
to export products was also perceived as a problem. This fuelled demands for a 
comprehensive multilateral review of the terms of technology transfer agree-
ments and to develop a set of mutually agreed terms in the form of a code on 
one hand, and also a revision of the standards of intellectual property protec-
tion, especially the Paris Convention on Industrial Property on the other.220
With the gift of hindsight, scholars see that the absence of a truly shared 
goal was a key reason for the failure of the nieo based claims of technology 
transfer.221 A number of developing countries were already experimenting with 
locally suited technology transfer policies domestically, e.g. the parameters for 
approved license agreements, reducing scope and duration of patents, domes-
tic working requirements, and provision for compulsory licensing. Whereas 
the developed countries focused on protecting the business interests, calling 
for adequate protection of intellectual property rights across the borders and 
also a liberal regulatory environment for businesses and foreign investment. 
Due primarily to this absence of a shared vision, the Code negotiations that 
started in 1972 backed by the unctad, failed in 1983 after six conferences.222
The failed Code negotiation nevertheless served to clarify the position of 
the parties. It also portrayed how the issue of technology transfer can spill 
over from the domain of private contractual transactions to that of inter- state 
claims. The developing countries sought to use their advantage in numbers 
to correct a perceived systemic disadvantage to their private firms. Whereas 
the developed countries refused to influence private sector transactions by 
regulating the market. All sides nevertheless agreed that transfer of technol-
ogy comprised mostly of private business transactions, taking place in the 
J Patel, Pedro Roffe and Abdulqawi Yusuf (eds), International Technology Transfer : The 
Origins and Aftermath of the United Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct 
(Kluwer Law International 2001) 60– 64.
 220 Wei Zhuang, Intellectual Property Rights and Climate Change :  Interpreting the TRIPS 
Agreement for Environmentally Sound Technologies (Cambridge University Press 
2017) 47– 59.
 221 Roffe and Tesfachew (n 214); Padmashree Gehl Sampath and Pedro Roffe, ‘Unpacking 
the International Technology Transfer Debate: Fifty Years and Beyond’ (2012) 36 ictsd, 
Issue Paper <http:// papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2268529> accessed 25 
October 2020.
 222 It should be noted that in the same period, the technology transfer based approach 
towards deep seabed mining also failed, as the United States refused to ratify the UN Law 
of the Sea Convention and forced a revision of the rules on that issue. For details, see 
Thomas Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation:  The Quest for 
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backdrop of a domestic and international legal framework. One could see that 
transfer of technology became a political agenda due to the dissatisfaction 
over the operation of private commercial transactions. It also failed because of 
disagreements on that point. The tussle between these two competing views 
for a dominant narrative position at the international level has coloured the 
nature and approach of the subsequent legal regimes tackling technology 
transfer, especially the World Trade Organization (wto) and the multilateral 
environmental agreements (mea s).223
B Regime Specific Trends
Since the failure of the Code negotiations, the issue of technology transfer, in-
stead of remaining as a self- standing agenda, was subsumed as a component 
in different issue- specific negotiations (e.g. trade regulation, or protection of 
the environment). This dispersion of the notion across supra- national forums 
of varying institutional set- up and strength resulted in a perceptible difference 
in the way the notion was understood, incorporated, and implemented. The 
most notable is the divergence in the approach towards operationalisation of 
technology transfer in the subsequent mea s vis a vis the multilateral trade re-
gime embodied in the wto.
Provisions for technological and financial assistance are ubiquitous in the 
soft laws, as well as the treaty instruments regarding environmental issues that 
came into being in the decades following the United Nations Conference on 
Human Environment in 1972.224 A typical example can be Article 10A of the 
Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances. The provision holds that
Each Party shall take every practicable step, consistent with the pro-
grammes supported by the financial mechanism, to ensure:
 (a) that the best available, environmentally safe substitutes and related 
technologies are expeditiously transferred to Parties operating un-
der paragraph 1 of Article 5; and
 223 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Technical and Financial Assistance’ in Daniel Bodansky, 
Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental 
Law (First edition, Oxford University Press 2007).
 224 28 multilateral agreements were identified by the unctad in 2001 as containing tech-
nology transfer arrangements. All except 9 on that list were multilateral environmental 
agreements; the rest being intellectual property conventions, wto covered agreements 
and the Energy Charter Treaty. See, unctad (ed), Compendium of International arrange-







 (b) That the transfers referred to in subparagraph (a) occur under fair 
and most favourable conditions.225
About the same time, in the then newly established wto,226 specific mention 
of technology transfer as an obligation appeared in the context of intellectual 
property issues. The wto Agreement on the Trade- Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (trips)227 was the outcome of efforts by the developed 
countries to ensure for their businesses an avenue to secure protection of in-
tellectual property rights (ipr) abroad. The agreement provided for mandato-
ry minimum standards of ipr protection for all the wto members minus the 
least- developed countries (ldc s) to establish and maintain. The agreement 
was founded on the conviction that the protection of intellectual property 
rights “should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to 
the transfer and dissemination of technology […]”.228 Moreover, the developed 
countries were put under a strict obligation to incentivise respective institu-
tions to transfer technologies to the ldc members.229
The differences between the trade and the environmental treaty regimes’ 
approach to technology transfer manifest how political interests vary across 
those regimes, thereby influencing the final bargain struck. In the mea s, the 
scope of technology transfer was narrow and specific to the issue at hand. 
Therefore, the North v South schism over property rights did not dominate 
the discussions.230 Moreover, the emergence of integrative notions like sus-
tainable development helped to move the narrative of technology transfer 
closer towards preservation of commons. The developed countries also found 
it politically palatable to commit additional financial resources to issues that 
were of interest to their own citizens.231 As a result, the practice of finance 
backed technology transfer provisions became standardised in the mea s. This 
 225 Article 10A, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 (1522 
unts 3; 26 ilm 1550 (1987)).
 226 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1994 (1867 unts 154; 33 
ilm 1144 (1994)).
 227 Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 (Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 unts 299; 33 ilm 
1197 (1994)).
 228 Article 7, ibid.
 229 Article 66.2, ibid. For further details, see section iv B below.
 230 Abdulqawi A  Yusuf, ‘Technology Transfer in the Global Environmental Agreements:  A 
New Twist to the North- South Debate’ in Surendra J Patel, Pedro Roffe and Abdulqawi 
Yusuf (eds), International Technology Transfer : The Origins and Aftermath of the United 
Nations Negotiations on a Draft Code of Conduct (Kluwer Law International 2001) 315.
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approach prioritised making of state- to- state financial and technical assis-
tance to attain the mea s targets instead of constraining the firms’ freedom to 
contract.232
In contrast, the wto rules were a branch of international economic law that 
sought to regulate international trade between its members in unprecedented 
detail and depth. These new set of rules played a significant part in influenc-
ing the terms of competition among private firms. In that context, the trips 
agreement made sure that holders of intellectual property are provided with 
a minimum level of security in all jurisdictions. This Agreement triggered the 
code- era conflict of interests in the wto, in a slightly different formulation. 
The question became whether rigorous protection of, or flexibilities regarding 
ipr s would contribute to transfer of technology. While mandatory technology 
transfer had no place in the wto agreement, one exception was the strict obli-
gation to transfer technology to the ldc s.
This brief account explains how the absence of a shared understanding of 
the meaning and determinants of technology transfer resulted in the notion’s 
regime- specific and somewhat kaleidoscopic character. Although the same 
state- level actors animated the transfer of technology agenda in various regime 
settings, differences between those regime characteristics and specific political 
interests of the parties greatly influenced how the key issues were perceived and 
pursued. To further comprehend the implications of this ‘structural ambigui-
ty’233 that is diffusion of lct, we explore the evolution of the notion in the rel-
evant treaty regimes, namely those of climate change and international trade.
ii Developments in the Climate Regime
The legal regime of climate change shares common traits with other mea s. 
Bodansky and others highlight three key characteristics of the climate treaty 
regime. First and foremost, the regime undergoes a soft law based incremen-
tal evolution.234 This is observable in the framework and Protocol approach 
to the rulemaking, gradual institutionalisation, and standard setting through 
diverse bodies managed through the Conferences of Parties (cop).235 The sec-
ond trait is that the rules are framed in a fashion that eases participation.236 
 232 Yusuf (n 230) 314, 317.
 233 We recall the term coined by Humphreys mentioned earlier. See Humphreys (n 90).
 234 Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 129) 22– 26.
 235 ibid 22– 26, 56– 60.













It is evidenced in the practice of shallow initial commitments across a wide 
range of issues,237 coupled with a mechanism for progression over time. Partic-
ipation is further eased by according flexibilities in terms of commitment,238 
also by differentiated standards of treatment.239 The last feature, another con-
sequence of the soft approach, is that compliance mechanisms related to the 
regime are mostly non- adversarial and facilitative in nature.240
The evolution of the arrangements related to technology development and 
transfer in the climate regime also manifest the above features. As shown below, 
the institutional blueprint of technology transfer has emerged through work done 
at the committee stages, thereupon endorsed by successive cop s. There are also 
continuous efforts to develop a closely twined relationship between technology 
transfer and the financial support mechanisms. In addition, parallel areas have also 
emerged with a potential positive influence on low- carbon technology diffusion. 
These areas include mitigation mechanisms like the market- based approaches, 
especially the clean development mechanism (cdm), as well as the non- binding 
commitment processes like the Nationally- determined commitments (ndc s).
A Evolution of Institutional Frameworks
(i) Background: the Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol
Provisions relating to technology transfer in the framework convention 
were, true to the title, of framework nature. To bridge the wide divergence 
between the developing and developed parties’ views,241 the language of the 
relevant unfccc provisions are vague.242 The convention lays down a com-
mitment (Article 4.1) upon all members to “promote and cooperate in the 
development, application, diffusion, including transfer, of technologies.”243 
 237 Daniel Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard 
University Press 2010) 183– 187.
 238 Recall Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement, urging that “[e] ach Party shall prepare, com-
municate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to 
achieve”. Flexibility is also unavoidable as the operational rules are formulated at institu-
tional levels that do not have the mandate to negotiate treaty provisions.
 239 Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 129) 26– 27.
 240 ibid 64– 68. The Paris Agreement relies upon periodic review in the form of global stock-
take (Article 14), and a compliance mechanism (Article 15)  that is “expert- based and 
facilitative in nature and function in a manner that is transparent, non- adversarial and 
non- punitive”.
 241 While the developing countries claimed for access to technology on easier terms, pos-
sibility of issuing compulsory license and to obtain financial support; the developed 
nations wanted technology ‘cooperation’ rather than ‘transfer’, see, ibid 140– 141.
 242 ibid 140.
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Implementation of that obligation is differentiated, as the developed coun-
tries are put under a strict obligation of conduct. Article 4.5 urges the devel-
oped parties to “take all practicable steps” to “promote, facilitate and finance” 
transfer of technologies to other parties, particularly the developing ones. 
The same essence is also traceable in Article 4.3, which further obliges the 
developed countries to provide financial support for, inter alia, transfer of 
technology.244 In contrast, the efforts to be made by developing countries to 
implement their respective commitments under the convention were made 
conditional upon reception of financial support and technology transfer.245 
While being unable to indicate practical avenues to implement those com-
mitments, the language of the framework convention already highlighted key 
issues that would recurrently guide the evolution of the institutional process, 
namely differentiation, and support. Also, these are the only provisions that 
are grounded in hard law
Subsequently, the Kyoto Protocol entering into force in 2005, did not con-
tribute much in developing frameworks for technology transfer. As is well 
known, the language of strict differentiated obligation introduced by the 
Protocol contributed to its slow demise, as the top emitters gradually aban-
doned the process.246 In the same spirit of the Framework Convention, the 
Kyoto Protocol obliged all parties to cooperate to create effective modalities 
of technology transfer.247 It also strengthened the language of urging the 
developed parties to extend financial support for the transfer of technology 
to the developing parties.248 Although unrelated to the formal institutional 
framework related to technology transfer, the market based mechanisms es-
tablished under the Protocol, especially the clean development mechanism 
(cdm), had some technology transfer effect.249 Nevertheless, for reasons 
explained later in this chapter, those mechanisms also gave rise to contro-
versies yet to be settled among the participants.250 Operation of the Kyo-
to Protocol is extended till 2020 with respect to parties willing to commit 
thereunder.
 244 Article 4.3, ibid.
 245 Article 4.7, ibid.
 246 Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 129)  105– 108; Bodansky, The Art and Craft of 
International Environmental Law (n 237) 161– 162, 185; Rosen (n 161); Napoli (n 161).
 247 Article 10(c), Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 1998 (UN Doc fccc/ cp/ 1997/ 7/ Add1; 37 ilm 22 (1998)).
 248 Article 11(2)(b), ibid.
 249 See pp. 71 & 84 below.
















(ii) Structural Development at the Conference of Parties (cop s)
The real development of the institutional arrangements for technology trans-
fer took place at the cop level, where efforts have been complex, and multi- 
pronged. Very early on (cop4), Parties agreed to implement Article 4.5 of the 
unfccc through need- based financing of technology transfer projects251 with 
support from the finance arm of the convention. The result was the initiation 
of the technology needs assessment process (tna) (Box 1). This process was 
purposed to provide developing countries with a clear understanding of their 
technology needs and priorities.252 Also in cop4, the Subsidiary Body on Scien-
tific and Technological Advice (sbsta) was mandated to initiate a consultative 
process for effective implementation of Article 4.5 of the Convention.253 By 
2001, the first regulatory framework was launched with supervision from an ex-
pert group, of which the key details are provided in the following sub- section.
Box 1: Technology Needs Assessments (tna s)254
Initiated in 2001, the tna s have arguably become the most important 
step that a developing country can undertake to specify its technology 
needs and obtain necessary support thereupon. Undertaken voluntarily 
by a developing country member to the unfccc, a tna paves the path 
to adopt a Technology Action Plan (tap), which then serves as a basis to 
develop bankable technology transfer projects.
The tna process remains loosely linked to the evolving technology- 
related institutional framework of the climate regime. Currently, the 
technology executive committee (tec) discharges guidance and over-
view functions regarding the tna, a task previously conducted by the 
now demised expert group on technology transfer (egtt). However, the 
bulk of the activities, i.e. initiation, technical support, advice, and later 
finance, are carried out by a number of collaborators.
While implementation of the tna projects have always been in the 
domain of the Global Environment Facility (gef), the key finance arm 
 251 Decision 2/ cp4, ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fourth Session’ (1998) fccc/ 
cp/ 1998/ 16/ Add.1. At that period, the sole financing arm was the Global Environment 
Facility (gef). For more on the gef, see pp 67- 69 below.
 252 ‘tna History’ <http:// unfccc.int/ ttclear/ tna/ history.html> accessed 25 October 2020.
 253 Decision 4/ cp4, ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fourth Session’ (n 251); 
Decision 9/ cp5, ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifth Session’ (1999) fccc/ 
cp/ 1999/ 6/ Add.1.
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of the unfccc; the assessment activity was initially assisted by the UN 
Environment Programme (unep) and the UN Development Programme 
(undp). From 2009, tna s and implementation thereof were carried 
out as a global project in phases. Finance was still supplied by the gef 
under a strategic technology transfer programme, implementation 
was carried out by the unep in partnership with the Danish Technical 
University (dtu).
So far, there has been three tna global project phases, which have 
seen to 85 countries undergoing the assessment. According to the official 
technology information repository ‘tt:clear’, while about 260 mitigation 
project has been floated by developing countries for finance, about 6 so 
far have been supported. Linked to the tna s, the gef also launched 14 
pilot projects, which remain at different stages of completion.
a) Technology Transfer Framework (ttf)
The technology transfer framework (ttf), adopted in 2001 (cop7), was the 
result of a consultative process.255 The ttf envisaged activities around five 
key themes, namely (i) technology needs assessments (tna s), (ii) technology 
information; (iii) enabling environments; (iv) capacity building; and (v) mech-
anisms for technology transfer. The needs assessment, already an ongoing pro-
cess, was integrated with the framework with a view to identifying and prioritis-
ing the areas of support required by the developing countries. Actual transfers 
were planned to be attained in two ways- creation of an enabling regulatory 
environment on one hand, and the developing countries’ technological capac-
ity building on the other. This would remain a rare instance when regulatory 
reform, especially fair- trade policies would find mention in connection with 
enabling environment in a cop document on technology transfer. Elaborating 
the tasks under that theme, the developed parties were urged to “[…] promote 
further and to implement facilitative measures, for example, export credit 
programmes and tax preferences, and regulations, as appropriate, to promote 
the transfer of environmentally sound technologies”.256 Equal emphasis, if not 
more, was put on capacity building efforts for the developing countries, along 
with an urge to make greater financial resources available for the same.257 The 
 255 Decision 4/ cp7, ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session’ (2001) 
fccc/ cp/ 2001/ 13/ Add.1.
 256 Annex to the Decision 4/ cp7, ibid 26– 27.









dual emphasis on enabling environment and capacity building would become 
the balancing act for all subsequent technology transfer arrangements.
The institutional mechanism that emerged out of the ttf was in the form 
of an Expert Group on Technology Transfer (egtt). The egtt was mandated 
to boost stakeholder coordination, cooperation, and to facilitate the develop-
ment of relevant projects and programs. The goal behind creating an ‘expert’ 
group was probably to depoliticise the issues and to work towards objective 
solutions. Although the group played some facilitative function,258 it was criti-
cised to be a weak one, having a top- down approach towards technology trans-
fer. It also failed to defuse the tensions between the developed and the devel-
oping countries’ views.259 The mandate of the expert group lapsed in 2010.
b) The Technology Mechanism (tm)
Work began in 2007 to replace the ttf with a new framework. The Bali Ac-
tion Plan, which was instrumental in initiating the new process, flagged en-
hanced action on technology transfer and provision of related finance as two 
key components of a long- term climate deal.260 Pursuant to that, the infor-
mal Copenhagen Accord decided in 2009 to establish a bottom- up ‘technol-
ogy mechanism’ (tm). The decision was formalised in the following year at 
cop16.261 Composed of a policy and an implementation arm (technology ex-
ecutive committee (tec) and climate technology centre and network (ctcn), 
respectively), the tm was proposed to build upon the previous activities, albeit 
with redefined priorities and operational structures, as explained below.262
The policy arm of the mechanism, i.e. the tec, is composed of a body of 
twenty independent technology experts from the developed and the develop-
ing countries.263 The functions assigned to the tec was mostly deliberative 
and advisory, including, inter alia, making recommendations on technology 
transfer barriers.264 Compared to the egtt, the tec had a reduced scope, as 
 258 Efforts included training and capacity building to carry out technology needs assessments. 
Merylyn Hedger, ‘Stagnation or Regeneration: Technology Transfer in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’ in David Ockwell and Alexandra 
Mallett (eds), Low- carbon technology transfer: from rhetoric to reality (Routledge 2012) 213.
 259 de Coninck and Sagar (n 89) 260.
 260 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/ cp13, ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Thirteenth 
Session’ (2007) fccc/ cp/ 2007/ 6/ Add.1 4– 5.
 261 Decision 1/ cp16, ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session’ (2010) fccc/ 
cp/ 2010/ 7/ Add.1  <http:// unfccc.int/ resource/ docs/ 2010/ cop16/ eng/ 07a01.pdf> accessed 25 
October 2020.
 262 ibid 18– 22.
 263 ibid 30.
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some of the issues like capacity building and availability of necessary financial 
resources were moved to different fora. Based on the assigned mandate, in-
puts from public, private and institutional stakeholders, and periodic guidance 
from the cop s, work in the tec progressed based on a rolling agenda. Such 
work mostly included different thematic dialogues, workshops, periodic anal-
ysis, and guidance support to tnas.
It is important to note that perception of the kind of steps necessary to be 
taken for the development of enabling environments for technology transfer 
changed with the shift from the earlier framework. Between 2012 and 2015, 
activities undertaken by the tec touching upon enabling environments and 
barriers to technology transfers can be summed up to a workshop on nation-
al systems of innovation in developing countries,265 thematic dialogues, and 
some periodic recommendations made to the cop.266 It shows that the ear-
lier emphasis on the need for specifically addressing trade- related issues has 
waned. A  plausible reason for this can be the Parties’ different positions on 
market- based approaches to mitigation. In addition, the absence of jurisdic-
tion to discuss trade matters can also be a factor. Among other mandated tasks, 
the tec supplied guidance to the tna process over time.267 Even in that re-
gard, as we would see later in this chapter, Secretariat reports suggested the 
significance of barriers that can be tackled by trade policy measures.268 De-
spite that, there were no such discussions or recommendations from the tec. 
The body, however, made suggestions to develop a permanent linkage with the 
financial mechanisms
The Climate Technology Centre and Network (ctcn), the other integral 
part of the tm, is comprised of a central coordinating body connected to a 
worldwide network of member organisations. Together, the ctcn responds to 
the needs of technical assistance (ta) submitted by the developing countries. 
The ctcn is hosted by a unep- led consortium and is financed from a vari-
ety of sources, ranging from donor countries, the finance mechanism of the 
convention, as well as contributsions from consortium members. The type of 
 265 It was held in 2014. ‘Joint Annual Report of the Technology Executive Committee and 
the Climate Technology Centre and Network for 2014’ (2014) fccc/ sb/ 2014/ 3 8 <http:// 
unfccc.int/ resource/ docs/ 2014/ sb/ eng/ 03.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020.
 266 ‘Joint Annual Report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology 
Centre and Network for 2015’ (2015) fccc/ sb/ 2015/ 1 12– 13 <http:// unfccc.int/ resource/ 
docs/ 2015/ sb/ eng/ 01.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020.
 267 ibid 10– 11; ‘Joint Annual Report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network for 2016’ (2016) fccc/ sb/ 2016/ 1 9– 10 <http:// unfccc.int/ 
resource/ docs/ 2016/ sb/ eng/ 01.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020.










technical support provided by the ctcn is request- based, occasionally involv-
ing assistance regarding tna s. The ctcn website reports that so far 180 ta 
requests have been received, of which 77 have been completed.269
The success of the work undertaken by the tec and ctcn remained closely 
linked to the availability of adequate financial resources. This is a persistent 
problem for the network, frequently resulting in its inability to prioritise the 
support projects.270 Despite having a finance- backed approach to the transfer 
of technology, availability of resources to a tune that is adequate to reach the 
necessary scale of assistance has never become a reality in the context of the 
tm. This remains a major handicap for the system.
(iii) Technology Framework under the Paris Agreement
Despite being appended as Annex to the cop21 decision, the Paris Agreement 
can be considered as a treaty from a legal viewpoint.271 Article 10 of the Paris 
Agreement, coupled with the relevant parts272 of the cop21 decision, supply 
new guidance to the existing technology transfer rules and practices. The new 
provisions bring adaptation and mitigation activities into equal focus.273 Apart 
from that, the Agreement’s provisions further underscores the need for linkage 
between the technology and financial mechanisms. In somewhat ambiguous 
wording, the Article also supplies one of the rare instances of strict differenti-
ation in the Paris Agreement, holding that additional financial support “shall 
be provided to the developing country parties”.274 As mentioned, the wording 
 269 ‘Request Visualizations’ (Climate Technology Centre & Network, 20 August 2015) <https:// 
www.ctc- n.org/ technical- assistance/ request- visualizations> accessed 25 October 2020.
 270 ‘Joint Annual Report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology 
Centre and Network for 2018’ (2018) fccc/ sb/ 2018/ 2 18– 21  <https:// unfccc.int/ sites/ 
default/ files/ resource/ SB_ 2018_ 2.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020. It is mentioned that the 
ctcn ‘continues to experience challenges related to the availability of sufficient and sus-
tained funding as it strives to fund its activities in future years’.
 271 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25 Review of 
European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 142, 144– 145. Of course it 
opens the question of priority between the terms of the Paris Agreement and the unfccc. 
Nevertheless, between two sets of relatively flexible commitments, conflict is not imme-
diately apparent. For an alternate view arguing the legal form of the Paris Agreement as 
a Protocol, see Sandrine Maljean- Dubois, Thomas Spencer and Matthieu Wemaere, ‘The 
Legal Form of the Paris Climate Agreement: A Comprehensive Assessment of Options’ 
(2015) 9 Carbon & Climate Law Review 68.
 272 Adoption of the Paris Agreement 2015 (Report of the Conference of the Parties in its 
twenty- first session, Decision 1/ cp 21, fccc/ cp/ 2015/ 10/ Add1) paras 66– 71.
 273 Articles 10(1) and 10(2), Paris Agreement (n 28).
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is ambiguous as it does not clarify who bears that responsibility to extend fi-
nancial support.
Article 10 also envisioned a new technology framework (tf) that would 
serve the long- term vision of the Paris Agreement.275 While the institutional 
framework of the tm is subsumed into the Paris process, the tf is supposed 
to provide overarching guidance to the former. The corresponding part of the 
cop21 decision entrusted the sbsta with the development of the particulars 
of technology framework along four themes – (i) undertaking and updating 
of the tna s, (ii) provision of enhanced financial support for the tna s, (iii) 
assessments of technologies ready to transfer, and (iv) enhancement of en-
abling environments and removal of barriers.276 This task was discharged by 
December 2018, when in cop24  the details of the framework (i.e. the ‘Paris 
Rulebook’) were agreed.277
The tf envisages five focused areas of action, namely:  innovation, imple-
mentation, enabling environment and capacity building, collaboration and 
stakeholder engagement, and support. In many ways, it seems to have suc-
cessfully picked up the avenues of action, which did not have a strong voice 
in the technology mechanism and incorporated them to create a long- term, 
comprehensive work agenda. With respect to trade and diffusion of lct, the 
re- introduced theme of enabling environment and also that of collaboration is 
of special importance.
With respect to creating an enabling environment, the tf holds that it is 
important to consider the challenges faced by the countries, as well as their 
different needs. Learning from the decades of insight from conducting tna s, 
the activities suggested by the framework to create and enhance enabling en-
vironment include, inter alia, the following:
(b) Facilitating countries in enhancing an investment- friendly environ-
ment, […] a policy environment, legal and regulatory frameworks and 
other institutional arrangements; […]
 275 Article 10(4) reads as, ‘[a] technology framework is hereby established to provide overar-
ching guidance to the work of the Technology Mechanism in promoting and facilitating 
enhanced action on technology development and transfer in order to support the imple-
mentation of this Agreement […]’. ibid.
 276 Paragraphs 66– 71, Adoption of the Paris Agreement (n 272) 9– 10; de Coninck and Sagar 
(n 89).
 277 Technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement 2019 
(Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, 








(d) Assisting countries in developing and implementing policies for 
enabling environments to incentivize the private and public sector to ful-
ly realize the development and transfer of climate technologies;
(e) Assisting governments in playing a key role in fostering private 
sector involvement by designing and implementing policies, regulations 
and standards that create enabling environments and favourable market 
conditions for climate technologies;278
Yet again, it is submitted that such tasks as mentioned above cannot be execut-
ed without the involvement of the trade regulations. However, it is worthwhile 
to hope that the framework holds collaboration with, and engagement of 
stakeholders at the local, regional, national, and global levels to be important. 
It has been mentioned that the necessary action in this regard, inter alia, is:
Enhancing collaboration and synergy with relevant international orga-
nizations, institutions and initiatives, […] to leverage their specific ex-
pertise, experience, knowledge and information, particularly on new and 
innovative technologies;279
In sum, it would appear that the tf indicates the existence of a shared will to 
tackle, among others, economic and market- related barriers to technology de-
velopment and transfer. To that effect, collaboration with other organisations 
and institutions are also foreseen. While any effective collaboration is yet to 
develop, this is a potential opening to establish formal linkages with the trade 
legal regime to explore policy measures that assist low- carbon technology dif-
fusion. We return to this issue in the following chapter.
At least three compliance enabling mechanisms are linked to the post- Par-
is arrangement for the transfer of low- carbon technologies. A periodic review 
will look into the effectiveness of the tm in implementing the agreement, as 
well as the adequacy of the support provided to the mechanism.280 The extent 
to which the mechanism adapts its work to the guidance of the technology 
framework is a factor in the assessment of effectiveness.281 Moreover, under a 
novel transparency framework, the developed country parties are required to 
 278 ibid 16.
 279 ibid 20(d).
 280 Adoption of the Paris Agreement (n 272) para 69.
 281 Scope of and modalities for the periodic assessment referred to in paragraph 69 of deci-
sion 1/ cp.21 2019 (Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its 
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furnish, among others, information on the technology and capacity- building 
support provided to the developing countries.282 Information so provided re-
mains subject to a technical expert review. Lastly, the process of ‘global stock-
take’283 is also required to take note of the efforts in terms of support provided 
to the developing country Parties with respect to technology development and 
transfer.284 Characteristic to the emphasis upon non- adversariality that epito-
mizes the Paris Agreement, none of these avenues provides options for strict 
enforcement when the necessary level of technology transfer is wanting.
B Evolution of Financial Support Systems
The account of the institutional evolution of technology transfer arrangements 
already showcases the importance of adequate finance to bankroll the transfer 
projects as well as related technical assistance. This entails footing a financial 
bill of unprecedented scale, actual measurement of which can vary depending 
on the assumed scope of technologies. For example, the sdg Goal 13 calls for 
annual contribution of usd 100 billion by 2020 through a fully operationalised 
Global Climate Fund.285 One earlier study endorsed by the expert group on 
technology transfer (egtt) concluded that development, diffusion, and deploy-
ment of mitigation technologies may require annual additional finance of usd 
262 to 670 billion.286 To date, reaching such levels have remained impossible.
The key finance mechanisms of the climate regime, i.e. the Global Environ-
ment Facility (gef), and the new Green Climate Fund (gcf) allocate resources 
for technology transfer activities at different stages. The aforementioned study 
finds that out of the overall flow of finance in 2009 for development and diffu-
sion of climate technologies that stood somewhere between 69 to 153 billion 
US dollars, only 19 million passed through the gef that was spent in support-
ing developing countries.287 Establishment of a permanent linkage with the 
 282 Article 13, Paris Agreement (n 28); Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transpar-
ency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement 
2019 (Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its first session, 
Decision 18/ cma1, Annex, fccc/ pa/ cma/ 2018/ 3/ Add2) para 126.
 283 Articles 10(6) and 14, Paris Agreement (n 28).
 284 Matters relating to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and paragraphs 99– 101 of decision 
1/ cp.21 2019 (Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the third part of its first 
session, Decision 19/ cma1, fccc/ pa/ cma/ 2018/ 3/ Add2) para 36(f).
 285 Goal 13, United Nations General Assembly (n 210).
 286 egtt,  ‘Recommendations on Future Financing Options for Enhancing the Development, 
Deployment, Diffusion and Transfer of Technologies under the Convention’ (2009) 

















financial mechanism remains an open issue, as described below. Following 
paragraphs provide a brief overview of the situation of technology finance so 
far.288
(i) The Global Environment Facility (gef)
The gef is a consortium of international agencies, countries and civil societ-
ies that support and finance implementation activities under several meas, 
including the unfccc.289 It uses periodically replenished contributions made 
by the participants. With respect to technology development and transfer to 
tackle climate change, the operational focus of the gef until 2007 was on re-
moving the market obstacles preventing diffusion of mature technology and 
supporting development and deployment of promising technologies.290 In 
response to the parties’ request in 2007,291 the gef presented a new strategic 
program the year after, named Poznan strategy, which still guides the actions 
of the institution.292 In light of that strategy, technology finance operation of 
the gef takes place under three prongs, namely (i)  providing assistance in 
undertaking of the tna s, (ii) implementation of pilot projects arising out of 
those assessments, and (iii) dissemination of the experiences of success.293 
Later, after the launch of the technology mechanism (tm), two additional pri-
orities were added to the previous agenda – (i) support to the ctcn, and (ii) 
public- private partnerships for technology transfer.294
Through the Poznan Strategic Program, the gef has been continuously 
supporting the technology activities, though the scale of overall support can 
be put to question. Regarding the tnas, a total of eighty- four countries were 
 288 For additional information on the scale and importance of public financial commit-
ments, see Chapter 5 i at p. 198 onwards.
 289 As per decision 12/ cp2 at cop2, a memorandum of understanding was struck between 
the unfccc cop and the Council of gef.
 290 gef, ‘Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies: Case Studies from gef Climate 
Change Portfolio’ 3– 4  <http:// www.thegef.org/ sites/ default/ files/ publications/ GEF- 
TechTransfer- lowres_ final_ 2.pdf> accessed 25 October. For a critical take on gef’s 
market transformation approach, see the studies by Watson & Byrne, and Haum in 
page 83 and 84 respectively below.
 291 Decision 4/ cp13, ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Thirteenth Session’ (n 
260) 26– 28.
 292 Decision 2/ cp14, ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fourteenth Session’ 
(2009) fccc/ cp/ 2008/ 7 3– 4 <https:// unfccc.int/ resource/ docs/ 2008/ cop14/ eng/ 07.pdf> 
accessed 25 October 2020.
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provided gef support in three phases since 2001. Out of those, thirty- six 
tnas are completed, twenty- eight underway and twenty about to begin.295 
During this period, only eleven pilot projects arising out of the tnas have 
been approved for implementation.296 Support to the ctcn is provided by 
the gef under five ongoing projects. All these add up to nineteen mitiga-
tion technology transfer projects (including three cancelled ones) in totoal 
since 2009, requiring the entity to invest 111.7 million usd of own fund and 
709.3 million of co- financing by other institutions.297 The facility identifies 
the key perceived obstacles in financing technology projects as – (i) absence 
of domestic policy frameworks enabling the adoption of est s, (ii) absence 
of robust technology options, (iii) information unavailability, (iv) lack of 
viable business and delivery models to supply the markets, and (v)  lack of 
finance.298
(ii) The Green Climate Fund (gcf)
Parallel to the Poznan Strategic Program, the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 
floated the idea of a new finance mechanism in the form of the Green Cli-
mate Fund (gcf), which was eventually launched in 2010 at the cop 16 in 
Cancun. The new fund is a response to the voiced demand for new and addi-
tional finance to tackle climate change. Like the gef, the gcf is also an oper-
ational entity under the finance mechanism of the Framework Convention, 
but unlike the former, it deals solely with the climate change issue. Despite 
having an informal target to mobilise usd100 billion annually and initiate 
a ‘paradigm shift’ in low- carbon development, the gcf has been successful 
in collecting about usd 10.3 in actual pledges so far.299 As of July 2019, the 
fund has approved a total of 111 projects in total deploying usd 5.2 billion of 
its own resources, and triggering another usd 1.5 billion in co- finance.300 
By the same time, the gcf received eleven finance request from the ctcn, 
 295 unfccc, ‘Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties’ 
(2017) fccc/ cp/ 2017/ 7 47– 49 <http:// unfccc.int/ resource/ docs/ 2017/ cop23/ eng/ 07.pdf> 
accessed 25 October 2020.
 296 ibid 46– 47.
 297 ibid 44.
 298 ibid 103– 109; Global Environment Facility, ‘Report of the Global Environment Facility 
on the Progress Made in Carrying out the Poznan Strategic Programme on Technology 
Transfer’ (2018) 122– 136.
 299 Green Climate Fund, ‘Eighth Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (2019) fccc/ 
cp/ 2019/ 3 4– 5.















of which only six has been approved, amounting to total commitment usd 
1.8 million.301 While there may be some technology transfer benefit arising 
from the overall gcf engagement, but a system to track such achievement is 
still in process.302
(iii) The Linkage between Technology and Finance
There is no doubt that the level of success of a finance- driven international 
support mechanism for technology transfer would largely be a function of 
the amount of resources allocated for the purpose. Current legal arrange-
ments still underperform on this account, as featured by technology transfer 
being only a partial responsibility in the gef agenda. While the developing 
countries demand establishment of a hard linkage between the finance (in-
cluding the gcf) and the technology mechanism (tm), it was consistent-
ly being resisted by the developed countries.303 In 2015, the cop21 invited 
the tec and the operating entities of the finance mechanism (namely the 
gef, and the gcf) to sit together and find ways of supporting the tm.304 In 
cop22, the parties encouraged the gcf to regularly report the actions being 
taken to establish the linkage. Later in cop23, an independent review rec-
ommended formalisation of the relationships between ctcn, gef, and gcf 
through enhanced collaboration of the national focal points of these entities 
(nationally designated authorities (nda) for gcf, and nationally designated 
entities (nde) for ctcn).305 The latest reports reveal that the ctcn is part-
nering with the gcf to access some funds from that latter entity’s ‘readiness 
program’.306 However, partnership with the gef still remains on an ad hoc 
basis.307 In the absence of a stronger, and supporting relationship between 
technology support and finance, the success of the tm would remain a far 
cry.308
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 302 ibid 19.
 303 de Coninck and Sagar (n 89) 263.
 304 Decision 13/ cp.21  ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty- First Session’ 
(2015) fccc / cp/ 2015/ 10/ Add.2 28– 29.
 305 ‘Report of the Independent Review of the Effective Implementation of the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network’ (2017) fccc/ cp/ 2017/ 3 para 90.
 306 ‘Joint Annual Report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology 
Centre and Network for 2019’ (2019) fccc/ sb/ 2019/ 4 para 104; Green Climate Fund (n 
299) para 97.
 307 ibid para 105.
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C Other Avenues Contributing to Low- Carbon Technology Diffusion
(i) Market- Based Approaches
a) The Clean Development Mechanism (cdm)
While the technology transfer arrangements were too slow to take shape, the 
market- based mitigation measures agreed under the Kyoto Protocol309 of 
the Framework Convention, especially the clean development mechanism 
(cdm),310 became an unlikely vehicle for low- carbon technology transfer. It 
is unlikely because the mandate of the cdm was never related to technology. 
Opening in 1998, the Kyoto Protocol had the objective of strengthening the 
mitigation commitments of the unfccc parties. To that effect, it provided for 
strict emission reduction targets, which were possible to be met through do-
mestic, as well as extraterritorial mitigation activities. The latter was known as 
market- based mitigation measures, comprising of joint implementation, with 
or without emission trading schemes,311 and the cdm.
The cdm has a project- centred approach. According to the Kyoto Protocol, 
entities from the developed countries can invest in mitigation projects in the 
developing countries and get credit (i.e. certified emission reduction, or cer) 
for emission reductions that is ‘additional’ to ‘business as usual’. A project de-
veloper, with approval from the host country, initially submits the documents 
for approval. A project is approved when it is registered by the Executive Board 
(eb) of the cdm. When successfully implemented, the eb issues the cer s, 
which can then be bought and sold in the market and used by any Annex i 
party to prove their compliance with the Kyoto limits during the commitment 
period.312
Although studies have shown some limited success and untapped poten-
tial of cdm projects to transfer low- carbon technologies,313 some drawbacks 
have been pointed out as well. The cdm approach was primarily mandated 
 309 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1997.
 310 Article 12, ibid.
 311 Article 4(6), ibid.
 312 Joëlle de Sépibus, ‘Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism to Accelerate 
Technology Transfer’ (2009) nccr Trade Working Paper 2009/ 42 6 <https:// www.wti.org/ 
research/ publications/ 7/ reforming- the- clean- development- mechanism- to- accelerate- 
technology- transfer/ > accessed 25 October 2020.
 313 Eric Haites and others, ‘Technology Transfer and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM)’ in David Ockwell and Alexandra Mallett (eds), Low- carbon technology trans-
fer : from rhetoric to reality (Routledge 2012); Stephen Seres, Eric Haites and Kevin Murphy, 
‘Analysis of the Contribution of the Clean Development Mechanism to Technology’ (unf-
















to mitigate emissions, not to transfer technology. As a result, the project de-
signs were suited to the needs of the former and not the later. It also became 
clear that the structure and design of the cdm approval, and issue of cer s 
were flawed. Moreover, the projects tended to concentrate on only a number of 
destinations – as private entrepreneurs were reluctant to move elsewhere. De 
Sepibus identified some of these failures as being: (i) the problem of fixing the 
emission accounting baseline, (ii) private intervention in auditing, (iii) tech-
nology path dependency, (iv) chilling effect on developing country low- carbon 
policy development, etc.314
Along with the rest of the Kyoto Protocol, operation of the cdms is pro-
jected to last till 2020 (i.e. the second commitment period, 2013– 20). As it is 
official that the Protocol would not be extended further, and an alternate plan 
is underway as the Paris Agreement, the current iteration of cdm would expire 
after that period. While some were positive about market- based mitigation op-
tions like the cdm, the others held deep concerns about its overall impact and 
reforms.315 The conflicting views have influenced the negotiation under the 
Paris Agreement, as shown below.
b) Difficulty to Renew Market- based Approaches under the Paris 
Agreement
In an attempt to address all the divergent views surrounding the market- based 
approaches to mitigation, Article 6 of the Paris Agreement was drafted in a 
language that covers and encourages all forms of possible cooperation activ-
ities.316 While creating the opportunity for market- based cooperative mecha-
nisms for emission mitigation, it also underscores the need for ensuring overall 
emission reduction, stringent accounting, strong oversight, distributional sup-
port to adaptation, and contribution to sustainable development. Side by side, 
it also recognises the need to coordinate and cooperate on mitigation towards 
the fulfilment of ndc s through non- market approaches. The language of the 
provision does not, however, indicate any potential technology transfer benefit 
arising out of such cooperation activities.
The market- based cooperative approaches under the Paris Agreement could 
further be divided into two types. The internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes (itmo s) possibly envisage transactions like emission trading or other 
 314 de Sépibus (n 312) 10– 13.
 315 Andrew Howard, ‘Voluntary Cooperation (Article 6)’ in Daniel Klein and others (eds), The 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (Oxford University Press 
2017) 182.
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forms of credit transaction processes317 subject to the requirement that they pro-
mote sustainable development, are transparent, and ensure environmental in-
tegrity.318 Further guidance was sought to be supplied by the sbsta as part of the 
Paris rulebook.319 Article 6.4 to 6.7 lay down further details of a new mechanism, 
which in broad parts resembles cdm or Joint Implementation (ji) approaches 
under the Kyoto system. The language of the whole Article avoids using terms like 
‘credit’, ‘market’ or ‘trade’ – a result of the strong aversion of certain members.320 
The elaborated mechanism urges ensuring overall mitigation of global emission, 
support of adaptation activities from the proceeds and avoiding double counting.
Details of the mechanism were left to be developed in the rulebook.321 By 
the first session of the conference of parties serving as a meeting of the parties 
to the Paris Agreement (cma) in 2018, no consensus on any of these issues 
has been reached. Key disagreements are regarding methods to avoid double 
counting of emissions, decision on carrying over Kyoto era cdm credits, means 
of ensuring overall mitigation reduction, and difficulty to account for trade 
in mitigation outcomes between parties with varying ndc commitments.322 
Recently concluded cop25 / cma2 also failed to find an agreement, and the 
issues have been pushed to the next conference in 2020.
(ii) Technology Aspects of Other Climate Processes
a) Nationally Determined Contributions (ndcs)
Nationally determined contributions (ndc), the foremost building blocks of 
aggregate mitigation under the Paris process, bear a deep connection with 
the availability and access to low- carbon technologies. According to a unf-
ccc secretariat study,323 almost all of the developing countries (140) refer to 
 317 Howard (n 315) 185– 186; Andrei Marcu, Carbon Market Provisions in the Paris Agreement 
(Article 6) (Centre for European Policy Studies (ceps) 2016) 5– 7.
 318 Articles 6.2 and 6.3, Paris Agreement (n 28).
 319 ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty- First Session’ (n 304) para 37.
 320 Marcu (n 317) 7; Howard (n 315) 188.
 321 ‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty- First Session’ (n 304)  38– 39. It 
should however be noted that while indc s are an iterative process, tna s are so far a one- 
off step leading a technology action plan.
 322 See for details, ‘In- Depth Q&A: How “Article 6” Carbon Markets Could “Make or Break” 
the Paris Agreement’ (Carbon Brief, 29 November 2019)  <https:// www.carbonbrief.
org/ in- depth- q- and- a- how- Article- 6- carbon- markets- could- make- or- break- the- paris- 
agreement> accessed 25 October 2020.
 323 unfccc, ‘INDCs and Technology:  A Synthesis of Technology Issues Contained in 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’ (2016) <https:// unfccc.int/ ttclear/ misc_ 
/ StaticFiles/ gnwoerk_ static/ HOME_ infobox_ 2/ a61f9f4b94704dd78f06b2bc7cd0b547/ 


















technologies in the ndc s. 70% of all the non- Annex i parties seek internation-
al technology development and transfer support to implement their ndc com-
mitments.324 While the technology mechanism was not frequently referred to, 
the developing country parties indicated financial as well as non- financial ob-
stacles as barriers to attaining the ndc commitments. In 2018, the technology 
executive committee (tec) suggested to use the tna process to specify, priori-
tise and update over time the technology aspects of the ndc s.325
b) Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (namas)326
Similarly, nationally appropriate mitigation actions (namas) were an outcome 
of an earlier process that is still in place. nama s share characteristics with 
ndc s as well as the tna s. They were made with a view to creating a transpar-
ent platform for mitigation projects. While the unfccc hosts a registry for the 
nama s prepared and submitted for finance, there is no institutional finance 
that is allocated for the projects. A  donor- supported nama facility finances 
the projects. Many of the nama s actually involve introduction of new tech-
nologies to a specific domestic emission sector. However, in comparison to the 
number of nama s submitted, very little (about 8.5%) have been financed for 
implementation.327
D Summary Analysis
This section summarises the key points emerging from the above discussion.
a) Balancing and Supporting Function of Technology Transfer
Effective legal arrangements for technology transfer remains an indispensable 
part of a long- term global climate deal. Not only does it enable countries to 
increase the level and scale of emission mitigation, technology transfer, espe-
cially providing assistance to the developing countries in that regard, also per-
forms a crucial balancing function. Overall, such arrangement is a key avenue 
 324 ibid 2.
 325 Technology Executive Committee (tec), ‘Updated Paper on Linkages between the TNA 
and NDC Process’ (unfccc 2018) tec/ 2018/ 16/ 7 19– 20 <https:// unfccc.int/ ttclear/ misc_ 
/ StaticFiles/ gnwoerk_ static/ tn_ meetings/ 40067a60235c4b1c9737e9abf532003a/ e8a0bd-
09bec44237934ee7ed569b2d9d.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020.
 326 To be clear, the nama here does not have any realation with the non- agricultural market 
access negotiation at the wto.
 327 Angelica Afanador and others, Status Report on Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
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to implement the ideal of common but differential responsibility in practice. 
It also enables fostering of inclusivity in the multilateral climate agreement by 
ensuring the greatest number of participation.
b) Institutional Evolution is Soft- Law Based, Incremental, and 
Facilitative
We find that much of the development of the institutional frameworks regard-
ing technology development and transfer in the climate regime has taken place 
incrementally, using soft- law based approaches.328 The upside of such an ap-
proach is that the resultant frameworks are inclusive in terms of participants, 
as well as coverage of interests. However, encompassing different interests and 
approaches result in systems that are complex and difficult to navigate. This is 
true for the whole of the Paris Agreement.329 Also, inclusivity comes at the cost 
of sacrificing legal stringency of the substantive commitments. As the latest 
experiences with the Paris Agreement, and the technology framework there-
in show, aspirational goals and some procedural obligations form the core of 
the operative rule, emphasising more on a highly participatory and facilitative 
nature of progress.330 It is yet to be seen whether such frameworks result in 
generating effective and adequate levels of technology transfer.
c) One- Off Projects, the Thrust of Current Actions, Are Inadequately 
Financed
In practice, under the current arrangements, the developing countries obtain 
necessary low- carbon technologies through implementation of standalone 
projects – e.g. following up a tna,331 through cdm s,332 or by obtaining finance 
for the submitted nama.333 These processes are only loosely connected to the 
current legal framework for technology transfer in the sense that the bulk of 
the work is carried out by autonomous entities (e.g. gef for project implemen-
tation, and the unep- dtu consortium for tna s). These processes are only ef-
fective to the extent financial resources are committed to them. Given the slow 
pace of growth of the scale and volume of institutional finance channelled to 
 328 Hedger correctly termed the evolution of a working technology transfer process under 
the unfccc as ‘slow, laborious and incremental’. Hedger (n 258).
 329 Brunnée, ‘The Rule of International (Environmental) Law and Complex Problems’ 
(n 200).
 330 Jutta Brunnée, ‘MEAs and Complex Prevention’ (Hague Winter Academy, Hague, January 
2019) [on file with the author].
 331 See Box 1 at p. 60 above.
 332 See p. 71 above.















low- carbon technology diffusion, it is only realistic to conclude that exclusive 
dependence on finance backed technology transfer would be unsuccessful to 
bring forth the kind of systemic technological change that has been showed to 
be necessary to avoid climate change.
d) Systemic Change Would Require Finding New Ways to Enhance 
Technology Diffusion
Following the above conclusion, i.e. the inadequacy of financial support, it is 
important that other complementary avenues of progress are explored. Of key 
importance are the market- based reform approaches including necessary revi-
sion of international trade and investment practices. Experience so far would 
suggest that although market- based approaches are not alien to the climate 
regime, they tend to be controversial as their benefits remain limited and exe-
cution questionable. The difficulty to deal with it within the climate law frame-
work can arise due to several factors – (i) trade- related issues are subject to the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the wto,334 (ii) this may not be in the interest of all 
parties, as experience suggests that developed countries prefer market- based 
approaches, (iii) in terms of impact however, some of these issues may affect 
developing country process and production, and lastly (iv) there has been 
some negative experience with such mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Given these factors, it is highly welcome that the enabling environment and 
capacity building feature prominently in the new technology framework as an 
integrated agenda.335
To throw a clearer light on the contours of the task at hand, the next section 
undertakes a comprehensive overview of the objective understanding of the 
barriers to the diffusion of lct s.
iii Growing Empirical Understanding of Technology Diffusion Barriers
This section serves as a synopsis of the current empirical understanding of the 
barriers to low- carbon technology diffusion that bear a potential linkage with 
trade rules. It presents the picture that is emerging from the scholarly litera-
ture, especially since the late 2000s. This includes – (i) studies that specifically 
focused on counting and analysing climate technology patents, (ii) those that 
focus on finding a broader range of barriers in a specific sector, or economy, 
 334 This is discussed at length from p. 80 onwards. This also forms the crux of Chapter 3.
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and (iii) the self- assessed barriers to prioritised mitigation technologies, as 
communicated by the developing countries.
All the studies commonly point out the prevalence of economic and finan-
cial challenges to low- carbon technology diffusion. The scope of the available 
research, however, remain scant both in terms of the sectoral coverage, as well 
as the number of countries studied. Drawing general conclusions therefrom 
can be informative, but not highly accurate. However, there is a higher prob-
ability for new and more comprehensive empirical analyses to rather corrob-
orate than differ with the insights that are currently available and presented 
hereunder.
A Studies on the Relevance of Intellectual Property Rights
Traditionally, the debate on patent flexibility vs protection grabs the most at-
tention when it comes to the issue of trade and technology transfer barriers. 
This debate often ends with split discourse of development vs diffusion.336 The 
developing countries tend to draw from their experience with ipr s in the field 
of public health protection, and conclude that easing of ipr s would facilitate 
access to climate technologies.337 Whereas, opposite views held by most devel-
oped countries indicate the innovation encouraging role of the ipr s through 
the promise of secured exploitation and the possibility of eventual disclosure.
One of the earliest studies looking at global patenting activities was done 
by Dechezleprêtre and others.338 The authors examined thirteen environmen-
tal technologies to locate the places of innovation and the role played by the 
developing countries, also to measure the extent of technology transfer. It was 
found that between 1978 and 2005, patenting activities in the studied areas 
were highly concentrated (90%) in twelve mostly oecd member countries.339 
With respect to the number of patents registered, developing countries were 
 336 David G Ockwell and others, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Low Carbon Technology 
Transfer:  Conflicting Discourses of Diffusion and Development’ (2010) 20 Global 
Environmental Change 729.
 337 See for example, Frederick M Abbott, Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address 
Climate Change:  Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public 
Health (ictsd International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 2009); 
Ahmed Abdel- Latif, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and the Transfer of Climate Change 
Technologies: Issues, Challenges, and Way Forward’ (2015) 15 Climate Policy 103, 106, 112.
 338 Antoine Dechezleprêtre and others, ‘Invention and Transfer of Climate Change– 
Mitigation Technologies: A Global Analysis’ (2011) 5 Review of Environmental Economics 
and Policy 109.
 339 Namely (in order from top), Japan, US, Germany, China, South Korea, Russia, Australia, 
France, UK, Canada, Brazil and Netherlands. The ranking changes with Germany on the 











found to be lagging far behind.340 The study concluded, among others, that the 
domestic policy environment, as well as the price of fossil fuel influence pat-
enting activities. Another key finding, later corroborated by other researchers 
was a spike in clean technology patenting from the 1990s. This was attributed 
to the growing number of international environmental regulation. Consider-
ing the gathered data on multiple filing of a patent application as a proxy of 
technology transfer, the study also concluded that such transfers took place 
largely within oecd countries, followed by 22% of transfers from the oecd to 
non- oecd countries, mainly China. Transfers between developing countries 
remained close to none (1%).
In a similar method, Lee et al. examined the patent landscape, concentra-
tion of ip, relationships between technology systems and policy implications 
thereof.341 Focused on patenting activities in six low- carbon energy technolo-
gies342 spanning from 1976 to 2007, the study confirmed the similar surge in 
patenting during the 1990s. In addition to the oecd countries, the authors 
named China as an important innovation hub. It was due to the growing 
Chinese market since the early 2000s, attracting foreign investments and in-
creased patent filing by their subsidiaries. The authors concluded that patent 
protection in the studied sector is not a hindrance to technology access as the 
patent ownerships did not result in the holders’ monopolistic dominance in 
the market. Instead of multiple filing, Lee and others looked at co- assignment 
of patents as a proxy for the evidence of collaboration and hence technolo-
gy diffusion. It was found most such activities took place within and between 
the oecd countries (95%), demonstrating synergistic relationships between 
firms, universities, and public research bodies.
Clean technology diffusion has been in the focus of the Global Challenges 
Reports periodically published by the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (wipo). As a part of that, Helm and others replicated the abovementioned 
research by Lee et al. with a longer range of data (till 2011) on four of the six 
selected technologies.343 It was found that that over the last five years of the 
period studied, there has been an immense growth in the number of patent 
 340 Taiwan in 21st, India in 27th and Mexico in 29th position. Dechezleprêtre and others (n 
338) 116.
 341 Bernice Lee, Ilian Iliev and Felix Preston, Who Owns Our Low Carbon Future?: Intellectual 
Property and Energy Technologies (Chatham House 2009).
 342 Wind, solar pv, concentrated solar power, biomass- to- electricity, carbon capture, and 
cleaner coal.
 343 Sarah Helm, Quentin Tannock and Ilian Iliev, ‘Renewable Energy Technology: Evolution 
and Policy Implications – Evidence from Patent Literature’ (wipo 2014) Global Challenges 
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filings in the selected technologies.344 Also, in certain cases, specific technolo-
gies (e.g. solar pv) outgrew other competitors within the sector. A novel find-
ing was that of the growth of developing country firms. In three of the four 
selected technologies, the authors noted the position of China as the leading 
patent family owner, contributed by the public research institutions and uni-
versities.345 Especially in the solar pv sector, the authors found the technolog-
ical front runners to be based in Asia.346
The 2015 wipo Global Challenges Report, authored by Lybecker and 
Lohse, focused on the role of intellectual property and other factors enabling 
the diffusion of green technologies.347 Based on a survey of secondary lit-
erature, the authors concluded that “[w] ell- developed systems to protect 
and enforce ip rights have been found to stimulate technology diffusion.”348 
One work was however mentioned, which finds protection of iprs resulting 
in rising costs of green technologies.349 The authors also highlight a range 
of market and behavioural failures that slow the rate of diffusion of green 
technologies.350 The market failures identified therein are energy market 
failures,351 capital market failures,352 innovation market failures,353 and in-
formation problems354.
An extensive study of the changing landscape of patents in clean energy 
technologies (cet)355 was jointly undertaken by the United Nations Environ-
ment Program (unep), the European Patent Office (epo), and the International 
 344 ibid 4.
 345 ibid 34.
 346 It is due to the growing dominant presence of South Korean (e.g. lg) and Indian (e.g. 
Suzlon) firms. ibid 22, 26, 32.
 347 Kristina M Lybecker and Sebastian Lohse, ‘Innovation and Diffusion of Green 
Technologies’ (wipo 2015)  Global Challenges Report <http:// www.wipo.int/ edocs/ pub-
docs/ en/ wipo_ rep_ gc_ 2015_ 1.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020.
 348 ibid 10– 12.
 349 Global Commission on the economy and climate, Better Growth, Better Climate: The New 
Climate Economy Report : The Global Report (2014) 261– 262.
 350 Lybecker and Lohse (n 347)  16. The structure was adapted from an earlier work, see 
Gillingham and Sweeney (n 82).
 351 Energy market failure includes causes such as untamed environmental externalities, 
average- cost electricity pricing, and lack of energy security. ibid.
 352 Capital market failure is caused by liquidity constraints. ibid.
 353 It arises from the lack of an innovator’s ability to prevent R&D spillovers. ibid.
 354 This includes information asymmetry, lack of information, principal- agent problem 
etc. ibid.
 355 Fifty technology categories (including renewable technologies like solar pv, wind turbine, 
geo thermal, and components like rotors and blades) were considered by the epo within 
























Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ictsd).356 The study again 
confirmed the fact of patent concentration in the oecd countries, as most of 
the applications were also found to be coming from a few key jurisdictions.357 
However, when the proportion of cet patents to the overall patenting activity 
in a location (i.e. relative importance given to cet) is considered, developing 
countries like Brazil, India, and Mexico come closer to the top in select sectors.
Noting that the data of multiple patent filing is an unsuitable proxy for 
technology transfer,358 the abovementioned study undertook a licensing sur-
vey to unearth the factors that influence technology owners’ tendency towards 
out- licensing and collaboration. The results indicate that firms that are inten-
sively involved in the cet sectors engage in collaborative ip activities more 
frequently than other firms.359 However, very few of such activities involve out- 
licensing to developing countries.360 Even where such involvement exists, the 
partner firm is most often located in China, Brazil, India, or Russia.361 A survey 
conducted among the firm managers revealed that key perceived out- licensing 
obstacles include transaction costs, difficulty in finding partners, and difficul-
ty in finding mutually agreeable terms of license (e.g. pricing, and geographic 
scope).362 It was also found that while robust domestic laws on intellectual 
property protection in the partner country would indeed be a considered fac-
tor, it is never the sole determinant of a firm’s decision to out- license.363 Other 
influencing factors were found to be the presence of scientific capability on 
the technology receiving side, market conditions, and investment climate.
A study by Copenhagen Economics focused specifically on whether iprs 
pose a barrier to climate technology transfer. The answer was negative because 
it was found that there was no significant price difference between patented 
and free technologies.364 The study further tended to argue that ipr s cannot 
be a significant problem to technology transfer in low- income countries simply 
 356 unep, epo and ictsd, ‘Patents and Clean Energy: Bridging the Gap between Evidence 
and Policy’ (unep, epo, ictsd 2010).
 357 Namely the USA, Japan, Germany, the UK and France, and the Republic of Korea.
 358 It is because of the fact that firms apply for patent protection in a specific jurisdiction not 
only to work it therein, but also for defensive purposes.
 359 unep, epo and ictsd (n 356) 56– 57.
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because those technologies are hardly ever patented in those regions.365 In 
contrast, absence of domestic ipr protection regulation, lack of absorptive 
capacity, and subsidies counterproductive to the climate protection goal were 
indicated as areas that may persist to prevent technology transfer.366
B Sector and Country- Focused Studies
Besides the above, other studies look at low- carbon technology diffusion with 
respect to specific geographies (mostly China, or India), sectors (e.g. wind, or 
solar pv based electricity production), or projects (e.g. gef financed cdm proj-
ects). Instead of zeroing in on ipr related concerns, these analyses deal with 
the opportunities and challenges faced by the private sector operators. They 
are, as a result, informative of a broader spectrum of hurdles on the path of 
clean technology adoption.
Barton looked at the relationship between the protection of ipr s and ac-
cess to clean energy technologies (cet s) in three sectors (solar pv, biomass, 
and wind).367 Studying the level of industry concentration368 in these sectors, 
he finds that those are mostly clustered in developed countries with the ex-
ception of some emerging developing country firms mainly in India (wind), 
China (solar pv), and Brazil. The conclusion drawn therefrom was that the 
industries in the studied sectors currently operate in an oligopolistic fashion 
with very little ipr related barrier to entry.369 As competition drives the prices 
of technologies down quickly, entrant firms from the developing countries do 
not face insurmountable barriers to entry, except for few instances concerning 
access to state of the art technologies.370 Barton, however, draws attention to 
other industry- specific hindrances, e.g. the protected markets of agricultural 
produce hurting the biofuel industry. Domestic favouritism in allocating pub-
lic research funds also breeds inefficiency, according to the author. To make the 
 365 ibid 15– 38. Abdel- Latif cautions against drawing such simplistic conclusions.; Abdel- Latif 
(n 337) 113.
 366 Copenhagen Economics and The ipr Company (n 364) 27– 33.
 367 John H Barton, Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing 
Countries (ictsd 2007)  <https:// seors.unfccc.int/ applications/ seors/ attachments/ get_ 
attachment?code=DM9V7CBIEL8AKG3C1YQLDMFTK64UOLUZ> accessed 25 October 
2020.
 368 Measured by number of shipments made in case of Solar pv, percentage of national pro-
duction capacity owned in case of Biomass, and percentage of global market share in case 
of Wind. Data used are collected from secondary sources.
 369 Barton (n 367) 4– 5. Barton is also one of the first to reject the argument for patent flexibil-















renewables competitive, Barton advocated for subsidies, designed and imple-
mented in a non- discriminatory fashion.
Lewis made a comparative analysis in the same year between two successful 
wind energy firms based in developing countries, i.e. Suzlon in India and Gold-
wind in China. The goal was to look at how the respective national policy con-
texts have influenced the firms’ technology acquisition and assimilation strate-
gies.371 The study shows that globally successful firms can emerge in developing 
countries even without needing ipr related flexibilities. Lewis highlights that 
corporations devise strategies to get the most benefit from the enabling policy 
frameworks put in place by domestic governments. In the Indian context, key 
policy enablers for Suzlon consisted of progressive central and regional sourc-
ing commitments, feed- in- tariffs, tax breaks, and certification schemes to en-
sure the quality of the components. Whereas in China, Goldwind benefitted 
from a progressive national target for generating renewable energy. The Chi-
nese firms were guaranteed long- term prices if they satisfied the local content 
requirement.372 They were also granted research subsidies.373 Both firms ini-
tially depended on licensing with smaller developed country firms to acquire 
necessary technologies. Subsequently Goldwind capitalised on the growing do-
mestic market, while Suzlon strategically established itself in key supply mar-
kets (e.g. USA), and innovation centres (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands), 
while benefitting from cheaper manufacturing in India at the same time.
Two field studies on clean technology were reported in a volume edited by 
Ockwell and Mallett on low- carbon technology transfer.374 One conducted by 
Pal and Sethi followed the uptake of energy- efficiency technology by Indian 
sme s in two sectors, i.e. glass foundry, and iron casting.375 They found that 
those sme s suffer from high transaction costs, as well as from deficiencies 
in expertise, knowledge, and information to take up new technologies. The 
case the authors followed was one where a domestic knowledge institution 
acted as a conduit between international technology and the sme s. Access to 
 371 Joanna I Lewis, ‘Technology Acquisition and Innovation in the Developing World: Wind 
Turbine Development in China and India’ (2007) 42 Studies in Comparative International 
Development 208.
 372 It should be noted that such an approach is in clear violation of current wto rules regu-
lating subsidies.
 373 Lewis (n 371) 217– 219.
 374 Ockwell and Mallett (n 54).
 375 Prosanto Pal and Girish Sethi, ‘Case Study:  Technology Transfer of Energy- Efficient 
Technologies among Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in India’ in David Ockwell 
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long- term and flexible funding was also provided to the businesses. The tech-
nologies in question were adapted to the local need and then implemented 
throughout the industry.
Watson and Byrne reported the other study, dealing with both mature376 and 
novel377 technologies in China. They found a positive effect of government in-
tervention in the market. The researchers concluded that transfer of the mature 
technologies was made possible due to an incremental policy push by the gov-
ernment over long- term, also at the same time adequate finance options being 
made available (gef for boilers, cdm for cement). Acquisition of relevant tech-
nologies by the Chinese firms also took place through joint ventures, license 
agreements with international smes, and R&D base acquisitions. Although 
local firms have acquired significant technological expertise in mature technol-
ogies, they still depended on international licenses. Unlike the Indian example 
above, the Chinese firms often preferred domestic technological solutions over 
the imported ones due to better access to know- how, and adaptability benefits. 
Technologies at or closer to the knowledge frontier nevertheless were difficult 
to gain access to due to non- cooperation by the original owners who are wary 
of the competition. With respect to the latest generation gas turbine technolo-
gy for integrated gasification combined cycle (igcc) power plants, lack of tech-
nical skills and access to the technology was found to be key problems. With 
respect to hybrid electric vehicles (hev s), lack of government policy backing, 
and absence of necessary supporting infrastructure were key obstacles.
Gallagher brought her long experience into play when looking at the evo-
lution of four specific technologies378 in the expanding Chinese clean energy 
sector.379 With respect to concerns regarding intellectual property thefts, the 
author found very little evidence of actual patent infringement on cet s.380 
Based on interviews, patent analysis and examination of domestic dispute 
settlement practices, Gallagher concluded that the established foreign oper-
ators in China take calculated risks and strategically manage their operations 
for twofold rewards – (i) better access to the Chinese domestic market, and 
(ii) overall export competitiveness.381 Protection of intellectual property was 
found to be concerns for both foreign and domestic firms in China. But none 
 376 Efficient boilers, and cement production technologies.
 377 Offshore wind power generation, hybrid electric vehicles (hev), integrated gasification 
and combined cycle (igcc) technologies.
 378 These are gas turbines, solar pv, advanced batteries for vehicles, and coal gasification 
technologies.
 379 Gallagher (n 71). See in particular Chapters 3, 4 and 7 of that volume.
 380 ibid 110– 114.














were so significant as to disrupt the growth of an industry. The most significant 
issue that calls for intervention is, according to Gallagher, the lack of a ‘natural’ 
market with a growing demand for cet s.382 This led the author to put the prin-
cipal focus on ‘market formation policies’ for further improvement.383 Market 
formation policies epitomise “stable, predictable, transparent and medium to 
long- term” policies that help build broad and sustained markets by tackling 
pervasive externalities and distortions.384
Haites and others analysed the cdm projects that referred to technology 
transfer in the project documents to find out the significant determinants 
of transfer in their specific context.385 Apart from finding a declining rate of 
technology transfer to the recipient countries over time,386 the authors further 
discover a positive relationship between the level of technology transfer and 
project size.387 Moreover, technology transfer declines if the same country has 
several projects of the same type.388 Although the study itself does not report 
any conclusive findings regarding barriers to transfer, a similar study done by 
the same authors for the unfccc in 2010 presented a counter- intuitive con-
clusion that countries facing economic or intellectual property rights related 
barriers experience more technology transfers through the cdm.389 The au-
thors’ conjecture on the possible reason of such finding is that the financial 
security of the cdm projects may attract to the host country technologies that 
would otherwise not be introduced by the private entities.390
Haum studied an off- grid solar pv project implemented in India, to assess 
the role of the gef finance in the development of technological capacity.391 
The study was based on the premise that technology transfer through mar-
ket transformation should only be considered successful if it resulted in the 
 382 ibid 74– 77.
 383 ibid 96– 101, 167– 173.
 384 ibid 96– 97, 171– 172.
 385 Haites and others (n 313).
 386 This is due to the fact that once a technology is introduced in the recipient country, it 
loses novelty for the purpose of analysis. Also given the fact that cdm projects tended to 
concentrate in a few countries, such decline should be reasonably expected.
 387 Haites and others (n 313) 175– 179.
 388 ibid.
 389 Seres, Haites and Murphy (n 313) 18, 22.
 390 ibid 22, 50.
 391 The Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative (pvmti) is one of the earliest gef 
financed market transformation projects. See, Ruediger Haum, ‘Project- Based Market 
Transformation in Developing Countries and International Technology Transfer: The Case 
of Globel Environment Facility and Solar Photovoltaics’ in David Ockwell and Alexandra 
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incremental development of the capacity to innovate among recipients.392 
For the new innovative capacity to come out, it was also important that there 
is steady demand for the technology in the market. Haum found out that the 
studied project resulted in some new demands for off- grid solar home systems, 
but the scale or the quality thereof was not adequate for the domestic cell and 
module manufacturers to further develop their technological capacity. One 
qualified conclusion drawn by the author is that for market transformation to 
work as envisaged by the gef, the size of the market intervention has to be 
large enough to create incentives at a scale attractive for the domestic manufac-
turers, which is currently not the case. Haum also indicated a positive influence 
of the domestic market size, and size of the relevant economic sector on tech-
nology transfer, as the suppliers are more interested to cater to bigger markets.
C Technology Barriers Perceived by Developing Countries
Technology needs assessments (tna s)393 provide an outlook of the barriers 
faced by the developing countries in adopting, inter alia, prioritised mitiga-
tion technologies. As of yet, around eighty- five countries have completed the 
tna process. Three synthesis reports,394 published by the unfccc secretariat 
since 2006, allow an aggregate overview of eighty countries.395 The summary 
reports describe, among others, the type of mitigation technologies prioritised 
as necessary by the participating non- Annex i countries, the key barriers in de-
ployment and diffusion of the same, as well as the possible measures necessary 
to remove such obstacles.
Barrier analysis in the submitted tna s largely follow the categorisation of 
barriers in the related guidebooks.396 The tna guidebook on barrier analysis 
indicates that barriers to technology transfer can be classified in ten catego-
ries, which are – (i) economic and financial, (ii) market failures, (iii) policy, 
legal and regulatory, (iv) network failures, (v) institutional and organizational 
capacity, (vi) human skills, (vii) social, cultural and behavioural, (viii) informa-
tion and awareness, (ix) technical, and (x) others.397 The information box (Box 
 392 ibid 187– 190.
 393 For a brief description, see Box 1 at p. 60 above.
 394 The first published in 2006, the second and the third in 2009 and in 2013 respectively.
 395 The second report, which expanded upon the first one focused on all the tna s until that 
date, being 70 in total. The third tna synthesis report was prepared in response to the 
sbsta request to provide a summary of the tna s completed under the Poznan strategic 
program. Out of the 31 tna s included there, 10 were from countries which were not avail-
able in the second report. All add up to 80.
 396 See, for example, Boldt and others (n 55) 15– 25.















2) below provides an illustrative account of individual non- Annex i members’ 
perception of technology transfer barriers.
A key insight emerging from the synthesis reports is that the need to tack-
le economic and market- related barriers is perceived as most significant by 
almost all the parties. The second report showed that this category of barri-
ers was mentioned by most (82%) of the countries with regard to prioritised 
mitigation technologies.398 The third report assigned more than 90% of the 
responses to this category.399 Economic and market- related barriers include 
problems such as high cost of the technologies, related affordability problem, 
and the availability of cheaper but more polluting alternatives, the difficulty 
of finding finance due to the lack of interest shown by the private sectors (e.g. 
banks and other financiers), underdeveloped markets, irregularity of supply, 
etc.400 Energy technologies, the sector most prioritised by the parties regard-
ing mitigation, also suffered from the same barriers.401 Apart from econom-
ic barriers, the next big obstacles were categorised as policy and regulatory 
barriers, and technical barriers.402 The technical barrier category deserves 
attention, as problems within that category, e.g. the inadequacy of appro-
priate standards, codes, and certification are particularly related to the wto 
rules.403 Other repeated mentions included lack of human capacity and state 
resources, shortage of information on appropriate technologies, the complex-
ity of new technologies, institutional capacity shortage, etc.404 Among the 
measures highlighted by countries for removal of the barriers included, in-
ter alia, state involvement in attracting foreign investment, gaining access to 
different international and national funding sources, rationalising prices and 
removal of unreasonable subsidies, introducing energy- efficiency evaluation 
standards, increasing R&D activities, etc.405 Most of the parties underscored 
 398 unfccc, ‘Second Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties Not 
Included in Annex I  to the Convention’ (2009) Note by the secretariat fccc/ sbsta/ 
2009/ inf.1 28– 30.
 399 unfccc, ‘Third Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties Not 
Included in Annex I to the Convention’ (2013) Note by the secretariat fccc/ sbsta/ 2013/ 
inf.7 25– 27.
 400 unfccc, ‘Second Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties Not 
Included in Annex I to the Convention’ (n 398) 28– 30.
 401 unfccc, ‘Third Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties Not Included 
in Annex I to the Convention’ (n 399) 25– 27.
 402 ibid 6, 25– 26.
 403 ibid 26.
 404 unfccc, ‘Second Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties Not 
Included in Annex I to the Convention’ (n 398) 28– 30.
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the need for financial incentives, commonly in the form of tax exemptions on 
imported technologies. The report further highlighted the need for detailed 
regulations and standards, technology information availability, also for facil-
itation of stakeholder networks to overcome policy, technical and network 
failures.406 The third report notes that some of the members indicate the 
need for further clarification of the relationship between intellectual prop-
erty rights and technology transfer, but it was not registered as a significant 
barrier.407
Recently, Sara Traerup and others prepared a report providing a compre-
hensive account of barriers and enablers for the technology executive com-
mittee (tec). The report covers the tna s made by the developing countries 
so far, their nationally determined contributions (ndc s), also technical assis-
tance requests made by countries to the ctcn.408 The overall findings echo 
the conclusions above to a large extent. The authors find economic and fi-
nancial barriers to be the single most significant hurdle for the least devel-
oped countries (ldc s) and the small island developing countries (sidc s).409 
A new finding was that the examined documents vary on the order of signif-
icance of other barriers. While the synthesis of information from the ndc s 
and the ctcn requests show technical barriers to be the most significant cat-
egory,410 the information from the tna reports appear to put slightly more 
emphasis on policy and regulatory obstacles, as well as market imperfec-
tions.411 In the technical category, one key problem was poor quality, or per-
formance of clean technologies, which the authors suggested to be tackled 
through appropriate standardisation initiatives.412 It was also noted that with 
respect to none of the desired technologies, economic and financial barriers 
were the only set of problems. This means that successful technology transfer 
would require a integrated, system- wide approach to overcome the existing 
problems.
 406 unfccc, ‘Third Synthesis Report on Technology Needs Identified by Parties Not Included 
in Annex I to the Convention’ (n 399) 28.
 407 ibid 41.
 408 Sara Traerup, L Greersen and C Kundsen, ‘Mapping Barriers and Enabling Environments 
in Technology Needs Assessments, Nationally Determined Contributions, and Technical 
Assistance of the Climate Technology Centre and Network’ (2018) Background paper 
tec/ 2018/ 17/ 4.
 409 ibid 7.
 410 ibid 6, 9.

















Box 2: Illustration of Barrier Analysis: tna s of Moldova and Kenya413
The Republic of Moldova completed its tna in 2012. In respect of the 
technology prioritised in the energy sector, i.e. combined heat and power 
generation using internal combustion engines (ice chp), the analysis 
indicated a range of economic, financial, and market- related barriers 
among others. It was indicated that the implementation of ice chp tech-
nology has a potential of ghg emission reduction of up to 24,415 tCO2 by 
2020. A key identified problem was high upfront cost of the technology, 
which meant that the economy of scale was achievable only on high in-
vestment levels. This was problematic due to small market size and high 
cost of finance. Also, there was no incentive (e.g. tax benefit, or pricing 
of negative externalities) in the markets for shifting to this technology. 
The barrier was further compounded by an absence of energy efficien-
cy regulation and little experience of the regulating agency in this area. 
Moreover, some segments of the domestic market, i.e. district heating, 
were dominated by a few providers under an oligopolistic fashion. Mea-
sures planned by Moldova for overcoming the barriers included import 
duty exemption on the ice chp technology, energy efficiency regulation, 
optimisation of district heating market along with transparent cost allo-
cation on heat and power, informational awareness and strengthening of 
the regulatory agency.
The barrier analysis done by Kenya in 2013 as a part of the tna pro-
cess, solar home systems (shs) and solar dryers were identified as pri-
oritised mitigation technology in the energy sector. The key problem in 
mainstreaming shs technology was found to be prohibitive costs. Re-
quirement of high upfront investment, cost of repair and maintenance, 
absence of any subsidies on the component prices, and high interest 
rates (15% to 30%) charged on private loans, cumulatively prevented 
large scale deployment and diffusion of the technology. Issues that act 
as barriers to deployment of solar dryers were also found to be similar. 
Measures planned to remove those barriers in Kenya included steps to 
strengthen domestic regulatory institutions and standards, and creating 
linkages with internationally available support funds. Besides, corrup-
tion control was also identified as a necessary measure. Kenya planned 
to overcome supply and cost problems of the required technologies 
through setting up domestic manufacturing and assembling plants.
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D Summary Analysis
While not exhaustive, the growing body of empirical evidence on the barri-
ers to low- carbon technology diffusion contains important insights that must 
be reflected in rulemaking and domestic policy formulations. We summarise 
those as follows - 
 
a) Low- Carbon Technology Diffusion Is a Developing Country- Specific 
Problem
Transfer of technology on commercial terms work well between partners who 
are equally well- off in terms of technical and financial capability. The large- 
scale patent and license data surveys revealed that innovation and transfer of 
clean technologies is not a problem in the oecd member countries. In con-
trast, developing countries suffer a range of economic, financial, and technical 
barriers that prevent private commercial transactions from taking place. How-
ever, we find that some of the developing countries (especially, China, Korea, 
India, and Brazil) are increasingly changing this polarisation by catching up 
and leading the market in specific technologies.
b) While Patent Protection Is Not an Apparent Major Problem, Further 
Clarification Is Desirable
So far, it can be said that a robust domestic system for the protection of in-
tellectual property rights is one of the many factors positively influencing a 
foreign firm’s propensity to transfer technology. Although patenting activity 
in clean technologies has surged over the recent decades, market competition 
and availability of alternatives in most sectors have prevented monopolies 
from arising. This is why the majority of scholarly opinions tend to favour the 
position that legal protection granted to intellectual property rights is a posi-
tive rather than a negative factor for the diffusion of low- carbon technologies. 
However, given the limited amount of studies, drawing general conclusions is 
difficult, also premature. To the extent information is available, no such obsta-
cle has been found – especially in sectors where the technology is already com-
mercially available.414 There is opportunity, and necessity too, to expand the 
scope of the studies focusing on the relationship between intellectual property 
rights and clean technologies, especially looking at issues of plant variety pro-
tection, or issues other than patents.415
 414 See section iii A above.
 415 Bradly J Condon, ‘Climate Change and Intellectual Property Rights for New Plant Varieties’ 










c) Domestic and International Policies Should Target the Actual 
Obstacles Faced by Private Firms
While ipr s are not found to pose significant obstacles in the different climate 
technology areas explored, sector or location- specific studies invariably find 
a significant positive impact of enabling policy frameworks that ease private 
firms’ access and adoption of the technologies. In varying factual contexts, 
policy measures such as long- term guaranteed price, access to appropriate 
finance, local- content requirements, and energy efficiency regulations have 
been found to be beneficial. In addition, development of understanding and 
skills to adapt a new technological solution to local needs is important. Con-
sidering these aspects, the technology needs assessments (tna s), and barriers 
identified in the process are of special relevance.
The available syntheses of the tna reports overwhelmingly point to the 
economic and financial problems as the most significant barrier to climate 
technology diffusion. High prices, difficult financing, and little incentive in the 
market make technology adoption difficult. These problems are compounded 
by other issues like skills shortage, and absence of technical standards.
d) Market Development Is Very Important
The need for specific and coordinated attention to develop markets for clean 
technologies is undeniable. The highly shared view of pervasive economic and 
financial barriers as key obstacles are irrefutable indications of widespread 
market and system failure affecting climate technology dissemination. Studies 
therefore correctly highlight the need for medium to long- term policy inter-
ventions to tackle different forms of market failures.416 This is an important 
insight to carry on to the study of the trade rules, which, if allowed, can posi-
tively influence market formation by tackling some of the price barriers, and 
creating room for enahanced financial supports, as well as other incentives.417
The rest of this chapter focuses on tracing the current rules and related de-
velopments in the trade regime relevant for low- carbon technology diffusion.
iv Developments in Trade Regulation
References to technology transfer appear in the body of laws of the multi-
lateral trade regime, and also in negotiations and deliberations from time to 
 416 See p. 79 above. Also in particular, Lybecker and Lohse (n 347).
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time. Concrete provisions regarding technology transfer only exist in the trips 
agreement. Some provisions regarding technical assistance also appear in oth-
er areas of the wto universe, but those are more tailored towards facilitating 
a specific objective. That apart, the wto rules on removal of market access 
restrictions on trade in goods and services play a direct role in facilitating clean 
technology diffusion. In addition, one wto working group is tasked with ex-
ploring the linkages between technology transfer and trade – a decades- long 
endeavour yet to bear fruit.
Beyond the boundaries of multilateralism, references to technological as-
sistance and transfer of technology appears in some preferential trade agree-
ments. Non- reciprocal unilateral preferences like the generalised system of 
preferences (gsp) and the Enabling Clause can also become of relevance as 
important routes to support the developing countries. Beyond the domain of 
the wto, the unctad is continuously engaged in research and communica-
tion in this area.
In the backdrop of the absence of any resounding success along the avenues 
mentioned above, recently transfer of technology has come up as a contentious 
point of dispute between key members. All these are discussed hereunder.
A Existing Multilateral Rules
(i) The trips Agreement
The wto Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(trips) is a partial conclusion of the bargain between developed and devel-
oping countries that began in the nieo context and led to the failed code of 
conduct.418 It has already been mentioned earlier in this chapter that transfer 
of technology is one of the objectives of the trips agreement. It is also the sub-
ject of a strict obligation imposed on the developed countries for the benefit of 
the ldc s. Alongside, the trips agreement emphasises the need to maintain 
effective competition regulations to prevent de facto monopolies as a result of 
the ipr protection.
Articles 7 and 8 elucidate the general approach taken in trips towards 
technology transfer and its linkage with the protection of the ipr s. Article 7 
contains an expectation that technology transfer is achieved through protec-
tion and enforcement of the ipr s.419 Following up, Article 8 recognises that 
additional measures may be required (e.g. competition regulation) to prevent 
 418 See the beginning of this chapter.
 419 Article 7, Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (n 227). It 
holds that ‘[t] he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should con-








abuse of ipr s in ways that prevent technology transfer.420 It also mentions 
that public policy measures need to be consistent with the agreement.421 The 
general scheme therefore leads to the conclusion that in the absence of actions 
in pursuance of the obligation to transfer technology, protection of ipr s is in 
itself a contribution to the facilitation of technology transfer.
However, the trips agreement provides options, namely, reducing the scope 
of patent rights, or issuance of a license, which can be of use to further ensure 
technology diffusion. Articles 27 allows for exclusion of specific areas from the 
scope of patentability. Such exclusion can be for protection of public order 
or morality,422 or can cover therapeutic processes and plant varieties.423 The 
latter among those is only allowed subject to the condition that comparable 
alternate protection is put in place. Article 30 allows limitation of the exclu-
sivity of patent rights subject to the condition that it does not ‘unreasonably’ 
interfere with the interests of the holder. Governments can, therefore, issue 
licenses without the authorisation of the patent holder to, inter alia, prevent 
anti- competitive practices.424 Under appropriate circumstances, these options 
can be of use to dismantle patent exclusivity related barriers to the diffusion 
of any technology.
Article 66.2 of trips imposes a positive obligation upon developed coun-
tries to transfer technology in the following terms:
[…] Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterpris-
es and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and 
encouraging technology transfer to least- developed country Members in 
order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base.425
Although the provision uses strict obligatory language (‘shall’), the subject- 
matter of that obligation is not to transfer technology to the ldc s, but to pro-
vide incentives to domestic firms. The goal of such incentives is to ‘promote 
and encourage’ those firms to transfer technologies to the ldc s. Therefore, it 
can be questioned whether successful transfers of technologies from the de-
veloped countries to the ldc s are required to effectively discharge this obliga-
tion. More on this can be found in the following section.
 420 Article 8.2, ibid.
 421 Article 8.1, ibid.
 422 Article 27.2, ibid.
 423 Article 27.3, ibid.
 424 Sub- paragraph (k) of Article 31, ibid.
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(ii) Other Relevant Rules under the Covered Agreements
Apart from the trips agreement provisions carrying over some of the earlier 
political conflicts into the wto, there are some other relevant commitments 
with respect to technological assistance, easing of market access and subsidi-
sation. Assistance provisions mentioned here are of soft law nature, and there-
fore not capable to form the basis of a legal claim. More importantly, as these 
provisions are not exclusive to the lct- related goods or services, they can be 
equally used to facilitate emission intensive trades as well.
a) Rules for Easing Technology- Related Goods and Services Market Access
Trade flows of lct- embedded goods are directly dependent on the market 
access regulations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt), es-
pecially those on tariffs. While all the wto members are obliged to submit 
schedules containing maximum rates of tariffs, the levels mentioned therein 
are then subjected to multilateral negotiation rounds with a view to their grad-
ual decrease.426 The negotiations are to be carried out with adequate consid-
eration for the needs and situations of individual members and industries.427 
It is also possible to reduce tariffs unilaterally, as long as the benefit is made 
equally available to all members.
In a similar fashion, market access regulation in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (gats) is relevant to ensure that services that are integrat-
ed with lct s are available domestically in competitive terms. For example, 
construction, engineering and consultancy services play a supportive role 
in renewable energy projects. Financial services are important to bridge the 
resource constraints faced by private firms interested in new technologies. 
Opening of a specific services sector is exclusively a member’s prerogative, re-
alised through positive commitments in its Schedule.428 Similar to the gatt, 
periodic negotiation rounds should take place to gradually increase effective 
market access on trade in services for all members, while according flexibility 
for the developing countries.429
The gats further obliges the developed wto members, also the developing 
members to establish contact points to facilitate information availability to 
the developing country suppliers. Information that is sought to be made easily 
 426 Article xxviii bis, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 unts 299; 33 ilm 1197 (1994)).
 427 Article xxviii bis, ibid paragraph 3.
 428 Articles xvi, and xx, General Agreement on Trade in Services 1994 (Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 unts 183; 33 ilm 1167 (1994)).












available includes, among others, “the availability of services technology”.430 
Special priority is provided to the least- developed countries (ldc s) in such 
facilitation effort.
b) Provisions for Assistance Regarding Adoption of Green Standards
To the extent that adoption of new technologies also involves conforming 
to technical regulations and standards, the Agreement of Technical Barriers 
to Trade (tbt) comes in play. Article 11 of the tbt agreement requires wto 
members to advise and provide technical assistance to other members upon 
request, especially when such a request comes from a developing country 
member. The technical assistance is relating to different regulatory and com-
pliance aspects of conformity assessment procedures between the countries, 
the establishment of standardising bodies, and participation in international 
standardising bodies.431 It is also provided that members shall encourage other 
bodies within their territories involved in conformity assessments to engage in 
similar advice and technical assistance.432 However developing country mem-
bers are not expected to use international standards as a basis for domestic 
standard- setting, if such are not commensurate with their financial, develop-
mental, or trade needs.433 Similar to above, the special needs of the ldc s are 
to be especially prioritised in this regard.
c) Easier Subsidy Disciplines for Developing Countries
The developing countries, especially the least- developed ones, can make use 
of the relaxed subsidy disciplines to support domestic firms’ adoption of clean 
technology. The wto agreement on subsidies (ascm) does not prevent ldc s 
from export subsidisation.434 While the developing countries are supposed to 
phase out prohibited subsidies eventually, some may be maintained on justified 
grounds subject to review by the subsidies committee.435 Also, subsidies below 
a de minimis level by the developing countries shall not be countervailed.436
 430 Article iv.2(c), ibid.
 431 Articles 11.2 – 11.6, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 1994 (Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 unts 120).
 432 Article 11.7, ibid.
 433 Article 12.4, ibid.
 434 Article 27.2(a) and Annex vii, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
1994 (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 
unts 14).
 435 Article 27.4, ibid.
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Also relevant to note in this regard is the lapse of non- actionable subsidies 
under the scm agreement. Article 8 of the ascm was drafted to keep three 
broad categories of domestic subsidies beyond scrutiny at the wto – name-
ly (i) subsidies for research and development,437 (ii) subsidies for the devel-
opment of disadvantaged regions,438 and most importantly (iii) subsidies for 
compliance with environmental requirements.439 Each category had to com-
ply with specific threshold limitations to be considered as non- actionable. The 
disagreements over the continuation of these supports resulted into the dis-
mantling of non- actionable subsidies in 1999.440
Similar support measures remain available to members with respect to agri-
cultural products. While Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture ensures that 
a member’s aggregate amount of domestic support stay within committed lev-
els,441 Annex 2 lays out some of the exemptions accorded to public services and 
programs in this regard, as long as those are not de facto price supports. Included 
in that scheme are government services, including environmental research re-
lated to agriculture, training services, extension and advisory services to transfer 
the knowledge gained from research.442 These options can be used to domes-
tically explore and promote ways of less emission intensive farming methods. 
However, like most other provisions discussed, these are also general in nature.
B Negotiations and Deliberations at the wto and unctad
(i) The trips Council
The trips Council is the body responsible for the administration of trips 
agreement. In 2003, it was decided at the Council that the developed mem-
bers will be required to report periodically on steps taken to implement Article 
66.2 of the agreement.443 Pursuant to the decision, a number of the developed 
members have been reporting444 on the incentives granted by them. Already 
 437 Article 8.2(a), ibid.
 438 Article 8.2(b), ibid.
 439 Article 8.2(c), ibid.
 440 For details, see, Dominic Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures :  Balancing Policy Space and Legal Constraints (Cambridge University Press 
2014) 187– 189.
 441 Article 6.1, Agreement on Agriculture 1994 (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 unts 410).
 442 Annex 2, para 2, ibid.
 443 World Trade Organization, ‘Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement: 
Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 19 February 2003’ (2003) ip/ c/ 28.
 444 Every third year, new reports are submitted which are then reviewed and discussed in 




















in 2011, Moon demonstrated the difficulty to measure how much technology 
transfer actually took place due to the trips provision. The scope of the re-
ports has remained ambiguous due to the absence of a common understand-
ing of what technology transfer actually meant. There was also no specificity 
as to how a transfer is taking place.445 Later, while tracing the development up 
till 2016, Watal and Caminero reemphasised on the absence of a shared under-
standing, as well as found shortcomings in the conduct of both the developed 
and the ldc members.446 On developed countries’ front, it was noted that 
the reports were often compiled from data obtained from different agencies, 
which appeared to be a recapitulation of the countries’ official development 
assistance (oda) activities. The authors argued further that a reason behind 
there not being a meaningful development in reporting is the lack of engage-
ment from the ldc side in the question and response sessions that follow the 
reports. Authors conclude that “[m] eaningfully improving Article 66.2 imple-
mentation and reporting requires continuous and effective engagement of the 
part of both developed country and ldc member delegations”.447
The reports submitted since the above assessment448 show that most mem-
bers’ reports lump a broad range of aid and support activities into technology 
transfer. To give a sense of how varied the items reported can be, the recent 
reports included mentions of training events, scholarship programs, specific 
financed projects, donation to international funds, and etc. One important no-
ticeable issue however is that due to the broad range of activities reported, 
most are matters that bear no relationship with intellectual property protec-
tion at all. This is a consistent subsequent practice, which has given the legal 
meaning of Article 66.2 a scope that goes beyond the subject- matter limit of 
the trips. The reports reviewed also show that countries frequently mention 
climate change related projects, e.g. those for renewable energy generation, as 
technology transfer incentives.
In a proposal to enable effective implementation of the technology transfer 
commitment, the ldc group requested the trips council to deliberate and 
 445 Suerie Moon, Meaningful Technology Transfer to the LDCs:  A Proposal for a Monitoring 
Mechanism for TRIPS Article 66.2 (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ictsd) 2011).
 446 Jayashree Watal and Leticia Caminero, ‘Least- Developed Countries, Transfer of Technology 
and the TRIPS Agreement’ (World Trade Organization 2018)  wto Staff Working Paper 
ersd- 2018- 01. The paper also contains a succint account of the evolution of Article 66.2 
monitoring mechanism.
 447 ibid 25.
 448 Latest sets of reports, submitted in 2015 (ip/ c/ w/ 611/ Add.1– 6) and 2018 (ip/ c/ w/ 646/ 
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decide that the developed countries should only report incentives that are ex-
tended to the ldc s for technology transfer.449 Moreover, the ldc group pro-
posal also called for deliberation on the language, “incentives to enterprises 
and institutions”, as found in Article 66.2.
(ii) The Committee on Trade and Environment (cte and ctess)
Established in parallel with the wto itself,450 the committee on trade and en-
vironment has become the hub to share information and deliberate on the 
trade and environmental issues in general, including issues involving trade and 
climate change. The regular sessions of the committee serves as a platform 
to deliberate on a range of matters, in the forefront being the Doha issues – 
(i) market access impact of environmental measures, including possible eco-
nomic and environmental benefit of lowering trade restrictions, (ii) relevant 
provisions of the trips agreement, (iii) labelling requirements for environ-
mental purposes, (iv) issues of technical assistance, and (v)  environmental 
and developmental aspects of the negotiations. The committee is periodically 
briefed by the wto members on various environmental issues, as well as in-
ternational organisations. The unfccc has since long been an observer at the 
committee.
A key contribution of the cte to attain trade and climate coherence is en-
suring transparency through making information available. By the cte au-
thorisation, the wto secretariat periodically publishes an updated environ-
mental database, collecting and sorting all the environmental notifications in 
the wto. The database is informative regarding the the frequency and nature 
of climate change related regulations notified to the wto, although a clear 
classification is not maintained. Another important contribution is a periodic 
publication of a matrix of environmental provisions that bear upon trade. The 
latest version takes account of the Paris Agreement.451
Since 2010, the deliberation and briefing activity of the cte, within the 
scope of the above- mentioned mandate, has encountered issues that bear 
upon climate change. Member representatives of the ‘friends of the fossil fuel 
reform’ group have kept the committee abreast of the efforts being made in 
 449 World Trade Organization, ‘Proposal on the Implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement: Communication from Cambodia on Behalf of the LDC Group’ (2018) ip/ c/ 
w/ 640.
 450 Uruguay Round ministerial decision on trade and environment, 15 April 1994.
 451 wto Secretariat, ‘Matrix on Trade- Related Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements’ (World Trade Organization 2017) Note by the Secretariat wt/ 









cutting down unreasonable fossil fuel subsidies. There has been a consistent 
discussion of accounting and implementation methods of carbon footprint-
ing, including a recent briefing on the iso 14067 standard.452 Members were 
also informed on the progress of the plurilateral environmental goods agree-
ment negotiation.453 Country experiences regarding trade and climate change 
interrelationships, trade components of respective ndc s were also shared. 
The unfccc also kept the members periodically updated on the progress of 
the climate negotiations.454
The discussion in the regular sessions of the cte also outlines the hard- 
lined divergence of views amongst members. For example, with respect to in-
formation briefs regarding the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, it was viewed by 
some as beyond the scope of the committee.455 A similar view is also shared by 
some members regarding discussions on climate- related issues, holding that 
it is of exclusive unfccc domain.456 This position also affected a recent pro-
posal on deepening the understanding of trade and climate relationship.457 
Some others objected to the focus of the platform becoming almost exclusively 
climate- related.458 Members’ supplied updates on the progress of the plurilat-
eral environmental goods agreement (ega) was also treated by some as being 
information only, and criticised by some for breaking out from the multilateral 
 452 Committee on Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 20 June 2017: Note 
by the Secretariat’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2017) wt/ cte/ m/ 63 16.
 453 Committee on Trade and Environment, ‘Report (2015) of the Committee on Trade and 
Environment’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2015) wt/ cte/ 22 4– 5.
 454 ibid 5.
 455 It is a consistent position maintained by Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. See, Committee 
on Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 28 June 2018:  Note by the 
Secretariat’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2018)  wt/ cte/ m/ 65 5; Committee on 
Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 1 November 2017:  Note by 
the Secretariat’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2018)  wt/ cte/ m/ 64 4; Committee 
on Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 20 June 2017:  Note by the 
Secretariat’ (n 452) 3; Also supported by Qatar, Committee on Trade and Environment, 
‘Report of the Meeting Held on 14 and 15 November 2016: Note by the Secretariat’ (World 
Trade Organization (wto) 2017) wt/ cte/ m/ 62.
 456 Position held by Saudi Arabia, Russian Federation and Venzuela over recent years, 
Committee on Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 28 June 2018: Note 
by the Secretariat’ ibid 14; Committee on Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting 
Held on 20 June 2017: Note by the Secretariat’ (n 452) 26– 27.
 457 Committee on Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 14 and 15 
November 2016: Note by the Secretariat’ (n 455) 19– 20.
 458 View of Morocco and Bolivia, Committee on Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the 
Meeting Held on 30 June 2016: Note by the Secretariat’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 
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platform.459 The iso standard on carbon footprint was challenged on grounds 
of being undemocratic, not differential enough, and a trade barrier for devel-
oping country interests.460
The negotiation agenda mandated by Article 31 of the Doha declaration was 
pursued by the wto members in the special sessions of the cte. The mandate 
included negotiation in three areas – (i) relationship between the trade obli-
gations and trade- related commitments in the mea s, (ii) institutional coordi-
nation between the wto and the mea s, and (iii) reduction of tariff and non- 
tariff barriers to trade in environmental goods and services. Over the last two 
decades, none of the three avenues has resulted in fruition. Developments in 
policy and jurisprudential approaches in recent times have made the necessity 
of negotiated rules for trade and environment harmonisation largely redun-
dant.461 For example, the commendable jurisprudential approach by the Ap-
pellate Body has contributed to creating a level of certainty about the expected 
consequences of environment- conscious trade measures. Also, to the extent 
trade and climate change institutional coordination is concerned, ad hoc ap-
proaches have developed, and each institutions is granted observer status in 
relevant proceedings of the other. However, it is true that neither of the organi-
sation can influence the other’s agenda- setting. On the third avenue, the latest 
available unclassified information (from 2011) suggest deep divides lingering 
between developed and developing members on the scope of negotiation, and 
approach to be followed (i.e. list based, project- based, hybrid, or request and 
offer system).462 The difficulty of arriving at a multilateral consensus has seen 
in 2014 the triggering of a plurilateral approach. Though such a breakout sig-
nifies stronger ambition on the part of some members, reports and comments 
thereupon in the regular session suggest that the initiative also resulted in a 
possible lack of engagement by those members in the multilateral process.463 
The issue remains hamstrung to this day.
 459 View shared by Bolivia, Argentina, India and Cuba, ibid 34; Committee on Trade and 
Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 6 October 2015: Note by the Secretariate’ 
(World Trade Organization (wto) 2016) wt/ cte/ m/ 60 18.
 460 Committee on Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 20 June 2017: Note 
by the Secretariat’ (n 452) 16– 17.
 461 Cossy and Marceau (n 92) 391.
 462 Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session (ctess), ‘Report by the 
Chairman, Ambassador Manuel A.  J. Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee’ 
(World Trade Organization (wto) 2011) tn/ te/ 20 2– 3, 15– 17. According to the Chairman, 
‘[t] he primary area requiring delegations’ urgent attention relates to agreeing on an 
approach to coverage’.
 463 Committee on Trade and Environment, ‘Report of the Meeting Held on 6 October 












(iii) The Working Group on Trade and Technology Transfer (wgttt)
The working group was established in response to the need felt by the devel-
oping countries,464 including the ldc s465 for a common platform to clarify 
and implement the special and differential treatment provisions. Unlike the 
ldc s in the trips council, there was no wto forum where the developing 
countries could discuss the need for technology transfer. Nor was there any 
similar incentive schemes like that of the trips Article 66.2. Prior to the Doha 
Ministerial Conference in 2001, a large number of developing countries voiced 
the desire to establish a work program on the issue.466 In response, the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration established the wgttt with a mandate to examine 
the relationship between trade and technology transfer, also to make possible 
recommendations to increase technology flow to the developing countries.467 
The Hong Kong Ministerial later provided a rolling mandate to continue work 
in the group.468
The exploratory part of the wgttt mandate involved hearing from vari-
ous international organisations engaged in the area and side by side sharing 
of members’ experiences regarding technology transfer. Over the past decade 
and more, the group heard many presentations and briefings from all the ma-
jor international organisations.469 Issues the wgttt deliberated upon as a 
result of the briefings included the impact of home country measures, or tax-
ation policies on technology transfer, trends of cross- border technology flow, 
of the Meeting Held on 30 June 2016:  Note by the Secretariat’ (n 458)  35. This view is 
expressed by Venzuela, Argenta, India, Cuba and Bolivia during 2015 and 2016 meetings.
 464 The earliest request was made by India, prior to the Seattle Ministerial Conference. 
‘Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Communication from India’ (General 
Council, wto 1999) wt/ gc/ w/ 352.
 465 Committee on Trade and Development, ‘Proposed Work Programme for the Year 
2000:  Communication from Zambia’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2000)  wt/ 
comtd/ w/ 67; Committee on Trade and Development, ‘Proposal for Sub- Committee 
Work Programme: Communication from Zambia’ (Committee on Trade and Development, 
wto 2001) wt/ comtd/ ldc/ w/ 24.
 466 ‘Preparations for the Fourth Session of the Ministerial Conference: Communication from 
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe’ (General Council, wto 2001) wt/ gc/ w/ 443.
 467 Paragraph 37, ‘Doha Ministerial Declaration’ (n 93). It provided, ‘[w] e agree to an exam-
ination […] of the relationship between trade and transfer of technology, and of any pos-
sible recommendations on steps that might be taken within the mandate of the wto to 
increase flows of technology to developing countries’.
 468 Paragraph 43, ‘Doha Work Programme: Ministerial Declaration’ (wto 2005) wt/ min(05)/ 
dec.
 469 Institutions that shared research findings with the group included, inter alia, unctad, 
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non- equity modes of technology transfer, different sector- specific studies, the 
role of global value chains, technology diffusion in developing countries, and 
more. Experiences were also shared by many member countries, including the 
European Union, Switzerland, the Philippines, and Chinese Taipei. However, 
the absence of a structure or a progressive work plan kept the discussions very 
broad, and ultimately no specific insight emerged. Somewhat similar to the 
earlier mentioned experience in the trips context, there was no agreed un-
derstanding of what technology transfer was, or how it would be best assist-
ed within the wto mandate. Not only was the topic itself complex, but also 
arguably the inputs received by the working group from different institutional 
bodies were probably not based on the same understanding of the concept of 
technology transfer and its many dimensions.
Nonetheless, several common issues could be identified among the whole 
range of inputs received by the working group. Technological capacity and 
ability to innovate was universally accepted to be a significant contributor to 
increased factor productivity and therefore economic growth. Liberal trade re-
gime, especially the import regime facilitating the acquisition of capital goods 
and intermediates were considered to boost access to technology.470 Both 
home and host country incentives to facilitate foreign direct investment (fdi) 
flows, especially in R&D collaboration is also beneficial.471 Among others, ef-
fective ipr regimes, mobility of scientific and technical professionals, linkage 
of domestic business and industry associations to international networks and 
overall integration of innovation to government policy framework was also 
generally suggested.472 Not surprisingly, such insights are also in line with the 
empirical findings of the previous section.
The recommendations part of the working group’s mandate fell short, as 
members’ views on the topic did not coalesce enough to generate shared 
 470 As early as 2008, research findings shared by the World Bank contained these conclu-
sions. wgttt, ‘Report (2008) of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology 
to the General Council’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2008) wt/ wgttt/ 10; World 
Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2008: Technology Diffusion in the Developing World (The 
World Bank 2008)  <http:// elibrary.worldbank.org/ doi/ book/ 10.1596/ 978- 0- 8213- 7365- 1> 
accessed 25 October 2020.
 471 wgttt, ‘Report (2004) of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology to the 
General Council’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2004) wt/ wgttt/ 6.
 472 wgttt, ‘Report (2007) of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology to the 
General Council’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2007) wt/ wgttt/ 9; wgttt, ‘Report 
(2010) of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology to the General Council’ 
(World Trade Organization (wto) 2010)  wt/ wgttt/ 12; wgttt, ‘Report (2014) of the 
Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology to the General Council’ (World 








conclusions. From the very beginning, the developing countries’ interests con-
verged around several issues, which include  – a substantive review of tech-
nical support provisions in different wto covered agreements, constraints 
in further implementation of those, and full operationalisation of the Article 
66.2 of the trips agreement.473 Progress in any of those areas was impossible 
due to several objections.474 In particular, it was contended that the review 
activities would result in substantive overlaps with other forum mandates, e.g. 
that of the trips council.475 It was also argued that the wgttt did not have a 
mandate to negotiate, which was necessary to review existing regulations.476 
Furthermore, some claimed that any recommendation should have an organic 
linkage with work done under the exploratory part of the mandate.477 It is as-
sumed that since no headway could be made towards progress, general interest 
in the group’s activity waned over time. Only one recommendation has so far 
has managed to stay on the agenda, which is about development of a webpage 
meant to serve as a repository of technologies reasonably available and also to 
assist business to business matchmaking.
In 2018, the African group proposed a revision of the wgttt mandate.478 
The proposal sought for concrete tasks to be mentioned, e.g. assessment of 
developing country needs and constraints, examination of relevant wto pro-
visions, studying of appropriate incentives in a similar fashion to Article 66.2 
of the trip s, and more. Although potentially useful for low- carbon technology 
diffusion, the success of the endeavour is subject to high speculation.
 473 wgttt, ‘Provisions Relating to Transfer of Technology in wto Agreements: Communication 
from Cuba, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Pakistan 
and Zimbabwe’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2002)  wt/ wgttt/ 3/ Rev.1; wgttt, 
‘Possible Recommendation on Steps That Might Be Taken within the Mandate of the WTO 
to Increase Flows of Technology to Developing Countries: Communication from Cuba, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Tanzania and Zimbabwe’ (World Trade Organization 
(wto) 2003) wt/ wgttt/ w/ 6.
 474 wgttt, ‘Report (2004) of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology to 
the General Council’ (n 473) para 8; wgttt, ‘Note on the Meeting of 19 July 2004’ (World 
Trade Organization (wto) 2004) wt/ wgttt/ m/ 9 para 4; wgttt, ‘Report (2005) of the 
Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology to the General Council’ (World 
Trade Organization (wto) 2005) wt/ wgttt/ 7 paras 9, 11; wgttt, ‘Report (2008) of the 
Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology to the General Council’ (n 470) paras 
22, 24; wgttt, ‘Report (2010) of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology 
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At the end of the day, the wgttt remains an ideal platform to initiate the 
discussion as to which of diverse policy options to trigger low- carbon technol-
ogy diffusion, would fall squarely in the wto domain, how to prioritise those, 
and find the points of convergence among the members’ interests to imple-
ment them in a positive, and inclusive manner.
(iv) Developments at the unctad
Although the earlier unctad efforts to establish a Code of Conduct on tech-
nology transfer practices failed to succeed, the experience gathered there-
from by states was influential to secure the technology transfer obligation 
enshrined in Article 66.2 of the trips agreement. Since then, work related 
to transfer of technology at unctad has produced a number of studies and 
reports, though none exclusively on climate technologies. Issues addressed 
in this regard include examination of different approaches in investment 
agreements to ensure transfer of technology,479 survey of home country 
measures,480 and communication of successful country experiences481. 
A range of industry and country- specific case studies was also published.482 
Many of these reports were also presented at the wgttt. Current mandate of 
unctad includes, among other areas, continuation of research on the impact 
of transfer of technology on trade and development.483
In 2014, one unctad report made a general survey of issues relating to 
transfer of technology and development. The report highlighted many existing 
gaps in knowledge, including the lack of a common definition of ‘technology’ 
or ‘technology transfer’.484 The report also mentioned that despite a widening 
technology gap between the developed countries and the ldc s,485 a complete 
understanding of the policies necessary to close the gap remains wanting.486 
The concept of national innovation system, portraying the need for policy 
 479 unctad, ‘Transfer of Technology’ (unctad 2001) unctad/ ite/ iit/ 28.
 480 unctad, ‘Facilitating Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries:  A Survey of 
Home- Country Measures’ (unctad 2004) unctad/ ite/ ipc/ 2004/ 5.
 481 unctad, ‘Investment and Technology Policies for Competitiveness: Review of Successful 
Country Experiences’ (unctad 2003) unctad/ ite/ ipc/ 2003/ 2.
 482 unctad, ‘Studies in Technology Transfer: Selected Cases from Argentina, China, South 
Africa and Taiwan Province of China’ (unctad 2014) unctad/ dtl/ stict/ 2013/ 7; unc-
tad, ‘A Case Study of the Salmon Industry in Chile’ (unctad 2006) unctad/ ite/ iit/ 
2005/ 12.
 483 Paragraph 65(c) ‘unctad xiii: Doha Mandate’ (unctad 2012) unctad/ iss/ 2012/ 1.
 484 unctad, ‘Transfer of Technology and Knowledge Sharing for Development  – Science, 
Technology and Innovation Issues for Developing Countries’ (n 69) 2– 3.



















interventions tackling market and system failures was also comprised in the 
report.487 It was further advised that the developing countries should make 
prudent use of the ipr flexibilities in the trips agreement.488
C Trade Disputes Regarding Technology Transfer and Renewables
Until recently, technology transfer has not been a contested issue in the vi-
brant history of wto dispute settlement. There was one reference to it in the 
Appellate Body decision in the US – Shrimp dispute,489 where several coun-
tries challenged the United States (US) measure of prohibiting the import of 
shrimp caught in a process that incidentally harms sea turtles. In a landmark 
judgment, the Appellate Body in that dispute decided that the US measure was 
provisionally justifiable because endangered sea turtles were exhaustible natu-
ral resource and their conservation attempts a valid policy motive to maintain 
a gatt- inconsistent measure under Article xx(g) of the agreement. However, 
for any such measure to pass muster, its implementation needed also to be 
proven as not being arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory. The US measure 
failed that test regarding its varying technology transfer support. The Appel-
late Body considered that the level of effort made by the US to transfer neces-
sary fishing technology to exclude turtles was connected to the duration of the 
phase- in period. As those periods were different for the members affected, the 
ab concluded that the level of effort made for necessary technology transfer 
was not the same.490
It is also relevant to not that trade remedy measures adopted by the de-
veloped countries regarding renewable energy production components have 
become frequent over the past decade.491 Spearheading these activities are an-
tidumping (ad) and countervailing (cvd) duties imposed by the EU and the 
US against Chinese solar cells and modules.492 Massive public funding leading 
to an exponential rise of the Chinese producers to the forefront of the global 
 487 ibid 22– 23.
 488 ibid 28– 29.
 489 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 94).
 490 ibid 157.
 491 Johannes Kasteng, ‘Trade Remedies on Clean Energy: A New Trend in Need of Multilateral 
Initiatives’ (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ictsd), World 
Economic Forum (wef) 2013); Kim Kampel, ‘Options for Disciplining the Use of Trade 
Remedies in Clean Energy Technologies’ (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ictsd), World Economic Forum (wef) 2017) Issue paper.
 492 Kampel, ibid 12– 17; Edwin Vermulst and Madison Meng, ‘Dumping and Subsidy Issues 
in the Renewable Energy Sector’ in Thomas Cottier and Ilaria Espa (eds), International 
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solar market493 has led to other countries scrambling to protect their domestic 
firms. Treatment of China as a non- market economy (nme) has also contrib-
uted to finding higher margins of dumping.494 While some of the antidumping 
disputes were settled through price undertaking,495 one challenge by China 
to the imposition of cvd by the US has made its way to the multilateral dis-
pute settlement.496 Recently, the Republic of Korea challenged the imposition 
of safeguard duties by the United States on its exports of silicon photovoltaic 
products.497 China, facing similar US measures, also followed suit.498 Respec-
tive Panels have already been composed to hear the disputes.
It would be useful to note that trade remedy actions usually take place be-
tween countries that are competitive with each other in a given sector. There-
fore, despite having a negative impact on the volume of trade, these disputes 
would have little impact on the flow of clean technology to new recipients. For 
example, during the same period as above, India also undertook an antidump-
ing investigation and found a positive dumping margin regarding Chinese 
solar components exports, but no duties were imposed due to the domestic 
dependency on those products.499
In addition to above, past years also saw several wto disputes where do-
mestic subsidies coupled with local content requirements were challenged. 
Earliest among those was the Canada – Renewable Energy dispute, which led 
to some pathbreaking jurisprudence to be discussed later.500 Similarly, China 
 493 Zhang and Gallagher (n 80) 195, 199; Helm, Tannock and Iliev (n 343) 25– 30.
 494 Vermulst and Meng (n 492) 337– 338; Kampel (n 491) 17, 46.
 495 Vermulst and Meng (n 492) 345; Christoph Herrmann, Bruno Simma and Rudolf Streinz 
(eds), Trade Policy between Law, Diplomacy and Scholarship: Liber Amicorum in Memoriam 
Horst G. Krenzler (Springer 2015) 389; European Commission, ‘Fact Sheet: The European 
Union’s Measures Against Dumped and Subsidised Imports of Solar Panels from China’ 
<https:// trade.ec.europa.eu/ doclib/ docs/ 2015/ july/ tradoc_ 153587.pdf> accessed 25 
October 2020; The minimum price undertaking was withdrawn in September 2018, Becky 
Beetz, ‘EU Officially Ends MIP for Chinese Solar Imports’ [2018] pv magazine International 
<https:// www.pv- magazine.com/ 2018/ 08/ 31/ eu- ends- mip- against- chinese/ > accessed 25 
October 2020.
 496 United States  – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China [2015] 
Appellate Body Report wt/ ds437/ ab/ r.
 497 ds545, United States – Safeguard measures on imports of crystalline photovoltaic prod-
ucts, request for consultations: 14 May 2018.
 498 ds562, United States – Safeguard measure on imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
products, request for consultations: 14 August 2018.
 499 Vermulst and Meng (n 492) 346– 347.
 500 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed- in Tariff Program [2013] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds412/ 

















challenged some subsidy programs of EU member countries, which was settled 
at the consultation stage.501 In 2016, as a result of US complaint, the Appellate 
Body confirmed a Panel decision holding that domestic content requirements 
in an Indian solar energy program as wto- inconsistent.502 In response, India 
also successfully challenged similar requirements prevalent in the incentive 
schemes of seven states503 in the US.504 A similar challenge was also filed by 
China at the wto, which has not progressed beyond the consultation phase.505
Since early 2018, transfer of technology has become a key sticking point in 
the relationship of the major trading partners with China. It has manifested 
in two separate claims eventually resulting in disputes – one complained by 
the United States, another by the European Union. In both cases, the claims 
challenge Chinese practice of what complainants term as ‘forced technology 
transfer’. The practice in question involves Chinese requirement to enter into 
joint ventures, share technology, or perform researches in China in return of 
investment market access. These are some of the traits that academic litera-
ture discussed earlier found at times to be the reasons behind China’s ability 
to swiftly scale up technological competence.506 In climate change literature, 
such use of domestic market access as leverage was taken as an example of 
successful strategy.
The US initiated its dispute (ds542) on 23 March 2018. The request for con-
sultation circulated by the US indicates that the claim involves challenging a 
range of Chinese domestic regulations regarding import and export of technol-
ogies and equity joint ventures with foreign partners.507 It has been argued by 
the US that the laws in question limit the scope of a US patent holder’s rights 
as guaranteed by Article 28 of the trips Agreement.508 On 17 January 2019, a 
Panel has been composed to settle the dispute.
 501 ds 452, European Union and certain Member States  – Certain Measures Affecting the 
Renewable Energy Generation Sector, request for consultations 5 November 2012.
 502 India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (n 4).
 503 Namely, Washington, California, Montana, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Michigan, 
Delaware, and Minnesota.
 504 United States  – Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector [2019] Panel 
Report wt/ ds510/ r.
 505 ds 563, United States – Certain Measures Related to Renewable Energy, request for con-
sultations 14 August 2018.
 506 Lewis (n 371); Gallagher (n 71).
 507 ‘China  – Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: 
Request for Consulatations by the United States’ (2018) wt/ ds542/ 1; ip/ d/ 38.
 508 Side by side, the United States has also taken unilateral retaliatory measures. Those are 
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The EU launched its own dispute (ds549) against China in June 2018. This 
dispute challenged thirty- six specific pieces of domestic regulations in Chi-
na.509 Among those, one exclusively relates to low- carbon technology, namely 
China’s New Energy Vehicles (nev) Production Enterprises, and Production 
Regulation. The European Union contended that the Chinese regulatory re-
quirement upon foreign enterprises seeking to enter new energy vehicles mar-
ket (including, electric hybrids and fuel cell operated vehicles) to, inter alia, 
master and understand the technology, establish exclusive design and devel-
opment institution, and establish product information databases, including 
technical and design specifications is a violation of the commitment made by 
China in its Protocol of Accession to the wto.510 The commitment in question 
is contained in paragraph 7.3 of Part i of the Chinese Protocol of Accession to 
the wto. It precludes the country from imposing performance requirements 
upon foreign investments, which the EU alleges the Chinese technology trans-
fer practices to violate.
D Non- Multilateral Approaches
(i) Plurilateral Initiatives
a) Environmental Goods Negotiation
A plurilateral initiative to remove tariff barriers on an agreed list of environ-
mental goods was launched in 2014. Although the initiative was welcomed 
as taking the process forward, subsequent cte reports and meeting minutes 
indicate that some developing countries find such step as stalling the possi-
bility of a multilateral solution.511 However, the plurilateral initiative itself 
stalled in 2016. Disagreement among parties on the list of products to be 
included was considered to be the main reason leading to the deadlock.512 
While on the record, the parties remain committed to finding a solution, 
ongoing trade war and the US threat to the multilateral trade system have 
shifted the priorities. It does not seem plausible that the talks would restart 
any time soon.
Outside the domain of the wto, however, twenty- one members of the Asia- 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (apec) have agreed in 2012 to a fifty- four items 
 509 ‘China – Certain Measures on the Transfer of Technology: Request for Consulatation by 
the European Union (Revision)’ (n 4).
 510 ibid 6.
 511 See (n 459) above.
 512 ictsd, ‘Ministerial Talks to Clinch Environmental Goods Agreement Hit Stumbling Block’ 
(2016) 20 BRIDGES <https:// ictsd.iisd.org/ bridges- news/ bridges/ news/ ministerial- talks- 













list of environmental goods, tariffs upon which are to be gradually lowered to 
5 per cent or less.513 The list covers products relating to renewable energy gen-
eration. However, in terms of low- carbon technology, the coverage is not com-
prehensive.514 Moreover, as the apec is a voluntary forum, the commitments 
do not have a binding effect upon the participants.
b) Provisions Allowing Green Public Procurement
The plurilateral governmental procurement agreement (gpa) is in effect since 
1994 among 48 wto members with an aim to open up the government pro-
curement market to the participants. While the gpa requires participants to 
issue technical specifications and select the most advantageous tender, the re-
vised agreement further mentions that such specifications can be prepared to 
“promote the conservation of natural resources or protect the environment”.515 
This further clarifies the ability of a government participant to the revised gpa 
to choose low- carbon technologies compared to polluting but cheaper alterna-
tives. Although so far there are only a handful of developing countries partici-
pating in the revised gpa, some remain in the process of accession and many 
others take part as observers.
(ii) Preferential Trade Agreements (pta s)
According to one report, by 2016 there were thirty- four preferential trade 
agreements (pta s) that have specific mention of climate change.516 To provide 
context for this number, the same research mentions that general referenc-
es to the environment are made in 263 pta s, including the 114 where specific 
 513 Annex C, ‘2012 Leaders’ Declaration’ <https:// www.apec.org/ Meeting- Papers/ Leaders- 
Declarations/ 2012/ 2012_ aelm> accessed 25 October.
 514 Rene Vossenaar, ‘Identifying Products with Climate and Development Benefits for 
an Environmental Goods Agreement’ (ictsd 2014)  <https:// seors.unfccc.int/ appli-
cations/ seors/ attachments/ get_ attachment?code=FL5IRCXNKHGQDAD6JQULRT-
67L7A02OHU> accessed 25 October 2020.
 515 Article x(6), Revised Agreement on Government Procurement 2012 (Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4B, 1915 unts 103, (1994)); 
Marc Steiner, ‘The WTO Government Procurement Agreement: Assessing the Scope for 
Green Procurement’ (2015) 9 BIORES <https:// ictsd.iisd.org/ bridges- news/ biores/ over-
view?page=6> accessed 25 October 2020; Robert D Anderson and Anna Caroline Muller, 
‘The Revised WTO Agreement On Government Procurement (GPA): Key Design Features 
and Significance for Global Trade and Development’ 48 60, 960, 970– 971.
 516 José- Antonio Monteiro, ‘Typology of Environment- Related Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements’ (World Trade Organization 2016) wto Staff Working Paper ersd- 2016- 13 67. 
This is the number when explicit reference to climate change is taken into account. When 
indirect references are included, e.g. provisions on energy efficiency, or renewables, the 











Rules and Facts on Low-Carbon Technology Diffusion 109
environmental provisions can be found.517 Climate commitments found in the 
pta s so far are of best endeavour nature – mostly involving reciprocal agree-
ments to reduce emission, to cooperate on specific areas like renewable energy, 
or technological innovations, while allowing for flexibility to accommodate de-
veloping country interests.518 Some specific commitments exist with regard to 
the promotion of trade in environmental goods, services, and technologies.519 
While the author of the aforementioned report does not specifically highlight 
it, a quick inspection reveals that most of the ptas with climate change com-
mitments are those in which the European Union is a party. These include the 
EU agreements with Colombia and Peru, Georgia, Moldova, Canada, Ukraine, 
South Korea, Turkey as well as association agreements with Macedonia, and 
Croatia. This is an example of the positive change a capable and willing coun-
try can induce unilaterally. Other significant agreements outside the EU part-
nership are the pta s between South Korea and Peru, Japan and Peru, South 
Korea and New Zealand, as well as South Korea and Turkey.
The pta between the EU, Peru and Colombia went the farthest in incor-
porating climate law notions within the agreement. Of special importance is 
the endorsement of common concern and a related duty to cooperate in the 
following terms:
[T] he Parties recognise that climate change is an issue of common and 
global concern that calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries 
and their participation in an effective and appropriate international re-
sponse, for the benefit of present and future generations of mankind.520
Against this backdrop, the above legal provision further iterates commitment to 
differentiated responsibility and equity.521 The parties articulate the objective 
 517 ibid 9.
 518 ibid 67.
 519 ibid 56– 57. Based on the author’s computation of the data in the wto rta database, 17 
agreements contain provisions on trade in renewable energy products and services. The 
same number for energy- efficient goods and services is 13.
 520 Article 275.1, ‘Trade Agreement between the European Union and Its Member States, of 
the One Part, and Colombia and Peru, of the Other Part’ [emphasis supplied].
 521 Article 275.2, ibid. It provides that ‘[t] he Parties are resolved to enhance their efforts regard-
ing climate change, which are led by developed countries, including through the promo-
tion of domestic policies and suitable international initiatives to mitigate and to adapt to 
climate change, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions, 
and taking particularly into account the needs, circumstances, and high vulnerability to 












as being a rapid transition to low- carbon economies and further agree to pro-
mote trade and environment measures that would enhance access, dissemina-
tion and use of clean production technologies and the same for mitigation and 
adaptation. With respect to specific measures, the parties commit to consider 
steps that would contribute to mitigation and adaptation, including removing 
barriers to trade in goods and services in mitigation technologies as well as 
boosting energy efficiency and renewable energy.
In contrast, the United States, as a developed country and still the most pow-
erful player in international trade, casts a strong negative shadow on climate 
and trade interaction. None of the pta s to which the US is a party contain spe-
cific provisions referring to climate change, although many of them address en-
vironmental issues in a highly elaborate fashion. Nowhere is the absence more 
conspicuous than the recently negotiated usmca.522 The environmental chap-
ter of this agreement between the three North American trading partners cov-
ers many issues, without mentioning climate change even for once. It cannot 
but be a deliberate choice. There is also a similar absence of reference to climate 
change in the cptpp,523 which in all probability can be attributed to the initial 
interest of the United States to get on board. This stance of the United States is a 
major obstacle in multilateralising any emerging positive pta language.
It is noteworthy that neither China nor India is a party to any pta s that is 
responsive to the need for trade and climate cooperation. This speaks of their 
conservative attitude when it comes to assuming greater responsibility. While 
India is less present in the pta scene in general, its existing ptas hardly con-
tain any environmental commitment, hard or soft. The Chinese story is similar, 
although China has a range of preferential trade agreements, especially with 
the East Asian trading partners. Some of the Chinese pta s mention environ-
ment with respect to the exception provisions. None of the two countries is a 
party to the mega- regional trade agreements. India, among the two still bene-
fits from a few gsp schemes,524 preferences wherein are not currently condi-
tional upon any climate- related preconditions.
 522 Chapter 24, Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, 
and Canada (usmca), Signed 30 November 2018 https:// ustr.gov/ trade- agreements/ 
free- trade- agreements/ united- states- mexico- canada- agreement/ agreement- between, 
accessed 25 October 2020.
 523 Chapter  20, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans- Pacific Partnership 
(cptpp), entry into force 30 December 2018 https:// www.mfat.govt.nz/ assets/ Trade- 
agreements/ TPP/ Text- ENGLISH/ 20.- Environment- Chapter.pdf, accessed 25 October 2020.
 524 The number of gsp donors for India stood at 8 in 2018. unctad, Generalized System of 
Preferences: List of Beneficiaries (unctad 2018). In March 2019 the USA decided to with-
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In recent research, Morin and Jinnah have taken the analysis one step forward 
trying to answer the question as to what extent the merging of climate issues 
into pta s accrue beneficial results.525 Analysing the climate change related pro-
visions in 688 pta s signed since 1947, the authors come to a sobering conclusion. 
One key finding is that despite the optimism surrounding preferential agree-
ments serving as building blocks towards multilateral rules, the climate- related 
commitments, even when concrete, do not really add to the existing mitigation 
efforts. It is because there is no evidence suggesting that big emitters otherwise 
not committing to mitigation are doing so in a pta. The authors guess that it 
is possibly due to the fact that countries consider long term climate costs are 
not balanced by the additional economic and political gain of economic inte-
gration. Another evidential finding is that climate- related commitments have 
increasingly become precise over time, especially in the 21st- century pta s. How-
ever, there exists a trade- off between the precision of the commitments and the 
stringency of the enforcement provisions. The pta s signed by the EU tend to 
have relatively detailed and precise commitments, but they are usually backed 
up with a consultation- based compliance mechanism. Whereas, those signed by 
the US contain very general climate commitment, but they tend to have stricter 
dispute settlement provisions often resulting in a binding determination.
(iii) Conditional Unilateral Preferences: gsp s under the 
Enabling Clause
The generalised system of preferences (gsp s) are unilateral preferential tar-
iff schemes offered by a developed country to developing and least- developed 
ones. gsp schemes derogate from the standard non- discrimination commit-
ment at the wto. Such derogations are possible due to a decision by the gatt 
contracting parties, formalised in 1979.526 While the gsp can be used to grant 
special lct- related tariff benefits to the developing countries, subject to ade-
quate performance prerequisites, no such scheme has yet been put in place. 
One encouraging example is the EU practice, wherein benefits additional to 
the regular gsp scheme (named ‘gsp plus’) are accorded subject to the bene-
ficiaries’ participation in a select number of human rights, labour protection 
and environmental treaties, including the unfccc.527
 525 Jean- Frédéric Morin and Sikina Jinnah, ‘The Untapped Potential of Preferential Trade 
Agreements for Climate Governance’ (2018) 27 Environmental Politics 541.
 526 Differential and More Favourable Treatment:  Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries 1979 (L/ 4903).
 527 Annex viii, Regulation (EU) No 978/ 2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 











a) The Polarised Legacy of Technology Transfer in a Hard Law 
Framework
Although with respect to technology transfer, the trade and the climate regime 
started from a common position of the unsuccessful code negotiations, subse-
quent developments have been markedly different. While a soft- law based 
approach in the climate regime has led to an incremental formulation of an 
insti tutional structure with respect to clean technology development and 
transfer, no comparable development took place within the trade regime. One 
reason behind such different outcomes is that unlike the climate rules frame-
work, negotiated rules in the trade regime entail strict legal consequences, 
resulting in a possible tendency among actors to avoid making of costly new 
rules. While there are many existing rules that are relevant for low- carbon 
technology diffusion, most are of general nature.
Yet another reason for the absence of progress in the wto front is the inher-
itance of the politically fraught issue of technology transfer and protection of 
ipr s by the wto. The trips council is the ideal platform where the develop-
ing countries could voice concerns over necessary ipr flexibilities to facilitate 
technology transfer. This had the effect of drawing all the political capital, leav-
ing little, or none to explore new avenues of technology diffusion.
b) Stalemate as the State of Play at the wto
Connected to the above, although the existing empirical studies showed that 
there is a need to influence the markets for greater diffusion of lct s, any fo-
cused and meaningful discussion to that effect is yet to take place in the wto. 
The absence of a common understanding of transfer of technology and its de-
terminants have led to a compartmentalisation of discussions in different de-
liberative fora like the trips council, the trade and environment committee, 
and the wgttt, without any meaningful synergies being developed over time. 
We find some technical assistance and subsidy provision that may be of utility, 
but those remain of general and best endeavour character.
The deadlock in progress actually serves the members whose interests are 
vested in keeping the status quo. This is conspicuous from the repeated refusals 
to cooperate by some members at the cte. To take the agenda of trade and lct 
diffusion forward, this stalemate situation must be overcome.
c) Limited Progress Made in Smaller Constellations
Outside the wto, there have indeed been somewhat successful attempts at 
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smaller constellations there are positive alignments of interests, in broader 
participatory groups, progress is stalled. Evidence of the former is visible in the 
pta s where like- minded parties make detailed commitments going beyond 
the wto standard. The latter can be noted in the stuck plurilateral negotiation 
on environmental goods.
d) Improving Trade Cooperation for Clean Technology Diffusion Is 
Important
In the backdrop of emerging disputes involving technology transfer, as well as 
growing political distrust, it is impossible to overemphasise the urgency of ef-
fective cooperation at the wto in this regard. Cooperation will not only further 
the cause of lct diffusion, but will also strengthen the institution’s legitimacy.
The doctrine of Common Concern can supply the formal structure and nor-
mative content around which an effective convergence of interest of the wto 
members is possible. By creating an exclusive dialogue around the need for 
effective trade- related responses to facilitate climate technology diffusion, the 
doctrine of Common Concern will attract the parties to engage in meaningful 
negotiation. This will be elaborated in the following chapter.
v Conclusion
This chapter undertook an important stocktaking exercise. Beginning at the 
aftermath of the unsuccessful origin of technology transfer as an internation-
al agenda, it traced through the regulatory morphosis in the climate and the 
trade regime. It also presented a comprehensive picture of the existing litera-
ture on the determinants of low- carbon technology diffusion.
We found that transfer of technology only becomes a topic in public in-
ternational law when commercial transactions at private market terms leave 
some or many actors dissatisfied, almost often involving developing country 
partners. This leads to general or issue- specific attempts, which at times suc-
cessfully generate regulatory arrangements for desired levels of clean technol-
ogy diffusion.
We also found that approaches to technology diffusion arrangements can 
vary a great deal across legal regimes. The climate regime showcases a multi- 
pronged approach. Despite an expansive framework based on a deeper under-
standing of the issue, the approach falls short due to its reliance on financial 
resources, which is unavailable at the required scales, and also due to its failure 
to agree on market reform approaches. Avenues in the trade regime remain less 




of technology transfer. Efforts made in the trade regime tend to focus on the 
issue of intellectual property protection, which is of importance in many areas.
Review of the existing empirical studies indicated that legal protection of 
intellectual property rights is not a significant barrier for the diffusion of cli-
mate technologies. The studies rather highlighted a necessity to undertake 
market development policy measures, i.e. actions that would tackle the exist-
ing market failures in the dissemination of lct s. The part trade rules can play 
in that regard remains yet to be explored. Moreover, political disagreements 
and conflicts of views, especially with regard to according a more active role 
to market reforms in the building up of enabling environments, was found to 
affect both trade and climate regimes. The outcome of such conflicting posi-
tions of countries is not only limited to the absence of adequate progress in 
rulemaking. It also fuels disputes in the trade regime.
One positive development that is noted, however, is the increasing recogni-
tion of the role of the trade policy measures for climate action, including diffu-
sion of technologies in the pta s. The EU appeared to play the most progressive 
role in this regard.
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 chapter 3
Towards a Cooperation Based Trade Action Agenda
After an acquaintance with the market- related determinants of low- carbon 
technology (lct) diffusion and highlighting the gaps in the relevant regula-
tory frameworks in the previous chapter, the question now is that how those 
gaps may be bridged by creating new opportunities for appropriate respons-
es. Guided by the doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind, this chap-
ter proposes an expansion of the wto members’ responsibility to cooperate 
to resolve the challenges of lct diffusion. It begins by pointing out that in 
purely positivistic terms, the trade rules’ falling short of accommodating the 
interest of lct diffusion is not illegal per se. It is because even if trade- relat-
ed actions are potentially conducive to an enabling environment for clean 
technology diffusion, current wto rules do not compel members to act in 
the service of the climate protection goal. It is argued that although the inde-
pendence of a sovereign to make policy choices is the foundation of interna-
tional law, refusal or avoidance of cooperation with respect to issues that are 
of Common Concern can raise questions about the legitimacy of its power 
to act. Moving towards the goal of creating a coherent framework of technol-
ogy diffusion actions, this chapter lays out a propositional agenda putting 
the insights from the Common Concern doctrine to use. It is proposed that 
cooperation within the trade regime should be preceded by formal recogni-
tion of the notion, and would thereupon entail the development of coherent 
rules of action respecting the principles of equity and differentiation. This 
is moulded into a new proposed narrative to guide trade policy measures 
for lct diffusion. Finally, possible ways of implementing the narrative by 
taking appropriate steps at the multilateral, regional, and domestic levels are 
explored.
i ‘Common Concern’ as a Guide to Trade Cooperation
The desirability of trade measures to support climate action is a well- visited 
topic in scholarly literature. In contributions dealing with the issue, the re-




involvement,528 scepticism also exists.529 Brunnée, for example, highlights 
that the climate regime has over time evolved into a complex prevention 
mechanism based on non- adversariality and flexible compliance,530 making 
it incompatible with the strict rule- enforcement approach found in the trade 
regime. Despite the contrasting takes, the search for a path towards stronger 
trade actions in the service of climate goals is worthwhile for a number of rea-
sons described below.
First of all, the need to facilitate clean technology diffusion is urgent, imme-
diate, and unavoidable, as already articulated.531 Second, outright refusals to 
multilaterally address the trade- related issues involved in lct diffusion at the 
wto would not prevent the deployment of climate- motivated unilateral trade 
measures. In the absence of multilateral efforts, this issue would be relegated 
entirely to the domestic level, where it would be subjected to varying interests 
and conflicting approaches in different jurisdictions. The resulting multiplicity 
would end up being more burdensome for the developing countries on one 
hand, and threaten the predictability and transparency of the global trade 
rule system on the other. Third, much of the dichotomous difference between 
the trade and the climate rules may only be ‘imaginary’, leading to no big legal 
conflicts at the operational levels.532 With the quasi- universal participation of 
states in both regimes and the common subscription to the goal of sustainable 
 528 Frédéric Simon, ‘Stiglitz Urges Joint EU- China Trade Sanctions against the US on Climate 
Change’ (euractiv.com, 28 March 2019)  <https:// www.euractiv.com/ section/ climate- 
environment/ news/ stiglitz- urges- joint- eu- china- trade- sanctions- against- the- us- on- 
climate- change/ > accessed 25 October 2020; Paul Sammon, ‘Could the Threat of Carbon 
Tariffs Save the Paris Agreement?’ (18 September 2018)  <https:// ictsd.iisd.org/ opinion/ 
could- the- threat- of- carbon- tariffs- save- the- paris- agreement> accessed 25 October 2020; 
Scott Barrett and Robert Stavins, ‘Increasing Participation and Compliance in International 
Climate Change Agreements’ (2003) 3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics 349; S Barrett, ‘Climate Treaties and the Imperative of Enforcement’ 
(2008) 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 239.
 529 See, for example, Alexandra E Cirone and Johannes Urpelainen, ‘Trade Sanctions in 
International Environmental Policy:  Deterring or Encouraging Free Riding?’ (2013) 30 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 309.
 530 Brunnée, ‘MEAs and Complex Prevention’ (n 330); Brunnée, ‘The Global Climate Regime’ 
(n 159); Jutta Brunnée, ‘Enforcement Mechanisms in International Law and International 
Environmental Law’ in Ulrich Beyerlin, Peter- Tobias Stoll and Rudiger Wolfrum (eds), 
Ensuring compliance with multilateral environmental agreements :  a dialogue betweeen 
practitioners and Academia (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006).
 531 See Chapter 1 ii A at p. 13 above.
 532 Kati Kulovesi, ‘Real or Imagined Controversies- a Climate Law Perspective on the Growing 
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development, it is counterintuitive to assume that commitments made in one 
regime should conflict with those in others.533 Fourth, restrictions are not the 
only tool in the trade regime’s repertoire of possible measures supporting cli-
mate change. Trade- related measures can be supportive or facilitative in nature 
as well.534 In the absence of any overarching regulation, states gravitate towards 
trade restrictions as a function of the current realpolitik, as those measures en-
tail imposing costs on others while incurring none. Finally, while it may be true 
that the enforcement of climate commitments through trade sanctions could 
result in unwanted entanglements of compliance actions between the legal re-
gimes, if negotiated climate- related commitments are part of the multilateral 
trade rules, there shall be no objection to taking recourse to dispute settlement.
The following paragraphs outline the practical considerations regarding the 
development of such trade commitments.
A The Challenge of Cooperation and Common Concern Doctrine
The actual existence of a state’s responsibility to act in pursuance of shared 
interests in an issue area has a close, often a causal relationship with the 
prior existence, nature, and success of international cooperation in that re-
gard. However, even though a long time has passed since Wolfgang Fried-
mann pointed out international law’s gradual turn towards cooperation at 
different levels,535 a duty to cooperate is not a commonplace occurrence yet. 
 533 We note also the argument made by Broude, holding that complexity is pervasive in all sys-
tems, and it is not unique to international law. As a result complexity in itself ought not be 
the dissuading factor leading a subject- matter to escape the domain of international law. 
Tomer Broude, ‘Complexity Rules (or: Ruling Complexity), a Response to Jutta Brunnée’ 
(Social Science Research Network 2017) ssrn Scholarly Paper id 3075798 <https:// papers.
ssrn.com/ abstract=3075798> accessed 25 October 2020.
 534 Some authors focus on a ‘carrot and stick’ balance when introducing trade measures’ sup-
port. See, for example, Tracey Epps and Andrew Green, Reconciling Trade and Climate: How 
the WTO Can Help Address Climate Change (Edward Elgar 2010); Andrew Green and Tracey 
Epps, ‘Is There a Role for Trade Measures in Addressing Climate Change?’ (2008) 15 31; 
Aaditya Mattoo and Arvind Subramanian, A ‘Greenprint’ for International Cooperation on 
Climate Change (The World Bank 2013) <http:// elibrary.worldbank.org/ doi/ book/ 10.1596/ 
1813- 9450- 6440> accessed 25 October 2020; Barrett and Stavins (n 530); Gabrielle Zoe 
Marceau, ‘The Interface between the Trade Rules and Climate Change Actions’ in Deok- 
Young Park (ed), Legal Issues on Climate Change and International Trade Law (Springer 
2016). For extensive treatment of the topic, see, Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z 
Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change: World 
Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press 2009); Tamiotti, World Trade Organization and 
United Nations Environment Programme (n 73).










Cooperation is almost always voluntary in international affairs, subject to the 
consent of a state as custodian of the sovereign authority. This comes out clear-
ly in the Charter of the United Nations. While one of the purposes of the UN 
is to achieve international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural, 
and humanitarian problems,536 the key principles the organisation abides by 
are, inter alia, respect for sovereign equality and political independence of the 
member states.537
As a result of the above, duties of cooperation can mostly be found in limited 
constellations of consent- based regulatory frameworks (e.g. treaties), which ad-
dress shared interests of both economic and non- economic nature. These duties 
arise due to the interdependent nature of the issues needing to be regulated, re-
quiring reciprocity instead of wilful action by individual states. The legal regime 
of international trade is such an area. The trade regime is premised upon inter-
dependence rather than independence of nations in their economic relations.538 
Thomas Cottier also highlighted that international trade rules make a reciprocal 
regime; one that is built around a quid pro quo exchange of commitments of eco-
nomic interest for all the parties involved.539 In the core of the multilateral trade 
rules, there is an obligation to negotiate in good faith, binding all the parties to 
engage in interaction without the constraints of reaching a final outcome.540
Duties of cooperation, when arising within treaty frameworks, are also 
circumscribed by the same. Such a duty tends to pertain only to the subject- 
matter that is of interest to the treaty. This holds true for the trade regime. The 
duty to negotiate and consult in the wto law does not extend to fringe inter-
actions which form the essence of ‘trade and …’ issues, e.g. labour rights or ani-
mal welfare, unless it is formally extended by agreement. Similarly, while there 
is a duty to cooperate in the climate regime arising from the legal recognition 
of the problem as a common concern of humankind, it does not automatically 
extend to the legal realm of trade. This disconnect is a product of fragmenta-
tion, as was detailed in the first chapter. We recall the proposition that a consti-
tutionalist frame is best suited to anticipate such fragmentation and respond 
to it based on existing and new meta- norms, i.e. legal principles that can guide 
separate rule systems to mesh and integrate.541 This is the primary role of the 
 536 Article 1(3) Charter of the United Nations 1945 (1 unts xvi).
 537 Article 2, ibid.
 538 Donald McRae, The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development of 
International Law, vol 260 (The Hague Academy of International Law 1994) 111.
 539 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7).
 540 Cottier and Payosova (n 169) 15.
 541 See Chapter  1 iii D at pp.  27- 28 above. Also, Ernst- Ulrich Petersmann, ‘From Negative 













Towards a Cooperation Based Trade Action Agenda 119
Common Concern of Humankind doctrine. With respect to lct diffusion and 
trade, the doctrine is an addition to the underlying framework of principles 
in the trade regime, helping to launch and sustain an expanded cooperation 
agenda therein.
It should also be recalled at this point that the principle of sustainable de-
velopment is already a mainstay of the trade regime, providing a foundational 
basis for ‘trade and …’ integration.542 However, even when the principle is giv-
en its fullest expression, it would suffice to create space for ex post legitimation 
and not serve as the basis for an ex ante demand. But making a demand that 
countries act ex ante, is the essence of a pre- existing duty to cooperate.543 To 
clarify, the principle of sustainable development does not go so far as to put an 
actor under a strict positive responsibility to act in stopping climate change. 
Pursuant to the doctrine of Common Concern, the discourse is framed as such 
that it goes beyond the question of what states ‘may’ or ‘could’ do to prevent 
climate change. It rather points out what states ‘must’ do to that end.544 For 
any such deliberation to take place to that effect at the multilateral stage, the 
essential precondition is having a duty to cooperate in place.
Leaving the defined boundaries of trade cooperation to outline how a state 
‘shall’ or ‘must’ act would appear to go against the grain of the fundamental 
international law rule of coexistence, marked by the respect for sovereign-
ty and political independence, as initially indicated. In response, we take 
the line of argument that understanding sovereignty as an exclusive power 
monopoly wielded by a government is an outdated approach. John Jackson 
correctly pointed out that if sovereignty is understood in terms of its core func-
tion, i.e. allocation of power, the changing fundamentals of world affairs do 
indeed require a departure from the traditional understanding.545 Sovereignty- 
modern, as Jackson termed it, calls for a rebalancing of the power exclusivity 
of each state based on proportionality and subsidiarity, among other things.546 
This line of thought would challenge the exclusive dependency upon states’ 
Law’ (2000) 37 Common Market L. Rev. 1363; Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis 
(eds), The Prospects of International Trade Regulation : From Fragmentation to Coherence 
(Cambridge University Press 2011).
 542 Voigt (n 209).
 543 See pp. 27- 28 above.
 544 Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer and Pablo Arnaiz, ‘Duty to Protect, Climate Change and 
Trade’ in Panagiotis Delimatsis (ed), Research handbook on climate change and trade law 
(Edward Elgar 2016).
 545 John Howard Jackson, ‘Sovereignty- Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’, 
Sovereignty, the WTO and changing fundamentals of international law (Cambridge 
University Press 2006).












consent in determining whether trade rules ought to be employed for climate 
protection. We can also consider the argument of Schefer and Arnaiz in the 
following terms:
[S] ince the consequences of climate change on certain populations is 
expected to be serious enough to be of concern to the international com-
munity as a whole, states will have a duty to take any steps necessary 
to prevent realization of these threats to the extent possible, […]. Giv-
en the inextricable connections between trade and climate change, as 
well as the likelihood of any mitigation and adaptation efforts affecting 
trade, the trade law system must be incorporated into any responsibility 
framework.547
However, recourse to the doctrine of Common Concern does not mean aban-
donment of the respect for sovereignty principle altogether. It rather neces-
sitates updating our terms of understanding the notion. In areas marked by 
interdependence, a sovereign’s goals of self- determination and public welfare 
inherently requires that the authority is exercised in cooperation.548 Thomas 
Cottier holds:
As the principle of Common Concern seeks to prevent or remedy threats 
to international peace, security and welfare in a broader sense, the pur-
pose is in line with the original goals of sovereignty enabling to main-
tain law and order, provide peace and welfare, and prosperity in society. 
The principle of Common Concern of Humankind thus complements 
the same goals aspired by self- determination and enters the stage where 
these very goals cannot be secured by States alone but depend upon in-
ternational cooperation. Common Concern helps us to reshape and un-
derstand the proper functions of contemporary modern sovereignty. We 
 547 Schefer and Arnaiz (n 544) 67– 68.
 548 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty in Conflict’ (2004) 8 European Integration Online 
Papers <https:// papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=594942> accessed 25 October 2020; Franz 
Xaver Perrez, ‘Efficiency of Cooperation:  A Functional Analysis of Sovereignty’ (1998) 
15 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 515; For a deeper take on the 
relation between Common Concern doctrine and pemanent sovereignty, see, Cottier, 
‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7); Also, Alexander Beyleveld, 
‘Exploring the Recognition of New Common Concerns of Humankind:  The Example 
of the Distribution of Income and Wealth within States’ in Thomas Cottier (ed), The 
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can perceive it as a dialogue between the two concepts, influencing each 
other in shaping and coordinating their respective contours.549
Of course, despite the salience of the argument qualifying the exclusive nature 
of the notion of sovereignty, an unconditional responsibility to cooperate is 
not practical. As much as trade cooperation would be necessary, so would it 
be necessary to appropriately delimit its scope. The limits of the influence of 
the Common Concern doctrine upon the trade regime, as detailed earlier,550 
would come into play in this regard.
Over the past number of years, there have been many well- thought out 
propositions on the type of appropriate trade actions that would contribute to 
climate mitigation as well as the transfer of lct s.551 In comparison, very little 
work has been done on advancing a formal basis on which such propositions 
of positive actions could take root in the wto law and practice.552 Citing the 
example of fisheries subsidies negotiation, Margaret Young astutely suggest-
ed that the interaction between trade and climate regimes must be, inter alia, 
based on principles underlying the climate regime.553 While it sounds like a 
lucrative proposition, it should be noted that regulation of fisheries subsidies 
is explicitly mandated to the wto through the sustainable development goals 
(sdg s). No such mandate has so far been assigned to the wto regarding cli-
mate change.554
The proposed doctrine of Common Concern can compel the undertaking of 
effective trade policy responses to the climate crisis. By so doing, it will serve 
 549 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.4.4.
 550 See Chapter 1 vi at pp. 47- 48 above.
 551 See for example, Ricardo Melendez- Ortiz and Mahesh Sugathan, ‘Enabling the Energy 
Transition and Scale- Up of Clean Energy Technologies:  Options for the Global Trade 
System – Synthesis of the Policy Options’ (2017) 51 933; James Bacchus, ‘Global Rules for 
Mutually Supportive and Reinforcing Trade and Climate Regimes’ (International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ictsd), World Economic Forum (wef) 2017); 
Mattoo and Subramanian (n 534); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Steve Charnovitz and Jisun 
Kim, Global Warming and the World Trading System (Peterson Institute for International 
Economics 2009).
 552 Except, of course, the work done surrounding the doctrine of Common Concern by 
Thomas Cottier and others.
 553 Margaret A Young, ‘Climate Change Law and Regime Interaction’ [2011] Carbon & Climate 
Law Review 12. However, one point is that unlike climate change the sustainable devel-
opment goals (sdg s) explicitly mandates the wto to deliver upon fisheries subsidies 
regulation.
 554 Instead, as noted before, there are examples of conscious efforts by Members to keep the 















as a convenient framework to mainstream the existing propositions. It would 
also enhance the legitimacy of the wto in a constitutionalist legal order.555 It 
is without any doubt that the states already have the obligation to resolve the 
common concern of climate change. What remains to be done still is an ex-
press and effective foregrounding of that obligation in the domain of trade law. 
The Common Concern doctrine is well- equipped to do that. The proposed doc-
trine will serve as the formal basis to grant an enhanced mandate to the wto 
for working in the interface area of trade and climate change and to determine 
the terms of its deeper interaction with the climate governance institutions.
Before moving to the next point, we must admit that confining the discus-
sion of Common Concern inspired cooperation only to that between states 
is limiting in a sense. We recognise that for the diffusion of lct, cooperation 
must also influence other levels of governance, e.g. cities, and include actors 
other than the state, e.g. research collaboration between firms and universities. 
Nevertheless, international cooperation is a good starting point for the discus-
sion. It is also influential to bring about broader cooperation.
B Key Issues Regarding a Novel Duty to Cooperate
Following up on the argument that the doctrine of Common Concern is well 
poised to be placed within the trade law domain to fill the absence of a duty 
towards positive cooperation, here we outline the key points of such an en-
deavour. To recap, as the legal paradigm of Common Concern demands for 
adequate preventive and remedial actions to be taken, the duty to cooperate 
arising therefrom obliges the involved parties to look for and adopt the best 
possible means of doing so. Put in the context of international trade regulation, 
the doctrine would demarcate in clear terms the reach of the exclusive policy 
autonomy of sovereign states.556 A potential delineation of such manner has a 
twofold impact. On one hand, a well- defined domain of interdependent action 
in the trade regime serves as a better rallying point around which the govern-
ments can pursue meaningful mutual engagement in good faith to tackle the 
identified gaps in the trade and climate policy.557 On the other hand, absence 
of any bearing of an issue to a known Common Concern serves to reinforce its 
 555 Cottier and Payosova (n 169).
 556 Arguably, by the acceptance of climate change as a common concern already entails that 
with respect to the issue no one state has absolute policy autonomy (see  chapter 1 pp 34- 
37). Express use of the notion in the trade field would assist the dialogue in clarifying the 
ambit of interdependent rule making.
 557 The importance of such systemic change particularly involving the trade regime was one 
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place squarely within the classical domain of sovereignty. This clear demarca-
tion through the linkage with Common Concern limits the proposed duty to 
cooperate only to narrow, critically important areas.
Developing an enhanced cooperation agenda based on the doctrine of 
Common Concern would require three key steps, i.e. (i)  recognition, (ii) co-
herent rules of action, and (iii) equity and differentiation. Formal recognition 
of the concept expedites the inclusion of the notion into the body of wto law. 
The recognition must thereupon be followed by the creation of an institution-
al mandate and forum, making a shared understanding of the needs and relat-
ed responses possible. Lastly, a balance must also be engrained in allocation 
and apportionment of responsibility between the wto members, incorporat-
ing a standard of equitable differentiation. These three steps are elaborated 
hereunder.
(i) Incorporation through Recognition
To the extent concerted action in pursuance of a Common Concern is envis-
aged to take place at the wto, it can only be possible through appropriate 
agenda- setting at the Ministerial level. An express recognition of the doctrine 
of Common Concern of Humankind, as well as establishment of a shared un-
derstanding of its consequences, creates a basis for the agenda- setting.558 An 
example can be given of sustainable development. Recognition of sustainable 
development in the preamble of the Marrakesh agreement enabled the mem-
bers to set the Doha Development Agenda, which, among others, integrated 
the notion of mutual supportiveness of the goals of free trade and environ-
mental protection.559 Not only would recognition serve the purpose of agenda- 
setting, but bringing Common Concern of Humankind into the folds of the 
treaty regime of international trade would also allow recourse to the principle 
for the purposes of interpreting the treaty obligations.560
At the end of the day, it is a consensus- building exercise that would be suc-
cessful only if taken up by the willing state and non- state actors. Repeated 
claims made on the basis of Common Concern, and proposals for negotiation 
 558 Common Concern would serve the purpose of establishing an inclusive agenda. On this 
point, see again, Young (n 553) 153. The author notes – ‘[r] egime interaction during nego-
tiation, implementation and adjudication will be informed by principles that encourage 
transparency and inclusivity. Such principles recognise that the full range of “interests”- of 
all those affected by climate change- needs to be incorporated in the meeting of regimes’.
 559 Same is true for setting the fisheries subsidies negotiation agenda. ‘Doha Work 
Programme: Ministerial Declaration’ (n 468), Annex D, para 9.









that captures the varying interests of the members are therefore important. In 
the initial phase, already familiar language such as – “[r] ecognizing that cli-
mate change is a common concern of humankind, members shall, therefore, 
take steps to resolve the concern, namely …”,561 can start the process of claims 
and responses.
(ii) Coherent Rules of Action
Recognition of Common Concern must be followed by defining the perime-
ter of climate action in the trade regime. This requires a clear articulation of 
the shared goals, specification of the scope of activities, as well as limits of 
the incursion of trade rules into the climate domain. In broadest terms, the 
fundamental purpose of trade cooperation should be to pay due attention to 
the reality of climate change and the need to take appropriate actions, while 
taking into account the shared values and agreed goals in that regard. Also im-
portant is to set the general terms of interaction between the regimes. It means 
that within the scope of Common Concern, the climate protection imperative 
should receive primacy over impartial preservation of market access benefits 
and strict adherence to non- discrimination.562
A shared understanding of the objective further triggers the question of 
tasks apportionment along two dimensions of governance, horizontal and 
vertical, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.563 Horizontal ap-
portionment of tasks need to take place at the international level. Along this 
dimension, the issue would be the sharing of detailed rulemaking mandate 
between the trade and the climate regime at the global level. The vertical ap-
portionment concerns the linkage between international and the lower levels 
of governance. Along that dimension, the principal task would be to create a 
complementary and interlocked system for sharing the governance function to 
 561 The language can build upon the expression as contained in the Preamble of the Paris 
Agreement. One further example is Article 275 of the Free Trade Agreement between the 
EU, Colombia and Peru. See p. 109 above.
 562 Young (n 553) 152. The author notes – ‘[t] he negotiation of new international laws relating 
to climate change which have the possibility of interaction with existing laws from other 
regimes must be attendant to the possibilities and constraints of regime interaction’.
 563 Isabelle Feichtner, ‘Subsidiarity’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Online, 
Oxford University Press) <https:// opil.ouplaw.com/ view/ 10.1093/ law:epil/ 9780199231690/  
law- 9780199231690- e1477?print=pdf> accessed 25 October 2020. Subsidiarity is a principle 
of power allocation found frequently in domestic constitutional law. It is also a growing 
norm in international affairs. While scholars differ on the meaning of the notion, here it is 
used as a principle that sets the locus of action at a level of governance or a regime that is 
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implement the rules that translate the climate responsibility into effective and 
adequate action.564
To the extent removal or reform of market barriers positively contribute to ad-
dress the Common Concern of climate change, the notion of subsidiarity applied 
horizontally should dictate that the wto is not absolved of responsibilities on that 
front.565 Unlike the opposing view maintained by some members as noted in the 
previous chapter,566 subject- matter expertise available at the wto necessitates 
the finding that the organisation is the best platform to guide the power of inter-
national trade in addressing the climate change. For example, while conservation 
and management of marine fisheries resources are contributed to by different in-
ternational organisations and treaty bodies, the work on regulation and removal 
of fisheries subsidies is mandated to the wto.
Effective implementation of any outcome of international cooperation at the 
wto would require support from other levels of governance. The essence of verti-
cal subsidiarity in this regard is putting in place a shared and symbiotic relation-
ship between international and domestic law. On one hand, rulemaking at the 
international level should ensure that ample options exist to suit a state’s specific 
circumstances and interests. On the other hand, domestic actions should ensure 
that sufficient effort is made to meet the targets set at the global level.
(iii) Equity and Differentiation
In law, the role of equitable considerations is to imbue strict positivistic read-
ings of black- letter rules with contextual considerations of an economic, mor-
al, or developmental character.567 In this sense, equity is present in different 
domestic legal systems,568 as well as at the international level.569 Equitable 
 564 Cottier and Hertig (n 117) 320– 322. The authors note that ‘transboundary environmen-
tal problems do not need to be regulated comprehensively on the global level. […] 
International law may prescribe the goal to be reached in terms of CO2 reduction, while 
it is up to “lower” levels of governance to choose the means to reach that aim and to 
implement them’.
 565 Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, ‘Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization 
or Global Subsidiarity?’ (2003) 16 Governance 73, 86– 88.
 566 See Chapter 2 iv B at pp. 98- 99 above.
 567 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) ss 1.3.2.1, & 1.5.3.
 568 Thomas Cottier, ‘Equity Revisited: An Introduction’, Equitable principles of maritime bound-
ary delimitation: the quest for distributive justice in international law (Cambridge University 
Press 2015) 9– 13; Also, Thomas Cottier, ‘Equity in International Law’ in Thomas Cottier, 
Shaheeza Lalani and Clarence Siziba (eds), Intergenerational Equity: Environmental and 
Cultural Concerns (Brill Nijhoff 2019)  <https:// brill.com/ view/ title/ 39490> accessed 25 
October 2020.














considerations and due regard to different socio- economic conditions remain 
at the heart of the special and differential treatment standards available under 
the wto agreement.570 While trade has led to growth, the benefit therefrom 
does not reach all within and between countries; meaning that the agenda of 
equity therein remains incomplete.
In this context, it is proposed that any new obligations which are the out-
come of trade cooperation for lct diffusion must balance the states’ respon-
sibilities of compliance with their ability to do so. Similarly, homework mea-
sures that are adopted in relation to the new cooperation arrangement should 
also be modulated in their application while taking due account of equitable 
considerations. This way, incorporation of equity plays a positive role in ensur-
ing inclusivity and participation by all actors, which are themselves common 
attributes of multilateral climate actions.
A legal context is necessary for the implementation of equity, as in the ab-
sence thereof, the notion becomes ambiguous and hence difficult to put into 
action.571 While the doctrine of Common Concern serves as the tool to broaden 
the ground for applying equity in trade law, the particular legal context is aptly 
supplied by the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (cbdr). 
cbdr is a long- standing and dynamic foundational norm of the climate 
regime, which apportions the burden of climate responsibility among countries 
having regard to their historic contribution to the problem, as well as different 
levels of ability to meet the demands.572 Reflecting the change in the economic 
situation of the countries, the nature of the cbdr principle has also changed 
over time. Initially, under the Framework Convention (i.e. the unfccc),  
cbdr was reflected in a sharp division between the developed (listed in An-
nex- i) countries and others in terms of mitigation commitments, as well as 
commitments regarding financial and technological support.573 The voluntary 
nature of the nationally determined contributions (ndc s) under the Paris 
Agreement largely dispenses with differentiation on the mitigation front, as all 
countries are equally obliged to commit.574 With respect to support provisions, 
especially finance, differentiation can still be observed, but a specific reference 
 570 ibid 26.
 571 ibid 31– 34.
 572 Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 129) 27, 52.
 573 ibid 28.
 574 ibid 219– 220, 223– 224. The authors call it a model of ‘bounded self- defferntiation’. The 
only exception is the obligation upon developed countries to provide financial support to 
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to unfccc Annex- i is missing.575 These dynamic developments should be tak-
en into consideration at each stage of climate action in pursuance of the Com-
mon Concern doctrine, especially when such measures entail costs to other 
countries. Compliance with the cbdr is also necessary due to its position as a 
well- established guiding norm for climate action, which cannot be abandoned 
simply by switching action platforms at the international level.
Equity and differentiation are the safeguards to maintain a balanced agenda 
and to prevent the Common Concern doctrine from becoming a tool of value 
imperialism.576 It should not, however, be automatically assumed that a lack 
of capacity to act, or pressing economic development priorities can altogether 
excuse governments from any compliance responsibility. Equitable consider-
ations would rather necessitate identification of the capacity gaps and devel-
opment of support systems for such wto members.
ii Cooperation Regarding Low- Carbon Technology Diffusion
This section portrays how the above- outlined trade cooperation agenda would 
shape the relationship between trade and lct diffusion. The previous chapter 
showcased the differences in the conceptualisation, pursuit, and institutional 
frameworks regarding technology development and transfer between the cli-
mate and the trade regimes. While the soft law based climate regime has wit-
nessed an incremental development in rulemaking, the stricter trade regime 
has fallen short of making any notable progress. It is proposed that the latter 
situation be changed by developing a new narrative of trade action, based on 
the framework of cooperation outlined above. The effort would be initiated 
by establishing a shared understanding of the key notions, and also by articu-
lating the trade regime’s role. The new narrative would be an improvement in 
terms of its prioritised focus on the diffusion of lct s, also in terms of creating 
new opportunities to take empirically informed actions.
A Outline of the Proposal
The starting point of cooperation for lct diffusion is a shared belief in the pos-
itive contribution of domestic trade policy measures to that effect. The next 
 575 Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani (n 129) 225– 226.
 576 Peter- Tobias Stoll explains that a doctrine such as Common Concern runs the risk of 
imposing liberal western values across the board. See, ‘Comments:  The Doctrinal 
Approach of Common concern’ in Cottier (ed) Prospects of Common Concern in 








important point is an agreement among the wto members endorsing that the 
deployment and diffusion of lct s are better facilitated in the existence of an 
enabling policy environment domestically, as well as globally. Such an agree-
ment is the first step to create a ground of shared understanding, as well as 
recognition of the relevant rules and principles of the climate regime. Though 
the creation of necessary policy environment is a domestic prerogative, a glob-
al consensus to do so enables the realisation of that target in a complementa-
ry, mutually beneficial, and least trade- distorting fashion. Towards this end, 
trade cooperation at the international level should establish the need to pre-
vent the failure of the markets to adequately spread lct. Appropriate trade- 
related measures can contribute to the growth of new technology markets, 
address the price competitiveness problem, change patterns of production in 
the manufacturing hubs, reduce consumption emission in the biggest markets, 
attract further investment in the key sectors, and boost technology outflows. 
Although a theoretically sound claim, no concrete steps have yet been taken to 
turn it into reality.
Operating under the responsibility to cooperate arising out of the doctrine 
of Common Concern, the role of the trade regime, therefore, would be to com-
plement the progress made in the climate regime regarding clean technology 
diffusion. In this regard, it would be important to reflect the same spirit con-
veyed through the terms of the technology framework (tf) serving the Paris 
Agreement. The foundational principles enshrined in the tf are coherence, 
inclusiveness, a results- oriented approach, a transformational approach, and 
transparency.577 Those should also guide cooperation in the trade regime. The 
framework identifies the promotion of diffusion and deployment of existing 
and emerging climate technologies as one of the factors identified for innova-
tion promotion.578 The tf also acknowledges the need for market regulation 
and an enabling policy environment. Furthermore, it is mentioned that the 
private sector should be made aware of future market opportunities and also 
be incentivised to participate.579 With respect to the enabling environment 
and capacity building, the technology framework invites governments to take 
steps to enhance private sector involvement through policy interventions that 
create “favourable market conditions for climate technologies”.580 Considered 
together, the tf supplies the docking point for trade cooperation to feed into 
 577 Para 3, Technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement 
(n 277).
 578 Para 8(c) ibid.










Towards a Cooperation Based Trade Action Agenda 129
the lct diffusion goals. Well- functioning markets, healthy competition, and 
appropriate protection of intellectual property – all contribute to realising an 
enabling regulatory environment for technology transfer. This includes mar-
ket mediated transfers, coupled with necessary support mechanisms, which 
are useful and indispensable complements to the overall efforts to mitigate 
climate change.
While cooperation to create an enabling environment can be worthwhile 
even when it is not all- inclusive, broadest possible participation is the most 
desirable outcome nonetheless. Effective cooperation efforts must at least 
cover the top emitters,581 the big markets,582 and countries on the technology 
frontiers583 – all culminating to indicate the special relevance of the G20 na-
tions. Except for any poor, or vulnerable economy, countries belonging in these 
categories are well- integrated into the global trading system, which shows the 
potential of trade rules to modify their practices. Moreover, as many of these 
countries would be middle to high- income ones, they would be more amena-
ble to regulation through trade policy preferences and restriction, compared 
to promises of financial or other forms of assistance.584 The latter is neverthe-
less an important issue with regard countries specifically vulnerable to climate 
change impacts.585 Ensuring participation by these economies in cooperation 
is indispensable to retain the legitimacy of the effort. Moreover, it is also im-
portant for these countries to have an equal voice in rule- setting.
The substantive content of the proposition can be presented in a simpli-
fied ‘push- pull’ interaction as depicted in Figure 3 below. The main message 
conveyed here is that trade cooperation for the diffusion of lct principally 
involves putting together complementary measures that can be adopted and 
 581 According to the latest (2014) available data, the ten biggest greenhouse gas emitting 
countries and regions are, China, United States, European Union (28), India, Indonesia, 
Russia, Brazil, Japan, Canada, and Iran. Available at www.climatewatchdata.org, accessed 
25 October 2020.
 582 According to the latest (2017) available data, the ten biggest importing countries are, 
China, United States, Germany, Japan, France, South Korea, Italy, Netherlands, Mexico 
and Canada. Available at www.wits.worldbank.org, accessed 25 October 2020.
 583 Countries that are at the technology frontier would vary depending on the field of inno-
vation in question. However, as the patent concentration studies cited in the previous 
chapter showed, quite invariably these are mostly oecd countries with the exception of 
India, China and Brazil in select areas. For more, see Chapter 2 iii A at pp. 77- 80 above.
 584 As the insights from the cdm projects also shows that some of these countries, e.g. India 
and China, are more receptive to market- mediated technology transfers in comparison to 
other developing countries.
 585 It is difficult to group a category as such. It should nevertheless include, inter alia, lower 













implemented by the parties to the technology- related transactions. From a 
macro perspective, measures to facilitate clean technology diffusion should 
primarily focus on two issues. First, in the countries where technologies origi-
nate (labelled ‘Foreign’), appropriate incentives must be introduced to encour-
age their outflows to deserving destinations. This is a ‘push factor’ (number 
1) as shown in the figure. Second, countries at the receiving end of the lct s 
(labelled ‘Home’) must create policy arrangements that ease the domestic pro-
ducers’ access to cleaner technology solutions. This is a ‘pull factor’ (number 2), 
also a part of the domestic enabling environment at Home. The exact choice of 
pull measures may depend on the actual market situation and barriers preva-
lent therein. In addition to the two issues, process and production regulating 
measures like a carbon tax (number 3) adopted at the major destinations for 
the Home’s exports (labelled Foreign) may further boost the demand for lct 
in Home’s export- oriented sectors. Side by side, appropriate assistance mecha-
nisms must also be put in place to reflect differentiated responsibility and also 
to ensure that the trade policy measures in the foreign countries do not unrea-
sonably affect the market access opportunities of the developing nations.
Certain caveats should be duly noted. First is the importance of complemen-
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 figure 3  Trade- related aspects of clean technology diffusion
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that the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ measures are complementary to each other. This goes 
back also to demonstrate the need for prior cooperation between the parties to 
establish mutual understanding and commitment to a shared goal. Second, co-
operation itself is only the first step, demonstrating the political commitment. 
It must be followed up by practical measures that are implemented domesti-
cally. In the absence of domestic implementation, cooperation alone cannot 
bring diffusion of lct s. That is the domain of homework obligations; another 
aspect of the Common Concern doctrine. Last, reforms of market regulations 
are but one facilitator for technology transfer. While focusing on the enabling 
environment and the trade rules, it must also be accepted that other measures 
beyond the domain of wto laws are also as important for successful transfers 
of lct s, e.g. domestic investment on education and training.
B Identifying Actors and Respective Motivations
The framework above also identifies that trade policy assistance for lct trans-
actions can arise from different directions– from actors whose motivation to 
so act may vary to a degree. Two such actors are those that are directly en-
gaged in the commercial transaction leading to diffusion of technology, i.e. 
the supplier and the receiver. Irrespective of the exact nature of the private 
transactions (e.g. license agreement, export and import, foreign investment, or 
public- private partnership), trade policy measures exist that match the moti-
vation of the respective ends. This apart, in cases where the technologies are 
sought to service export- oriented sectors, demand changes in the large enough 
consumption market (e.g. processing standard imposed by the EU) can further 
hasten the suppliers’ choice of investment in new solutions.
Suppliers of lct  s: This category of actors would include, but would not ex-
clusively be limited to the handful of locations at the technology frontier.586 
Firms are in need of innovation that suits their specific circumstances. Any 
other firm having the necessary solution can be a supplier of lct. While the 
suppliers are undoubtedly motivated by the necessity of climate mitigation, 
but there also are the interests of accessing new markets and revenue growth. 
Policies that incentivise out- licensing, investment, technology cooperation, as 
well as trade, are most suited to further trigger the motivation of the suppliers.
Receivers of lct s: In theory, lct s are in demand all over the world to keep 
going ‘green’. From a trade perspective, the primary focus of policy should 
be to influence sectors or locations that are significant sources of ghg emis-
sions due to intensified production and export activities due to being a global 





manufacturing hub (e.g. China), or specific export- oriented activities. For such 
locations to deploy lct s, the action ought to make reasonable business sense. 
More specifically, in these locations, apart from climate change mitigation, the 
key driving motivation would be securing access to export markets in the long- 
term. Policy measures that result in a lower cost of the technologies, contribute 
to creating long- term demand for low- carbon products and secure the firms 
from competing with polluting alternatives will be appropriate for such regions.
Another equally important category of technology receivers is the poorer 
countries with development constraints and strong export dependency. These 
locations cannot, for obvious economic and capacity constraints, undertake too 
drastic a shift towards clean technologies. It is of utmost importance to make 
sure that the economic development opportunities of these countries achieved 
through trade are not unduly constrained. Thus any cooperation scheme at the 
multilateral level must incorporate support mechanisms that can adequately as-
sist these regions to set out on a low- carbon growth trajectory.
Large consumption/ importing markets: These are the large markets (e.g. the US 
or the EU) serving as export destinations for many countries. Changes in the con-
sumption patterns and regulations in such regions are of utmost importance for 
reducing carbon leakage, as well as to establish full responsibility for emissions 
made. Such steps can also create an additional demand- pull that would encourage 
the suppliers to shift towards cleaner products and production. The focus should 
remain on the need to reflect changing consumer choices, as well as the shared 
and differentiated responsibility to address carbon emissions. As consumption 
regulation measures can easily take a pure protectionist bias, it is important that 
the Common Concern doctrine draws the limits for their application.
C Identifying Relevant Measures
There are different trade measures that suit particular situations and motiva-
tions of the actors and positively contribute to the lct diffusion in line with 
the proposed narrative. These measures are themselves not new, but the em-
phasis on their potentially facilitative role for lct diffusion is. In light of the 
foregoing paragraphs, it is contended that the respective position of a country 
or sectors therein would dictate the type of trade policy measure that should 
be deployed in any given situation. As a result, when thinking of relevant poli-
cy measures, it is prudent not to advocate for a fixed list of options. Instead, we 
argue that the form and nature of trade- related actions facilitating diffusion of 
low- carbon technology are context- dependent.587
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Most of the trade policy measures facilitating clean technology diffusion can 
be put into either one of the following three categories, i.e. (i) market access re-
form, (ii) process and production regulation, and (iii) industry- level incentives. 
In a given circumstance, appropriate measures from one of these categories can 
potentially boost lct transactions by positively influencing either the demand or 
the supply side of the transaction, as well as by boosting related consumption and 
production. These categories are covered below. Other beneficial measures not 
falling under any of these categories are mentioned thereafter.
(i) Easier Market Access for Low- Carbon Technology Products and 
Services
The dismantling of market access barriers is seemingly the least controversial 
avenue to augment the trade flow in lct related goods and services. Unsur-
prisingly, liberalisation of environmental goods and services (egs) is a long- 
standing Doha agenda.588 Even so, many developing countries still maintain 
unbound, or very high bound rate tariff lines relevant to clean technologies.589 
For example, in South Asia, Bangladesh and Myanmar have no fixed upper lim-
its (i.e. the bound rate of duty) on the rates of import tariffs applicable on solar 
pv cells (HS854140). In Pakistan, the bound rate of tariff for the same is 50% ad 
valorem.590 Lower prices resulting from the removal of market access barriers 
provide dual benefits. It allows interested recipient firms better options and 
prices for cleaner technology solutions, as well as grants better market access 
to the relevant suppliers of technology.591
Though easy sounding, easing market access for lct products has prov-
en to be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The key reasons behind the 
failure to deliver on the Doha agenda on egs and subsequent stalling of the 
plurilateral approach are disagreements regarding product coverage and ne-
gotiation method.592 Scholars also contend that a large group of developing 
 588 See Chapter 2 iv B (ii) at p. 99 above.
 589 David Ockwell and others (eds), ‘The Role of Trade and Investment in Accelerating Clean 
Energy Diffusion:  Private Sector Views from South- Asia’, Low- carbon technology trans-
fer : from rhetoric to reality (Routledge 2012) 275– 277.
 590 ‘Tariff Download Facility: WTO Tariff Data Base’ <http:// tariffdata.wto.org/ Default.aspx> 
accessed 25 October 2020.
 591 Melendez- Ortiz and Sugathan (n 551) 940– 941.
 592 Mark Wu, ‘The WTO Environmental Goods Agreement:  From Multilateralism to 
Plurilateralism’ in Panagiotis Delimatsis (ed), Research handbook on climate change and 
trade law (Edward Elgar 2016) 285– 289; Robert Howse and Petrus B van Bork, ‘Options for 
Liberalising Trade in Environmental Goods in the Doha Round’ (International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development 2006)  <https:// www.files.ethz.ch/ isn/ 92782/ 2006_ 













and least- developed countries have no export interest in the products under 
negotiation.593 As a result, on one hand, there is a perverse incentive for many 
members to free- ride without meaningful engagement;594 and on the other 
hand, actively engaged members try to maximise benefits by including prod-
ucts of export interest that have very little to do with environmental benefit.595
When the Doha mandate was framed in the early 2000s, development and 
transfer of climate technology was not a top global priority as it is now. As a result, 
the negotiations did not focus on this aspect. Any future negotiation mandate 
should take account of the mutual benefits arising from climate technology diffu-
sion, which may then make reaching a balanced outcome easier.
While services are an inseparable component for the deployment of lct s, 
there has been no focused discussion on improving market access for the nec-
essary services. The need for such improvement arises from the fact that the 
components part of the clean technologies are often vertically integrated with a 
range of services (e.g. design and engineering, construction, sale, maintenance 
and operation, training etc.).596 The difficulty is that there is very little under-
standing of the extent of the services need in this regard.597 Also, the current 
 593 Mark Wu, ‘Why Developing Countries Won’t Negotiate:  The Case of the WTO 
Environmental Goods Agreement’ (2014) 6 Trade, Law and Development [i] ; Fahmida 
Khatun, ‘Trade in Environmental Goods by Least Developed Countries:  Issues for 
Negotiations’ (2012) 13 South Asia Economic Journal 157.
 594 Wu, ibid.
 595 ictsd (n 512).
 596 For a broad overview of the relevant services, see, Ronald Steenblik and Massimo Gelosso 
Grosso, ‘Trade in Services Related to Climate Change: An Exploratory Analysis’, vol 2011/ 03 
(2011) oecd Trade and Environment Working Papers 2011/ 03 <https:// www.oecd- ilibrary.
org/ trade/ trade- in- services- related- to- climate- change_ 5kgc5wtd9rzw- en> accessed 
25 October 2020; For wto focused discussion, Thomas L Brewer and Andreas Falke, 
‘International Transfers of Climate- Friendly Technologies: How the World Trade System 
Matters’ in David Ockwell and Alexandra Mallett (eds), Low- carbon technology trans-
fer :  from rhetoric to reality (Routledge 2012)  297– 298; Thomas L Brewer, ‘International 
Technology Diffusion in a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement: September 2012’ in Gary 
C Hufbauer, Ricardo Melendez- Ortiz and Richard Samans (eds), The Law and Economics 
of a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (Cambridge University Press 2016)  <https:// 
www.cambridge.org/ core/ product/ identifier/ 9781316137048%23AT- app- 7/ type/ book_ 
part> accessed 25 October 2020.
 597 Neither the guidance documents of the technology needs assessments, nor the process of 
assessments itself have so far have made any indication in this regard. For some relevant 
discussion, see, Joachim Monkelbaan, ‘Trade in Sustainable Energy Services:  October 
2013’ in Gary C Hufbauer, Ricardo Melendez- Ortiz and Richard Samans (eds), The Law 
and Economics of a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement (Cambridge University Press 
2016)  <https:// www.cambridge.org/ core/ product/ identifier/ 9781316137048%23CN- bp- 3/ 
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services classification system does not allow sufficiently exclusive identifica-
tion of the climate- related services to launch multilateral negotiations.598
The earlier mentioned success of the apec countries in reducing tariffs on 
a list of environmental products599 is an example that shows market access re-
form can be achieved among a smaller number of participants. While the apec 
list is incomplete when it comes to climate technology related products,600 it 
has successfully influenced some other preferential trade agreement (pta) ne-
gotiations.601 We assume that an exclusive focus on liberalising lct or climate- 
related products and services based on the Common Concern narrative could 
be substantially easier to implement within smaller constellations.
It is also possible to explore non- reciprocal ways of easing market access. 
There is no prohibition against unilateral liberalisation of the domestic market 
for goods and services of relevance for the lct s. Also, further examination 
should be made on whether preferential market access schemes like the gsp+ 
can introduce preconditions such as adequate emission reduction efforts by 
the candidate countries .
(ii) Regulation of Production Processes and Performances
Process and production measures, commonly known as ppm s, generally re-
fer to government interventions to influence process and production across 
borders.602 As a category, ppm is broad. It can include varied types of mea-
sures which, when deployed by a significantly large importing market, can 
trigger the uptake of lct s by the exporting firms. This way, the ppm s allow 
the importing country to conditionally grant the benefit of its domestic mar-
ket access, at the same time reflecting fundamental public policy concerns. 
Some of the prominent tools that fall into the ppm category are taxes, technical 
regulations, and other forms of preconditions that apply to products’ intrinsic 
on Climate Change Mitigation’ in Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z Bigdeli (eds), 
International trade regulation and the mitigation of climate change:  World Trade Forum 
(Cambridge University Press 2009).
 598 Mahesh Sugathan, ‘Winds of Change and Rays of Hope How Can the Multilateral 
Trading System Facilitate Trade in Clean Energy Technologies and Services’, Clean Energy 
Technologies and the Trade System:  Proposals and Analysis (International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ictsd), World Economic Forum 2013); Also see, 
Monkelbaan, ibid; Nartova, ibid.
 599 See p. 108 above.
 600 Vossenaar (n 514).
 601 Melendez- Ortiz and Sugathan (n 551). It was mentioned that some pta s negotiated by 
Canada uses the apec list as basis for tariff reduction.














characteristics or their production methods.603 Compliance with the import-
ing country’s ppm would therefore enable an exporter to avoid financial costs 
(e.g. tax burden), or valuable benefits (e.g. licenses or permits for export). Rel-
evant product characteristics related compliance requirements imposed by a 
ppm can include efficiency or performance standards (e.g. fuel efficiency of 
a car, or energy efficiency of consumer electronics).604 Process requirements 
could be based on emission footprint standards, or specific processing require-
ments (e.g. low- emission aluminium smelting methods).
As part of the broader ppm category, technical regulations and standards 
pertaining to the reduction of ghg emissions can be considered as technolo-
gies in their own right. Mandatory technical regulations and certification are 
important not only to shape demand, but also to overcome the technical barri-
ers by defining new markets for lct s. Side by side, voluntary standards are in-
creasingly becoming norms rather than exceptions guiding different aspects of 
sustainability in trading relations between businesses, as well as between busi-
nesses and consumers. Delimatsis points out that while so far the voluntary 
sustainability standards have been slow to incorporate climate change related 
criteria, such inclusion may prove to be controversial due to the added cost 
and possible negative impact on poverty reduction resulting from diversion 
of trade.605 The author proposes for the standards schemes to be connected 
to climate finance mechanisms so that the producers and the suppliers along 
the value chain can reap benefit from the capacity- building supports.606 This 
would further contribute to clean technology diffusion.
While the appeal of the ppm s regarding technology diffusion lies in the 
possibility to channel domestic demand and thereby triggering the need for 
corresponding technology in the production source countries, it leaves a wto 
member open to a potential legal challenge. This is especially true for the 
measures that distinguish based on non- product related attributes (e.g. emis-
sion footprint), which according to the current wto jurisprudence may be 
 603 For a detailed overview, see, Christiane R Conrad, Processes and Production Methods 
(PPMs) in WTO Law :  Interfacing Trade and Social Goals (Cambridge University Press 
2011) 21– 56.
 604 For a quick take on the relevance of standardization in different sectors of ghg emission, 
see, Jorge L Contreras, ‘Standards and Related Intellectual Property Issues for Climate 
Change Technology’ (Social Science Research Network 2012)  ssrn Scholarly Paper id 
1756283 418– 421 <https:// papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=1756283> accessed 25 October 2020.
 605 Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘Sustainable Standard- Setting, Climate Change and the TBT 
Agreement’ in Panagiotis Delimatsis (ed), Research handbook on climate change and trade 










Towards a Cooperation Based Trade Action Agenda 137
considered as discriminatory.607 Notwithstanding that, there is considerable 
leeway in finding such measures as compliant with the gatt 1994 and oth-
er covered agreements.608 With respect to renewable energy, Thomas Cottier 
proposed that the use of non- product related ppm measures be matched with 
the related technology transfer support so that the development concerns can 
be addressed.609
The next chapter discusses some of these issues in the context of a proposed 
carbon pricing measure.
(iii) Promotion of Trade in Low- Carbon Technologies through 
Incentives
Regulation of domestic incentives is important for the diffusion of lct s in two 
ways. First, governments can support the domestic commercial entities that 
enter into low- carbon technology related export or investment transactions 
with developing country firms by sharing the political or financial risks under-
taken (e.g. through official export credit supports).610 Such support measures 
might help to materialise lct transactions which otherwise would not have 
taken place. Tax rebates schemes are often provided to domestic industries to 
be established in new locations. Incentives in equal terms can be provided to 
invest in low- carbon development across borders as well.611 Second, the ge-
ographies seeking to attract new technologies can likewise devise specific in-
centives, e.g. feed- in tariffs (fit s), to attract foreign investments. With respect 
to incentivising low- carbon technology transfer to least- developed countries, 
more could be achieved within the framework of Article 66.2 of the trips.
 607 Conrad (n 603)  13; Erich Vranes, ‘Carbon Taxes, PPMs and the GATT’ in Panagiotis 
Delimatsis (ed), Research handbook on climate change and trade law (Edward Elgar 2016); 
Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental PPMs in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of 
Illegality’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 59, 91.
 608 Gabrielle Marceau, ‘Do PPM Concerns Have a Future’ in Denise Prévost, Iveta Alexovičová 
and Jens Hillebrand Pohl (eds), Restoring trust in trade : liber amicorum in honour of Peter 
van den Bossche (Hart 2019).
 609 Thomas Cottier, ‘Renewable Energy and Process and Production Methods’ (International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ictsd), World Economic Forum (wef) 
2015) 5– 6.
 610 Michael Finus and others, ‘International Cooperation:  Agreements and Instruments’, 
Climate change 2014: mitigation of climate change: Working Group III contribution to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 1035– 1036. Chapter 5 of the thesis discusses this option in greater 
detail.
 611 Bernard M Hoekman, Keith E Maskus and Kamal Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to 
Developing Countries:  Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options’ (2005) 33 World 














Given the increased developing country interest in domestic supports, as 
well as the shared commitment to climate responses, it would be quite worth-
while to explore any opportunity to rejuvenate the non- actionable category 
of subsidies. As argued later, the resurrection of Article 8 in toto may not be 
the best way possible.612 Instead, members should renegotiate the provision to 
allow measures of direct pertinence to resolve issues of Common Concern, in-
cluding that of lct diffusion. With respect to the agriculture sector, there is al-
ready scope for supporting farmers with climate- friendly means and methods. 
To the extent developing and least- developed countries would need access to 
better farming methods, additional support mechanisms could be developed. 
Again, the trips Article 66.2 can be of utility for the ldc s in this regard.
Currently, there exist no prohibitions on encouragement of foreign invest-
ment, or on subsidisation of services export. While lack of regulation is not 
good news in itself, as it leaves the markets solely at the will of the parties, this 
can nonetheless be used as an opportunity to incentivise lct related invest-
ment and services outflow.
Another area of regulation in this regard is to rationalise and reduce incen-
tives that act against the diffusion of lct s. Such are subsidies provided for 
fossil- fuel production and prices thereof, supports towards polluting electrici-
ty generation, as well as similar infrastructure and generation supports abroad.
(iv) Other Areas
Although market- mediated transfers account for a large part of lct diffusion 
across countries, there are also some that due to inherent characteristics do 
not find themselves in private markets.613 Non- market technologies are of a 
one- off type, i.e. not so frequently transacted as to sustain a private market 
domestically. For example, power plants, grid infrastructure, and transport 
management systems would fall within this category. Often governments are 
the providers of these. Hence public procurement policies can play a role in 
showing preference lct s over others.
Apart from that, long- term policy signals are also important to induce 
technology diffusion. Trade policy, especially when committed through inter-
national legal instruments, plays a complementary part to assure the private 
actors in the market, as well as investors overseas, of a stable and facilitative 
business environment. Needless to say, other business environment indicators 
can also play a beneficial role. With respect to lct, of special significance is 
 612 More on this in Chapter 5 iii B below.
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ensuring that relevant and adequate educational and training opportunities 
are available to the domestic workforce. These aspects indeed merit a deeper 
discussion, but they remain beyond the scope of the study.
For the developing country firms moving closer to the technology frontier, 
access to cutting edge products and solutions can become growingly problem-
atic. It is because the industry leaders may become reluctant to share their 
intellectual property (ip) due to concerns over competition. Research indeed 
suggests that there are some key pieces of technology that firms refuse to 
share.614 In such cases, ipr related flexibilities like compulsory licensing can 
play a role. That apart, there is no general case to be made for deviation from 
the minimum ip protection standard secured under the trips.615 What is more 
important for technology transfer is a transparent and predictable legal system 
capable to protect the ipr s of the foreign holders. This is a contributing fac-
tor to building long- term trust and thereby boosting the inward flow of lct s. 
However, it is also important that effective competition regulation is put in 
place so that concentrated market power does not result in abusive practices.
D A New Balance
Introducing a new narrative of trade and diffusion of lct, especially one that 
calls for the undertaking of positive responsibility, requires striking a new and 
careful balance along several dimensions.
One factor is to delimit the domain of the Common Concern inspired nar-
rative within the trade regime. Informed by the notion of horizontal subsid-
iarity, the operational mandate of the wto with respect to clean technology 
diffusion has to be precisely drawn. With the helpful hint from the technology 
framework (tf) as agreed by parties in the Paris Agreement, the reach of the 
institutional intervention of wto in this regard would go no further than nec-
essary for trade rules to make a direct and positively beneficial contribution to 
clean technology diffusion.616
Another aspect of the balance concerns the implementation of specific 
trade policy measures through domestic actions. While good faith trade coop-
eration devolves upon all states as a shared responsibility, the principle of dif-
ferentiation would suggest that actions following the outcome of cooperation 
 614 See for example the study of Watson and Byrne on the experience of the Chinese firms in 
Chapter 2 III B at p. 83 above.
 615 This is extensively addressed in Chapter 2 iii A above.
 616 Although, there can theoretically be other Common Concern inspired mandates to tackle 
other aspects of climate change through trade related responses. Any such additional 










be conditioned upon the ability, as well as the availability of support. For the 
ldc s in particular, the homework responsibility should therefore be made 
conditional upon their receiving necessary support. That apart, the developing 
countries can be granted relatively more policy room to incentivise their do-
mestic firms’ adoption of lct s. Such an approach would make it easier to find 
an agreement among stakeholders in different situations.
Furthermore, to put in place an economic policy environment conducive to 
the diffusion of lcts, it is also important that there is a degree of complemen-
tarity between steps taken by different actors themselves, and also between 
the trade regime and others on the whole. For example, successful technology 
diffusion would be achieved when sectors or technologies incentivised from 
one side meet with complementary promotions from the other side. Similar-
ly, incentivising growth of clean technology- based industries needs to be met 
with removal of support from the fossil- based energies and sectors. Overall, it 
should be kept in mind that trade measures would complement the tf and not 
supplant it.
E Ensuring Compliance
In theory, the proposed narrative for technology diffusion should be mutually 
beneficial and therefore should not draw any significant compliance challeng-
es. However, if cooperation is not achieved, or if one or few significant pollut-
ers do not cooperate, the doctrine of Common Concern would call for, also 
legitimise, unilateral imposition of trade restrictions by the counterparts.617 
In cases where unilateral countermeasures are being considered, it must be 
made sure that the non- cooperation is wilful (based on mala fides) and not 
arising out of true capacity constraints. Also on the part of the countries tak-
ing measure, such a step must come subsequent to attempts at a conciliatory 
settlement between the parties. This point is elaborated at length in the last 
chapter of the book.
iii Implementing the New Approach
A Overcoming Political Inertia
At the outset, it must be admitted that the key practical challenge to putting 
the proposed narrative into operation is overcoming the apparent political 
inertia in the multilateral trading system. The doctrine of Common Concern 
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proposes to overcome this challenge by suggesting further responsibility be 
assumed by states. However, as discussed in the first chapter, this normative 
aspect of the doctrine requires more support in the form of affirmative state 
practice to achieve unquestionable legal salience. Though the initiation of 
state practice itself is hardly a matter for legal enquiry traditionally, legal 
scholars, as we also noted in the first chapter, highlight from time to time the 
dialectical process of the emergence of new legal norms through repeated 
practice.618 What can nevertheless be said is that the important next step for 
the doctrine of Common Concern to overcome the political inertia is ‘norm 
entrepreneurship’, as termed by Finnemore and Sikkink.619 It means that the 
interested state and non- state actors620 need to take the vanguard position in 
putting the proposition into operation. Countries that take the lead in domes-
tic trade- related climate action (e.g. the European Union), can be expected 
to do the same with respect to lct diffusion. The accumulation of political 
will to engage with the proposed technology diffusion narrative can speed up 
if demands to that effect come from the non- state actors (e.g. the different 
citizens’ movements).621 The potential economic benefits of the proposed 
arrangement would also work to that effect. Importantly, the fundamental 
thrust behind the Common Concern based argument for lct diffusion is that 
the benefits arising therefrom are shared by all irrespective of their geograph-
ic locations. This brings the proposed cooperation narrative to the domain of 
a positive- sum game.
For the willing political actors, operating under the precept of Common 
Concern as a basis of action can provide additional legitimacy support. Any 
such action taken would, in a reflexive fashion, accord legal salience to the 
doctrine, and through that to the proposed narrative of clean technology dif-
fusion. In addition, engagement of the trade regime in relation to broader 
common interests will also contribute to the output legitimacy of the wto. 
On the opposite side, outright refusals to engage in good faith discussions and 
consensus- building to facilitate lct diffusion under the framework of Com-
mon Concern should be seen as unbecoming of the responsibilities of a sover-
eign actor and therefore illegitimate.
 618 See Chapter 1 v C above.
 619 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 199).
 620 Bacchus terms it as ‘the willing’, James Bacchus, The Willing World : Shaping and Sharing a 
Sustainable Global Prosperity (Cambridge University Press 2018).











B Tasks at the Multilateral Level
The experience with the environmental goods negotiations at the wto has 
aptly taught that even seemingly easy multilateral cooperation can be very 
fraught in practice. Nevertheless, for reasons outlined earlier,622 cooperation 
is most beneficial when it takes place at the multilateral level. To reiterate in 
brief, only through multilateral cooperation is it possible to take full account 
of the varied stakeholder interests, potentially resulting in a truly shared un-
derstanding of lct diffusion and the related parameters of coordination be-
tween the climate change and the trade regimes. On the same note, institu-
tional coordination between the wto and the unfccc at specific issue levels 
is impossible in the absence of a multilateral initiative. Compared to regional 
cooperation, multilateral engagement should be preferred by the developing 
countries, because otherwise, the standards of differential treatments may suf-
fer the chance of being omitted out of any agreed outcome.623
First, the wto members must recognise the need to act to prevent climate 
change, based on the doctrine of Common Concern. Such recognition, as noted 
earlier, is best done through a Ministerial declaration. The declaration should 
expressly mention that climate change is a common concern of humankind 
and therefore the members have a responsibility to adopt and implement nec-
essary trade- related measures. It must further be noted that against the back-
drop of a mutually supportive trade and environmental rules, the special situa-
tion of climate as a common concern begs for positive steps to be taken within 
the trade regime. Such actions should be complementary to the attainment of 
the goals embedded in the Paris Agreement. Noting the positive impact trade 
policy can have on various areas of climate action, the members shall coop-
erate to facilitate those outcomes while being aware of the special situation 
of the developing and least- developed members. The Hong Kong ministerial 
declaration on fisheries subsidies can be instructive in this regard.624
 622 See section ii at p. 127 above.
 623 One can note the experience of the multilateral environmental agreements in this regard, 
which played a crucial role in mainstreaming the differentiated responsibility norm.
 624 Annex D, ‘Doha Work Programme: Ministerial Declaration’ (n 470) para 9, holding “recall 
our commitment at Doha to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and environ-
ment, note that there is broad agreement that the Group should strengthen disciplines on 
subsidies in the fisheries sector, including through the prohibition of certain forms of fish-
eries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and over- fishing, and call on Participants 
promptly to undertake further detailed work to, inter alia, establish the nature and extent 
of those disciplines, including transparency and enforceability. Appropriate and effec-
tive special and differential treatment for developing and least- developed Members 








Towards a Cooperation Based Trade Action Agenda 143
The next step is to put in place operational rules that would provide the 
substantive content and extent of a member’s responsibility to act to facilitate 
diffusion of lct s. Within the wto legal framework, substantive rulemaking 
can take different avenues (e.g. partial amendments of the existing rules, plu-
rilateral or multilateral agreements, time- limited specific waivers, peace claus-
es etc.).625 The best possible approach would be for the members to create 
a negotiation mandate and a platform to develop new rules facilitating the 
diffusion of climate technology. Until an agreement is reached and has become 
applicable for all members, possible illegality of any trade measures demon-
strated to promote lct diffusion within the Common Concern framework 
shall be waived.626
To specify the subject- matter of cooperation, it is possible to have an emis-
sion sector- focused approach (e.g. energy, transport, agriculture, industry, 
waste etc.), or a trade- issue specific one (i.e. liberalisation, ppm s, incentives, 
differential supports, and other issues). A sector- focused approach would al-
low dealing with the full spectrum of trade- related concerns across the dif-
ferent covered agreements pertaining to the chosen sector.627 This would un-
lock more possible combinations while exchanging concessions and therefore 
may ease finding of an agreement. The attractiveness of the other option, i.e. a 
trade- issue focused agenda lies in its simplicity, as it will keep the negotiation 
agenda linear and thereby cut down on complexity. It would also have the ad-
vantage of familiarity, as the members’ representatives and the institutional 
expertise are attuned to tackle the questions in a trade- issue specific manner. 
Moreover, as each of the trade- related questions neatly belong to specific cov-
ered agreements, subsequent integration of any outcome would be relatively 
easier.
importance of this sector to development priorities, poverty reduction, and livelihood 
and food security concerns;” .
 625 For a comparative discussion on each of the avenues in the context of clean energy tech-
nologies, see, Amelia Porges and Thomas L Brewer, ‘Climate Change and a Renewable 
Energy Scale- Up: Responding to Challenges Posed to the WTO’, Clean Energy Technologies 
and the Trade System:  Proposals and Analysis (International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (ictsd), World Economic Forum 2013).
 626 Article ix:3 and ix:4, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (n 
226); Porges and Brewer, ibid 56– 57.
 627 For a similar proposition, see, Thomas Cottier and Donah Baracol- Pinhão, ‘Environmental 
Goods and Services: The Environmental Area Initiative Approach and Climate Change’ 
in Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z Bigdeli (eds), International trade regula-









A question may nevertheless arise regarding the method of integrating the 
substantive outcome with the covered agreements. Though this is a question 
that is better left to the nature of the ultimate outcome, a few observations are 
warranted here. Any negotiated reduction in tariffs can be appended to the 
gatt schedule of commitments or as a separate plurilateral agreement. Other 
issues like the ppm question can be resolved by agreeing to an interpretative 
understanding. Where the issue would be a shortcoming in one of the wto 
covered agreements (e.g. the agreement on subsidies), amendment of the ex-
isting provisions or inclusion of new ones will be the solution. There may also 
be issues that may advance the ongoing work agenda at the wto. One such is 
the discussion on a better classification of services to facilitate market access 
negotiation under the gats. Progress in that regard can be finally subsumed in 
the agreement as well.
Furthermore, current coordination between the wto and the unfccc 
secretariats needs to be deepened. With respect to lct, upcoming work in 
the climate regime under the supervision of the technology executive com-
mittee (tec) has elements that are of much relevance to the wto. An un-
derstanding should be struck between the tec on one hand and the wto 
secretariat under the committee on trade and environment (cte) leadership 
on the other. The understanding should cover mutual information and exper-
tise sharing, coordination of tasks, as well as sub- delegation and co- working, 
if possible. In the same vein, the mandate of the working group on trade and 
technology transfer (wgttt) should be reformulated with specific emphasis 
on trade- related climate technology diffusion issues. Recommendations by 
the wgttt on ways to remove lct diffusion obstacles can open new paths 
towards cooperation.
It is important that the development concerns find adequate attention in 
the process of negotiations. However, development should not be an excuse 
to shield the major emitters from making significant, effective commitments. 
This would be counterproductive. The focus should rather be on identifying the 
constraints that the countries face and the nature of assistance that could be 
provided to tackle those. Of course, the developing countries’ responsibilities 
would be conditional upon the provision of the necessary support. With spe-
cial regard to the ldc s, arguably, Article 66.2 of the trips Agreement already 
supplies a robust platform for incentivising technology transfer. However, 
the performance of the developed countries’ obligation under that provision 
could be better guided so that the climate- related technology needs are taken 
into special account. The language of this provision can be connected to the 
identified technology needs and the nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
(nama s) by the ldcs, which can then be advanced to the developed country 
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parties for finance or other incentives. Comparable mechanisms should also 
be devised for developing countries in need of support.
While some of these tasks can arguably be undertaken under the current 
Doha negotiation mandate (e.g. goods and services market liberalisation), it 
would be optimal to draw up a new trade and climate negotiation agenda com-
prised of the proposals made here. As political feasibility is the wall between 
the optimal and the real, in all probability, a few of the prioritised issues must 
make the cut. Willing states should find in the Common Concern- based coop-
eration agenda a balanced approach worth investing in.
C Incorporation in Preferential Trade Agreements (ptas)
The preferential trade agreements (pta s) serve not only as labs for the willing 
states to try out new commitments with limited participation but they also 
pave the way for the inclusion of emerging issues, as well as their subsequent 
multilateralisation.628 Outside the shadow of the wto, the pta s are the next 
best option to generate trade cooperation regarding diffusion of lct s. The 
pta s can serve as platforms for technology- related experience and informa-
tion sharing, involve non- state actors, as well as test a range of market reform 
measures (e.g. removal of fossil fuel subsidies, or easing market access). Mod-
ern ptas can hypothetically include commitments regarding facilitation of 
cross- border investments in lct s- something beyond the reach of the wto.
Benefits apart, pta s have structural limitations as well. Issues of interest 
covered in the pta s would tend to be narrowly tailored to the interests of the 
parties. This is a challenge to subsequent multilateralisation of the contents 
of such agreements. Also, some issues, e.g. institutional coordination, are in-
herently multilateral and cannot be addressed in a pta setting. It should also 
be noted that apart from preferential market access, the pta s cannot legiti-
mise any other actions in contravention of the wto laws (e.g. export subsidies 
for lct).
That being mentioned, the best examples of progress made through the 
pta s so far are the agreements between liberal trade partners that are also 
willing to combat climate change. For instance, agreements signed by the 
European Union with its like- minded partners provide the best available 
examples of treaty language regarding trade and climate cooperation. The 
EU- Colombia- Peru agreement has already been mentioned for its formal 
 628 James Bacchus, ‘On Making and Remaking Enabling Frameworks for Sustainable 
Development’, The willing world :  shaping and sharing a sustainable global prosperity 





endorsement of climate change as a common concern of humankind by the 
parties.629 The agreement between the EU and Singapore saw the parties be 
open to the possibility of “cooperation on trade- related aspects of the cur-
rent and future international climate change regime, including ways to ad-
dress adverse effects of trade on climate, as well as means to promote lct s 
and energy efficiency”.630 The recently concluded Comprehensive Econom-
ic and Trade Agreement (ceta) between the EU and Canada also advances 
similar cooperation language.631 The ceta provides an opportunity to con-
sult with the non- state actors.632 Such opportunities are ideal for advancing 
the narrative currently proposed. As the forerunners, these countries should 
explore ways of further strengthening their pta commitments with respect 
to climate action.
D Domestic Actions
As the narrative has demonstrated, the efforts ultimately boil down to facilita-
tive trade measures taken for climate technology diffusion at the domestic and 
sub- state levels. There is a significant difference between such actions taken 
against the backdrop of effective international cooperation, and otherwise. In 
the first scenario, a large part of the domestic action is an implementation 
of the agreed international arrangement, the terms of which are determined 
by the nature of the actor, the action in question, and the particularities of 
the domestic legal system. Depending on those factors, actions can vary from 
liberalisation to export promotion, or from improvement of the business en-
vironment for the relevant industries to the adoption of ppm s. In the second 
situation, i.e. in the absence of a legitimising background of an international 
legal framework, a duty to act in response to the common concern of climate 
change nevertheless exists. But as it is not woven into the structure of trade 
law, any trade measure taken in pursuance of common concern may be dif-
ficult to justify. Therefore, in the absence of cooperation at the international 
 629 See Chapter 2 iv D (ii) at p. 109 above.
 630 Article 12.10 (f), EU – Singapore free trade agreement.
 631 The parties envisage cooperation to extend on “trade- related aspects of the current and 
future international climate change regime, as well as domestic climate policies and 
programmes relating to mitigation and adaptation, including issues relating to carbon 
markets, ways to address adverse effects of trade on climate, as well as means to pro-
mote energy efficiency and the development and deployment of low- carbon and other 
climate- friendly technologies;”, Art 24.12, sub 1(e), Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (ceta). In 2018, the ceta joint committee issued a recommendation to coop-
erate towards promotion of the objectives of the Paris Agreement.
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level, domestic actions, probably carried out only by the willing parties, would 
put those parties under a disproportionate burden.
As a last resort, the Common Concern doctrine is open to the possibility of 
unilateral countermeasures to elicit adequate actions from the non- compliant 
trading partners. It would be important to pay due regard to the expression 
‘last resort’ before one summarily dismisses the proposition. We echo an ear-
lier statement that this option is not proposed as a response against capacity- 
constrained actors, or those that must prioritise economic development over 
everything else. Putting aside the reasonable causes of variable compliance, 
one would see the kernel of realism that is embedded in this proposition. It is 
important that the opportunity to impose trade- related countermeasures ex-
ists against the blatant dismissal of the necessity of action, or blunt denials of 
the facts on climate change. While previously such propositions were labelled 
as yet another developed country ploy, it should be noted that with the change 
of that traditional narrative, the developed countries (e.g. the United States) 
would also find themselves in the crosshairs.633
iv Conclusion
This chapter has outlined a new trade cooperation narrative to guide the re-
form of the wto rules and domestic trade policies for the benefit of lct dif-
fusion. We portrayed here that trade measures have not only restrictive but 
also facilitative aspects, which can be put to use for the diffusion of clean tech-
nology. Furthermore, the deployment of trade measures need not necessarily 
affect climate commitments. The regimes can continue to retain their respec-
tive structural and operational uniqueness. Nevertheless, the same values of 
climate action can be animated in both systems. The Common Concern of Hu-
mankind doctrine can guide the trade regime in such a way that it contributes 
to the fulfilment of climate targets.
At the heart of the narrative is a responsibility to effectively cooperate with-
in the trade regime, founded upon the doctrine of Common Concern. The con-
tributory and complementary role of trade policy measures is often overlooked 
in the climate literature as the latter tend to highlight the use of trade tools 
only as a vehicle for delivering threats of sanctions. This chapter advanced that 
the Common Concern doctrine based cooperation framework can be used to 
drive forward a novel, empirically informed, and dedicated narrative for the 





diffusion of lct s. To implement that in practice, the chapter has outlined a 
‘push- pull’ framework, also identified the relevant sets of actors and measures 
therein. While cooperation should ideally take place in a multilateral setting, it 
is also the most difficult to do so at that level. Easier, in comparison, is cooper-
ation among a smaller constellation of actors, e.g. in a pta setting. The chapter 
suggests that more and stronger steps be taken along those avenues.
Appropriate domestic measures are what eventually carry the day. There-
fore, the chapter further suggests that given the available policy options and 
the particular situation of a country, the cooperative outcome must further 
be implemented through suitable actions at different levels of domestic gov-
ernance. However, keeping in mind the tenets of equity and differentiated re-
sponsibility, due care must be taken to account for the special situations of 
developing and least- developed countries. While this would not exempt the 
countries from adopting necessary measures, respective actions must be met 
with adequate support.
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 chapter 4
Assisting the Diffusion of Low- Carbon Technology 
through Emission Pricing
This is the first of the two chapters that take the discussions to the level of 
domestic trade policy measures for low- carbon technology (lct) diffusion. 
Following the outlines of the proposed trade cooperation narrative laid out in 
the previous chapter, the goal here is twofold. One is to take the application of 
the narrative a step further by looking into a particular facilitative trade policy 
action in the backdrop of the existing framework of rules. Such an exercise 
would contribute by highlighting the bottlenecks where climate mitigation 
motivated measures may come to conflict with trade rules. The other goal is 
to identify the ways the proposed doctrine of Common Concern can ease or 
tackle those challenges.
In substantive terms, the present chapter would call for pricing of ghg 
emissions domestically and also for imposing similar regulation upon imports 
(i.e. border adjustment). It would also propose that additional revenue gained 
from carbon pricing of imports be reverted to the production sources, the de-
veloping countries in particular, as technology upgradation support. The driv-
ing hypothesis here is that through the pricing of ghg emissions, it is possible 
to create a business environment that renders low- emission production and 
processing lucrative. To establish that hypothesis, the first section supplies a 
factual background to carbon pricing, as well as describes the key components 
of the proposed pricing approach. Thereafter, the second and the third section 
discuss the thorny issues with respect to wto rules in this regard. The follow-
ing section introduces a counterfactual position, proposing a harmonisation 
endeavour under the rubric of Common Concern of Humankind. The conclud-
ing part sums up the analysis and the key findings therefrom.
i Pricing Emission using Taxes and Tariffs: A Brief Introduction
The two- most- debated means of putting a price on ghg emissions are either 
imposition of a tax, or establishment of an emission permit trading system.634 
 634 Ian WH Parry and others (eds), Fiscal Policy to Mitigate Climate Change:  A Guide to 






Due to various challenges attached to the global implementation of a cap and 
trade system,635 carbon pricing through taxation is relatively less complicated 
and more effective.636 In addition, under specific circumstances, carbon tar-
iffs, a less- discussed policy option, can also be as efficiently deployable as the 
taxation based approach.
The factor common to carbon taxes and tariffs is that both of these are ap-
propriate tools to impose a price on ghg emissions (i.e. co2 or co2 equiva-
lent) embedded in imports. With respect to taxation, the process is known as 
‘border tax adjustment’ (bta), a general term denoting the act of adjusting 
the taxes on imports as equivalent to the domestic standards.637 It means that 
untaxed imports coming in from overseas will face an additional tax burden, 
like a tariff; and domestic products will be relieved from the same when bound 
for export, like a subsidy.638 Relevant rules regulating the application of import 
bta is found in the gatt, while the same for export adjustment is found in the 
scm agreement. For this chapter, the focus would be on import adjustment. 
Export exemptions are not discussed because those are motivated solely by 
industrial competitiveness concerns and not that of climate mitigation. Car-
bon tariffs, a novel idea, seeks to mimic the effect of carbon pricing of imports 
through a variable duty. Details are provided in the following paragraphs.
A Rationale behind Carbon Pricing for Technology Diffusion
The choice between taxes or tariffs as the best applicable option will depend 
on contextual factors, as explained below. Irrespective of the choice, the com-
mon rationale in both cases is that imposing an effective price rate on carbon 
emissions in the export destinations can create a strong ‘demand- pull’ among 
 635 Such challenges include the difficulty in agreeing on a global emission cap and distribu-
tion of the permits across countries, domestic administration and allocation challenges, 
opportunities for corruption etc. See, Richard N Cooper, ‘The Case for Pricing Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions’ in Peter C Cramton, David JC MacKay and Axel Ockenfels (eds), Global car-
bon pricing: the path to climate cooperation (mit Press 2017); William Nordhaus, ‘Climate 
Clubs and Carbon Pricing’ in Peter C Cramton, David JC MacKay and Axel Ockenfels 
(eds), Global carbon pricing: the path to climate cooperation (mit Press 2017) 119.
 636 Martin L Weitzman, ‘How a Minimum Carbon- Price Commitment Might Help to 
Internalize the Global Warming Externality’ in Peter C Cramton, David JC MacKay and 
Axel Ockenfels (eds), Global carbon pricing:  the path to climate cooperation (mit Press 
2017) 129– 130.
 637 Timothy M Todd, ‘What Is A Border Adjustment Tax?’ Forbes (17 January 2017) <https:// 
www.forbes.com/ sites/ timtodd/ 2017/ 01/ 17/ what- is- a- border- adjustment- tax/ #4c7de2c-
bc1b9> accessed 25 October 2020.
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export- oriented firms towards emission reduction through clean technology 
upgrades.639
While carbon taxes are widely regarded as the most viable economic policy 
tool to mitigate emission,640 a carbon tariff is a relatively new idea. Carbon tax-
es are so called because they are most often designed as a rate imposed on per- 
unit of carbon dioxide (co2) emission. The tax can also be similarly imposed 
on emissions of other greenhouse gases (e.g. no2, ch4, and other Kyoto Proto-
col gases) by converting those in co2 equivalent terms. When imposed, the im-
pact of a carbon tax is expected to pass along the supply chain influencing the 
final price of the output.641 A carbon tariff can hypothetically follow the same 
method of rate calculation as that of the tax. But as the term ‘tariff ’ suggests, 
unlike a tax, it would be imposed only upon imports. Tariffs can be an appro-
priate tool to implement carbon pricing when discharging responsibility for 
import consumption is the regulator’s only intent. The same would be the case 
if the regulator seeks to curb emissions from a specific industry which is do-
mestically absent, for example, production of cement or aluminium. The main 
point here is that unlike a tax system, which requires a pre- existing domestic 
base to be adjustable on imports, tariffs do not face any such preconditions. 
Tariffs would also make better sense in geographies where domestic sources 
of emission are already minimised, or non- existent. For example, Bhutan has a 
negative emission profile and a very limited domestic tax base.
Like any other environmental taxation, internalisation of the exter-
nal costs (i.e. cost to the climate) into the price is the fundamental mo-
tivation behind a carbon tax.642 The same can also be said about carbon 
 639 See Figure 3 at p. 130 and related explanation.
 640 International Monetary Fund (imf), ‘Fiscal Monitor:  How to Mitigate Climate Change’ 
(imf 2019) 3– 4; Victor Gasper and others, ‘Fiscal Policies to Curb Climate Change – IMF 
Blog’ (imfblog, 10 October 2019) <https:// blogs.imf.org/ 2019/ 10/ 10/ fiscal- policies- to- curb- 
climate- change/ > accessed 25 October 2020; Leslie Hook, ‘Surge in US Economists’ Support 
for Carbon Tax to Tackle Emissions’ Financial Times (17 February 2019)  <https:// www.
ft.com/ content/ fa0815fe- 3299- 11e9- bd3a- 8b2a211d90d5> accessed 25 October 2020; ‘How 
to Design Carbon Taxes’ [2018] The Economist <https:// www.economist.com/ finance- and- 
economics/ 2018/ 08/ 18/ how- to- design- carbon- taxes> accessed 25 October 2020. It should 
also be taken into account that the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics was awarded partially to 
Willian Nordhaus for his trendsetting work on carbon pricing.
 641 Cooper (n 635) 94.
 642 Janet E Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen, ‘Introduction to Environmental Taxation 
Concepts and Research’ in Janet E Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen (eds), Handbook of 
research on environmental taxation (Edward Elgar 2012)  15– 19; oecd, Environmentally 










tariffs.643 From an economic point of view, carbon pricing policies are more 
efficient in curbing ghg emissions than alternative regulatory approaches.644 
Ideally, an economy- wide implemented carbon price would be most effective 
at least cost, as it would allow mitigation activities to be undertaken where 
they are cheapest (upstream or downstream supply chain), without being tied 
to a specific segment or technology, as a regulation may suggest.645 A carbon 
tax or tariff can therefore act as additional catalysts to new technology deploy-
ment and diffusion all across the economy, as cheaper ways of mitigating emis-
sion at all levels of energy use become attractive.646 Carbon pricing adjusts the 
cost of carbon- based energy, thereby making the substitutes relatively more 
attractive.647
Compared to a tax based approach, a tariff scheme can be lucrative due to 
the strategic ease in initial adoption. From a legal point of view, the structure 
of the wto laws suggests different sets of rules for tariffs and taxes. In that re-
gard, as detailed later, there is arguably more policy room to legitimise a tariff 
than a tax.648 Also, the wto is better placed, in terms of jurisdiction, to man-
age tariffs rather than handling tax cooperation.
What also builds a case for adopting carbon pricing policies is the surprising 
scale of underutilisation of the approach even among the developed countries. 
Except for a few jurisdictions and limited instances of taxes on fuel and road 
transports, the bulk of emissions from the oecd countries is not priced. One 
recent report highlights that 60% of all oecd emissions resulting from ener-
gy use still remain outside any pricing scheme.649 Moreover, 90% of all oecd 
emission is taxed at a rate that is bellow ‘effective’.650 The result of inaction 
 643 Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Anirudh Shingal, ‘The Potential of Tariff Policy for 
Climate Change Mitigation:  Legal and Economic Analysis’ (2014) 48 Journal of World 
Trade 1007; Holzer (n 602) 205– 207.
 644 Jean- Philippe Barde and Olivier Godard, ‘Economic Principles of Environmental Fiscal 
Reform’ in Janet E Milne and Mikael Skou Andersen (eds), Handbook of research on envi-
ronmental taxation (Edward Elgar 2012) 35– 40; oecd, Environmentally Related Taxes in 
OECD Countries (n 642) 22– 23.
 645 Alan Krupnick and Ian Parry, ‘What Is the Best Policy Instrument for Reducing CO2 
Emissions?’ in Ian WH Parry, Ruud A de Mooij and Michael Keen (eds), Fiscal policy to 
mitigate climate change: a guide to policymakers (International Monetary Fund 2012) 3– 13.
 646 Tom Tietenberg, ‘Carbon Pricing:  Lessons Derived from Experience’ in Ian WH Parry, 
Ruud A de Mooij and Michael Keen (eds), Fiscal policy to mitigate climate change: a guide 
to policymakers (International Monetary Fund 2012) 165– 166.
 647 oecd, Effective Carbon Rates (oecd Publishing 2016) 28– 29 <http:// www.oecd- ilibrary.
org/ taxation/ effective- carbon- rates_ 9789264260115- en> accessed 25 October 2020.
 648 See section ii below.
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is an exponential rise in future costs of implementation, contributing to the 
growing possibility of failure to limit the global temperature rise within the 
Paris Agreement target.651
In relation to domestic implementation, bringing imports also under the 
coverage of carbon tax (i.e. border adjustment) enables a country to influence 
the production processes of the source countries to shift towards less emitting 
modes.652 This way, an import adjusted carbon tax can create an opportunity 
for greater uptake of lct s globally.653 Facing a growing scale of unpriced emis-
sion destined to the developed country,654 consumption responsibility, as well 
as the principle of polluter pays,655 can be put into effect within the broader 
Common Concern framework. Price put on carbon emission would also fur-
ther attainment of the sdg of sustainable production and consumption.656
B Design Considerations for an Effective and Equitable Measure
This part discusses key design issues that relate to carbon pricing with trade 
and technology diffusion aspects. Design characteristics of the pricing mea-
sures play a strong role in determining the extent to which least- cost mitiga-
tion and technology diffusion can be expected as a result. A range of factors 
deserves consideration to this effect, including the subscribed policy goals of 
the instrument, optimality considerations, and also political feasibility con-
cerns.657 A carbon pricing program has to make initial policy decisions about 
 651 Valentina Bosetti and others, ‘Emissions Pricing to Stabilize Global Climate’ in Ian WH 
Parry, Ruud A de Mooij and Michael Keen (eds), Fiscal policy to mitigate climate change: a 
guide to policymakers (International Monetary Fund 2012) 59– 62.
 652 oecd, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD Countries (n 642) 74– 75; However, there is a 
view that adjustment of imports only makes the approach ‘non- neutral. Reinhard Quick, 
‘Guest Post: A Carbon Border Tax or A Climate Tariff?’ (International Economic Law and 
Policy Blog, 2 October 2019) <https:// ielp.worldtradelaw.net/ 2019/ 10/ guest- post- a- carbon- 
border- tax- or- a- climate- tariff.html> accessed 25 October 2020. In contrast, upholding 
neutrality would mean exempting the carbon intensive exports from the coverage of the 
scheme. Gabriel Weil, ‘Incentive Compatible Climate Change Mitigation: Moving beyond 
the Pledge and Review Model’ (2017) 42 William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy 
Review 923, 944– 946.
 653 Holzer (n 602)  55– 56; Ian Parry, Rick van der Ploeg and Roberton Williams, ‘How to 
Design a Carbon Tax’ in Ian WH Parry, Ruud A de Mooij and Michael Keen (eds), Fiscal 
policy to mitigate climate change: a guide to policymakers (International Monetary Fund 
2012) 35– 36.
 654 Fernández- Amador, Francois and Tomberger (n 81).
 655 oecd, Effective Carbon Rates (n 647) 29– 30.
 656 Goal 12, United Nations General Assembly (n 210).

















the coverage, level of price imposition, administrative, and monitoring effi-
ciency, as well as revenue utilisation priorities.658
(i) Specifying a Tax Base
Determination of the tax base as well as an effective tax rate ensures the ad-
equate coverage and strength of the program. From an optimality point of 
view, covering almost all the emission sources with a common rate of tax is 
ideal. Especially with regard to taxing co2 emissions, a uniform rate changes 
relative prices of the energy and therefore allows users to substitute between 
sources and move towards cleaner sources as necessary, combining with use 
efficiency and reduction of demand.659 However, practically, a uniform car-
bon price is difficult to implement politically as there may be strong com-
mercial, social, or developmental interest to exempt some economic sectors 
(e.g. agriculture, or small enterprises), or class of population (e.g. low- income 
households).660 Therefore, it is pragmatic to initiate a pricing program that 
covers one gas, preferably co2, in priority sectors, and gradually expands 
thereupon.661
(ii) Determining Coverage of the Pricing Scheme
Policy considerations of exempting select sectors, or activities from tax cover-
age, and administrative ease of implementation may dictate the point in the 
energy supply chain where a co2 the tax will be levied. As the figure (Figure 4) 
in the next page shows, a carbon tax can be imposed at an upstream position 
(e.g. for coal, at the mouth of the mine; for petroleum, at the refineries; or at 
the border), or at different downstream stages (e.g. distribution levels, or at the 
point of use).662 The more upstream a tax is imposed, the wider becomes its 
coverage. Cooper argues that taxing fossil fuels at the upstream, coupled with 
 658 ibid 27– 28.
 659 ibid 29– 31.
 660 An appropriate example of the political challenge of implementing a carbon price is the 
‘gilet jaune’ movement in France, which was triggered by climate motivated fuel tax that 
especially hurt the poorest sections of the population. ‘Who Are the “Gilets Jaunes”?’ 
BBC News (6 December 2018)  <https:// www.bbc.com/ news/ world- europe- 46424267> 
accessed 19 May 2020; Cristina Abellan Matamoros, ‘What Are the Gilets Jaunes so Upset 
About?’ (euronews, 16 November 2018)  <https:// www.euronews.com/ 2018/ 11/ 16/ what- s- 
all- the- fuss- about- the- french- fuel- tax- hikes- euronews- answers> accessed 19 May 2020; 
See also, Partnership for Market Readiness (pmr), Carbon Tax Guide:  A Handbook for 
Policy Makers (World Bank 2017) 75– 79.
 661 Tietenberg (n 646) 159.














Diffusion of Low-Carbon Technology through Emission Pricing 155
rebates for any downstream mitigation is an optimal method.663 In practice 
so far, however, there has been no such program and a downstream approach 
is most commonly found.664 Downstream taxes focusing on industry- specific 
activities (e.g. steel, or aluminium industries) would be easier to implement 
compared to an economy- wide upstream tax, which may become difficult to 
monitor.665
(iii) Carbon Footprint Calculation
The imposition of a carbon price on imports, either through border adjust-
ment or tariffs, would require calculation of a partial or complete carbon 
footprint of the product in question.666 Carbon footprint calculation requires 
establishing ‘system boundary’, i.e. clear designation of the scope of activi-
ties regarding which the emissions are to be calculated.667 When the system 
boundary comprises of one firm (i.e. a site footprint) the emission footprint 
is partial, but easy to compute.668 In contrast, a complete carbon footprint of 
a product would require the system boundary to cover the whole lifecycle of 
the product.669 Such calculation would quickly become prohibitively complex, 
as it would span across activities of many firms in different jurisdictions.670 
Therefore, at the initial stage, carbon pricing of imports should attempt to ap-
proximate a products’ share of the site footprint of the exporter. Even in that 
situation, the impact of a carbon price can be particularly burdensome to the 
developing and least- developed countries, as their energy system depends on 
fossil fuel to a relatively larger degree. These concerns, as well as technology 
support need, must be addressed through recycling the additional revenue as 
explained later.
 663 Cooper (n 635).
 664 Tietenberg (n 646) 159– 160.
 665 Parry, van der Ploeg and Williams (n 653) 36.
 666 Lidija Čuček, Jiří Jaromír Klemeš and Zdravko Kravanja, ‘Chapter  5  – Overview of 
Environmental Footprints’ in Jiří Jaromír Klemeš (ed), Assessing and Measuring 
Environmental Impact and Sustainability (Butterworth- Heinemann 2015) 159– 161.
 667 Robin Kent, ‘Chapter 9 – Carbon Footprinting’ in Robin Kent (ed), Energy Management 
in Plastics Processing (Third Edition) (Elsevier 2018) 388– 389 <http:// www.sciencedirect.
com/ science/ Article/ pii/ B978008102507950009X> accessed 25 October 2020.
 668 ibid 390– 397.
 669 ibid 398– 399.
 670 The computational difficulty led William Nordhaus to propose a single- rate enforcement 
tariff. See, William Nordhaus, The Climate Casino:  Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for 
a Warming World (Yale University Press 2013) 254– 257. It is to be noted that Nordhaus’ 
proposition is an enforcement step, recourse to which is open only after the failure of 




















It is important to fix a price rate for carbon emissions that is at least high 
enough to induce a behavioural change of the actors towards abatement 
(Box 3). A related concern is generation of revenue at a scale adequate to sup-
port the sectors and communities most affected financially due to emission 
pricing. The band within which an optimal price can be found is limited at 
the upper range by the marginal cost of emitting one extra ton of co2 to the 
atmosphere671 and at the lower ranges by political viability. What should also 
be noted regarding the rate of carbon pricing is that it needs to move gradually 
upwards, as the risk to climate increases with time. As a result, the more global 
inaction worsens the climate risk, the sharper would be the upward movement 
of carbon pricing over time.672 According to the oecd, attaining the ambitious 
1.5oC target of the Paris Agreement would require a carbon price of eur50 per 
ton imposed today. The rate increases towards hundreds of euros by 2050.673 
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 figure 4  Potential stages for carbon pricing in an economy. Graphic adapted from 
Partnership for Market Readiness (pmr) (n 662) 80
 671 oecd, Effective Carbon Rates (n 647) 31.
 672 Bosetti and others (n 651).
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carbon emission.674 A recent imf report called for the immediate imposition 
of a tax, which would gradually rise to usd75 per ton by 2030.675
Box 3: Carbon Pricing in Practice
Examples of Carbon Pricing in Different Jurisdictions676
The British Columbia carbon tax program is one of the forerunners in 
introducing a carbon tax. The tax is applied and collected at the whole-
sale level on different fuels. The general rate is $10 per tonne of co2 equiv-
alent emission, but the actual applicable rate varies depending on fuels. 
Introduced in 2008, the tax raised an estimated amount of $1849 million 
over the first three years – an amount that was earmarked to reduce the 
individual and corporate income tax rates. The tax does not apply on 
biodiesel, ethanol, or exported fuels.
A carbon tax has been in place in Sweden since 1991. While initially 
the rate was eur 24 for per ton of co2 emitted, by 2019 it has gradually 
increased to eur 114. The industries within the coverage of the EU emis-
sion trading scheme (ets) are exempted from the tax. The revenue gen-
erated is not earmarked, although according to the government, it may 
be spent for purposes related to the tax, e.g. addressing distributional 
impacts, or financing climate- related projects.
In Switzerland, a co2 levy is in place since 2008. It is imposed on all 
fossil- based fuels, and oils used for heating purposes. The current rate 
of levy (as of January 2018) is chf 96 per ton of co2 emission. A major 
 674 Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Overcoming the Copenhagen Failure with Flexible Commitments’ in 
Peter C Cramton, David JC MacKay and Axel Ockenfels (eds), Global carbon pricing: the 
path to climate cooperation (mit Press 2017) 102; Nordhaus, ‘Climate Clubs and Carbon 
Pricing’ (n 635) 120– 121.
 675 Gasper and others (n 640). See for greater details, International Monetary Fund (imf) 
(n 640).
 676 Sources of the examples are, oecd, ‘Database on Policy Instruments for the 
Environment’ <https:// pinedatabase.oecd.org/ #> accessed 25 October 2020; Partnership 
for Market Readiness (pmr) (n 660); ‘Sweden’s Carbon Tax’ (Government offices of 
Sweden, January 2019)  <https:// www.government.se/ government- policy/ taxes- and- 
tariffs/ swedens- carbon- tax/ > accessed 25 October 2020; ‘CO2 Levy’ (Federal Office for 
the Environment (FOEN), 2018)  <https:// www.bafu.admin.ch/ bafu/ en/ home/ topics/ cli-
mate/ info- specialists/ climate- policy/ co2- levy.html> accessed 25 October 2020; Ivetta 
Gerasimchuk and others, ‘Stories from G20 Countries:  Shifting Public Money out of 
Fossil Fuels’ (International Institute for Sustanianable Development 2018)  <https:// 
www.iisd.org/ sites/ default/ files/ publications/ stories- g20- shifting- public- money- out- 









portion (two- thirds) of the revenue is allocated for redistribution pur-
poses. The rest is spent on supporting energy- efficient building renova-
tions, and to replenish a technology fund.
A petroleum and coal tax is in place in Japan since 1978. In 2012, the 
rates were increased as a special response measure to global warming. 
Under the present scheme, coal and natural gas are taxed at eur 11.3 
and eur 15.4 per ton. The tax, however, exempts certain sectors (e.g. ag-
riculture, forestry, and fisheries), as well as specific industries (e.g. coal 
imported for steel and iron manufacture). The revenue generated is ear-
marked to improve energy supply and demand structure. It is also spent 
to introduce alternative energy sources.
In India, a clean energy cess was put in place in 2010. It was a fixed 
tax imposed on coal, lignite, and peat mined in India, although the rate 
increased over time. Initially earmarked to replenish the National Clean 
Energy Fund created the same year, subsequent budgetary crisis saw the 
fund being diverted elsewhere. The tax was collected as excise duty. In 
2017 the clean energy cess was replaced with a goods and services tax 
(gst) at the same rate.
A carbon dioxide vehicle emissions tax has been introduced in South 
Africa in 2010. Initially applying on new passenger vehicles, from 2011 the 
tax was also extended to double cabs. The tax charges for grams of co2 
emission per kilometre, beyond a fixed threshold. For double cabs, the 
rate is eur7.79 per gco2/ km. For new passenger vehicles, the rate is eur 
6.36 gco2/ km.
(v) Revenue Utilisation
Revenue generated from carbon pricing can be substantial, allowing for in-
vestments to meet specific policy goals, which can include, among others, ad-
dressing the barriers to adoption of lct s. It is suggested that an appropriately 
measured carbon tax (e.g. about usd25 per ton) can generate 1 per cent of the 
gdp in terms of additional revenue, or even more depending on the carbon 
intensity of the economy.677 Available studies mostly suggest utilisation of the 
 677 Parry, van der Ploeg and Williams (n 653)  32; Ian WH Parry, ‘Reflections on the 
International Coordination of Carbon Pricing’ in Peter C Cramton, David JC MacKay and 
Axel Ockenfels (eds), Global carbon pricing:  the path to climate cooperation (mit Press 
2017) 20; Ian WH Parry, Chandara Veung and Dirk Heine, How Much Carbon Pricing Is in 
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revenue from carbon pricing either to readjust the tax burdens678 or to invest 
in climate technologies and addressing market barriers.679 The information 
box above supplying a snapshot of actual practice also corroborate such sug-
gestion.680 We however argue that imposition of taxes and tariffs on imports 
originating from developing countries would be justified and equitable only 
if commensurate efforts are made to make necessary technologies available 
to those countries. Therefore, when a carbon pricing scheme is extended to 
cover imports, the related plans of revenue utilisation should also include the 
needs of the developing countries. One way of doing it would be to channel a 
part of the revenue income from carbon pricing through a new, or an estab-
lished financial mechanism for lct adoption support in developing countries. 
As shown below, this is a chief part of the carbon pricing measure proposed in 
this chapter.
C The Need for International Cooperation
It is broadly agreed that global cooperation to settle a carbon price floor is the 
most effective means to ramp up mitigation efforts in addition to the nation-
ally determined contributions (ndc s) under the Paris Agreement. Given the 
weak ambition regarding the latter, there is high confidence that in the ab-
sence of such cooperation, meeting the Paris target would be impossible. This 
indicates how important cooperation is in terms of implementing a carbon 
price.681 To explain further, the need for cooperation on carbon pricing arises 
first and foremost from the looming failure of the Paris arrangement to deliv-
er the necessary scale and ambition of climate mitigation. Second, unilateral 
pricing of emission may affect the competitiveness of domestic products vis a 
vis imports. While border adjustments can address the competitiveness con-
cern, a neutral approach to bta s would call for exempting domestic exporters 
from coverage, resulting yet again in emission leakage. International cooper-
ation leading to an agreed minimum carbon price, coupled with tools of en-
forcement would be the best way to address the competitiveness and leakage 
concerns.682
 678 International Monetary Fund (imf) (n 640) 16– 17.
 679 ibid 19– 22.
 680 There are many instances worldwide where carbon tax revenue is used domestically for 
technology upgrade, climate finance, or energy efficiency. See, Partnership for Market 
Readiness (pmr) (n 660) 126; David Klenert and others, ‘Making Carbon Pricing Work for 
Citizens’ (2018) 8 Nature Climate Change 669; Holzer (n 602) 236– 238.
 681 Peter C Cramton, David JC MacKay and Axel Ockenfels (eds), Global Carbon Pricing: The 
Path to Climate Cooperation (mit Press 2017) 1– 5.













The biggest challenge against a multilateral agreement on carbon pricing 
is the difference in needs and capacities between countries. As a result, a uni-
form pricing- for- all strategy, only on its own would be inimical to the recip-
rocal building of trust among the partners over the long- term.683 Therefore, 
in addition to a global commitment to carbon pricing, need- specific support 
has to be made available, as indicated before,684 by deploying a portion of the 
revenue generated by the pricing schemes. With respect to a global approach, 
it may also be required that a new platform is developed.685 While the wto 
ticks many of the boxes of an ideal cooperation platform for carbon pricing, 
the subject- matter jurisdiction of the institution currently does not cover in-
ternational taxation.
Instead of immediately taking on the challenges of a multilateral agreement, 
smaller, club- based approaches are an alternative for building cooperation 
from bottom up. Nordhaus is one of the proponents of the club approach.686 
Cooperation on a global scale is difficult because an increase in the number of 
parties lead to a gradual erosion of trust. In contrast, among like- minded club 
members, cooperation is comparatively easier to achieve. Nordhaus’ sugges-
tion therefore involves parties with significant overlaps of interests forming 
clubs, where an agreed carbon price floor would be established.687 Existing 
preferential agreements between trading partners can serve as initial plat-
forms for building such clubs. Use of trade agreement would further enable 
the opportunity to enforce the commitments through punitive tariffs.688
There are significant complementarities between the Common Concern 
based lct diffusion agenda and existing calls for cooperation regarding car-
bon pricing. It should not be surprising as both share the same goal to resolve 
the climate- related collective action challenge. The doctrine of Common Con-
cern of Humankind can lend a legal character to the already existing insight, 
thereby strengthening this complementarity. We return to this point in the 
concluding section.
 683 Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change (The World 
Bank 2009).
 684 See pp. 144, 148 above.
 685 Weitzman (n 636) 131.
 686 William Nordhaus, ‘Climate Clubs:  Overcoming Free- Riding in International Climate 
Policy’ (2015) 105 American Economic Review 1339.
 687 Nordhaus, ‘Climate Clubs and Carbon Pricing’ (n 635).
 688 See  chapter 21 in, Nordhaus, The Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for a 
Warming World (n 670). Chapter 6 of this volume addresses issues regarding the position 
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D The Measure Proposed
We propose a carbon pricing measure that is designed to address the Common 
Concern of low- carbon technology diffusion. It is comprised of two principal 
parts. The first part is that of introducing a carbon price preferably through 
a tax, or a tariff scheme, as appropriate. Second, in deserving situations, the 
revenue generated from carbon pricing of imports should be recycled as clean 
technology diffusion support back to the product origin countries. While the 
latter proposition is not novel,689 it remains unexplored in literature and prac-
tice. Not only is technology support essential for a carbon pricing scheme to 
address the problem of low- carbon technology diffusion, but it may also fur-
ther enhance the justifiability of any possible wto legal inconsistency suffered 
by the measure.
Generally, taxation approach would stand out as the most familiar way of im-
plementing a carbon price. That being said, it is equally true that the approach 
will make little sense in case a domestic tax base is absent. In the latter situation, 
only a tariff- based scheme makes sense. However, adoption of a tariff- based ap-
proach is novel and may bring forward a few technical hurdles.
With respect to the taxation approach, an appropriate method of border ad-
justment can be an information intensive process. As hinted before, complexi-
ties can arise as domestically a carbon tax can be levied in different levels (i.e. 
upstream, or downstream), but the imports only come under its purview at the 
product stage. The easiest method would be to require the foreign producer to 
assess its site carbon footprint,690 which can then be used to determine emis-
sion per unit of output.691,692 Any approximation attempt should abide by the 
 689 There is one earlier example of such a proposition being made. See, Aaron Cosbey and 
others, ‘A Guide for the Concerned: Guidance on the Elaboration and Implementation of 
Border Carbon Adjustment’ (Entwined 2012) Policy report paras 82– 85 <http:// www.ssrn.
com/ abstract=2178312> accessed 25 October 2020. The authors mention that use of the 
bta revenue for technology transfer moves the trade regime closer to the cbdr principle 
(para 84).
 690 The methodology for site footprinting are less complex. Also there are several compatible 
standards available at the public domain. For more, see Tao Gao, Qing Liu and Jianping 
Wang, ‘A Comparative Study of Carbon Footprint and Assessment Standards’ [2013] 
International Journal of Low- Carbon Technologies < https:// academic.oup.com/ ijlct/ 
article/ 9/ 3/ 237/ 812115 > accessed 25 October 2020.
 691 Simplistically for example, the general formula would be the approximate net emission 
multiplied by the carbon price and divided by the total amount of widgets produced at a 
particular calculation period.
 692 A comparable real example is the way the US superfund tax on petroleum was proposed 
to be applied on imports. Products derived from the domestically taxed substances, which 
contained the taxed chemical of a volume of more than 50% of its material weight was 










constraint that the proposed burden should never be greater upon the imports, 
when compared to the domestic counterparts.
As tariffs are a relatively less granular tool when it comes to reflecting a car-
bon price, one should not expect a price approximation closely related to a 
product’s actual emission footprint. A carbon tariff would call for additional 
product classification beyond the six digits of the harmonised system (hs).693 
An additional two digits can be added to further categorise products in differ-
ent bands of emission profiles, which should then be matched to varying levels 
of tariffs. This can be particularly useful with respect to products that are not 
complicated, but emission- intensive (e.g. metals like aluminium and steel). To 
illustrate, research suggests that for each kilogram of primary aluminium pro-
duction, emission of greenhouse gases can range from 5.92 Kgco2eq to 41.10 
Kgco2eq, to which subsequent operation add a fraction more.694 A member 
seeking to regulate emission therefrom can choose the relevant tariff lines 
(hs codes 7601– 16) and further classify it at 8 or 10 digits hs level into several 
bands of increasing emission intensity. While the lowest category can be al-
lowed zero tariffs, the maximum emission footprint could be imposed tariff at 
the bound level.
Most importantly, irrespective of whichever approach is used, it is of utmost 
importance that the benefit of the revenue generated through the introduced 
scheme is shared with the developing and the least- developed countries. To 
that effect, it is proposed that the bulk of the import revenue from carbon 
pricing accruing to a developed country should be used to support technology 
upgradation by the developing country firms. It is possible to envisage chan-
nelling of such revenue through the established funds (e.g. the Green Climate 
Fund (gcf)) by creating a new window of technology support granted to the 
Imported Substances [1987] gatt Panel L/ 6175- 34S/ 136 2– 3. There are earlier US examples 
of similar cooperation with respect to Superfunds. In current respect sharing of informa-
tion such as the energy source, used processing methods, and efficiency technologies in 
place would be relevant.
 693 ‘Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (hs)’ (UN Trade Statistics) 
<https:// unstats.un.org/ unsd/ tradekb/ Knowledgebase/ 50018/ Harmonized- Commodity- 
Description- and- Coding- Systems- HS> accessed 25 October 2020. According to the unts, 
‘The Harmonized System is an international nomenclature for the classification of prod-
ucts. It allows participating countries to classify traded goods on a common basis for cus-
toms purposes. At the international level, the Harmonized System (hs) for classifying 
goods is a six- digit code system’.
 694 Meenu Gautam, Bhanu Pandey and Madhoolika Agrawal, ‘Carbon Footprint of Aluminum 
Production’, Environmental Carbon Footprints (Elsevier 2018) 210– 211 <https:// linkinghub.
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trade exposed sectors of the developing countries.695 The developing countries 
should also follow suite wherever possible. Revenue utilisation from the earlier 
cdm projects will serve as a lesson in this regard. In case such a scheme cannot 
be put into action, bilaterally arranged revenue returns will be the next best 
solution. Support from the carbon pricing revenue should focus on the coun-
tries that are eligible to obtain technological assistance under the unfccc 
technology mechanism (tm) and the Paris technology framework (tf). Apart 
from ensuring lct diffusion to the developing and least- developed export ori-
gins, such recycling schemes would contribute to the legitimacy enhancement 
of the carbon pricing measure by making equitable considerations and im-
plementing the differentiated aspect of climate responsibility.696 It would also 
play an important role in bolstering justifiability of the measure with respect 
to the wto laws, as explained later in this chapter.
ii wto Eligibility of a Carbon Pricing Measure
Although regulation of ghg emission through taxes or tariffs are guided by the 
same purpose, treatment of these measures under the wto laws could become 
significantly different from each other. In scholarly literature, wto compatibil-
ity of carbon taxes has dominated the attention,697 whereas little examination 
 695 Peter C Cramton and others, ‘Price Carbon – I Will If You Will’ in Peter C Cramton and oth-
ers (eds), Global carbon pricing: the path to climate cooperation (mit Press 2017). Authors 
therein suggested contribution of revenue to the gcf. Similar suggestion was made by 
Scott and Rajamani in the context of utilising the revenue of the EU Aviation Emission 
Trading Scheme. Also J Scott and L Rajamani, ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism’ (2012) 
23 European Journal of International Law 469.
 696 Stiglitz (n 674).
 697 A large body of literature already exists on the issues of border adjustment of a carbon tax. To 
indicate a few, Hufbauer, Charnovitz and Kim (n 551) chs 1, and 2; Robert Howse and Antonia 
Eliason, ‘Domestic and International Strategies to Address Climate Change: An Overview of 
the wto Legal Issues’ in Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova and Sadeq Z Bigdeli (eds), International 
trade regulation and the mitigation of climate change:  World Trade Forum (Cambridge 
University Press 2009) 60– 69; Henrik Horn and Petros C Mavroidis, ‘Climate Change and the 
wto: Legal Issues Concerning Border Tax Adjustments’ (2010) 53 Japanese YB Int’l L. 19; Joost 
Pauwelyn, ‘Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO Law’ in Geert 
Van Calster and Denise Prevost (eds), Research handbook on environment, health and the WTO 
(Edward Elgar 2013); Holzer (n 602); Joel P Trachtman, ‘WTO Law Constraints on Border Tax 
Adjustment and Tax Credit Mechanisms to Reduce the Competitive Effects of Carbon Taxes’ 
(Resources for the future (rff) 2016); John S Odell, ‘Our Alarming Climate Crisis Demands 
Border Adjustments Now’ (ictsd 2018) Think Piece. Nordhaus indicated the complexity in 
calculation of carbon footprint and suggests use of tariffs instead. Nordhaus, ‘Climate Clubs 









has been made on the tariff opportunity.698 Practically, however, any exporting 
country challenging the carbon pricing measure by an importing country can 
argue that such actions are ineligible; in other words, outright inconceivable 
within the framework of wto. If not so, a complainant can still argue that such 
measures result in discriminatory treatment of their products in a market. In 
response, any party taking a carbon pricing measure will need to argue that 
such measures are possible and do not result in discrimination. If found dis-
criminatory, a respondent can further argue that such discrimination has a 
legitimate policy grounding and hence it is justifiable under the wto law. As 
these arguments are unpacked step by step, the present section will tackle the 
eligibility aspect, i.e. whether or not the proposed pricing measure is outright 
incompatible with the existing framework of trade rules. Later discussions will 
address the aspects of discriminatory impact and potential legitimacy of the 
measure. These sections are interrelated without any doubt.
Due to the intended impact of a carbon pricing measure on how imports 
are produced abroad, in trade law terms they are known as ‘process and pro-
duction measures’ (ppm s).699 With regard to the ppm s, the thorny and yet to 
be decided question is that whether the reach of domestic trade policy can 
extend so far as to dictate production methods despite the fact that such con-
ditions do not influence the physical properties of the product. Carbon pric-
ing falls in this category of non- product related ppm s, commonly known as 
npr- ppms. The place of this category of measures under wto laws continues 
to be controversial.
A Eligibility of Carbon Taxes
The relevant law that determines border adjustability of domestic taxes is Ar-
ticle ii:2(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt).700 A plain 
reading of the provision shows that an equivalent charge can be imposed on 
imports when there is a domestic tax on products similar to the imported good, 
or on an input the import is produced from. The standard of required equiva-
lence is informed by the national treatment provision as found in Article iii:2 
 698 The only serious assessment of this option is made by Thomas Cottier, Olga Nartova, and 
Anirudh Shingal in a journal contribution. See, Cottier, Nartova and Shingal (n 643).
 699 See a brief refresher on the concept, see Chapter 3 ii C (ii) at pp. 135- 136 above.
 700 It provides that “Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing 
at any time on the importation of any product: (a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax 
imposed consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article iii in respect of the 
like domestic product or in respect of an Article from which the imported product has 
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of the gatt.701 In essence, Article ii:2(a) reflects the destination principle of 
taxation.702
The only trade dispute where the decision sheds some light on Article 
ii:2(a) is the India – Additional duties.703 There the Appellate Body (ab) had 
the opportunity to clarify the exception the provision forms to the general pro-
hibition against subjecting imports to any fiscal burden other than ‘ordinary 
customs duties’ (ocd s) and ‘other duties and charges’ (odc s) at the border.704 
It was also explained that the standard of non- discrimination in Article iii:2 
is the metric that informs the measurement of ‘equivalence’ between the bor-
der charge and internal tax, as mentioned earlier.705 Also, the comparison be-
tween the charge and the tax from a national treatment point of view is an 
integral part of Article ii:2(a); so much so that a separate claim of breach is not 
required with respect to Article iii:2.706
The imposition of a charge equivalent to a domestic carbon tax upon im-
ports can be challenged because of the ambiguity in characterisation of the 
tax itself.707 As the explanation above shows, border adjustments are allowed 
regarding taxes imposed “in respect of an article from which the imported 
product had been manufactured or produced in whole or in part”.708 Kateryna 
Holzer identifies that it is conceptually problematic to consider that ghg emis-
sion, upon which tax is based, is an ‘article’ from which the product is manu-
factured.709 Moreover, the legal provision entrusted with the maintainance of 
 701 For more on the national treatment standard, see section iii below.
 702 It is ‘[a] regime of international taxation according to which consumption taxes are 
levied where products are consumed. The rates of vat and excise applied are those 
of the country of final consumption, and the entire revenue accrues to that country’s 
budget. This system ensures production neutrality, since indirect taxes do not discrim-
inate between foreign and domestic producers, and exports are exempt from domes-
tic taxation. The disadvantage is the need for monitoring of cross- border trade flows’. 
‘Destination Principle of Taxation  – Oxford Reference’ < https:// www.oxfordreference.
com/ view/ 10.1093/ oi/ authority.20110810104737666#:~:text=A%20regime%20of%20inter-
national%20taxation,accrues%20to%20that%20country's%20budget.&text=See%20
also%20origin%20principle%20of%20taxation. > accessed 25 October 2020.
 703 India – Additional and Extra- Additional Duties on Imports from the United States [2008] 
Appellate Body Report wt/ ds360/ ab/ r, dsr 2008:xx 8223.
 704 ibid 153.
 705 ibid 170, 172, 175.
 706 ibid 180.
 707 Holzer (n 602) 99– 100.
 708 Article ii:2(a), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; Hufbauer and others noted that 
the french version of the provision is even more restrictive in its wording. Hufbauer, 
Charnovitz and Kim (n 551) 68.
 709 Holzer (n 602) 100– 101. The author points out that ‘[a] carbon tax is levied not on an input 




















equivalence between the import charge and domestic tax, only covers “inter-
nal taxes or other internal charges […] applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products”.710 This prompted Frieder Roessler to hold that border ad-
justments apply to those domestic taxes that are imposed on products, and not 
to the taxes that tackle negative externalities but are borne by the producers 
(e.g. energy tax).711
On the contrary, the view proffered here is that a carbon tax does indeed 
apply to a product, directly or indirectly. As a result, it comes under the pur-
view of the gatt Article iii:2,712 and also thereby allow border adjustment. 
When a tax is considerable as applied to a product is a decision to be made 
based on evidence. As long as the tax burden is shifted to the final consumer 
through price, it should be considered as applied to the product. As one Panel 
explained that the requirement for a tax to be within the scope of the gatt 
Article iii:2 is the existence of some connection between a product and the 
tax, even if indirect.713 Also as explained earlier, the choice of imposing a car-
bon tax in a specific stage of energy production and use is itself a function of 
administrative expedience. In all cases, the burden can be reasonably expect-
ed down to the final consumer. Joost Pauwelyn also held the view that an up-
stream tax can nonetheless be considered as applied to a product where there 
is a close enough nexus between the tax and the product for the destination 
principle to be applicable.714
Further support to such a conclusion can be drawn from the rules under the 
wto Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ascm),715 which 
regulates the extent to which an analogue export adjustment is possible. Giv-
en the assumption that the nature and limits of border adjustment regarding 
imports and exports must be at par, the argument would be that if duties like 
carbon taxes are allowed to be withdrawn from exports under wto rules, the 
iii:2, which also conditions the subject- matter scope of taxes adjustable at the border 
include, among others, those that are “applied indirectly” to products.
 710 First sentence, Article iii:2, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n 426).
 711 Frieder Roessler, ‘India  – Additional and Extra- Additional Duties on Imports from the 
United States’ (2010) 9 World Trade Review 265, 271.
 712 It should be noted that the subject- matter scope of Article iii:2 has been read to be wide 
enough so as to prevent any possibility of discrimination of imports through taxation. 
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [1996] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds8/ ab/ r; wt/ 
ds10/ ab/ r; wt/ ds11/ ab/ r, dsr 1996:i 97 17– 20.
 713 Mexico  – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages [2006] Panel Report wt/ 
ds308/ r, dsr 2006:1 43 [8.40, 8.42].
 714 Pauwelyn, ‘Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO Law’ (n 
697) 476– 480.
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same should be allowed to be applied on similar imports. Dealing with indirect 
taxes, paragraph (g) in Annex i of the ascm indicates that such taxes can be 
withdrawn from exports up to the extent to which they applied on like prod-
ucts destined for domestic consumption. Indirect taxes, as understood in the 
ascm, cover “all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges”.716 Based on 
the same arguments that carbon tax is considerable as applied to a product, 
there is a strong probability that a carbon tax would be deemed as an indirect 
tax under the paragraph (g)  and therefore be found as adjustable regarding 
exports.717 To retain a consistent scope of border adjustments, they should also 
be adjustable regarding imports.
Lastly, from a natural science perspective, it is possible to consider the tax as 
one on certain types of energy sources that serve as input in the product. David 
Stern points at the laws of thermodynamics which imply that any production 
would require a minimum amount of energy to “carry out the transformation 
of matter”.718 Moreover, like tangible matters used as input in the production 
process, energy is also a non- reproducible factor of production. Both are con-
sumed during production, releasing waste in the end.719 The energy sources 
(e.g. coal, or petroleum) that are taxed under carbon pricing are tangible and 
fall within the domain of goods. So also does electricity, irrespective of the 
absence of physical dimension.720 Put together, an argument that fossil- based 
energy sources or electricity produced therefrom are Articles from which a 
product is made is indeed conceptually a valid one.
In conclusion, despite the divisive views, there are strong arguments on be-
half of the position that carbon taxes are eligible for border adjustments under 
the wto laws, so long as the like domestic products are also effectively brought 
under its coverage. Of course, a clear decision to that effect passed down in a 
dispute would be most welcome, but such may not occur any time soon. Never-
theless, there exist very sound reasons as shown above to construe that energy 
sources are very much akin to the other material inputs used in production. So, 
 716 Footnote 58, ibid.
 717 Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (n 440) 516– 518.
 718 David Stern, ‘Stochastic Trend: Energy as a Factor of Production’ (Stochastic Trend, 18 April 
2010) <http:// stochastictrend.blogspot.com/ 2010/ 04/ energy- as- factor- of- production.html> 
accessed 25 October 2020.
 719 ibid.
 720 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed- in Tariff Program (n 4) para 7.11; Thomas Cottier and oth-
ers, ‘Energy in WTO Law and Policy’ in Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis (eds), 
The prospects of international trade regulation :  from fragmentation to coherence 












like taxes on input materials, energy taxes and other comparable forms of car-
bon pricing should also be adjustable at the border. If none of these arguments 
is found as salient enough, one can turn to the next alternative, i.e. imposition 
of a carbon tariff. Eligibility of this option is discussed next.
B Eligibility of Carbon Tariffs
Although it is arguably easier to implement carbon pricing for imports through 
a tariff scheme, the technicalities involved nevertheless call for close attention. 
Tariffs, also known as ordinary customs duties (ocd s), are legitimate levies ap-
plicable upon products in connection with importation.721 Tariffs are adminis-
tered following a harmonised system (hs) of product classification,722 and 
organised into schedules.723 Schedules are the basis on which tariff negotia-
tions are carried out to bring down the overall level of restrictions.724 Successful 
tariff negotiations result in bound rates of duties that members do not exceed. 
However, tariff actually applied (i.e. the applied rate) by a wto member can, 
and often do, go much below the bound rate, as long as all similar imports from 
all origin are treated in the same fashion.
With respect to the simulation of a carbon pricing measure using tariffs as 
detailed earlier, a member would need to modulate the applied rates within 
the sub- classes of a six- digit hs code.725 This entails that the lowest band of 
tariff, possibly zero, would be imposed on the sub- group with the smallest car-
bon footprint in a class of products. Then it would be required that the applied 
rate is increased step- by- step for product sub- groups with higher footprints. 
Eventually, the highest applicable rate may even go beyond the bound rates. 
This is especially true for the developed countries whose duties are already 
bound at very low levels with little or no room between those and the rates 
applied. From the legal point of view, this will require in many cases deconsol-
idation of the tariff commitments. As Thomas Cottier and others have already 
shown, consolidated tariff lines are not irreversible, and there are lawful ways 
to reach deconsolidation.726 Modifying a member’s schedule of concessions to 
 721 Paragraphs (a) and (b), Article ii:1, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n 426).
 722 According to the World Customs Organization, the hs system covers 5000 product groups 
in 6- digit codes. The hs codes are used for 98% of international trade transactions. See, 
‘What Is the Harmonized System (HS)?’ (World Customs Organization (wco)) <http:// 
www.wcoomd.org/ en/ topics/ nomenclature/ overview/ what- is- the- harmonized- system.
aspx> accessed 25 October 2020.
 723 Article ii, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n 426).
 724 Article xxviiibis, ibid.
 725 See p. 151 above.
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deconsolidate tariffs is a multi- party exercise of rebalancing interests through 
exchanges of concessions among them and subsequent multilateralisation of 
the outcome.727 However, if such a negotiated settlement cannot be attained, 
applied carbon tariff beyond bound rates will fall foul of the gatt Article 
ii:1(b) with or without drawing similar withdrawal of concessions from other 
parties.
Another issue is that while over time the price of ghg emission moves up-
wards, a tariff rate is expected to move in the opposite direction. It is recognised 
by the wto members that tariffs are an obstacle that should be reduced over 
time.728 Although initially it may not be a manifest conflict, if a tariff scheme 
is carried out over the long- term, the outcome will not be in line with the spirit 
of the organisation anymore.
In conclusion, the tariff approach offers an attractive, viable, possibly even 
easier alternative option to engage in carbon pricing over the short or medi-
um- term. In terms of efficiency, tariffs may not be as robust a tool as tax, but 
they will indeed be easier to implement due to lesser complexity. However, de-
consolidation of tariff lines and determination of appropriate tariff rates could 
nonetheless pose some technical challenge. In cases where the tariffs will go 
beyond the bound rates of duty, it can draw challenge and retaliation from oth-
er partners. Such problems can be resolved through appropriate consultation. 
We will come back to this point in the end.
iii Discriminatory Impact of Carbon Pricing
The non- discrimination principle in the gatt and the other wto covered 
agreements form the essential bulwark to preserve the equal economic free-
dom of the members. At the heart of the non- discrimination rule lies a time- 
tested insight – that unfettered markets are in most cases the best approach 
for the allocation of global resources through cross- border trade.729 The 
commitment to non- discrimination preserves this position by ensuring that 
 727 Article xxviii, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n 426).
 728 Article xxviiibis: 1, ibid.
 729 The preamble to the gatt described the contracting parties’ goal as achieving growth, 
expansion of trade and resource utilization by reducing trade barriers and discriminatory 
practices. See, Preamble, ibid. Advent of the wto sought to build a viable multilateral 
system on that core, while further qualifying the nature of growth – by express subscrip-
tion to the notions of optimality of resource usage, sustainable development, environ-
mental protection and differentiation. See, Recital 4, Preamble, Marrakesh Agreement 









equal terms of competition prevail for any products in every market within 
the members’ jurisdiction. In legal terms, this commitment results in two dis-
tinct obligations. One, known as the ‘most- favoured nations’ (mfn) obligation, 
compels the wto members to accord imports the same opportunity to com-
pete in the domestic market as other imports belonging to the same catego-
ry.730 The other, known as ‘national treatment’ (nt) obliges members to accord 
to imports at least as favourable treatment as provided to comparable domes-
tic products with respect to fiscal and non- fiscal measures.731 As well known, 
however, deviation from the non- discrimination commitment is permitted to, 
inter alia, meet specific policy goals in line with the general exception clause 
in the gatt.732
In case a complainant challenges the trade aspects of a carbon pricing mea-
sure, it will be on the basis of the argument that despite different emission pro-
files, the final products are the same. Therefore, putting a carbon price either 
through tax or a tariff influences the market price of the product and takes the 
competitive edge away to the detriment of the complainant’s economic inter-
est. This argument can be fashioned as an mfn violation claim to challenge 
both tax and tariff- based approaches, indicating different pricing of similar 
imports. The tax- based approach can face an additional challenge of nt viola-
tion, indicating detrimental tax burden upon imports vis a vis domestic prod-
ucts. Below, it is shown that the claims of discriminatory carbon pricing can be 
responded to on merits by arguing either that emission profile of a product is 
a significant criterion capable of outweighing other similarities between prod-
ucts, or a difference in the imposed fiscal charges between such products is 
not discriminatory at all. It can be further argued that even if considered dis-
criminatory prima facie, it is possible to save a revenue recycled carbon pricing 
policy under the gatt exception clauses.
The current section explores the extent of the above arguments in the con-
text of the present- day understanding of the non- discrimination obligation in 
gatt, as well as the provisions for legitimising the exceptions therefrom. The 
goal is to flag the contentious questions, which will be taken up for further 
examination in relation to the doctrine of Common Concern.
A Product Comparability: The Test of ‘Likeness’
As the first step of non- discrimination analysis in the context of a dis-
pute, the test of likeness establishes the comparability between the alleged 
 730 Article i:1, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n 426).
 731 Article iii:2, ibid.
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discriminated product or a category thereof and the product or group that is 
beneficially treated.733 With respect to the carbon pricing proposal, such com-
parability question could, for example, very simplistically be like whether al-
uminium billets (hs 760120) smelted using geothermal energy is comparable 
to the same smelted using fossil fuels. Depending on the nature of the claim, 
determination of the scope of comparability between products would be of 
utmost importance.
It is important to start by recounting the concept of likeness. Under both 
Articles i and iii of gatt, the test of likeness is essentially the same, that is, 
a case- specific734 exercise of comparing a range of attributes of the products 
under inspection,735 to determine how closely they actually or may potentially 
compete in a given market.736 The required closeness of the competitive rela-
tionship between products to satisfy the test depends on the legal context in 
which the analysis takes place.737 Moreover, the level of closeness would also 
later inform the discrimination analysis, to decide as to the level of interven-
tion that may amount to a disruption of the competitive relationship.738 The 
range of product attributes that would generally merit attention during a like-
ness analysis are grouped into four categories, namely – (i) physical properties, 
(ii) end uses, (iii) consumer perception, and (iv) tariff classification.739 A Panel 
is free to be guided by the factual context while giving weight to the evidence 
considered across all the categories.
 733 Reference to ‘likeness’ here refers to the product comparison standard in relation to a 
non- discrimination analysis especially under the gatt. It is a general reference to ‘like 
products’ under Article I and ‘like products’ and ‘directly competitive and substitutable’ 
(dcs) products in Article iii:2 and the related Ad Note. The differences in the standard of 
comparison in these terms are further clarified during analysis.
 734 Japan  – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (n 712)  21– 22; European Communities  – Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products [2001] Appellate Body Report wt/ 
ds135/ ab/ r, dsr 2001:vii 3243 [99].
 735 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, 
ibid para 103.
 736 ibid paras 102– 3, 109.
 737 ‘The concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion. The 
accordion of “likeness” stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions 
of the wto Agreement are applied’. Japan  – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (n 712). It is 
especially important with respect to Article iii:2. When the competing products are very 
close, there is no room for even a minimum tax difference under the first sentence of 
Article iii:2. In case the products compared are ‘directly competitive and substitutable’ 
the standard allows some room for a tax to vary.
 738 ibid.

















With respect to the general categories of product attributes considered 
during the likeness analysis, it should be kept in mind that those were never 
meant to form a conceptual straightjacket. Nevertheless, the practice of con-
sidering the four categories of attributes is a well- reasoned interpretative out-
come, proven through the test of time.740 Characteristic to the early Appellate 
Body (ab) judgments, the likeness test was developed following the Vienna 
Convention step by step;741 first approaching the literal meaning, then the 
context, and later drawing upon subsequent practice of the parties.742 While 
following of these exact four categories are not a binding rule, it is advisable as 
per dictates of efficiency, cohesion, and formality. However, these fourfold cat-
egories, are not immune to evolution over time when circumstances require. 
The ab itself was clear on this point when holding the following:
These criteria are, it is well to bear in mind, simply tools to assist in the 
task of sorting and examining the relevant evidence.  They are neither 
a treaty- mandated nor a closed list of criteria that will determine the 
legal characterization of products.  More important, the adoption of a 
particular framework to aid in the examination of evidence does not dis-
solve the duty or the need to examine, in each case, all of the pertinent 
evidence. […] Accordingly, whether the Border Tax Adjustments frame-
work is adopted or not, it is important under Article  iii:4 to take ac-
count of evidence which indicates whether, and to what extent, the 
products involved are – or could be – in a competitive relationship in the 
marketplace.743
 740 Japan  – Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic 
Beverages [1987] gatt Panel bisd 34S/ 83 [5.5]; European Communities  – Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products (n 734) paras 91– 92.
 741 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline [1996] Panel Report 
wt/ ds2/ r, dsr 1996:i 29 [6.8].
 742 The evidence of subsequent practice comprises solely of the gatt era report on Border 
Tax Adjustments. gatt, ‘Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments’ (1970) 
L/ 3464. Especially this excerpt from pargraph 18 of has been the key foundation of inter-
preting ‘like product’. “[…] problems arising from the interpretation of the term should 
be examined on a case- by- case basis. This would allow a fair assessment in each case of 
the different elements that constitute a ‘similar’ product. Some criteria were suggested 
for determining, on a case- by- case basis, whether a product is ‘similar’; the product’s end- 
uses in a given market; consumers tastes and habits, which change from country to coun-
try; the product’s properties, nature and quality.”
 743 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products (n 
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So there is no legal obstacle in considering the emission profiles during a like-
ness analysis, provided that the emission footprints have a bearing on the 
closeness of the competitive relationship between and among products. On 
this latter issue, at least two arguments are possible to show that emission foot-
print may impact how closely products compete in a market. For one, given 
the impending hazard of climate change, it can be assumed that consumers 
would indeed prefer the product that contributes less to emission. Another ar-
gument, drawing analogically from the ab position in the Canada – Renewable 
Energy dispute, is that products with differing emission footprints may belong 
to different markets. We elaborate upon these two arguments below.
The argument that the products’ emission profile would influence consum-
er choice is plausible but only occasionally salient. The proponents of this 
argument indicate that in ec – Asbestos the ab found consumer preference 
for health- risk- free product to be likely even in the absence of evidence.744 By 
extension, therefore, it could be said that if evidence of the risk of unmitigat-
ed emission and related consumer preference is submitted, it would be posi-
tively assessed by a dispute settlement Panel.745 However, the issue that arises 
is that when actual evidence is looked at, this intuitive presumption may not 
hold. Except for some developed countries, final consumers may not always 
act as price averse.746 Had they been so, the situation of free- riding would 
not arise in the first place.747 Moreover, in situations where consumers’ pref-
erences are prone to external influence,748 a Panel or ab would be cautious 
so as not to put such weight to this factor that fully diminishes other simi-
larities between the compared product groups. Especially when the product 
compared is an input (going to firms), price- sensitivity of the consumers is 
more manifest than in a similar situation involving a final product (going to 
individual consumers).
 744 ibid 123, 130, 139, 145.
 745 The argument could be further refined holding that there is a latent consumer demand 
in the market that is masked by the availability of similar products with higher carbon 
footprints. ibid 123; Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [1999] Appellate Body Report 
wt/ ds75/ ab/ r, wt/ ds84/ ab/ r, dsr 1999:i 3 [115].
 746 With respect to environment friendly (green) products in general, research finds that 
consumers do not act as green as they say. For a general survey, see, Jonas Lehmann and 
Yossi Sheffi, ‘Consumers’ (Not so) Green Purchase Behavior’ Draft Paper 26, 3 (2019) < 
https:// sheffi.mit.edu/ sites/ sheffi.mit.edu/ files/ 2019- 08/ Consumers%27%20%28not%20
so%29%20Green%20Purchase%20Behavior.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020.
 747 The fundamental tenet of environmental economics is the assumption that price respon-
sive behaviour of the consumers give rise to free- riding.












The argument that products with different emission profiles could be con-
sidered to exist in different markets and therefore are non- competitive is one 
that is made drawing analogical support from the ab decision in the Canada – 
Renewable Energy749 dispute. The ab in that dispute held (albeit on a different 
context) that the market for electricity produced from renewable sources is 
not the same as that produced from fossil fuels, when the inherent differences 
in costs, supply, and demand characteristics, and underlying policy intents are 
taken into due consideration.750 Some scholars raised the question whether, 
by analogy, it is possible to argue that maybe products differing in emission 
footprint also do not belong in the same market.751 But the challenge is that 
unlike the electricity scenario there is no single sharp distinction here, as 
products would be made from various (often mixed) electricity sources and 
would have a varying emission portfolio, making one clear distinction difficult 
to find. An analogy as such can lead to an outcome where there are as many 
markets as there are product groups of a distinct emission footprint, which 
is unreasonable. However, if the comparison is between products exclusively 
made from renewable electricity (i.e. zero carbon footprint) and those having 
some carbon footprint, there may be some plausibility that the argument will 
hold water.
So, although a product’s physical properties have been merited as a key cate-
gory of consideration, it does not rule out the opportunity to consider the non- 
physical attributes (npa) as well.752 But the extent to which emission footprint 
as an npa will set products competitively apart from one another is difficult 
to determine. For reasons detailed above, a finding that products differing on 
emission footprint do not compete at all in a given market would be highly 
implausible. Also, the carbon price measure itself is adopted assuming a com-
petition between such products, which the measure sets out to modify through 
 749 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed- in Tariff Program (n 500).
 750 For details, see p. 218 below.
 751 Steve Charnovitz, ‘Border Tax Equalization’ in Jagdish N Bhagwati, Pravin Krishna and 
Arvind Panagariya (eds), The world trade system :  trends and challenges (The mit Press 
2016)  40; Cottier, ‘Renewable Energy and Process and Production Methods’ (n 609)  3. 
Cottier, however, remains critical of the ab view. It should also be noted that the Panel in 
the dispute did not take this view either.
 752 It is also worth highlighting that the key source of interpretation, i.e. the border tax 
adjustment report, talks about products properties in general and not ‘physical’ proper-
ties. In the Brazil – Taxation dispute, Panel’s likeness analysis focuses on the bta expres-
sion rather than the Asbestos criteria. Brazil – Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and 
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corrective intervention. Much would depend on the magnitude of the differ-
ence in emission footprints between products. Going back to the aluminium 
example, there is plausibility in the argument that aluminium from geother-
mal smelters and that from coal smelters are not ‘like product’ under the first 
sentence of Article iii:2. But it is difficult to decide when fossil fuel and coal 
smelted aluminium is considered.
The ultimate finding in a dispute would indeed depend upon the way a 
Panel exercises its discretion in attaching relative weight to the differing non- 
physical properties vis a vis the possible similarity in other categories. Here lies 
another challenge. If argued that any non- physical properties should be given 
weight against similarity in other categories, it would reduce the value of like-
ness determination as a vanguard against protectionism. One probably could 
think of some criteria that would guide the discretion of the tribunal while 
making an assessment. It is not difficult to see the role of Common Concern in 
that respect. We will return to this issue in a later part.
B Standard of Discrimination: Change in Conditions of Competition
In case products varying in emission footprints are found to be in a close 
enough competitive relationship, the question then arises whether subjecting 
those products to different financial burdens can be considered as discrimi-
natory. As already indicated, whether a claim of mfn or and nt violation or 
both is raised depends on the adoption of tax or tariff approach in pricing. The 
claim regarding mfn would, in essence, be that there are some products that 
face a lower tax burden or custom duty in the respondent’s market compared 
to the claimant’s products. With respect to the tax based pricing approach, 
an additional national treatment (nt) violation claim could be lodged when 
claimant’s products face a higher tax amount vis a vis some comparable do-
mestic products.
With respect to the legal analysis of finding discrimination, Articles i and 
iii:2 of gatt show some similarities, also differences. Although ‘discrimina-
tion’ is not a term used in this provision, there is certainly a homogenous un-
derstanding of this notion that finds expression through the treaty terms. Un-
der both provisions, a determination of any measure falling within its clutches 
as discriminatory entail answering whether the effect thereof is translated into 
loss of competitive opportunity for the complainant’s products.753 However, 
 753 United States  – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and 
Tuna Products [2012] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds381/ ab/ r, dsr 2012:iv 1837 [7.278]; 
European Communities  – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 





given the differences in terms of scope and subject- matter focus of the two 
provisions, the factors that are probative of discrimination in the respective 
legal settings indeed differ. This point is elaborated in the next paragraph. An-
other feature that is common in both instances is that the legal analysis of 
finding discrimination is independent of subjective intent. It is ‘value- neutral’ 
in the sense that the effect in the market in terms of competition between 
products, proven empirically, is the sole determiner of the existence of 
discrimination.754
As mentioned above, despite the same goals, analyses under Articles i and 
iii go through distinct legal sequences. It is because the analysis of discrimina-
tion under respective provisions follows closely the structure and the wording 
therein. Under the mfn provision,755 the analysis involves determining wheth-
er the challenged measure grants an ‘advantage’, i.e. one that competitively fa-
vours products in the market. If so, not extending the same ‘immediately and 
unconditionally’ to all products would amount to discrimination. Whereas re-
garding a claim of internal taxation related nt breach under Article iii:2, find-
ing of discrimination follows a very different structure. Under this provision, 
the degree of similarity between two compared product groups determine the 
magnitude of difference in fiscal burden that may be considered discriminato-
ry. If products are so close as to be considered ‘like’ under the first sentence,756 
tax burdens upon them have to be the same. If products are not ‘like’ but nev-
ertheless ‘competitive and substitutable’ with each other, the analysis will be 
covered by the second sentence of the provision,757 where existence of a de 
[5.88]; Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization :  Text, Cases and Materials (Fourth edition, Cambridge University Press 
2017) 308– 309, 344– 345.
 754 Intent based argument, i.e. a measure is not discriminatory if not pursued with a pro-
tectionist intent, has long before rejected by the Appellate Body for good reasons. See 
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (n 712) para 119.
 755 The relevant part of the text of the provision (gatt Article i) provides that “[…] any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any prod-
uct originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all 
other contracting parties.”
 756 It provides that “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into 
the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to 
internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products.”
 757 The second sentence of Article iii:2 of gatt provides that “[…] no contracting party shall 
otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic prod-
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minimis level of tax difference would not matter. Any greater level of difference 
would be found discriminatory if it is maintained ‘so as to afford protection to 
domestic production’ (satap test, in short).758 Finding on the latter is decided 
upon based on the design, structure, and operation of the measure as well as 
the actual amount of tax differential.
(i) The Possible Outcome under National Treatment Obligation
Without a doubt, a carbon tax will impose a differential burden upon products, 
both domestic and foreign. The question whether such differential tax burden 
would be considered a breach of Article iii:2 or not, irrespective of being or-
igin neutral, depends upon contextual factors. One issue would be how the 
comparable product groups are drawn. Another question would be how close-
ly competitive the products are considered to be.
According to the Panel in Argentina – Hides and Leather, a comparison of 
the tax burden for the purpose of discrimination would take into account ac-
tual and not the nominal burden.759 The Panel argued that otherwise, a mem-
ber would be able to shift the tax bases and impose the same nominal rate 
with different outcomes between imports and domestic products. This finding 
disadvantages a carbon tax even when it applies a uniform rate of emission 
price. The problem is that the tax is imposed on products with respect to their 
negative emission externality, which is not a traditional product attribute.760 
This leads to the difficulty in arguing that different final tax burdens are non- 
discriminatory. To illustrate the point, had the uniform rate been based upon 
the presence of any trace element (e.g. mercury) in the product in a varying de-
gree, the actual fiscal burden would not be discriminatory despite the amount 
being different from one to another. In this illustration, the tax can easily be 
characterised as a tax on the ingredient itself, applied in a uniform manner. But 
the same argument is not easy to apply with respect to embedded emissions 
by considering the tax as that on the emission externality. It is because the 
‘competitive and substitutable’ products come from the explanatory note of the provi-
sion. This was understood as covering a wider scope of products that compete with each 
other, but are not ‘like’ under the narrow sense of the term in the first sentence. Van den 
Bossche and Zdouc (n 753) 366– 370.
 758 This standard arises from Article iii:1 that is referred in the second sentence (see foot-
note above). The provision maintains that differential treatment “should not be applied 
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.”
 759 Argentina  – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished 
Leather [2001] Panel Report wt/ ds155/ r, dsr 2001:v 1779 [11.182]; Holzer (n 604) 123; Van 
den Bossche and Zdouc (n 753) 364.









emission has not crossed the border with the product, unlike an incorporat-
ed ingredient. However, if one conceptualises a manufactured product to be 
composed of not only what it physically embodies, but also of the externality 
it imposes, there would be an opportunity to characterise a uniformly applied 
carbon tax as not discriminatory. We return to this argument in the following 
section.
Nevertheless, one fact that may lead one to be optimistic about implement-
ing a carbon tax without drawing a challenge is that so far, none of the tax 
measures successfully challenged at the wto is a transparent single- rate tax 
applied equally upon domestic production and imports. The wto disputes in-
volving taxation of alcoholic beverages are the best analogues. In all those dis-
putes, the challenged tax rates were such that are designed in a tiered fashion, 
effectively putting most of domestic production on a lower bracket than the 
imported ones. One may hope that a transparent carbon price, applied even- 
handedly, would not even draw a challenge. A case on point, as mentioned by 
Pauwelyn, is the excise tax on ozone- depleting chemicals in the US, which has 
remained in place for more than a decade without being challenged.761
Following the discussion above, it is clear that regarding an assessment of 
the breach of nt obligation, the methods of drawing up the compared prod-
uct groups, as well as the level of comparison would play an important role 
in finding discrimination. While comparing the final tax burden on products 
may allow for easier finding of discrimination, if the tax rates are compared, 
it could be found that despite different final burden, the measure itself does 
not discriminate. In contrast, if only the imported highly taxed products are 
compared with any available low taxed domestic products, finding of discrim-
ination will be easy.762 It is however assumed here that the comparison will be 
between the general incidences of taxation upon all domestic against all com-
plainants’ imports.763 As the issue itself is not yet fully resolved, we attempt 
to find and weigh analogical support from the existing jurisprudence in the 
following paragraphs.
 761 Sections 4681 and 4682, United States Internal Revenue Code; Pauwelyn, ‘Carbon Leakage 
Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under wto Law’ (n 697) 493.
 762 This is what Ehring termed as a ‘diagonal’ test. Lothar Ehring, ‘De Facto Discrimination in 
World Trade Law’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 921, 924, 926.
 763 Ehring argued that taxation ‘in excess’ should require further proof of asymmetric det-
rimental impact on imports, i.e. the benefit of differentiated taxation is reaped by a 
relatively larger proportion of domestic industries than the foreign. However, such a 
requirement may raise predictability concerns as the asymmetric impact on the com-
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If the carbon tax is covered under the first sentence of Article iii:2, there 
would be a very slim chance for it to be found non- discriminatory, unless it 
is agreed that an even- handed application of emission- based tax rate would 
not be discriminatory despite the varying final burden of tax.764 Otherwise ac-
cording to the existing jurisprudence, any difference of tax burden would be 
considered ‘in excess’ and therefore discriminatory.
However, if the measure falls under the second sentence of the provision 
because the compared products are rather considered as directly competitive 
and substitutable, it would have slightly better chances to pass the discrimina-
tion assessment. The provision requires competitive and substitutable prod-
ucts to be ‘similarly taxed’, allowing differentiation below a de minimis thresh-
old. Moreover, the dissimilar taxation would be discriminatory only when it 
is undertaken “so as to afford protection” (satap) to domestic production.765
The existence of the satap requirement may allow for further flexibility. It 
ought to be noted that in a gatt- era approach to the interpretation of ‘like-
ness’ the phrase “so as to afford protection” was understood as bringing con-
sideration of the policy objective into play.766 Under the wto jurisprudence, 
that approach was rejected very early on,767 as well as the express influence of 
the satap standard was limited only to the second sentence of Article iii:2. 
According to the Appellate Body (ab), the proof of the satap requirement 
required establishment of the protective application of a measure.768 It entails 
an overall assessment of the design, structure, and application of the mea-
sure with a view to objectively ascertain the true purpose.769 If no protective 
 764 This argument is made later in the chapter in light of the doctrine of Common Concern. 
See section iv B at p. 192 and onwards.
 765 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (n 712) 116.
 766 United States  – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages [1992] gatt Panel ds 
23/ R- 39S/ 206 [5.23– 5.26]. This is the ‘aim and effects’ approach. See for details, Robert E 
Hudec, ‘gatt/ wto Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” 
Test’ (1998) 32 The International Lawyer 32, 626– 635.
 767 Japan  – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [1996] Panel Report wt/ ds8/ r; wt/ ds10/ r; wt/ 
ds11/ r, dsr 1996:i 125 [6.16– 6.17, 6.33]; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 753) 362.
 768 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (n 715) 18. According to the ab, ‘[a] lthough it is true 
that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, nevertheless its protective appli-
cation can most often be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the revealing 
structures of a measure’. See Hudec’s critique of the point, Hudec (n 766) 631– 632.
 769 United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 [1989] gatt Panel bisd 36S/ 345 [5.2.2]; 
Philippines  – Taxes on Distilled Spirits [2012] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds396/ ab/ 
















application is found, dissimilar taxation of directly competitive and substitut-
able products do not breach nt commitment.770
As the satap requirement closely examines a measure in terms of its oper-
ation, it may serve to show a carbon- tax as non- discriminatory, especially in 
circumstances where the additional financial burden due to the taxation falls 
evenly between domestic and foreign products. However, it is not conclusive 
as facts will differ in every case.771 The satap analysis, in essence, would look 
at whether the foreign producers predominantly bear the high tax burden or 
not.772 Therefore, if the tax is introduced in a sector where the foreign products 
are more polluting in nature, it would surely be considered as discriminatory 
under the current standard.
(ii) The Possible Outcome under the Most- favoured Nation Obligation
Not much examination is required to hold that in many cases a carbon price 
measure would be found to be breaching the most- favoured nation obliga-
tion. Establishing a breach of Article i of the gatt requires four precondi-
tions to be fulfilled– (i) the measure should fall within the described scope 
of the provision, (ii) the products under consideration should be ‘like’, (iii) 
the measure in question should be granting an advantage, (iii) the advan-
tage should be shown as not granted to all like imports, immediately and un-
conditionally.773 A tax measure falls within the scope of the mfn provision 
without any doubt. The related question of ‘likeness’ between products have 
already been addressed, showing that there will unavoidably be products 
that are in a competitive relationship in the market facing different tax or 
tariff burden due to variation in their carbon footprints. The only remaining 
question is whether the benefit of a lesser tax burden on some imports com-
pared to others will be considered an ‘advantage’ within the meaning of the 
gatt Article i.
In the context of the open- ended wording as “any advantage, favour, priv-
ilege or immunity” as used in Article i, the term advantage has been given a 
wider interpretation. It was held that any measure providing favourable com-
petitive opportunity to some product or affecting the competition between 
 770 Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 753) 374.
 771 Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (n 745) para 137.
 772 Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages [2000] Panel Report wt/ ds87/ r, wt/ ds110/ r, dsr 
2000:i 303 [7.158]. The panel therein found that 95% of the foreign products fell under 
the highest tax brackets under the disputed measure.
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products would be considered an advantage.774 Similarly granting of favour-
able marketing opportunity was also found to be an ‘advantage’.775 Tariff dif-
ferentiation among like products was also deemed as advantageous.776 As a 
result, provided that products with different embedded emissions are consid-
ered to be ‘like’, different tax or tariff burdens would surely be seen as affecting 
their competitive relationship and according advantage to the products that 
face lower fiscal burden. Such benefit, when not extended to all other polluting 
products, would constitute a breach of the mfn obligation.
C Justifying the Pricing Measures
A carbon pricing measure that fails to meet the non- discrimination standard 
can yet be potentially saved under the general exception clause. The gatt Ar-
ticle xx is best understood as the balancing scale maintaining an equilibrium 
between one member’s policy- driven market interventions and others’ benefits 
guaranteed under the trade legal regime.777 As a result, Article xx serves as the 
prominent, if not the only avenue that allows harmonisation of trade commit-
ments with other global concerns.778 The requisite conditions for compliance 
with Article xx come in two tiers.779 First, the policy intent of the carbon pric-
ing measure must be brought within the coverage of one of the sub- paragraphs 
(a)  to (j). This is known as provisional justification. For the purposes of this 
chapter, the policy intent should be taken to be diffusion of low- carbon tech-
nology and thereby contribution to enhanced emission mitigation. Second, the 
opening sentence of Article xx, (i.e. the Chapeau) requires fair implementation 
of any exceptional measure that is found as provisionally justifiable.
 774 European Communities  – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas 
[1997] Panel Report wt/ ds27/ r, dsr 1997:ii; dsr 1997:iii 7.239.
 775 United States  – Certain Measures Affecting Import of Poultry from China [2010] Panel 
Report wt/ ds392/ r, dsr 2010:v 1909 [7.417]; United States  – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (n 753) paras 237– 240.
 776 European Communities  – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries [2004] Panel Report wt/ ds246/ r, dsr 2004:iii 1009 [7.58– 7.60].
 777 European Communities  – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (n 753) para 5.301.
 778 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 94).
 779 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (n 93) 22; United 
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 94) 119– 121; Brazil – 
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres [2007] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds332/ 
ab/ r, dsr 2007:iv 1527 [139]; United States – Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services [2005] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds285/ ab/ r, dsr 
2005:xii, p.  5663 (Corr.1, dsr 2006:xii, 5475)  [292]; Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 















With regard to provisional justification analysis, the policy intent mentioned 
above can potentially find cover under the sub- paragraphs (g),780 or (b),781 or 
even somewhat arguably under the subparagraph (a).782 The legal require-
ment for a measure to find refuge under these provisions is generally twofold. 
First, a preliminary analysis will take place to ensure that the measure is struc-
turally suited to contribute to the relevant policy goal.783 There is a unanimity 
of scholarly opinion that a measure designed to tackle climate change will not 
fail at this stage.784 We, therefore, do not dwell on this question. Second, the 
preliminary analysis is followed by a closer examination of the relationship 
between the measure and the policy goal, stringency of which is guided by the 
language of the specific provision (i.e. ‘relating to’ or ‘necessary’). In addition, 
the wording of the subparagraph (g)785 demands even- handed application, i.e. 
that the disputed measure is also implemented domestically. This section will 
briefly focus on the challenges possibly arising with respect to the relationship 
analysis part of the provisional justification assessment.
With respect to the low- carbon technology diffusion aspect of the carbon 
pricing measure, the Chapeau analysis takes special importance, as it dictates 
attention to be paid to the prevailing differences in situations between coun-
tries.786 This is the only opportunity to introduce the equitable considerations 
and respect for the cbdr principle in implementation of the carbon pricing 
measure. This bears central importance, as detailed hereunder, not only to en-
sure that clean technology diffusion takes place, but also to justify a carbon 
pricing measure facing scrutiny at the wto.
 780 The text provides:  “(g)    relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption;” [emphasis supplied].
 781 The text provides:  “(b)    necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;” 
[emphasis supplied].
 782 The text provides: “(a) necessary to protect public morals;” [emphasis supplied].
 783 With respect to xx(g) this requires determination that the measure involves ‘conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources. With respect to xx(a) and xx(b), it entails analy-
sis of the design of the measure in question to service public morals and protection of 
human, animal, plant life or health. Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 753) 558– 559, 574, 579.
 784 Marceau, ‘The Interface between the Trade Rules and Climate Change Actions’ (n 534) 13– 
15; Trachtman (n 697) 17; Holzer (n 602).
 785 See, n 780 above.
 786 The chapeau of Article xx allows an gatt inconsistent measure to be maintained ‘[s] ub-
ject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade […]’. General 
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(i) Provisional Justification under Article xx(g): the ‘Relating to’ Standard
Among the ‘related to’ and the ‘necessity’ standards used to designate the re-
quired relationship between a measure and policy goals, the former, used in 
subparagraph (g)  is the comparatively less stringent one. Test under the ‘re-
lating to’ standard requires establishing a “close and genuine relationship of 
ends and means” between the policy goal and the measure itself.787 As a sta-
ble climate is considerable as an exhaustible natural resource,788 and a carbon 
pricing measure directly contributes to the mitigation of its worsening by re-
ducing emission, as well as increasing demands for clean technologies, a close 
relationship between the pricing measure and conservation of the climatic 
conditions clearly exists.
As aforementioned, the subparagraph (g) also calls for even- handed appli-
cation of the measure, which is easier to fulfil with respect to a carbon tax, but 
may pose a problem regarding a carbon tariff. A carbon tax that is applied do-
mestically and also adjusted at the border is even- handed in effect. Whereas, a 
carbon tariff is by definition applicable only on imports. In cases where prod-
ucts or processes similar to those subjected to a carbon tariff exist domestically 
without being subjected to any comparable regulation, the even- handedness 
requirement will not be met.
(ii) Provisional Justification under Article xx(a) and (b): the 
‘Necessity’ Standard
With respect to the necessity standard under sub- paragraphs (a) and (b), we 
note that whether the pricing of emission to facilitate technology diffusion and 
climate mitigation would be considered ‘necessary’ or not will be determined 
by ‘weighing and balancing’ all the relevant factors.789 Under this approach 
of necessity determination, the apparent trade restrictiveness of a measure 
would be balanced against the extent to which the measure is apt to make a 
material contribution over time to the policy goal as well as the importance of 
 787 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 94) para 136.
 788 Current jurisprudence concur that any resources, including the renewable ones, can 
be ‘exhaustible’ within the meaning of the provision. See, United States – Standards 
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (n 741) para 6.37; United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 94)  paras 130– 134; United 
States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico [2015] Panel Report wt/ ds381/ 
rw [7.512].
 789 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef [2001] Appellate Body 










the policy goal itself.790 Overall, it remains a holistic exercise of qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of three categories of factors,791 i.e. (i) relative importance 
of the goal, (ii) potential contribution of the measure to the goal, (iii) trade 
distortive impact and reasonable availability of less distorting alternatives.792
With respect to the assessment of the contribution of the carbon pricing 
measure to the policy objective, it is submitted that when applied to the spe-
cific situation under the subparagraph (a), a key challenge will be to estab-
lish the moral unacceptability of excessive greenhouse gas emission among 
the domestic population. Public morality, taken as the standard of right and 
wrong,793 is understood as varying amongst the wto members.794 Therefore, 
the outcome will differ from case to case, subject to clear proof of the domestic 
moral rejection of an emission intensive lifestyle. In comparison, under the 
subparagraph (b), the contribution of carbon pricing to the protection of life, 
and health can be easily established through use of the available scientific ev-
idence linking reduction of ghg emission to the safeguarding of ecosystems, 
livelihoods, and communities in the long- term.
With respect to the other factors playing a role in the necessity analysis un-
der the subparagraphs (a) and (b), the nature of legal relationship between the 
wto laws and the climate rules, especially the UN Framework Convention (un-
fccc), and the recent Paris Agreement will require determination. As almost 
all the wto members are also part of the climate instruments, the latter would, 
in all probability, exert influence as a rule “applicable in the relation between 
parties”.795 While the Paris Agreement commitment to 1.5oC temperature 
 790 European Communities  – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (n 753) para 5.209. In both disputes, it was recognised by the Appellate Body that 
it is possible to qualitatively assess what a measure is apt to contribute in the long run.
 791 ibid 5.214– 5.215.
 792 Korea  – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (n 789)  para 164; 
European Communities  – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products [2014] Panel Report wt/ ds400/ r, wt/ ds401/ r, dsr 2014:ii 365 [7.630]; United 
States – Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (n 
779) paras 309– 311.
 793 United States  – Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services [2005] Panel Report wt/ ds285/ r, dsr 2005:ix 5797 [6.465]; China – Measures 
Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products [2014] Panel Report wt/ ds363/ r and Corr.1, dsr 2010:ii 261 
[7.759]; European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of 
Seal Products ibid paras 7.410, 7.631– 7.632.
 794 European Communities  – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (n 753) para 5.199.
 795 Article 31(3)(C), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (1969); European 
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limitation will serve to showcase the importance for climate mitigation and 
diffusion of low- carbon technology, the fact that under the Paris Agreement 
commitments are voluntary could work against the necessity determination. 
On the one hand, a complainant could argue that a strict carbon pricing mea-
sure imposed by the respondent would restrict the independence granted to 
a member under the Paris rules. On the other hand, the respondent can rebut 
holding that the voluntariness of commitment under Paris is available to both 
the parties. Therefore, the respondent would be entitled to the policy space to 
introduce carbon pricing as long as there is a sufficient nexus between the mea-
sure and the policy goal, despite an indirect extraterritorial impact.796
Lastly, the assessment of the lesser trade- restrictive alternatives could also 
be challenging. Emission mitigation can be pursued in different forms, includ-
ing ways that do or do not impact the market (e.g. a trade- restrictive carbon 
tax, against trade neutral afforestation). The Paris Climate Agreement leaves 
the parties to determine the appropriate means of mitigation, also providing 
opportunities to develop cooperation based market measures for the purposes 
of mitigation.797 Although a complainant can always show alternative means 
of emission reduction, it is not clear whether different means should be con-
sidered as alternates to each other, given the fact that the more emission is 
reduced the better it is for the planet in the long run.
(iii) Differentiation and Article xx Chapeau
As the final step of the justification analysis, the Chapeau ensures that the 
manner of implementation of a measure does not add to the existing in-
consistency that has been found to be provisionally justifiable. Purposed to 
prevent misuse of the Article xx carve- outs,798 the wording of the Chapeau, 
among other things, forbids a measure to be applied a way that causes “ar-
bitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail”. Past history shows that disputed measures often fail to 
Panel Report wt/ ds292/ r / wt/ ds293/ r / Add.1 to Add.9 and Corr.1, dsr 2006:iii 847. 
See in particular the paragraph 7.68 and footnote 243 of the Panel Report. In the men-
tioned footnote, the Panel notes that “[…] it would be incongruous to allow the interpre-
tation of a treaty to be affected by rules of international law which are not applicable in 
the relations between all parties to the treaty, but not by a subsequent practice which 
does not establish the agreement of all parties to the treaty regarding the meaning of that 
treaty”. The report has not been appealed.
 796 For a concise overview on the extraterritorial aspects of the argument, see Chapter  6, 
below.
 797 Articles 4 & 6 respectively, Paris Agreement (n 28).









pass this test.799 As this requirement is to avoid arbitrariness in application 
of a measure to similar countries, it logically follows that in case the coun-
tries are differently situated, the implementation of a measure with respect 
to them must vary as well. Countries upon which the same trade- restrictive 
measure would apply will face very different impact, in case prevailing con-
ditions therein are not same. This absence of consideration of the different 
conditions results in further discrimination that may be ‘unjustifiable or ar-
bitrary’.800 In the context of the present measure seeking to spread climate 
technologies, the question arises that whether the principle of cbdr, as found 
in the climate regime, would inform the wto rules to such an extent that a 
member would be required to modulate the application of carbon pricing. We 
focus on this question below.801
Deciding whether ‘same conditions prevail’ is partially an interpretative ex-
ercise, which according to the ab is better fulfilled by understanding the condi-
tions in the context of the specific policy objectives.802 So far there has been no 
dispute where it has been found that prevailing conditions between countries 
are different. With respect to a carbon pricing measure, however, the matters 
may not be the same. The policy goal pursued by the imposition of a carbon 
price is mitigation of ghg emissions, also diffusion of low- carbon technology. 
Given that both the trade and climate treaty regimes have widespread mem-
bership and almost all wto members are signatory to the Paris Agreement; fol-
lowing Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention,803 interpretation of whether 
‘same conditions prevail’ between countries in the context of climate mitiga-
tion goal, would be influenced by the cbdr principle. As a result, implementa-
tion of gatt inconsistent trade measures to address climate change must vary 
between countries, as same conditions do not prevail among all.
However, the nature and degree of differentiation could give rise to some 
complexities. We recall that the standard of differentiation dictated by the 
 799 Namely, US  – Gasoline (ds2), us – Shrimp (ds58), US  – Gambling (ds285), Brazil  – 
Retreaded Tyres (ds332), and recently ec – Seals (ds400, DS401).
 800 United States  – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 94)  paras 
165, 177.
 801 We do not venture into interpretation of ‘disguised restriction on international trade’, 
although it is accepted that it could also be useful. For what the phrase may come to 
mean, see, Lorand Bartels, ‘The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and 
GATS Agreements: A Reconstruction’ (2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 
95, 123.
 802 European Communities  – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (n 753) para 5.299– 5.303.
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cbdr principle has evolved over time from a strict dichotomy between devel-
oped and developing countries to an approach of varying flexibility depending 
upon context.804 Especially in the context of the Paris Agreement, one area 
in which the cbdr has been watered down is mitigation commitments, as all 
countries, irrespective of development status, are required to voluntarily un-
dertake, implement and ambitiously revise respective mitigation contribution 
(the ndc s).805 One key exception is that the developing countries ‘shall’ be 
provided support to implement ambitious targets.806 Such support will come 
in the form of financial assistance, technology transfer, and support for capac-
ity building. With regard to financial support, the classic dichotomous cbdr 
principle is at play putting the developed countries under strict obligation to 
support developing ones.807 The obligation is slightly qualified with regard to 
capacity building.808 Whereas with regard to technology transfer, the relevant 
provision holds that support “shall be provided to developing countries”, but 
omits the subject from whom it would be coming.809 To sum these all up in 
the present context, the only possible conclusion is that to the extent carbon 
pricing implemented by a developed country imposes upon developing wto 
members additional mitigation responsibility, related financial, technological, 
and capacity building support must be forthcoming.810 Otherwise, the carbon 
pricing measure shall be considered as unjustifiably discriminatory.
Hence, the revenue recycling aspect of the proposed carbon pricing mea-
sure has a role and value beyond that of implementing the Common Concern 
doctrine based low- carbon technology diffusion narrative. Not only would it 
facilitate diffusion of lct s, it would also justify the carbon pricing measure, if 
it is found to be primarily inconsistent with the non- discrimination rules. Sup-
port extended from the developed to the developing countries in the context 
of a carbon pricing measure would modulate its impact as per dictates of the 
 804 See pp. 126- 127 above. For greater details on the evolution of cbdr, see, Lavanya Rajamani, 
‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement:  Interpretative Possibilities 
and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 493.
 805 ibid 20– 21. On the whole, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement imposes similar standard of 
commitment upon developed and developing countries.
 806 Article 4.5, Paris Agreement (n 28).
 807 Paragraph 1 and 3 of Article 9, ibid. It is provided that the ‘[d] eveloped country Parties 
shall provide financial resources to developing country parties […]’. Also, ‘developed 
country parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance […]’.
 808 Article 11.3, ibid.
 809 Article 10.6, ibid.
 810 Cosbey and others (n 689) 5; For the necessity of incorporating the cbdr principle in the 
















Chapeau. Moreover, this assistance function would also square the trade mea-
sure off with the fundamental climate law principle of differentiation.
However, the above path in which the cbdr principle enters the domain of 
trade rules raises a thorny question. As we see, due to the nature of the order 
of legal analysis, the requirement of adjusting a measure with the develop-
ing country situations comes into play only when the measure in question is 
considered discriminatory, and the recourse to the general exception clause is 
taken. Otherwise, i.e. in cases where a carbon pricing measure is found as not 
discriminatory, the scope of making a demand for equitable application van-
ishes. We discuss this issue, among others, in the next section.
The analysis of the discriminatory effect of carbon pricing under the wto 
law reveals that its application on imports will probably be considered as dis-
criminatory. However, it is possible that in some instances a tax measure may 
be found as not discriminatory, provided that the products under consider-
ation are not fully alike, yet competitive, and the difference in tax rates are 
found as not applied to protect domestic production. As the last resort, the 
measure proposed may find refuge under the gatt Article xx, more confi-
dently so when the revenue recycling aspect to ensure technology diffusion is 
appropriately implemented. The latter will ensure that the impact of the mea-
sure is modulated in accordance with the different prevailing situations in the 
countries. Of course, most of these wto inconsistency issues can be resolved 
through cooperation. Of special importance in this regard would be multilater-
ally agreeing on a carbon price floor,811 and mutual recognition arrangements 
to encourage domestic implementation of pricing schemes.812
iv Alternate Reading Aided by Common Concern
The final part of this chapter is intended to serve as a counterfactual reading 
of the wto consistency of the proposed carbon pricing approach in a scenario 
where the doctrine of Common Concern is in the place of a full- fledged legal 
principle. Based upon the doctrine, we revisit the legal analysis presented in 
the previous part, now with the purpose of finding a frame that allows the 
trade rules to be understood in a fashion that does not put them at loggerheads 
with the efforts to price carbon emission. Any possibly harmonising reading 
should be taken as an example of the utility of the doctrine.
 811 See as discussed in section i C at pp. 159- 160 above.
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Before heading further, it is important to note the ways Common Concern 
can build an inroad to the domain of trade rules. We recall that the exact legal 
status of the notion is difficult to pin down as it continues to mature. However, 
even in the absence of cooperative trade rulemaking along the lines depicted 
in Chapter 3 before, the common concern of humankind remains a founda-
tional legal notion with relation to climate change. As a result, the traditionally 
agreed meaning of the notion can already influence the evaluation of climate 
motivated trade measures. What is also plausible is that it will eventually grow 
out of the treaty boundaries and become a self- standing notion, with a poten-
tial claim to become a part of customary law like sustainable development. 
Like the latter notion, Common Concern also has the legal structure of a prin-
ciple, i.e. a propositional nature that is adaptable to various emerging circum-
stances, including the current one (i.e. trade rules). When applicable, it can 
be assumed that Common Concern, like sustainable development, will supply 
‘color, texture, and shading’ to the provisions of the wto law.813 In so doing, it 
will carry the agenda of sustainable development further.814 The notion should 
be readily available to take recourse to as a terminological or formal context of 
any wto legal provision,815 especially in cases where members’ deployment 
of climate protection motivated trade measures are in question. Although use of 
the doctrine as a further context in line with Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Con-
vention requires identical membership to both treaty regimes,816 the answer in 
this specific case would indeed be affirmative.817
Following paragraphs retrace the previously presented analysis and looks at 
the role of the Common Concern doctrine in influencing the outcome.
A Regarding the Test of ‘Likeness’
It was shown earlier that a key issue with respect to the likeness analysis re-
garding a carbon pricing measure was the uncertainty of the relevance and 
 813 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 94) para 153.
 814 The relationship between the Common Concern doctrine and the principle of Sustainable 
Development has been elaborated at the outset. See Chapter 1 vi A at p. 48 above.
 815 Under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, while exploring meaning of a treaty term, 
or under Article 31(3)(c) as an applicable norm modifying parties obligations.
 816 European Communities  – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products (n 795)  para 7.71– 7.72; European Communities and Certain Member States  – 
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft [2011] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds316/ 
ab/ r, dsr 2011:i 7 [844– 845]; Graham Cook, A Digest of WTO Jurisprudence on Public 
International Law Concepts and Principles (Cambridge University Press 2015) s 4.2.2.
 817 Almost all wto Members are also Members of the unfccc, as well as the Paris 















influence of non- product related attributes in finding likeness between prod-
ucts. We also found that the likeness test is a well- developed and very fine- 
grained exercise of judicial discretion. To expect that recourse to the doctrine 
of Common Concern would outright lead to finding products’ differing only 
on account of emission footprints to be ‘unlike’, would be unreasonable. Nev-
ertheless, in ways mentioned below, the doctrine can bring valuable contribu-
tions to make the discretionary judgment more informed.
The key contribution of the doctrine can be in opening the opportunity to 
consider differences in non- physical product attributes in a likeness test. Com-
mon Concern can assist to assign a wider meaning to the term ‘product’ in the 
references to ‘like product’ in the non- discrimination obligation. Product is a 
generic term, the meaning of which ought to adapt over the changing course 
of time.818 Literally, it means “[t] hing produced by an action, operation, or nat-
ural process; a result, a consequence; spec. that which is produced commer-
cially for sale”819 – meaning that it cannot exist independent of any process 
that produces it, i.e. production. This attachment of a product with production 
process distinguishes it from other similar terms, like ‘material’, or ‘element’, 
and must be given appropriate attention during interpretation of the term. It 
finds a reasonable accommodation when a product is understood essentially 
as anything that has been worked upon and made ready for the market, in the 
process of which resources morph and produce positive (e.g. price) and nega-
tive (e.g. emissions, and waste) externalities. Therefore, a comparison between 
products should also be a comparison between their production externali-
ties as inherent characteristics of the product itself. Since the issuance of the 
working party report on border adjustment in 1970, which supplied the core 
aspects of the likeness criteria,820 much in this world has changed. The whole 
climate legal regime has since come into existence, underscored by the com-
mon concern principle, and highlighting the unavoidable necessity of alter-
ing polluting production processes. The doctrine of Common Concern would, 
therefore, dictate that likeness analysis of products take account of production 
externalities in the same way as any other product attributes. This understand-
ing of the term ‘product’, assisted by the doctrine of Common Concern would 
also be in line with the wto goals of sustainable development and optimal 
resource usage.
 818 Gabrielle Marceau, ‘Evolutive Interpretation by the WTO Adjudicator’ (2018) 21 Journal of 
International Economic Law 791, 803– 805.
 819 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, vol 2 ([Repr], Clarendon 
Press 1993).
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The impact of such a broader understanding of the notion of a product can 
influence the likeness analysis through two of the established categories of as-
sessment. First, assessment of a product’s properties for the purpose of like-
ness determination should also take account of non- physical properties, most 
importantly, their emission profiles. Second, it would also require the dispute 
settlement Panels to make a cautious assessment of consumer preference in a 
given market. In situations where product prices do not reflect important non- 
physical qualities, consumer preference for the lower- priced product should 
be taken as a distortion that hides the real choice a consumer would have 
made, had the price been adjusted to reflect the true cost. The Common Con-
cern doctrine would encourage a Panel to make this analysis. It is also relevant 
since sustainable consumption is also enshrined as an sdg.821
However, not all non- physical attributes (npa s) should be given the 
same footing in likeness test, and the doctrine can serve as the metric as 
to which attributes make the cut, and those that would not. The Common 
Concern doctrine can further come into play in determining the weight to 
be attached to emission footprints of compared products. Recalling that the 
test is to determine the extent of competition between two products in the 
market, depending on the circumstances, for example, the amount of emis-
sion involved or the magnitude of the difference of carbon footprints among 
products, this attribute could be assigned appropriate weight directly so as 
to tip the balance with other characteristics displaying similarities between 
the products.
Overall, the doctrine of Common Concern can indeed guide the Panels’ exer-
cise of discretion as they weigh and balance all the relevant product attributes. 
As mentioned before, it should not be taken as a binary approach, meaning 
that products differing in emission footprints will automatically be considered 
unlike. Truncating the analysis at this stage would have the effect of precluding 
the requirement of differential adjustment of the measure through revenue re-
cycling, as noted earlier. However, there remains a possibility that substantial-
ly large difference in emission footprints among the compared products in a 
market where consumers are proven to be sensitive towards carbon emissions 
may culminate in a finding of the absence of likeness. In other circumstanc-
es, different emission footprint may nevertheless set products competitively 
apart, but not exactly unlike.822
 821 Goal 12, United Nations General Assembly (n 210) 22– 23.
 822 For example, finding products as ‘directly competitive and substitutable’ and not ‘like’ 






B Regarding the Legal Standard of Discrimination
Recalling earlier analysis, we found that the main challenge with respect to the 
legal standard of discrimination and carbon pricing is that the current stan-
dard is most likely to find differential fiscal burdens upon competing products 
to be discriminatory. It is because when two products are considered alike, the 
price differential resulting from variable tax or tariffs would be considered as 
depriving one product of equal opportunity to compete against the other. Here 
we point out the fact that such a comparison between the products has nev-
er taken into account the possibility of pre- existing distortions in the market. 
This point is salient because for measures like carbon pricing, the economic 
and policy intuition (the environmentalist approach) that drives it assume 
such distortion and therefore attempts to cure it and bring back a level playing 
field. As a result, while both the carbon pricing measures and the legal stan-
dard of discrimination are geared to create equal terms of competition in the 
market, different treatment of the initial market conditions in the respective 
approaches put these two in apparent conflict.823
Therefore, we hold that a key reason for finding carbon pricing as discrim-
inatory under the wto laws is the fundamental difference between the wto 
and the environmentalist intuitional thinking about how markets work. Un-
der the wto law, the principle assumption about the markets would appear 
to be that those are not distorted, in the backdrop of which a carbon tax or 
tariff induced differences in fiscal burden appear as distortive. In contrast, 
from an environmentalist perspective, a carbon price is the response to an 
already distorted market, where the intervening fiscal measure restores equi-
ty. Like the blind men inspecting an elephant, although these two views con-
tradict each other, none are wrong. While the rules of trade cover the whole 
universe of cross border transactions, the environmental regime spills into 
the trade regime when there is a market failure (due to negative externali-
ties). Differential tax burdens in an undistorted market are discriminatory, 
but the same is not true when there would be a market failure. The doctrine 
of Common Concern can be of particular utility to flag situations of perva-
sive market failure, which lead to destabilisation and massive loss of global 
welfare. The doctrine would also indicate that a legal assessment of discrim-
ination with regard to any corrective fiscal interventions like carbon pricing 
in such a market should be more informed of the nuances involved. An in-
formed approach in this regard would help to harmonise the divergent trade 
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and environmental intuitions into a common understanding of the product 
markets.
The harmonised approach can be built upon acceptance that while in an 
undistorted market any differential intervention can discriminate against 
complainant’s products, if a market is distorted, some differential treatment 
may be warranted to keep equal terms of competition. So, application of the 
legal standard of non- discrimination in any specific case, a distinction ought 
to be made between government interventions in undistorted markets and the 
situations of market failure. A beneficial parallel in this regard can be drawn 
with the Appellate Body decision in the dispute Canada – Renewable Energy, 
where the ab opined that the important imperatives of avoiding negative ex-
ternalities can prompt the government to intervene in the market, which is 
not illegal per se.824 Also to be noted is the already existing understanding that 
private markets do not guarantee efficient production of global public goods 
(gpg s).825 So, in any dispute challenging government intervention, the fact 
that the situation in question is classifiable as a Common Concern should 
make a Panel aware of the possibility of the existence of a market failure. Com-
bined with the proposed likeness analysis that takes into account the negative 
production externalities of any product, any Panel would have adequate infor-
mation on the existence and extent of the distortions in a market arising from 
such unpriced externalities and affecting the competition between products. 
Based upon that, the fiscal interventions should not be termed discriminatory 
as long as they address that preexisting distortive competition gap between 
the products.
It should be clear that following this harmonised approach in the analysis of 
discrimination would not really require a deviation from the current legal stan-
dards. It would rather call for a more informed implementation of the same. 
The doctrine of Common Concern would aid the fact- based exercise of ensur-
ing equal opportunities to compete between products. From a technical point 
of view, it would mean that a Panel should take into account the prior market 
conditions to construe what may amount to an advantage or excess taxation 
under Article i, and dissimilar taxation with protectionist motive under Arti-
cle iii:2. In each case, a recognised Common Concern of Humankind doctrine 
will indicate the possibility of the existence of market distortions and inform a 
dispute settlement Panel to take that into account.
 824 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed- in Tariff Program (n 500) para 5.175, 5.177, 5.190.






Although the approach above aided by the Common Concern doctrine may 
save the carbon pricing component of the proposed climate technology diffu-
sion measure from being seen as discriminatory, this, along with finding that 
the products compared as ‘unlike’ due to variation in emission footprints, may 
admittedly exacerbate the existing challenge of accommodating the revenue 
sharing component of the measure within the wto law. The support compo-
nent of the proposed measure, as our earlier analysis has shown, only comes in 
play at the very last stage of the justification analysis to save a carbon pricing 
measure from being labelled as unjustifiably discriminatory. It follows that any 
pricing measure that is not considered discriminatory in the first place, gets 
absolved from the requirement of making implementational adjustment tak-
ing the cbdr principle into account.
To resolve this dilemma, fuller implementation of the Common Concern 
doctrine is called for. We remind that attention to equity is an essential part of 
the earlier outlined technology diffusion narrative, which is carried out by fol-
lowing the cbdr principle during the implementation of actual measures.826 
Therefore, while following the harmonised approach, a carbon pricing mea-
sure should be found non- discriminatory only when the application of the 
measure is adjusted to the varying responsibilities of the impacted countries. 
To make sure that it is the case, the proposed revenue recycling component of 
a carbon pricing measure remains relevant.
C Regarding the General Exception
The legitimate policy objectives endorsed under Article xx are wide enough 
to accommodate the climate mitigation goal. Common Concern is not essen-
tial, but a useful tool nevertheless, to underscore the importance of the lct 
diffusion as an objective. The doctrine, arising in the climate context and the 
consequent responsibility to act would indicate a substantial linkage between 
a carbon pricing measure and the need for conservation of a stable climate. 
This would contribute to meet the ‘relating to’ requirement under the Arti-
cle xx(g) of gatt, as previously discussed. In a similar fashion, with regard 
to ‘necessity’ analysis under subparagraphs (b), or (a), Common Concern can 
contribute to the ‘weighing and balancing’ exercise attaching further weight 
to the need for immediate and accelerated mitigation of carbon emission. It is 
important to note that although the Paris Agreement allows flexibility in terms 
of the nature and sectors in which mitigation commitments are undertaken, 
the doctrine does indeed highlight the necessity that such actions taken in an 
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adequate scale. Therefore, even though there may be less trade- restrictive op-
tions to reduce emission, the flexibility granted to a member taking mitigation 
action under the Paris Agreement, combined with the urgency of doing so, as 
highlighted by the Common Concern doctrine, the need for carbon pricing 
cannot be downplayed.
The requirement of compliance with the Chapeau will need to be met by 
tuning the impact of the carbon pricing with respective economic develop-
ment reality existing in each country. This is also demanded not only by the 
Common Concern doctrine, but also by the principles of equity and cbdr. 
However, Common Concern also dictates that mitigation remains of utmost 
importance. As a result, the fairness is reached through adjustment supports. 
Therefore, the doctrine would call for the adverse impacts of carbon pricing 
to be adjusted through financial and technological assistance and not through 
blanket exemptions from mitigation obligations.
v Conclusion
Carbon pricing plays an important role in resolving the crisis of ambition and 
cooperation challenge surrounding climate mitigation. Within the proposed 
Common Concern inspired narrative, an appropriate level of carbon tax or tar-
iff can contribute to emission mitigation and technology diffusion in a mutu-
ally beneficial solution, provided that part of the revenue generated by pricing 
schemes in the developed countries is deployed for additional support to the 
developing countries. This chapter pointed out that a doctrine of Common 
Concern can tackle some of the lingering wto consistency issues involving an 
emission pricing effort.
Cooperation is a useful and important prior step regarding carbon pricing. 
The chapter helps understand the nature and extent the cooperation problem 
related to emission pricing, which in its turn informs the appropriate respons-
es thereof. Agreement on a carbon price floor, as indicated by many, is the least 
difficult target to be achieved through cooperation. While a multilateral or 
club type agreement on carbon pricing can pre- empt subsequent challenge 
under the wto law. Appropriate forum in this regard remains wanting.
The domestic level is where the actual pricing takes place, with or without 
any agreement on a carbon price floor. In the absence of agreement, not only 
do countries remain free to adopt their own price rates, they can also challenge 
others’ measures as discriminatory. Unilateral pricing is attractive as it can en-
sure responsible consumption, as well as address competitiveness concerns for 
some domestic manufacturers. Among the alternate options of tariffs or taxes, 
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the latter may be a reasonable approach in most circumstances. It is import-
ant the pricing measures are somehow linked to a revenue sharing process, 
through which the developing countries can obtain assistance for access to 
necessary emission reduction technologies. Recycling of revenue, as the chap-
ter proposed, makes sure that technology diffusion takes place. It also fends off 
challenges of discrimination under the wto legal standard.
While under the current trade regulation framework, it is possible to chal-
lenge a carbon pricing measure as discriminatory, access to a legal notion such 
as Common Concern of Humankind can address some of those by promoting 
a more informed reading of the non- discrimination commitment. The current 
chapter also puts forth a proposition regarding a further nuanced understand-
ing of the concepts like ‘products’ and ‘markets’ to facilitate such a reading.
In the end, recognition and agreement among all the stakeholders on mat-
ters of Common Concern of Humankind are of paramount importance. The 
international legal landscape of climate regulation is but a sum total of the 
aspirations of the countries. When most countries fail to signal a willingness 
to formulate and implement an effective mitigation agenda, the international 
legal landscape merely holds a mirror to that fact. It is not surprising that there 
are gaps and disconnects between trade and climate laws. So much so that a 
truly climate mitigation motivated trade measure will find difficulty in being 
compliant with the trade rules. The doctrine of Common Concern ventures to 
plug such gaps. The proposed meaning to this notion, when collectively sup-
ported, can build the bridges and find the new perspectives to generate the 
necessary harmonisation between the two rule systems.
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 chapter 5
Encouraging Technology Export through Public 
Financial Support
This chapter supplies the second of the two case studies that test out Com-
mon Concern inspired trade measures in practice. This study zooms in to 
the issue of access to finance – one of the key obstacles for the private sec-
tor to acquire emission reducing technologies. Within that perimeter, the 
current chapter focuses on the relationship of potential support measures 
with the Subsidies Agreement of the wto – especially, the control it would 
exercise on potential enhancement of such measures. While the argument 
of boosting climate finance is considered as a virtuous one on the whole, 
the opaque issue is whether the cause would also justify unregulated public 
finance of private transactions in low- carbon technologies (lct), particu-
larly when involving developing country partners. This issue is explored in 
detail here.
The chapter begins with an outline of the need for additional public finance 
for technology outflows and proposes the enhancement of export promotion 
support as a positive contributor. The approaches thereof, i.e. supply of finan-
cial credit in better terms, or sharing of destination- specific risks are then ex-
amined in the backdrop of the trade regulation – the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (ascm, or the scm agreement), to be specific. 
Then the lens of Common Concern of Humankind is brought into play to iden-
tify areas of further development. The chapter explains that the promotion 
of clean technology exports and investments could be mutually beneficial for 
all parties involved. To that effect, the Common Concern doctrine can facili-
tate an accommodating understanding of the subsidies regulation, as well as 
indicate the pertinent areas of new rule- making. This conclusion however re-
mains subject to one important caveat. While markets often lack public sup-
port boosting trade or investment flows in the lct s, it may enjoy the same in 
the sectors that are harmful to the climate. A successful paradigm of financial 
assistance in the light of resolving the common concern of humankind should 
also include a parallel focus on the withdrawal of counterproductive supports 
existing on the market.
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i Prospects and Challenges of Public Financial Support
We earlier noted how inadequate finance limits the success of the formal reg-
ulatory arrangements on technology transfer in the climate regime.827 In the 
technology needs assessment (tna) reports, most developing countries iden-
tify non- availability of finance as the biggest problem.828 This is the context 
against which the need for augmentation of public financial support in this 
area must be assessed.
Despite its crucial importance, public share of total climate finance is not 
only minuscule, but its flow is also limited largely within developed countries. 
While the global total climate finance stood at somewhere between usd 456 
and 681 billion in 2016,829 only about a third or even less of that amount (usd 
157 billion) has travelled from the public and private sources in the developed 
countries to the developing destinations.830 Of the global total climate fi-
nance reported above, private financial flows, especially investment in renew-
able energy (usd 217 billion) and energy efficiency improvements (usd 224 
 827 See Chapter 2 ii B at p. 67 and onwards.
 828 See Chapter 2 iii C at p. 85 above.
 829 These numbers tend to vary largely due to disagreement on what counts towards cli-
mate finance and difference in approaches towards finding an aggregate number. This 
estimate is taken from the last biennial report (2018) prepared by the unfccc standing 
committee on finance. See unfccc, ‘UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance:  2018 
Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows Technical Report’ (United 
Nations Climate Change Secretariat 2019) 55– 58; For earlier estimates, see Sujata Gupta 
and others, ‘Cross- Cutting Investment and Finance Issues’, Climate change 2014: mitiga-
tion of climate change: Working Group III contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2014) 1213– 1214.
 830 unfccc, ‘UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance:  2018 Biennial Assessment and 
Overview of Climate Finance Flows Technical Report’ ibid 70. This is a very rough esti-
mate. Detailed data, especially those of the private financial flows, do not exist. Similar 
numbers are reported in the ipcc fifth assessment report, Gupta and others (n 832) 1234. 
This should not be confused with the 100 billion goal committed to in the Copenhagen 
Accord. For different takes on the latter, see oecd and Climate Policy Initiative, ‘Climate 
Finance in 2013– 14 and the usd 100 Billion Goal’ (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (oecd) 2015)  <https:// www.oecd.org/ environment/ cc/ OECD- CPI- 
Climate- Finance- Report.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020; Climate Change Finance Unit, 
Ministry of Finance, Government of India, ‘Climate Change Finance, Analysis of a Recent 
oecd Report:  Some Credible Facts Needed’ <https:// dea.gov.in/ sites/ default/ files/ 
ClimateChangeOEFDReport_ 0.pdf> accessed 25 October 2020; Mariama Williams, ‘The 
State of Play of Climate Finance – unfccc Funds and the $100 Billion Question’ (South 
Centre 2019)  21  <https:// www.southcentre.int/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2019/ 12/ CPB21_ The- 
State- of- Play- of- Climate- Finance- UNFCCC- Funds- and- the- 100- Billion- Question_ EN- 











billion) account for the lion’s share. One estimate shows that public financial 
flows, comprised chiefly of finance through multilateral development banks, 
amounted to 34% of the total flow of climate finance in 2015 and 2016.831 The 
same report also indicates that almost 80% of the total volume of climate fi-
nance is domestically raised and spent,832 meaning that a relatively very small 
portion of that total flows to the developing countries. To illustrate, private 
foreign direct investment (fdi) flow to renewable energy projects in develop-
ing countries was usd 1.5 billion in 2016,833 whereas in the same year, the total 
amount of funds spent globally on energy access stood at usd 19.4 billion.834
Therefore, there is a strong case for improving public financial support, es-
pecially by the developed countries, for activities that result in the diffusion 
of lct s to developing countries. Such support will be counted towards the 
fulfilment of the existing commitment of amassing usd 100 billion in new and 
additional finance.835 This would also be helpful in leveraging, as well as chan-
nelling private financial flows in the form of trade and investment transactions 
to locations that are otherwise unattractive in market terms. Domestically, 
such support can also open limited opportunities for green industrial policy. 
These issues are detailed below.
A The Problem and Potential of Public Finance
Public financial resources can be employed to cure the existing disincentives 
that prevent lct spreading transactions from taking place. In cases where such 
transactions involve developed and developing country partners, public finan-
cial institutions of the developed country can be involved in ways that resolve 
the challenges of access to finance and other risk factors that would otherwise 
dissuade a private business entity. Such involvement corrects financial market 
failures and promises to augment the scale of transactions taking place.
Unaffordable prices and lack of adequate access to finance have already 
been highlighted as key barriers to low- carbon technology diffusion to devel-
oping countries.836 These issues divert crucial energy infrastructure invest-
ments to high- carbon options with disastrous impacts over the long- run. For 
 831 Barbara K Buchner and others, ‘Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2017’ (Climate 
Policy Initiative 2017) 4.
 832 ibid 13.
 833 unfccc, ‘UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance:  2018 Biennial Assessment and 
Overview of Climate Finance Flows Technical Report’ (n 832) 70.
 834 Buchner and others (n 831) 7.
 835 This is the goal 13.a of the Sustainable Development Goals (sdg s). See United Nations 
General Assembly (n 210).















example, the fifth ipcc assessment report predicted 78% of the upcoming in-
vestments in fossil fuel power plants to be taking place in non- oecd countries 
due to their relatively lower cost.837 While ideally the developing countries are 
deserving destinations for low- carbon investment, most, except maybe a few, 
are considered relatively high- risk countries for investment in general.838 This 
drives up the cost of capital, also the rate of return on investment desired by 
private investors.839
In more detail, challenges to the enhancement of trade and investment flow 
to developing countries involve investment risks, insufficient returns, inade-
quate market size, difficulty to raise longer- term capital, capacity, and human 
resource constraints.840 The investment risks are manifested as risks due to 
the novelty of the technology, as well as risks arising from a specific locale – i.e. 
political and financial instability, rule of law problems etc.841 Combination of 
these different risks makes it difficult for a foreign investor in lct find a suit-
able financial proposition for their lenders and equity partners. Moreover, rais-
ing fund from the developing country financial markets are also challenging 
because of the absence of a deep market that can ensure an adequate supply 
of funds over the long term. All of these factors contribute to a market failure – 
where inadequate financial flows lead the developing countries to a higher- 
carbon trajectory.
In a global financial landscape highlighted by the growing clout of private 
financial services, the role of public financial support in addressing the above 
risks are complementary in nature. Public financial engagement in the clean 
technology sectors can leverage the flows of private finance by sharing risks. 
Because public engagement decreases the volatility of the sectors, the rate of 
returns on investment in those sectors increase, which can then help crowd- in 
private investors as well.842 In parallel, allocation of public funds to the rela-
tively risky ventures also leaves the traditional investment opportunities open 
 837 Gupta and others (n 829) 1217, 1236.
 838 See generally, ‘Country Risk Classification – OECD’ <https:// www.oecd.org/ trade/ topics/ 
export- credits/ arrangement- and- sector- understandings/ financing- terms- and- conditions/ 
country- risk- classification/ > accessed 25 October 2020; Also, ‘Sovereign Risk Indicators – 
S&P Global Ratings’ <https:// www.spratings.com/ sri/ > accessed 25 October 2020.
 839 Gupta and others (n 829) 1236.
 840 ibid 1224– 1226; For a different classification, see, Martin Stadelmann, Paula Castro and 
Axel Michaelowa, ‘Mobilising Private Finance for Low- Carbon Development’ (Climate 
Strategies 2011).
 841 Stadelmann, Castro and Michaelowa, ibid 6; Gupta and others (n 829) 1225.














for private financing enterprises.843 Overall, when such measures are taken by 
developed country governments, they are on one hand helpful in sharing and 
thereby reducing the risks faced by their exporters of and investors in low- 
carbon technologies. This additionally plays a role in reducing those countries’ 
emission footprint from import consumption, a matter that remains so far 
unaddressed.844 Side by side, such measures can also provide the developing 
country markets with much- needed technology and also access to additional 
finance.
B Possible Avenues of Public Support
Following above, it is submitted that the appropriate public policy option to 
support private trade and investment transactions depend very much on the 
nature of the prevailing obstacles and the existing policy environment. Public 
financial support for lct diffusion can take place in various ways. Develop-
ment assistance is one of the channels where financial assistance takes place 
in non- market terms. Financial incentives can also potentially be supplied by 
providing tax credits. Exporters of lct s or domestic investors investing in clean 
technology sectors abroad can be provided tax relief based on the evidence of 
successful technology diffusion.845 Two other options deal with addressing the 
financial constraints of the private actors engaged in clean technology related 
transactions. One way is to make necessary financial resources available to the 
relevant exporters, investors and related institutions at prevailing market rates, 
or even in better terms. The other option is for the government to help reduce 
the businesses’ exposure to risks arising from the transactions.846 Both of these 
options contribute to lowering of the overall cost faced by the private firms in 
 843 John Ward and others, ‘Catalysing Low- Carbon Growth in Developing Economies: Public 
Finance Mechanisms to Scale up Private Sector Investment in Climate Solutions’ (unep 
and Partners 2009); Stadelmann, Castro and Michaelowa (n 840); Karsten Neuhoff, 
‘International Support for Low- Carbon Growth in Developing Countries’, Climate policy 
after Copenhagen : the role of carbon pricing (Cambridge University Press 2011).
 844 See pp. 20, & 153 above.
 845 Hoekman, Maskus and Saggi (n 611); Bernard Hoekman, Keith E Maskus and Kamal 
Saggi, ‘Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy 
Options’ [2004] World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. It was proposed that as 
regional governments offer tax credits for companies to stay in technology poor areas, the 
central government can provide similar credits upon transfer of technology by a company 
abroad.
 846 Traerup, Greersen and Kundsen (n 408) 16. In this recent synthesis of climate regime pro-
cesses relevant to technology development and transfer, the authors highlight the poten-
tial of low interest credits, credit guarantees, improvement of access to international 











doing business. Export promotion tools like the supply of credits, credit guar-
antees, and insurances fall within these categories. This is where the chapter’s 
focus would remain.
Public financial supports, like export credits, are the mainstays of global fi-
nance, especially in the post- financial crisis era. Export credit activities include 
financial supports provided at specific fixed rates, or floating rates, as well as 
liquidity support like extension of grants.847 Instead of the actual supply of 
credits, the governments may also provide guarantees against default, thereby 
easing the businesses’ opportunity to obtain finance from the private market. 
Governments may as well insure an exporter or investor against incurring risks 
abroad. One study gave the example of the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration (opic) in the United States, which insures outward renewable energy 
investments against host government actions.848
These support measures are generally made available by countries to do-
mestic exporters and investors irrespective of the nature of the transactions. 
Guided by a nationalist commercial motive, these work to enhance the com-
parative advantage of the domestic exporters. As a result, while there are in-
stances of public agencies extensively supporting clean technology exports,849 
same is also true for other areas, including some polluting ones. For example, 
between 2010 and 2016, two major Chinese public finance institutions spent 
approximately usd 160 billion in energy finance – 80% of which went in build-
ing power plants abroad. Most (90%) of those power plants were of fossil- 
fuelled type.850
Investment promotion is one of the key ways by which public support can 
facilitate technology outflow. While much of the existing literature approaches 
 847 See for example, ‘Our Solutions’ (Export Finance Australia) <https:// www.exportfi-
nance.gov.au/ about- us/ our- solutions/ > accessed 25 October 2020. Also, ‘EDC Solutions’ 
(Export Development Canada) <https:// www.edc.ca/ en/ solutions.html> accessed 25 
October 2020.
 848 UN Environment Inquiry and Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, ‘Green Foreign 
Direct Investment in Developing Countries’ (United Nations Environment Programme 
(unep) 2017)  25  < http:// unepinquiry.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2017/ 10/ Green_ Foreign_ 
Direct_ Investment_ in_ Developing_ Countries.pdf .> accessed 25 October 2020.
 849 R Jachnik and others, ‘Tracking Climate- Related Export Credits:  Existing Official 
Reporting Practices, Illustration of Methodological Options and Implications through 
Project Examples’ [2017] Working document prepared for the Research Collaborative on 
Tracking Private Climate Finance 8– 16.
 850 UN Environment Inquiry and Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (n 848)  26. 
Chinese investment also tends to crowd out private firms. See Hong Ru, ‘Government 
Credit, a Double- Edged Sword: Evidence from the China Development Bank’ (2018) 73 










the issue of green investment promotion from a host- state perspective,851 
home country incentives find only occasional limelight.852 From the perspec-
tive of fostering outwards foreign direct investment (ofdi), the measures such 
as those mentioned above will allow home country firms to take benefit of ad-
vantages in other destinations, achieve further specialisation, and bring back 
revenue, as well as tangible and intangible skills.853 It can be expected that 
financial incentives will encourage the domestic firms to furnish better tech-
nologies to their subsidiaries, and also search for suitable partners abroad. It 
should, however, be kept in mind that financial incentives are not the sole de-
terminer for investment outflows. Investment outflow is influenced by various 
factors, which are not only comprised of those of the home country but also of 
host country characteristics, e.g. including macroeconomic stability, availabili-
ty of desirable skills or factors, robust infrastructure etc. Therefore it is import-
ant to make sure that the incentives are open- ended so that the domestic firms 
can combine them with respect to their chosen country of investment.
In addition to triggering of greenfield investment in lct sectors across bor-
ders, public finance can support domestic exporters in one- off technology 
transactions as well. Export credits will bridge the finance gap between the 
seller and the buyer; by allowing the buyer flexibility in terms of payment, and 
enabling the seller opportunity to recoup the investment in time.854 Credits, 
guarantees, and insurances would enable exporters of clean technology to ex-
pand supply to newer markets, including those in the low- income economies.
C The Promise and Challenge of the Export Credit Agencies (ecas)
Public financing of export is generally done either through export credit agen-
cies (eca s), or specially instituted banks (e.g. Export Import Banks).855 The 
 851 For example, unctad, ‘Promoting Low- Carbon Investment’ (United Nations 2013) Series 
A, number 7; Martin Dietrich Brauch and Aaron Cosbey, Vehicles, Availability, and 
Governance of International Public Finance for Climate- Friendly Investment (International 
Institute for Sustainable Development 2012); Ravindra Ratnayake, Marc Proksch and Mia 
Mikić, Climate- Smart Trade and Investment in Asia and the Pacific: Towards a Triple- Win 
Outcome (escap 2011).
 852 Karl P Sauvant and others, ‘Trends in FDI, Home Country Measures and Competitive 
Neutrality’ in Andrea K Bjorklund (ed), Yearbook on International Investment Law and 
Policy (Oxford University Press 2012).
 853 Jan Knoerich, ‘How Does Outward Foreign Direct Investment Contribute to Economic 
Development in Less Advanced Home Countries?’ (2017) 45 Oxford Development 
Studies 443.
 854 Marc Auboin, ‘Improving the Availability of Trade Finance in Developing Countries: An 
Assessment of Remaining Gaps’ (wto 2015) Staff Working Paper ersd- 2015- 06 3.













general rationale behind such engagement is not to compete with the sphere 
of commercial lending, rather complementing it to secure additional export 
growth.856 Prior to the financial crisis, this motivation was becoming growing-
ly questionable due to expansions in depth and coverage of private finance.857 
However, since the crisis, the slowing of commercial lending activities has led 
to widespread calls for stepping up public financing to maintain trade trans-
actions at ‘business as usual’ levels. The crisis has even prompted the wto to 
encourage increased eca activity, despite the possibility of triggering member 
states’ behaviour verging on illegal subsidisation.858
Technically speaking, there are no binding international law controlling 
the actions of the eca s, although they are entities established by the states. 
There is however a soft law framework in the form of the oecd Arrangement 
on Officially Supported Export Credits (hereafter ‘the arrangement’, Box 4). 
The arrangement has a unique and special relationship with the scm agree-
ment.859 Compliance with the arrangement provisions is required from the 
participants thereof, which is limited to the oecd member countries.860 Some 
of the arrangement provisions are also indispensable for all the wto mem-
bers seeking to engage in the export promotion activities, as will be detailed 
later. Apart from the arrangement, there are other, less detailed alternative 
platforms that work to coordinate the activities of the eca s. Such platforms 
include the Berne Union861 and the International Working Group (iwg) on 
 856 Jian- Ye Wang and others, Officially Supported Export Credits in a Changing World 
(International Monetary Fund 2005) 5.
 857 ibid 10– 13.
 858 Auboin (n 854).
 859 In the broader context of international attempts at disciplining artificial supports 
to the exports, this relationship go far back  – even before the currently existing orga-
nizations (i.e. oecd and the wto). A  list of prohibited subsidies was agreed at the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (oeec), and was later inherited by 
the oecd. The list was later appended to the gatt Tokyo Round (1973– 1979) Subsidies 
Code. Meanwhile, as the oecd arrangement came to being (see box above), an excep-
tion was introduced to the list. The wto subsidies agreement inherited that list. Andrew 
M Moravcsik, ‘Disciplining Trade Finance:  The OECD Export Credit arrangement’ 
(1989) 43 International Organization 173; Dominic Coppens, ‘Rationale for Disciplining 
Export Credit Support: Historical Context’, WTO disciplines on subsidies and countervail-
ing measures : balancing policy space and legal constraints (Cambridge University Press 
2014) 349– 355.
 860 Current participants are Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. oecd, ‘Export Credits’ 
<https:// www.oecd.org/ trade/ topics/ export- credits/ > accessed 25 October 2020.
 861 The Berne Union is a network of 85 export credit agencies, most of which are govern-
ment linked. ‘Berne Union – About the Berne Union’ <https:// www.berneunion.org/ Stub/ 















export credits.862 Unlike the arrangement, wto rules do not take account of 
these emerging platforms, although the latter often bring more developing 
country participation.
Box 4: The oecd Arrangement
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits
The oecd arrangement is, as Wang and others have put, a “gentlemen’s 
agreement among its participants; it is not an oecd act”.863 It is an evolv-
ing document864 that lays down the general terms of official finance for 
the participating countries. According to its provisions, official support 
can either be financing support (i.e. direct credit, or interest rate sup-
port), or pure cover (i.e. insurance, or guarantee). The arrangement also 
welcomes compliance by non- participants.
The goal of the arrangement is to prevent participants from compet-
ing in a race to the bottom regarding offered terms of export credit.865 
To achieve that, the arrangement suggests rules on maximum repay-
ment terms, down payment limits, minimum interest rates to be charged 
for fixed- rate finance (cirr),866 and minimum premium rates for risk 
finance (mpr)867. The arrangement also accepts the possibility of fi-
nancing at floating rates, which may in some cases dip below the cirr, 
depending on the market situation.868 Compliance with the provisions 
 862 The International Working Group (iwg) on Export Credits was established on a joint ini-
tiative by the United States and China. Its aim is to develop rules that cover not only oecd 
countries but also emerging countries like the brics.
 863 Wang and others (n 856) 31.
 864 The version in effect at the time of writing this chapter is the one dated 1 January, 2018.
 865 Article 1, oecd, ‘arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits’ (oecd 2018) tad/ 
pg(2018)1.
 866 These rates are known as ‘commercial interest reference rates’ (cirr). The cirr s are gen-
erally set in the participants’ currencies, as 100 basis points (1%) above a chosen base 
rate. The latter is derived from the yield of 3, 5, or 7 years government bonds issued by 
a participant. Overall, it ensures that while lending in its own currency, the government 
does not incur costs that cannot be recuperated. See Articles 19– 22, ibid.
 867 The participants are required to charge the minimum premium rates (mpr s) as a return for 
the risk coverage. The mpr s are determined taking into account several factors – (i) country 
risk classification, (ii) time at risk (‘risk horizon’), (iii) buyer risk category, (iv) the percent-
age of political and commercial risk cover, (v) applied techniques of country risk mitigation, 
and (vi) applied buyer credit risk enhancements. See Articles 24– 27 & Annex ix, ibid.
 868 It is to be noted however that with respect to floating rate finance scheme the short- term 
market rate will be applicable. The recipient institution are proscribed from the choice of 


















of the arrangement is ensured through ‘matching’869 – a measure that 
allows a competitor to match the terms offered by a participant or a non- 
participant, despite those terms being in breach of the agreed rules.
Among the sector- specific special rules (termed ‘understanding’) that 
are appended to the arrangement, one set deals with renewable energy, 
climate mitigation and adaptation, and water projects.870 Special mini-
mum interest rates apply to the designated activities falling within the 
scope of the understanding. The scope of the designated activities leaves 
out many of the low- carbon technologies, while including fossil fuel- 
based power plants incorporating carbon capture technology.
The portrayal of the ecas as climate benefactors can also be challenging due 
to the phenomenon described by an early report by the World Resources In-
stitute (wri) as ‘policy perversity’.871 While the countries commit to climate 
mitigation, their ecas are run with the sole motivation of the promotion of do-
mestic interests in commercial terms. As a result, not only is there an absence 
of climate, or environmental protection motivation, in real terms, a large por-
tion of the eca finance goes to polluting sectors. The wri report indicated that 
fossil fuel power generation, oil, and gas sectors account for 40% of the public 
finance flowing from the developed to the developing countries.872 The earlier 
example of massive Chinese financial support for building coal- fired power 
plants abroad should also be recalled.873 In 2013, usd 1391  million of oecd 
export finance went to renewable electricity generation sector in the middle 
and low- income countries.874 The same figure for fossil fuel power plants that 
year was usd 2464 million.875
Another issue with the current track record of the eca s is the absence of 
transparency. The transactions and terms offered by the eca s are often kept 
confidential. The participants to the arrangement report their activities to the 
oecd, but detailed information is either not reported or not regularly pub-
lished by the organisation. In addition to business confidentiality, additional 
 869 Article 18, ibid.
 870 Annex iv, ibid.
 871 Crescencia Maurer and Ruchi Bhandari, ‘Climate Notes:  The Climate of Export Credit 
Agencies’ (World Resources Institute 2000).
 872 ibid 5– 7.
 873 See note 850 above.
 874 oecd, ‘Statistics on Arrangement Official Export Credit Support for Electric Power 

















reasons behind such non- transparency could possibly be a desire to hide non- 
popular supports, as well as to be immune from export subsidisation claims.876
In addition, despite the eca s putative role as financiers of ventures that are 
conventionally deemed as risky, relatively very little goes to support transac-
tions involving partners from low- income countries. According to the oecd, 
in 2015, about 5% of the overall official non- oda finance support went to ldc s 
and low- income countries.877 The aforementioned transparency problem also 
makes it difficult to determine how much of it can actually be considered to 
be in support of climate mitigation. According to the available figures on the 
oecd arrangement, much of the financial support for electricity generation 
projects goes to fossil fuel projects.878
D The Proposed Measure
Simply put, we propose that the eca s should prioritise financing transactions 
that enable the diffusion of climate technologies. Within that context, sup-
ports in better than market terms must be extended to trade or investment 
transactions involving developing or least- developed country partners – trans-
actions which would not otherwise materialise due to capital market failures 
in the technology destination regions. It is also proposed that the minimum 
interest rates currently applicable under the oecd arrangement be relaxed to 
the extent commercially viable, when the transaction tangibly benefits devel-
oping countries’ clean technology access. To a degree, downward competition 
in offered terms of finance among the developed country eca s regarding cli-
mate technologies can be desirable.
As the proposal made above is a part of the earlier detailed technology dif-
fusion narrative,879 the goal here is to create win- win consequences for the 
involved parties. The proposed measure will benefit the suppliers of lct s 
by enabling business growth and market access. Similarly, it would help par-
tially address the developing and least- developed country firms’ problems of 
 876 Thomas Wenidoppler, ‘ECAs Go to Market:  A Critical Review of Transparency and 
Sustainability at Seven Export Credit Agencies in Central and Eastern Europe’ (Finance 
and Trade Watch, cee Bankwatch Network 2017).
 877 oecd, ‘Non- ODA Flows to Developing Countries: Export Credits’ <http:// www.oecd.org/ 
dac/ stats/ beyond- oda- export- credits.htm> accessed 25 October 2020.
 878 oecd, ‘Statistics on Arrangement Official Export Credit Support for Electric Power 
Generation Projects’ (n 874). On a further detailed level, the numbers on fossil fuel based 
electricity generation is dominated by support coming from Germany, Japan, Korea, and 
the United States; whereas, the same for renewables is contributed to a large extent by 
Germany and Denmark.











technology affordability and finance. Mechanisms as such can also cater to the 
additional growth in lct demand resulting from the proposed carbon pricing 
measure in the foregoing chapter.880 The revenue recycling component of the 
pricing measure discussed in that connection can also serve as the source of fi-
nance to offer better credit terms to the developing countries. To the extent the 
ldc s are at the receiving end of the publicly supported technology transac-
tions, the activities could be reported by the developed countries as partial ful-
filment of their obligation to transfer technology under the trips Article 66.2.
However, for such a proposition to be successful, it is important that the 
public financial supports are undertaken in a complementary manner. First 
of all, support for export and outward investments regarding lct s must take 
place in conjunction with withdrawal from counterproductive engagements 
(e.g. financing coal power plants, or subsidising fossil fuels). Second, financial 
incentives for the facilitation of lct transactions are supply- side solutions. 
For it to work, there must be effective demand in the receiving sector, itself 
depending upon an effective carbon price implemented domestically (e.g. 
possibly through a tax as discussed in the previous case study). Furthermore, 
countries seeking low- carbon technologies must also work to create an overall 
enabling regulatory environment by, among others, gradually reducing risks 
to foreign investments. This involves improvement of rule of law institutions, 
political stability, development of endogenous capacity, and improvement of 
adaptive skills.881
To sum up this section, increasing public financial support would play a 
direct and positive role to boost exports of and outward investments in lct 
sectors. Such supports can be extended in the form of supplying credits, grants, 
and risk- sharing measures. Although these tools are useful in practice, a key 
challenge is that the export credit agencies (eca s) that are in charge of de-
ploying them, do not generally operate under a climate protection mandate. 
Moreover, the practice of official export credits does not have any applicable 
international law. While there is the non- binding oecd arrangement, its par-
ticipants are mainly developed countries. Also, its coverage of climate- related 
projects falls short of including all forms of lct transactions. Therefore, as a 
part of the homework obligation under the doctrine of Common Concern of 
Humankind, developed country governments, as well as other technology lead-
ers need to provide public financial incentives to promote lct transactions 
with the developing countries. Such efforts are beneficial for all the parties 
 880 See Chapter 4 i D above.
 881 unfccc, ‘UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance:  2018 Biennial Assessment and 






involved. However, in addition to enhancing the volume of transactions in 
low- carbon technologies, complementary actions are also required, including 
withdrawal of supports running counter to the motive of climate protection.
Next, the compatibility of the proposed measure and its challenges with 
respect to the wto Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ascm) are assessed below.
ii eca Activities and the wto Subsidies Agreement
Although increasing export credit supports for clean technology diffusion are of-
ten prescribed, its relationship with the wto laws, especially the scm agreement 
is less looked into.882 Financial assistance, provided by the government to its firms 
through the eca s, can indeed boost low- carbon technology transactions. But the 
possibility of effectively doing so without breaching the provisions of the scm 
agreement is questionable. Lack of experts’ attention to this issue can either be 
due to a tacit understanding of the unresolved relationship between export cred-
its and subsidies, or possibly be due to a recent paucity in actual trade disputes 
brought by members in this regard.883
wto law, in particular, the scm agreement, also the earlier gatt Articles vi 
and xvi, are attracted in situations where a government financial support has 
potentially trade distortive effects. The ascm controls subsidies that affect trade 
relationship, even outright prohibiting some forms of supports, e.g. most export 
subsidies. In essence, the scm agreement represents a consensual balance struck 
 882 Literature on green subsidies and trade is vast, which makes the absence of discussion 
on export credits even more conspicuous. A sample of the influential literature on the 
topic, presented here, do not address the issue, Steve Charnovitz, ‘Green Subsidies and 
the wto’ [2014] World Bank Policy Research Working Paper <http:// documents.world-
bank.org/ curated/ en/ 2014/ 10/ 20290817/ green- subsidies- wto> accessed 25 October 2020; 
Bradly J Condon, ‘Disciplining Clean Energy Subsidies to Speed the Transition to a Low- 
Carbon World’ (2017) 51 Journal of World Trade 675; Ilaria Espa and Gracia Marín Durán, 
‘Renewable Energy Subsidies and wto Law: Time to Rethink the Case for Reform Beyond 
Canada – Renewable Energy/ Fit Program’ [2018] Journal of International Economic Law; 
Luca Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, The scm agree-
ment, Policy Space, and Law Reform’ (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 525; 
Gary Horlick and Peggy A Clarke, ‘Rethinking Subsidy Disciplines for the Future: Policy 
Options for Reform’ (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 673.
 883 Since the tussle between Embraer of Brazil and Bombardier of Canada pursued by the 
respective governments in the early years of the wto, the provisions relating export cred-
its have not been much contested. One exception the Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in 







by the wto members between distortive subsidisation and domestic interest 
protection. As the bargain is politically struck, the rationale underlying the agree-
ment is not always economically optimal. It is especially true with respect to the 
areas where existing market failures justify subsidisation from an economic point 
of view, but the current rules will prohibit such steps.
Initially, the scm agreement had a framework resembling a traffic lights ap-
proach, protecting certain subsidies from being challenged,884 while outright 
prohibiting certain others.885 In between, there were subsidies that could be 
challenged in a dispute provided that those resulted in some form of ‘adverse 
effect’.886 Since the lapse of Article 8 of the agreement there are no protected 
subsidies (i.e. non- actionable subsidies).887 While the prohibited subsidies can 
be challenged in a dispute by any members, the ‘adverse effects’ can be chal-
lenged by the members who are impacted thereby.888 In addition, the member 
into whose territory subsidised products are imported, can also initiate an in-
vestigation to determine the margin of ‘injury’ to the domestic industry. Upon 
a positive finding, the aforementioned member is allowed to impose a coun-
tervailing duty (cvd) against the exporting member.889
While the proposed measure in the previous section is motivated by the im-
portance of public financial support for low- carbon technology diffusion, the 
wto law must play a role to make sure that the supports do not become an ex-
cuse for unnecessarily distortive industrial policies, in particular harming the 
growth of new industries in the developing countries. As a result, it is import-
ant to retain the essence of the earlier mentioned balance in the scm agree-
ment between public support and trade distortion. To do so, while allowing 
for opportunities to promote clean technology transactions, is a quest to find 
a threshold beyond which a capital market failures resulting in lingering com-
mon concerns should be intervened by the governments. Where that threshold 
 884 Article 8, Non- Actionable Subsidies, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (n 434). It should be noted that the provision did not save subsidies that were 
designated as prohibited.
 885 Article 3, ibid.
 886 Articles 5– 7, ibid. The categories of adverse effects are:  (i) injury to domestic industry, 
(ii) nullification or impairment of benefit accrued under the gatt 1994, and (iii) serious 
prejudice.
 887 Article 8 was the outcome of a successful bargain driven by the EU, Canada and Mexico. 
It lapsed in 1999, along with the other part of the bargain, i.e. Article 6.1 of the Subsidies 
Agreement. See Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (n 
440) 187– 188.
 888 Articles 4.1 and 7.1, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (n 434).
 889 Article vi, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n 426); Articles 10– 11, Agreement on 














would lie depends on the extent to which the current subsidy rules allow or 
prohibit the proposed steps. Following paragraphs elucidate that point.
A The Key Questions
The key sticking points regarding the compatibility of enhanced eca support 
for clean technology finance with the scm agreement can be ordered in accor-
dance with the structure of the agreement itself. At the outset, the question 
would be to what extent the envisaged eca measures would come under the 
coverage of the ascm. Second, with regard to the transactions that may fall 
within the agreement’s scope, the issue would be how the agreement may deal 
with those.
The coverage of the ascm is determined by Article 1 of that agreement. 
Simply put, the provision holds that any ‘benefit’ conferring ‘financial con-
tribution’, coming from the government or a public body, or private entities 
‘entrusted or directed’ by the former are within the scope of the agreement. 
Whether the scm rules would cover the matters regarding promotion of lct s 
or not would primarily hinge on the question whether such measures are con-
siderable as conferment of benefit upon the recipient. If so, then rest of the 
Agreement provisions would come into play. Another issue would be the divid-
ing line between trade and investment, raising the question whether identical 
measures promoting investment rather than export would also fall within the 
scm agreement’s scope or not.
eca support measures that fall within the boundaries of the ascm raise two 
further questions. One is the extent to which the agreement would altogether 
prohibit support measures of such form. The agreement clearly disallows sub-
sidies that are contingent, either in law or in fact, upon export performance.890 
While compliance with the oecd arrangement by a support measure provide 
limited cover from the prohibition,891 the question would be whether that is 
sufficient or useful at all. Furthermore, even when an eca support for lct dif-
fusion is not found as manifestly illegal and subject to immediate withdraw-
al, there is the possibility that third- party wto members may challenge such 
financial supports on the ground of those being ‘specific’892 and resulting in 
price distortions or displacement of the share of their exports in the receiving 
country market.893
 890 Article 3, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (n 434).
 891 The second paragraph of item ‘k’ in the illustrative list of export subsidies, Annex i, ibid.
 892 Article 2, ibid.











Given the fact that the proposed approaches attempt to facilitate lct relat-
ed exports and investments in a mutually beneficial fashion, it is not foreseen 
that the receiving country itself may object to such actions by the incentivising 
country. However, in the absence of a shared understanding to that effect, in 
case such measures are found as a subsidy, they may also be challenged by the 
receiving country in a dispute or through an injury investigation followed by 
the imposition of cvd s. As it is not considered forthcoming, we will refrain 
from that analysis.
The following paragraphs elaborate on these questions.
B Scope of the Agreement
The subject- matter scope of the scm agreement is determined by the defini-
tion of a ‘subsidy’ as laid out in Article 1.1 therein. Accordingly, a subsidy exists 
when a benefit is conferred either by a financial contribution, or an income or 
price support. With respect to the measures under analysis, i.e. export credits 
and guarantees in different forms, the pertinent questions are, first, whether 
these are considerable as financial contributions; and second, if so, whether 
they confer benefit within the meaning of the ascm.894
(i) Financial Contribution by a Government or Public Body […]
Among the different avenues of support that are listed under Article 1.1(a)(1) of 
the scm agreement, one explicitly covers credits and guarantees. The first item 
of that list is, “a government practice [that] involves a direct transfer of funds 
(e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or 
liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees)”. Different forms of export credit support for 
lct diffusion would exactly fit this description.895 Direct support measures 
such as export credit or interest rate support would be considered as actual 
transfer of funds. For example, in the Japan – dram  s (Korea) the Appellate 
Body (ab) opined that the transactions that are similar to the ones given exam-
ple of in the list are covered by the list scope.896 In the Brazil – Aircraft dispute 
that involved interest rate support payment made by the Respondent to the 
institutions extending the export credit, it was not even contested that such 
 894 We do not explore the income and price support route because it is arguably a long 
stretch, for reasons below, to think that credit or guarantees would be found as such 
instead of financial contribution.
 895 Dominic Coppens, ‘Disciplines on Export Credit Support for Non- Agricultural Products’, 
WTO disciplines on subsidies and countervailing measures :  balancing policy space and 
legal constraints (Cambridge University Press 2014) 361– 362.
 896 Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea [2007] 










supports are subsidies.897 Pure cover supports, e.g. risk insurance or credit 
guarantees would be considered as a potential transfer of funds. Furthermore, 
to be considered as a financial contribution, it is not required for such transfers 
to be actually carried out.898 It should also be noted that it is the actual mea-
sure by the government that fall suspect. So, in cases where the eca s directly 
extend the support instead of going through a financial intermediary (e.g. a 
bank), then the transaction itself can be considered as a financial contribution. 
Similarly, in a situation where the government supports an intermediary to 
provide a guarantee or credit, it is the government support and not the credit 
itself that falls under the coverage of subsidy consideration.
Additionally, the subsidy definition requires that the putative financial con-
tribution must also have a linkage with a government apparatus. Therefore, 
among the different types of export credits and guarantees supplied in the 
market by the private financial entities, multilateral development banks, as 
well as public institutions, which will fall within the scope of the scm agree-
ment depends on the wording of the provision on one hand and actual charac-
teristics of the transaction on the other. Article 1.1(a)(1) specifies that the pro-
vider of support must be one of the three following – the government itself, or 
a public body within the domestic territorial domain, or even a private entity 
that is required by the government to provide such contribution as part of the 
governmental activity. Keeping this in view, support by the eca s is indeed con-
siderable as provided by the government or public body.899 Support by private 
financial institutions would not automatically be so considered, as long as the 
private institution has no relationship with the government. However, it has 
been decided with respect to one dispute that the extent to which government 
or public support enables a private financial institution to supply export cred-
its, the support itself would be considered a financial contribution.900
 897 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft [1999] Panel Report wt/ ds46/ r, dsr 
1999:iii 1121 7.12- 7.14; For more, see United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Second Complaint) [2012] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds353/ ab/ r, dsr 2012:i 7 
616, 620.
 898 Brazil  – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (n 900)  7.13; European Communities 
and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft [2011] Panel 
Report wt/ ds316/ r, dsr 2011:ii 685 7.302.
 899 Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft [2002] Panel Report 
wt/ ds222/ r, dsr 2002:iii 849 [7.62, 7.66]. The Respondent Canada did not dispute that 
financial support provided to Bombardier through its eca, i.e. the Export Development 
Corporation (edc) amounted to financial contribution within the meaning of ascm 
Article 1.
 900 Brazil  – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (n 897)  para 7.12– 7.13. Although the 










While in most cases, as mentioned above, the finding of official export cred-
it support as a financial contribution would be straightforward, some ambig-
uous questions can indeed arise. One such is the issue of characterising the 
nature of support extended through state- owned enterprises (soe s) or state- 
owned commercial banks (socb s). While such entities are not government 
itself, they could be considered as a ‘public body’. However, such characterisa-
tion, according to the Appellate Body, must comprise of a careful and detailed, 
fact- based exercise to determine whether the entity “possesses, exercises, or 
is vested with governmental authority”.901 There must be “formal indicia of 
government control, [and] evidence that such control has been exercised in a 
meaningful way”.902 In absence of such evidence, the entities, even if substan-
tially owned by the government, cannot be considered as a ‘public body’. Mere 
policy pronouncements or situations where the private entities conduct is a 
by- product and not a result of government action is not sufficient.903
To sum up, export support activities by the eca s would in most cases, in 
a straightforward fashion, be termed as a subsidy within the meaning of the 
scm agreement. While covering government support, the agreement will, in 
all probability, also bring under its cover the activities of state- owned commer-
cial entities, when providing similar natured supports to spread lct s across 
borders. Whether the latter would be the case depends on various surrounding 
factors pertaining to the relationship between the government and the entity 
in question. There may be some opportunity to hide a support measure behind 
it worthwhile to specify how it amounts as a subsidy. According to the Panel, the con-
tested measure ‘fulfils the definition of a subsidy because there is a government practice, 
whether it involves a direct transfer of funds - - as Canada believes - - or a potential direct 
transfer of funds – as Brazil believes. As soon as there is such a practice, a subsidy exists, 
and the question whether the practice involves a direct transfer of funds or a potential 
direct transfer of funds is not relevant to the existence of a subsidy’. [para 7.13].
 901 United States  – Definitive Anti- Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China [2011] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds379/ ab/ r, dsr 2011:v 2869 [317, also 288, 
290, and 310].
 902 ibid 318. Also note para 319:  “[i] n all instances, panels and investigating authorities are 
called upon to engage in a careful evaluation of the entity in question and to identify its 
common features and relationship with government in the narrow sense, having regard, 
in particular, to whether the entity exercises authority on behalf of government. An inves-
tigating authority must, in making its determination, evaluate and give due consideration 
to all relevant characteristics of the entity and, in reaching its ultimate determination as 
to how that entity should be characterised, avoid focusing exclusively or unduly on any 
single characteristic without affording due consideration to others that may be relevant”.
 903 United States  – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory 









non- transparent relationship between the government and an soe, but this 
will not be sustainable in the long run.
(ii) Determination of Benefit
The finding of benefit being conferred as a result of financial contribution is 
an examination that compares different situations of the recipient before and 
after the contribution. The pivotal question to be answered is whether the fi-
nancial support has rendered the recipient better off than the entity would 
otherwise have been. Whether the provider has incurred costs in doing so is 
irrelevant. With respect to export credit practice, one of the very early wto 
panel dealing with the issue opined that when government support enables 
a domestic producer to offer better terms of finance to the purchaser, benefit 
can be considered to exist prima facie.904
Also, the exercise of benefit analysis takes place in the context of the exist-
ing market conditions. In the Canada – Aircraft dispute the ab endorsed the 
Panel finding that a financial contribution confers ‘benefit’ when “it is provid-
ed on terms more advantageous than those that would have been available to 
the recipient on the market”.905 Markets, according to the ab are “the area of 
economic activity in which buyers and sellers come together and the forces of 
supply and demand affect prices.”906 Defining the bounds of the relevant mar-
ket, and finding an appropriate benchmark therein has, over time, emerged as 
a crucial point of determination.
Regarding the abovementioned use of a benchmark, Article 14 of the scm 
agreement, detailing benchmark calculation guidelines for cvd investigations, 
is relevant as an interpretative context of Article 1.907 It provides for differ-
ent methods to determine the benchmark in the various settings of financial 
 904 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Second Recourse by Canada to Article 
21.5 of the DSU [2001] Panel Report wt/ ds46/ rw/ 2, dsr 2001:ix 5481 41, 42; Coppens, 
‘Disciplines on Export Credit Support for Non- Agricultural Products’ (n 895) 363.
 905 Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft [1999] Panel Report wt/ ds70/ 
r, dsr 1999:iv 1443 [9.112]; Canada  – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft 
[1999] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds70/ ab/ r, dsr 1999:iii 1377 [157, 158]. The standard 
latter became know as the ‘private market test’.
 906 United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton [2005] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds267/ ab/ 
r, dsr 2005:i 3 [7.1236]; European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft  – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the Unites 
States [2018] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds316/ ab/ rw 1259.
 907 Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea [2007] 
Panel Report wt/ ds336/ r, dsr 2007:vii 2805 7.275; Canada – Certain Measures Affecting 












contribution. Three of the four methods supplied in Article 14 cover equity 
support, loan and loan guarantee relate to Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) – the list item cov-
ering export credit practices.
a) Identifying the Relevant Market: Simple Conclusion
A possible straightforward conclusion regarding the finding of benefit can be 
that it exists any time official support is provided to complement the capac-
ity failure of private financial markets in facilitating transactions involving 
lct s.908 The underlying argument is that these are transactions that would 
not otherwise take place in private market terms. We can also recall that the 
key reason behind our proposition is to enable exporters to engage in trans-
actions that are not feasible under the current conditions of the market. If 
the contexts paragraph (b)  or (c)  of Article 14, as appropriate, is taken into 
account, the conclusion would point in the same direction. In both of those 
provisions, the support in question, i.e. a loan or a guarantee, is suggested to be 
assessed against the terms of a comparable commercial loan in the market.909 
So, the cases where instances of a comparable commercial support measure 
do not exist, or in other words, is not offered by any private operators, it would 
appear conclusive that the terms offered by the government to support lct 
transactions are beneficial to the recipient.
b) Alternate Conclusion: Distorted Market Argument
In contrast to the straightforward conclusion above, it is submitted that some 
previous disputes have also taken account of situations where the private mar-
ket test is difficult to apply due to the absence of an undistorted benchmark. 
For example, in the United States – Softwood Lumber iv dispute, reference pric-
es that could be obtained in the domestic market were found to be distort-
ed. The question was, in context of Article 14 (d)  of the scm agreement,910 
 908 Coppens, ‘Disciplines on Export Credit Support for Non- Agricultural Products’ (n 
895) 366– 367.
 909 Paragraph (b) provides that “a loan […] shall not be considered as conferring a benefit, 
unless there is a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the loan pays on 
the government loan and the amount the firm would pay on a comparable commercial 
loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market.”
Paragraph (c) provides that “a loan guarantee […] shall not be considered as confer-
ring a benefit, unless there is a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the 
guarantee pays on a loan guaranteed by the government and the amount that the firm 
would pay on a comparable commercial loan absent the government guarantee.” [empha-
sis supplied]
 910 In situations where a government supplies goods or services to an entity, the Article 14(d) 










whether such prices should form the benchmark for benefit analysis. The 
Appellate Body held that under proven circumstances of predominant gov-
ernment role in the market to the effect that private prices are distorted, an 
investigating authority is justified in relying on out of market prices.911 Later, in 
the us – ad cvd (China), both the Panel and the ab agreed that similar flexi-
bility also exists under Article 14(b).912 There, in the context of loan rates, it was 
held that when it is established that government intervention in the market 
has rendered the interest rates unusable as benchmarks,913 Article 14(b) would 
not preclude establishing a comparable out- of- country benchmark,914 as long 
as it is well approximated.915 Such jurisprudence may help establish that in a 
given situation existing private market reference rates for credits, insurance 
or guarantees, or absence of such rates therein would call for out- of- market, 
constructed benchmarks to be used.
While developing a similar argument with respect to the proposed eca 
based support measures, one key distinction ought to be made. With respect to 
lct incentives, the market situation is different from the exampled disputes. 
While in the abovementioned situations the government influence distorts a 
benchmark that could potentially exist, in the current case there may not be 
any pre- existing benchmark as the clean technology spreading transactions 
would not otherwise take place at all. Especially in the latter situation, as pre-
viously argued, the government intervention is proposed to cure a private cap-
ital market failure to allocate an optimal level of resources to facilitate lct 
diffusion. In sum, while the proposed promotion of lct transactions by the 
being adequate. It is to be noted that the provision dictates the adequacy of remuneration 
to be determined ‘in relation to’ the prevailing market conditions.
 911 United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada [2004] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds257/ ab/ r, dsr 2004:ii 571 
[103.]. The conclusion was arrived at by the Appellate Body based on the finding that 
with the phrase ‘in relation to’ in Article 14(d) the drafters did not intend to exclude the 
possibility of using alternate benchmarks [para 88– 89]. This was a conclusion, which 
according to the ab was supported by the intent and purpose of the scm agreement [93– 
95]. Surprisingly the ab analysis began by an agreement with the Panel that provision in 
question does not call for comparison with a purely free market [87].
 912 United States  – Countervailing and Anti- Dumping Measures on Certain Products from 
China [2014] Panel Report wt/ ds449/ r, dsr 2014:viii 3175 [10.40– 10.45]; United States – 
Countervailing and Anti- Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China [2014] 
Appellate Body Report wt/ ds449/ ab/ r, dsr 2014:viii 3027 [489].
 913 United States  – Countervailing and Anti- Dumping Measures on Certain Products from 
China (n 912) para 479.
 914 ibid 480.
 915 ibid 482– 483. Such approximation comprises of various factors, including the repayment 












eca s is indeed a positive intervention in the financial market, it may have an 
effect of establishing a new benchmark standard, rather than distorting and 
existing one.
In connection with the above, it can further be argued that the financial 
market space where the intervention takes place is already distorted, as it does 
not allocate resources in an optimal fashion. Therefore, any positive interven-
tion to alter such a situation shall not be automatically considered as confer-
ment of benefit to the recipient. Instead, such interventions should only be 
compared to similar situations. This position can be substantiated drawing 
support from the ab decision in the Canada – Renewable Energy dispute. With 
respect to Article 1, and in context of Article 14(d) of the scm agreement, one 
of the questions in that dispute was whether the remuneration provided by 
the respondent government was ‘more than adequate’.916 The Appellate Body 
clarified that to define the scope of the relevant market in which a benefit is 
considered to have been conferred, one ought to take into account all avail-
able evidence, including supply- side considerations, and government demand 
preference, if any.917 The Appellate Body further mentioned that finding of the 
appropriate benchmark in the relevant market should not be considered as 
thwarted by government intervention, more so in situation where the market 
itself is an outcome of such intervention.918 The ab also proposed that the sit-
uations of a new market creation and distortion of an existing one should be 
distinguished from one another when looking for the potential existence of 
benefit due to government intervention in any market.919 Where a new mar-
ket is created, the benchmark of benefit ought to be found in that market, or 
by constructing a proxy for comparison.920 It is relevant to recall that in the 
dispute, an ideal benefit benchmark to measure remuneration provided to the 
renewable energy suppliers was eventually considered to be one that takes 
account of the intended government supply- mix and reflects what a market 
would yield.921 The latter or the proxy thereof could be found in administered 
prices or through price discovery mechanisms.922
 916 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector / Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed- in Tariff Program (n 500) para 5.159– 5.161.
 917 ibid 5.171– 5.178. To note – “The definition of a certain supply- mix by the government can-
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We see that the position taken by the ab in the above dispute bolsters the 
argument that the market of climate technology related export credits is dis-
tinguishable from the general financial market due to a given a specific poli-
cy prerogative, domestically or internationally. While measuring the benefit 
benchmark in the appropriate context of Article 14(b) or 14(c) of the ascm, it 
should be remembered that those provisions have the similar flexibility like 
Article 14(d), as mentioned above. Moreover, nothing in the ab elaboration 
of relevant market identification indicates that it should only be applicable to 
situations guided by Article 14(d). With respect to assessing the lct support 
activities of the eca s, the relevant market can be seen as that of finance terms 
offered by the sellers of lct s and accepted by the buyers. eca support for such 
transaction should not in and of itself be considered a subsidy, only because 
such transactions would not otherwise take place.
Practical benefit of the above argument can be subject to some scepticism 
at least. First, the eca s at present do not operate under a climate protection 
mandate.923 Those that promote climate projects, do so due to the unique spe-
cialisation of the domestic industries.924 So it would be difficult to justify an 
eca measure as a climate policy- driven market formation initiative. Second, 
the new market creation argument will not work in situations where there are 
private financial entities offering support to clean technology exporters and 
investors, but doing so at a high rate. The offering of better credit terms by 
the eca s in such situations has less chances to avoid being seen as a subsidy. 
Third, success of the market creation argument can prove to be counterpro-
ductive, if there are no checks on the public policy motives considered as an 
eligible excuse for new market formation. If the argument, as employed in the 
Canada – Renewable Energy dispute, is allowed to serve any preferred policy 
intent by the government, it can hypothetically be extended to everywhere, 
e.g. saving coal jobs, or ensuring affordable access to power through coal power 
plants etc. As a result, in the absence of further normative limitations, the ab 
interpretation in that dispute is dangerous to follow. The potential utility of the 
 923 We highlight the latter part of a paragraph cited earlier. The Appellate Body, while quot-
ing the Panel, holds that ‘[c] onsideration related to [the] externalities will often […] be 
the reason why governments intervene to create markets […]. On this point, we agree 
with the Panel’s statement that, where government intervention that internalizes social 
costs and benefits is limited to defining the broad parameters of the market, “significant 
scope will remain for private actors to operate within those parameters on the basis of 
commercial considerations” ’. ibid 5.189.
 924 The developed countries still remain the leaders in low- carbon innovation. See Chapter 2 






doctrine of Common Concern to limit the scope of this approach, as well as to 
find alternate benchmarks are discussed later in the chapter.925
To conclude, government financial contribution for clean technology ex-
port through the supply of credits or guarantees may not as straightforwardly 
be construed as a subsidy, as it may seem upon first look. There is some oppor-
tunity to argue that a clean technology supporting financial measures belong 
to an exclusive market and therefore should only be compared with a bench-
mark therein. If not readily available, such a benchmark should be construct-
ed. While this approach may prevent any such financial support from being 
considered a subsidy per se, it ought to be noted that a detailed, fact- intensive 
benefit analysis will not always save a measure. Also, making an argument as 
such requires further opportunity be made available to a dispute settlement 
Panel to make normative distinctions between policy objectives.
(iii) Incentives Falling outside the ascm Coverage
There is nothing in the scm agreement’s definition of subsidies that prevent an 
investment incentive from falling under its scope. However, no such measure 
can come under the scrutiny of its rules, because it was not the intent of the 
drafters to expand the scope of the covered agreements to investment activi-
ties. This is clear from the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, as well as the earlier gatt. Article xvi of gatt, which is the pre-
decessor of the ascm, mentions that the provision comes into play only when a 
subsidy “operates directly or indirectly to increase exports […] or reduce imports 
[…]”.926 Later, the Marrakesh Agreement articulated the objective of the wto as 
to “provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade rela-
tions among its members […]”.927 In a rare exploration of the impact of home 
state measures to promote investment, Sauvant and others have noted that often 
the home country measures (hcm) to promote ofdi and trade- related subsi-
dies are provided by the same agencies. While the latter frequently came under 
scrutiny at the wto court, the authors maintain that hcm s are unregulated.928
It is also not likely that supports by the multilateral development banks 
(mdb), or other international financial institutions (ifi) will be considered 
as a subsidy. Such supports can neither be attributed to a domestic govern-
ment, nor a public body within the meaning of the term elaborated earlier. The 
 925 See section iii A at pp. 233- 234 below.
 926 Article xvi(1), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n 426).
 927 Article ii(1), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (n 226).
 928 Box 1, ‘HCMs and the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, 











mdb s work at a supra- national level. Furthermore, only a public body ‘within 
the territories’ of a wto member may fall within the scope of the definition.929 
It should also be noted that the Panel in the ec – Large Civil Aircraft dispute 
mentioned that even though services rendered by a multilateral financial in-
stitution may conspicuously fall within the terms of the definition, hardly any 
may be such that can be considered actionable.930
Moreover, like the ascm, which deals with subsidisation with regard to 
trade in goods, there are no comparable rules regarding trade in services. Al-
though the wto members have committed to negotiate on the multilateral 
disciplines on removing the distortive effects of services subsidisation while 
taking account of the developing country needs in particular, any substantive 
rules are yet to emerge.931 As a result, it remains possible to supply services 
related to lct s, like education, training, engineering and construction, trans-
port, accounting, and financial services to the developing countries in subsi-
dised terms, without drawing a challenge under the current wto rules.
In sum, there are no obstacles for the developed countries to incentivise the 
domestic technology holders in making greenfield investments to technology 
seeking destinations. The same official public assistance measures as proposed 
in this chapter can trigger and support investment outflows as well. One way 
would be to provide incentives to the parent firms when they supply better 
emission reduction technologies to their developing country subsidiaries. 
Trade and investment promotion supports of any form, when coming from the 
mdb s, remain outside the ascm scope as well. Beyond the scope of the pro-
posed measures, supply of climate technology related services to developing 
countries can also be incentivised without breaking wto rules.
C Export Incentive and Regulation on Prohibited Subsidies
The structure of the scm agreement provides one shortcut route to challenge 
export credit activities. This is by claiming a breach of the illustrative list of 
prohibited subsidies. The list, appended to the scm agreement as an annex, is 
a historic legacy that has been carried over to the wto rules framework. It was 
the outcome of the gatt era attempts by the contracting parties to regulate 
trade distortive subsidies. As a definition of subsidy could not be agreed upon, 
the best compromise outcome was a list that designated certain circumstances 
 929 Coppens, ‘Disciplines on Export Credit Support for Non- Agricultural Products’ (n 
895) 362.
 930 European Communities and Certain Member States  – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (n 898) 7.888.









and thresholds in and beyond which government supports are prohibited. As 
the scm agreement inherited the list, it serves as instances of clear cases where 
a subsidy is contingent on export performance. Items ‘j’ and ‘k’ of the list lay 
down threshold conditions for government support made through guarantees, 
insurances, and credits. Therefore, to the extent the level of official direct cred-
it support or pure cover support goes beyond the suggested thresholds therein, 
a case of per se breach can be made, without even needing to separately estab-
lish the existence of subsidisation.932
The wording of the paragraph ‘k’ of the illustrative list also contains a rare 
exception, one that saves certain export credit measures when those are in line 
with the relevant ‘interest rate provisions’ of the oecd arrangement. Since the 
lapse of the non- actionable subsidies, this provision, known as the ‘safe- haven’, 
is the only exception mechanism applicable with respect to export credits.
That apart, government promotion of clean technology through the eca s 
are amenable to be challenged as a prohibited export subsidy. As already men-
tioned, Article 3.1(a) of the Subsidies Agreement prohibits subsidies that are 
contingent upon export performance, either in law or in fact. Although it in-
tuitively appears that an export credit would be found to be contingent on 
exportation, we will see that a lot depends on the design and actual operation 
of the measure as well as the specific characteristics in each instance.
(i) Per Se Prohibition under the Illustrative List
The common element in both the list provisions is that, characteristic to the 
other illustrative list items, a prohibition of support provided at a net cost to 
the government. This, except for explicit exceptions, is the main purpose of the 
list – i.e. establishment of certain clear cases of prohibited subsidies. The list is 
also unique as all the cases therein are examples of costs incurred by the gov-
ernment, which is a standard that was eventually avoided in the later agreed 
definition of ‘subsidy’ incorporated the scm agreement. Here we take a closer 
look at the two relevant list provisions and their implication for lct support.
a) Item ‘j’: Pure Cover Supports
Item ‘j’ prevents the following- 
The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by govern-
ments) of export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance 
 932 Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels [2005] Panel Report wt/ ds273/ 







or guarantee programmes against increases in the cost of exported prod-
ucts or of exchange risk programmes, at premium rates which are inade-
quate to cover the long- term operating costs and losses of the programmes.
A plain reading of the text would correctly suggest that the prohibition is on 
incurring net costs in the long run with respect to a pure cover support pro-
gramme. Breach of this provision is only established by evaluating the long- 
term performance of the program in its entirety, and when proved, the whole 
program will be considered prohibited.
The immediate question that would arise is whether all forms of insurances 
and guarantees to facilitate lct related commercial transactions will attract 
the involvement of the item ‘j’, which upon reading appears to be of limited 
scope. As the text shows, operation of the paragraph extends to programmes 
providing security against cost increases of exported products and exchange 
risks. While none of the dispute decisions so far have elucidated what this en-
tails, it is possible to envisage that not all forms of risk supports extended by an 
eca with respect to lct transactions relate to protection against price increase 
or exchange rate risks. For example, a seller may be prompted to disengage 
from a potential transaction due to political, or financial risks being involved, 
or simply due to lack of information, irrespective of the price performance of 
the export or the prevalent currency exchange rates. Risk sharing programs to 
assist a seller in such situations seemingly will not come under the coverage of 
the item ‘j’. These can therefore only be dealt with under the general rule on 
export subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of the agreement.
The nature of the evidence required to establish a breach of the paragraph 
‘j’ may further make it difficult for a complainant to challenge an lct support 
program. So far, only in the US – Upland Cotton dispute, the Panel was provided 
with an opportunity to explore that question of evidentiary requirement. The 
Panel expounded therein that it was not the precise amount of a premium, but 
the adequacy of it to cover the long- term costs of the program was subject to 
assessment under paragraph ‘j’.933 To that effect, the Panel’s extensive analysis 
of the respondent’s export credit programmes comprised of an assessment of 
the past performance whether the programmes were run at net cost or not, 
also of the relevant elements of the programmes’ structure, design, and oper-
ation.934 The approach was later endorsed by the ab.935 In that dispute, data 
 933 United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton [2005] Panel Report wt/ ds267/ r, dsr 2005:ii 
299 [7.823– 7.825].
 934 ibid 7.841.







ranging for a period of 10 years (1992– 2002) was considered by the Panel. Given 
the confidential nature of the export credit support programmes, producing 
such detailed data for the respondent is not bereft of substantial complexity 
for the complainant. In the absence of appropriate measures to protect busi-
ness confidential information, the respondent may also refuse to supply the 
data necessary to prove the case.936
With special regard to climate change related transactions, yet another 
question could be whether, or how the financial benefit of avoided emission 
in the long- run would be factored in measuring the operating costs and losses 
of a government insurance or guarantee program. If the government program 
to support clean technology transactions is guided by the motive to resolve 
a common concern, then the avoided emission is undoubtedly a benefit the 
government seeks to generate with the support. It makes reasonable sense if 
the computation of the long- term cost of a program also takes account of the 
benefit generated by avoiding costly emissions. One problem, however, is that 
such benefit would probably need to somehow accrue to the provider to be 
taken into account. These are questions that remain unresolved.
It should also be noted that the oecd arrangement, while providing for 
guidelines on credit risk premium, obliges the participants to pay at least the 
minimum rates (mpr s). What is of interest is that Article 23 of the arrange-
ment holds that the “premium rates […] shall not be inadequate to cover long- 
term operating costs and losses”. This borrowed language from paragraph ‘j’ 
raises the question of whether the oecd suggested mpr s would per se be 
probative of the absence of net cost support by the credit supplier. While the 
construction of the mpr s may factually make sure that a pure cover support 
program by the eca is not run at net cost, from a legal point of view, compli-
ance with the mpr may not automatically shield from the finding of paragraph 
‘j’ breach, for reasons mentioned in later paragraphs.937 Such compliance may 
nonetheless be of factual support when the long- run performance of the pro-
gram will be assessed.
b) Item ‘k’, First Paragraph: Direct Credit Support
First paragraph of the item ‘k’ prevents the following- 
The grant by governments […] of export credits at rates below those 
which they actually have to pay for the funds so employed […], or the 
 936 Canada  – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (n 905)  para 9.175– 9.177, 
9.188– 9.189.







payment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or finan-
cial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to secure a 
material advantage in the field of export credit terms.
The provision deals with direct supports, in the form of direct credits or in-
terest rate supports, either fully or in part. What is prohibited are transactions 
that result in a net cost to the government. This is also the point of similarity of 
the current provision when compared to paragraph ‘j’. However, the difference 
lies in the fact that while the previous provision assesses the net cost in the 
long run, no similar temporal bound exists in the current provision. Therefore, 
a complainant can challenge individual export credit transactions as being in 
breach of the item ‘k’ of the illustrative list.
The general issue, equally persisting regarding the lct related transactions, 
is that of determining ‘material advantage’ as prohibited in the above pro-
vision. This remains open for interpretation. In one instance, the Appellate 
Body held that a rate of interest below the cirr could raise a rebuttable pre-
sumption that advantage gained has been material.938 This can serve only an 
illustrative purpose and not more, as the rules of treaty interpretation would 
not endorse equating the scope of the meaning of ‘material advantage’ as that 
going above the cirr. In absence of an express mention in the text of the pro-
vision, the oecd arrangement may only have very little contextual relevance 
for interpretative purposes.
Arguably, a finding that a technology export promoting measure does not 
constitute material advantage provided to the producer per se, does not make 
the respondent any safe. Because a complainant, failing to establish a breach 
of the illustrative list, can nevertheless challenge the subsidy as violating Arti-
cle 3.1(a) provision. It has however been claimed that the illustrative list pro-
vision can be flipped and used as a defence. As the paragraph portrays export 
subsidy as net cost export credits provided to secure material advantage, Bra-
zil, as a respondent argued in a dispute that if, on the contrary, it is proven 
that the measure is not taken to secure material advantage, it should be suffi-
cient to conclude that it is not prohibited at all.939 We look at this a contrario 
claim below.
 938 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of 
the dsu [2000] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds46/ ab/ rw, dsr 2000:viii 4067 [64, 67]; 
Coppens, ‘Disciplines on Export Credit Support for Non- Agricultural Products’ (n 
895) 371– 372.
 939 The basis of the argument lies in footnote 5 of the scm agreement which provides 






(ii) Interpreting A Contrario: “So Far as […] to Secure a Material 
Advantage”
The a contrario argument is not an example of logical coherence. We recall 
that the first paragraph of item ‘k’ provides one illustration of prohibited ex-
port credit support, i.e. when provided at a ‘net cost’ to the government and 
resulting in ‘material advantage’ to the recipient. Disproving either, or both of 
these requirements can only mean that the measure is not prohibited within 
the illustrated scenario of item ‘k’. Falling out of the coverage of this one specif-
ic scenario does not logically imply that the measure is absolved of any possi-
ble prohibited characteristics. The first paragraph does not lay down anything 
on situations that “do not constitute export subsidy” as laid down in footnote 
5.940 Therefore this line of argument is unmeritorious.
In the Brazil  – Aircraft 21.5 dispute, the Panel categorically rejected the a 
contrario argument for the first time.941 Noting that the footnote 5 extends to 
only those provisions that affirmatively regard a transaction as not prohibited, 
the panel indicated that the first paragraph of item ‘k’ is not worded as an af-
firmative exception.942 Treating it as such would have taken away the special 
meaning of the distinctive drafting of the affirmative exceptions in the illustra-
tive list (e.g. safe- haven clause in the second paragraph). The panel also high-
lighted that such a reading would eventually run counter to the interests of 
the developing countries, as it would be comparatively easier for a developed 
country to subsidise exporters.943 It was also noted that attempts at that time 
of reforming the scm agreement proposed modified language for footnote 5 
that does away with the opportunity of making such an argument.944
However, this issue lingers because the Appellate Body did not follow suit in 
categorically rejecting the a contrario argument. The ab did not endorse it ei-
ther. While addressing the respondent’s appeal in the above dispute, the ab de-
cided that Brazil failed to discharge the burden of establishing the benchmark 
be prohibited under this or any other provision of this Agreement” [emphasis supplied]. 
Brazil maintained this position throughout the aircraft disputes.
 940 Ibid.
 941 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the 
dsu [2000] Panel Report wt/ ds46/ rw, dsr 2000:ix 4093 10– 23; The conclusions were 
confirmed by the panel in the second compliance dispute as well. See Brazil  – Export 
Financing Programme for Aircraft – Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the dsu (n 
904) 61– 63.
 942 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the 
dsu (n 941) para 6.36– 6.37.
 943 ibid 6.57– 6.59.













(other than the cirr) against which material advantage is to be measured.945 
This precluded the ab from addressing the argument that no material advan-
tage was provided. However, the ab mentioned that if Brazil would have dis-
charged the burden of proof, it could have been found that the measure was 
“justified under item (k) of the Illustrative List”.946 As a result, though logically 
unsound, there remains a sliver of possibility that the a contrario argument 
may be entertained in the future.
Even allowing an a contrario reading would not be particularly beneficial to 
the lct export incentives. If it develops as a carve- out, it would be a general 
one. Nothing would prevent the members from using the defence for climate 
defeating purposes.
(iii) The Utility of Compliance with the oecd Arrangement
The safe- haven, found in the second paragraph of item ‘k’ of the illustrative list, 
provides that “if a member is a party to [the oecd arrangement], or if in prac-
tice a member applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, 
an export credit practice which conforms with those provisions shall not be 
considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement”. Once again, the 
wording is reminiscent of so far back a past that at present it gives rise to in-
tractable ambiguities, as well as legitimacy challenges potentially affecting lct 
related official support as much as others.
The plain reading of the provision above suggests that there are two points 
of entry to the affirmative exception of the safe- haven. One is by actual par-
ticipation in the oecd arrangement, and another by applying in practice the 
interest rate provisions of the prevailing version at the time. In both cases, the 
outcome is that the member’s export credit practice is safe from being prohib-
ited as long as there is compliance with the interest rate provisions. Therefore, 
it is a hypothetical possibility that some of the lct related official support 
measures will fall within the coverage of the safe- haven.
From a legal point of view, the scope of the carve- out depends on how one 
understands the term ‘export credit practice’ in the provision reproduced 
above. It was initially held that the meaning should in no way be limited to spe-
cific forms of transactions.947 In that sense, the safe- haven may save both direct 
 945 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the 
dsu (n 938) 23– 25.
 946 ibid 80. [emphasis supplied].
 947 Canada  – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (n 905)  para 5.81; Brazil  – 
Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the 









credit supports (direct finance, re- finance, and interest rate support) and pure 
cover supports (credit guarantees and insurances). However, according to lat-
er Panels, the additional requirement of applying the ‘interest rate provisions’ 
therein would limit the scope of the safe- haven only to those support measures 
regarding which the interest rates play a role. Taking the interest rates to be the 
cirr, Panels narrowed down the scope of the safe- haven to one specific type 
of support, i.e. direct export credits on fixed interest rates.948 It conforms with 
the provisions of the arrangement, as the cirr is applicable therein only with 
respect to official financing supports advanced at fixed rates,949 with a repay-
ment term of two years or more.950
While one may nevertheless argue for a wider interpretation of the term 
‘interest rate provisions’, so as to comprise also guidelines on the floating rate 
credits, guarantees, and insurances, this would depart not only from the liter-
al understanding of the safe- haven, but also the common intent animated in 
the related illustrative list provisions. At the time of drawing up the list, the 
concepts of minimum premium rates (mpr s) for risks and floating rate loans 
were not existing as modes of official support. The version of the oecd ar-
rangement prevailing at that time did not contain any such provisions as well. 
In those early days, most of the export credit practice comprised of fixed- rate 
credits. Moreover, the subject- matter term to be interpreted here, i.e. ‘interest 
rate provision’, is of particularly technical in nature, which is limitative of a 
possible evolutionary understanding. Nevertheless, there are indeed instances 
in trade law jurisprudence, where underlying common intent of the covered 
agreements has been construed in ways not completely foreseen.951 Providing 
a wider scope of meaning to the term ‘interest rate provision’ may serve to 
bring the floating rate supports within the safe- haven coverage. But bringing 
the mpr s within its folds would indeed be overstretching.
 948 Coppens, ‘Disciplines on Export Credit Support for Non- Agricultural Products’ (n 
895) 380; Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to 
Article 21.5 of the dsu [2000] Panel Report wt/ ds70/ rw, dsr 2000:ix 4315 [5.93– 5.106]; 
Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Second Recourse by Canada to Article 
21.5 of the dsu (n 904) para 5.102.
 949 Article 19, oecd, ‘arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits’ (n 865).
 950 Article 5, ibid.
 951 For example, in the United States – Gambling and Betting Services (ds 285), it was deter-
mined that commitments relating to trade in services scheduled by a Member would also 
cover instances of supply over the internet. While well- reasoned, this decision cannot be 
said to be an outcome commonly envisaged by the Members at the time of negotiating 
the gats provisions. For a detailed review, see Sascha Wunsch- Vincent, ‘The Internet, 











Compliance with the interest rate provisions may not provide any special 
advantage to boosting lct transactions. As mentioned before, the ecas them-
selves are primarily motivated to promote export by complementing the pri-
vate financial flows. Therefore, any general saving of official support measures 
by the eca s is going to be of use for all forms of economic activities, which 
may end up increasing rather than lowering global emissions. Also, required 
compliance with the cirr in the oecd arrangement is only useful to peg the 
lending rates against the currency of the participants and to prevent a down-
ward competition in that regard among the dominant players.952 Such preven-
tion may not even be a good idea, as freer competition in export credit terms, 
especially when offered to the cash poor developing country buyers, may see 
more public financial resources being invested in facilitating clean technology 
transactions. While it is not impossible to introduce more flexibility regarding 
interest rates for lct related transactions in the arrangement, no such effort is 
forthcoming. Nor is there any step on expanding the subject- matter scope of 
the climate mitigation understanding in the arrangement.
Apart from the safe- haven provision, the overall influence sought to be ex-
ercised by the participants to the arrangement upon the scm agreement pro-
vision is not beyond criticism. As already mentioned, the compliance with the 
arrangement provision has already been provided probative value by the ab 
with respect to legal issues beyond the safe- haven clause. Furthermore, the 
arrangement language keeps evolving in a fashion that seeks to influence the 
understanding of other illustrative list provisions, especially the item ‘j’ there-
in. Article 23 of the arrangement currently provides that “[t] he premium rates 
charged by the Participants shall […] not be inadequate to cover long- term 
operating costs and losses”. This opens the possibility that in later disputes, 
compliance with the mpr s will be taken as presumptive of abidance with the 
item ‘j’ requirement. Similarly, with regard to the provision on matching,953 
the wording suggests that a participant would not be found to be in contraven-
tion of the arrangement rules when matching interest rates below the cirr by 
other participant or non- participant.954 Therefore, a case of matching can still 
 952 Article 20, Chapter ii, oecd, ‘arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits’ (n 
865). The (cirr) are calculated for currencies of the participating members upon request, 
based on the rate of return on respective bonds.
 953 For ‘matching’, see Box 4 at p. 205 above.
 954 Article 18, oecd, ‘arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits’ (n 865). It holds 
that ‘Financial terms and conditions provided in accordance with this Article are consid-
ered to be in conformity with the provisions of Chapters i, ii […]’. Chapter ii contains the 








be found to be consistent with the interest rate provisions of the arrangement 
while effectively going below the cirr rates. These de facto influences that can 
be exercised through the arrangement provision, raises a legitimacy question, 
as the participants to the oecd arrangement is only a handful of high- income 
developed countries. We will revert to this issue while discussing the possible 
avenues for reforming the scm agreement in light of the Common Concern 
doctrine.
(iv) The De Facto or De Jure Export Contingency
Subsidies that are contingent on export performance are prohibited under 
the ascm. This includes both de jure, and de facto contingencies. This raises 
the question of whether any official export credit support, except for those in 
compliance with the oecd interests rates, can be saved if found to constitute a 
subsidy. The answer depends on the meaning of export contingency. A subsidy 
is contingent on export performance when boosting export is a condition to 
the grant. The distinction between de jure and de facto export contingency is 
that in the former case the conditionality can be read from the law explicitly or 
by implication,955 whereas in the latter case it is a fact- driven exercise. Export 
finance instruments, when considerable as a subsidy, may clearly be de jure 
export subsidy as it only focuses on export transactions. Also, with contextual 
support drawn from the illustrative list, it would be so confirmed.
Even if the eca supports are not considered de jure export contingent, they 
cannot avoid being taken as de facto contingent. The de facto export contingen-
cy is a well- tuned standard, where the ultimate goal is to determine whether 
a subsidy under consideration changes the undistorted market performance 
of the recipient in a fashion that is relatively export boosting.956 This investi-
gation takes account of the design, structure, and operation of the measure in 
question, as well as the relevant surrounding features. In the ec – Large Civil 
Aircraft dispute, the ab mentions that one way of finding de facto contingen-
cy would be comparing the ratio between anticipated export and domestic 
production after the subsidy and the same ratio before such support.957 It has 
been emphasised that the “total configuration of facts constituting and sur-
rounding the grant” should be taken into account. The mere knowledge that 
 955 European Communities and Certain Member States  – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (n 815)  para 1038. The report in turn cited a former ab report, Canada  – 
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (n 905) para 167.
 956 European Communities and Certain Member States  – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (n 816) para 1045.









the recipient’s business is export- oriented in nature does not prove export 
contingency in itself.958 Policy intent, however benevolent, would not save a 
financial support from being seen as de facto export contingent. Altogether, 
it would appear that measures exclusively promoting export transactions of 
lct s such as the one proposed in this chapter would be found as de facto con-
tingent upon export performance.
The brief discussion above serves to show the difficulty in saving an lct 
enhancing official export credit measure from being considered as a prohib-
ited subsidy. There are certain design features that may provide little shelter 
making a finding of export contingency somewhat difficult. For example, if a 
measure that boosts domestic, as well as export transactions at similar rates 
would be difficult to be found as illegal. The proposed measure would require 
further adaptation to make use of this shelter.
D Other Challenges to the Export Promotion Incentives
(i) Specificity
Apart from the prohibited category, subsidies can only be challenged when 
those are specific. Finding a subsidy as specific can eventually be a factual de-
termination exercise unless the support is legally constrained to specific enti-
ties, enterprises, or industries. The factual consideration in this regard includes 
the characteristics of the recipient enterprises, the manner of the grant by the 
authorities, as well as the time period of the grant etc. The specificity require-
ment highlights that the design of the incentives would play a role. Open- ended, 
transparent, and industry- wide availability of such support would help the 
finding of non- specificity. For the same reasons, it may as well be difficult to 
find official export promotion supports as specific, as these programs tend not 
to distinguish between industries, or sectors. The same applies to lct diffusion 
support as well. Any official support measure should be made wide enough so 
that relevant mitigation technologies in any part of the destination country’s 
economy can come under the coverage.
(ii) Actionability
Even though a technology export credit is saved by the safe- haven provision, 
it is not saved from challenges under other parts of the scm agreement when 
found to be specific in nature. This is despite the mention in the Agreement 
that measures the illustrative list declares as not constituting prohibited sub-
sidy shall not be so construed under any other provisions.959 The Appellate 
 958 Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (n 905) 167– 173.









Body chose to read the relevant language narrowly, construing that the expres-
sion only related to the determination of the prohibited nature of the subsidy 
and not determination of the actionability altogether.960 The reading opens 
the possibility that even the arrangement compliant official export credit sup-
ports can be challenged multilaterally as an actionable subsidy or unilaterally 
countervailed.
Earlier we have assumed that it would be less plausible that the countries 
gaining access to new technologies as a result of official support, would launch 
a countervailing duty investigation or challenge such measures in dispute on 
account of adverse effects to domestic industries. Even in absence of such 
challenge, it is probable that third parties, e.g. wto members having a compet-
ing industry in the technology sector in question may bring a dispute against 
the member extending the export credit on account of ‘serious prejudice’.961 
According to Article 6.3, a member can be seriously prejudiced if, inter alia, 
subsidies displace or impede its exports in a third country market; or if the 
subsidy results in significant price undercutting. In cases where export credit 
support goes to a foreign sector facing competing export interests (e.g. export 
of solar panels) from elsewhere, it can plausibly draw complaints from the 
competitors.
iii Looking Forward: Role of Common Concern
The foregoing section made a detailed explanation showing that the extent to 
which official support for lct exports come under the scm agreement, they 
could be challenged in disputes, except for the supports provided at fixed in-
terests rates in line with the oecd arrangement. Looking forward, two avenues 
appear. One is to avoid support options that draw challenge under the scm 
agreement. This means support through the non- governmental institutions, as 
well as concentrating incentives to domestic companies for ofdi activities in-
volving clean technologies. Another avenue is to look at whether the doctrine 
of Common Concern supplies any suggestion towards saving the export sup-
port measures within the ascm scope. This section further elaborates upon 
the second avenue. It explores the implications of the doctrine with respect to 
 960 United States  – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ [2000] Appellate Body 
Report wt/ ds108/ ab/ r, dsr 2000:iii 1619 [93]; Coppens, ‘Disciplines on Export Credit 
Support for Non- Agricultural Products’ (n 895) 387.








the status quo, and also takes a close look at the possibilities of moving forward 
in circumstances where the current paradigm provides no solution. While the 
former calls for finding a favourable reading of the existing rules, the latter 
would require examining the opportunities for reform.
A As an Aid to Interpretation
The doctrine of Common Concern can be of aid to further structure the rec-
onciling position taken by the ab with respect to measuring benefit in the 
context of subsidy determination. We recall that the ab decision in the Can-
ada – Renewable Energy endorsed the possibility that the governments may, 
driven by policy reasons, create heretofore non- existent markets.962 It has been 
explained earlier that although policy considerations found a way into the 
deter mination of a benefit benchmark, so far no normative criterion exists to 
evaluate the preference of one policy goal over another. Without any limits, 
such an approach can fall prey to arbitrary designations of policy goals, 
resulting in unabated subsidisation.963 Instead of being all- out critical of the 
ab position like most scholars, it is submitted that if public policy motivation 
to intervene in the existing market is given overriding precedence only in cases 
marked by the necessity to address otherwise intractable market failures, a 
reasonable distinction could be created between favourable government inter-
ventions others. The Common Concern doctrine will be helpful to that effect.
Within a recognised frame of Common Concern, as laid out in Chapter 3, 
official support measures for higher exports of lct s would be seen in a fa-
vourable light. In the context of the proposed narrative therein, resolving the 
failure of private financial markets to channel adequate resources for transac-
tions favouring lct s is an obligation that must be discharged through com-
plementary public support. Common Concern, therefore, strengthens the 
policy position that governments can and should take measures to boost tech-
nology supply for internalising emission externalities across borders, by en-
abling realisation of new export transactions that would not take place under 
current market terms. Such new transactions, made possible through official 
technology support should not be deemed as subsidies per se. Rather, whether 
 962 See p. 218 above.
 963 Luca Rubini, ‘ASCM Disciplines and Recent WTO Case Law Devlopments:  What 
Space for “Green” Subsidies?’ in Thomas Cottier and Ilaria Espa (eds), International 
Trade in Sustainable Electricity:  Regulatory Challenges in International Economic Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2017)  330– 331; Luca Rubini, ‘ “The Wide and the Narrow 
Gate”:  Benchmarking in the SCM agreement after the Canada– Renewable Energy/ FIT 








benefit has been conferred in such a situation would call for construction of 
a benchmark taking into account all the relevant factors. While the nature of 
relevant information may vary from case to case, some recurrent factor to take 
under consideration can include the necessity of the transaction evidenced 
by its contribution in resolving a Common Concern, the risk profile of the 
technology recipient country and firm, cost information of the exporter etc. 
One concrete approach can be to take the relevant interest or premium rate 
as suggested by the oecd arrangement, and making further adjustment there-
upon.964 Ultimately, as long as a transaction is necessary to respond to a Com-
mon Concern, official support thereof should be considered beneficial only if 
it results in a more than a reasonable profit to the recipient. The utility of the 
Common Concern of Humankind doctrine would lie in its assistance to high-
light an existing market failure regarding lct finances and also to construct an 
appropriate alternative benchmark for analysis.
The doctrine of Common Concern may also be useful to ease the standard to 
be met under the illustrative list provisions. For example, with respect to supports 
provided in the form of insurances and guarantees, the net long term operating 
costs and losses of the program can be determined by setting the accumulated 
costs against the benefit accrued in the form of avoided emissions due to the 
transaction. This will justify extending supports at lower rates of premiums com-
pared to transactions involving polluting technologies.
Although interpretative assistance from the doctrine of Common Con-
cern may reduce the chances of an official support measure with climate 
action motivation to be considered outright as a subsidy, it would not work 
as surely as if it were an exception clause. The possibility of challenging the 
official support measures for clean technologies as prohibited or distortive 
would nonetheless remain. The key challenge is that, as the next section ex-
plains, the formal legal language endorsing the need for policy- guided in-
tervention using subsidies does not exist anymore in the scm agreement. 
In this respect, one option is to expand the application of the gatt Article 
xx to the ascm. Scholarly opinions vary from sceptic965 to cautious966 and 
 964 We note that the cirr or the mpr are determinant of cost to the government. Adjustments, 
as mentioned above would be further warranted to ensure that a dispute settlement panel 
can decide on the conferment of benefit to the recipient.
 965 Condon, ‘Disciplining Clean Energy Subsidies to Speed the Transition to a Low- Carbon 
World’ (n 882) 685– 690.
 966 Bradly J Condon, ‘Climate Change and Unresolved Issues in WTO Law’ (2009) 12 Journal 
of International Economic Law 895, 903– 906; Espa and Marín Durán (n 882) 23– 27. The 
authors in the latter paper share the view that even though Art. xx scope is extended to 







enthusiastic967 on the viability of any such interpretation of the relevant texts. 
The optimistic account is based on the role of gatt as the umbrella agree-
ment in the Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement, to which list the ascm 
also finds itself. Furthermore, there is an express reference to gatt in Article 
32.1 of the scm agreement – readable as allowing the exception provision to be 
extended to the latter.968 Not only such an extension requires an interpretative 
leap, made even more difficult due to the changing global politics surrounding 
the wto, overall implication of such extension is unpredictable.969 Such 
an approach would also disregard the fact that the scm agreement initially 
had a limited escape clause, i.e. Article 8 on non- actionable subsidies, which 
the members have allowed to lapse along with parts of the Article 6 of the 
agreement. Arguing that gatt exceptions were always available to the scm   
agreement makes efforts by the contracting parties in entering into such delicate 
balances to a nullity.
B As a Guide for Reform
Before going further into discussion of the needed reforms of the scm agree-
ment, we ought to recall that the absence of regulatory reform does not block 
all the options of supporting cross- border supply of lcts. There are significant 
avenues that remain outside the scope of the ascm, which can be immediately 
deployed. The doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind would demand 
that those avenues are explored to the best extent possible.
Discussion in this chapter has revealed that the language of the ascm is 
unforgiving to the proposed incentive measures, irrespective of how leniently 
one tries to read its provisions. Thereupon, it is reasonable to conclude that 
while subsidies remain a key enabler for clean technology diffusion, it con-
tradicts the predominant neoliberal institutional bent and hence generally 
rejected.970 This leads to arguably the only viable long- term option,971 i.e. re-
drafting the necessary parts of the agreement to legitimise Common Concern 
 967 Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More’ (n 882) 559– 570.
 968 ibid 562– 566. The analysis is based on the Appellate Body decisions in China – Periodicals 
(ds31) and China – Raw Materials (ds394, ds395 & ds 398).
 969 ibid 570; Condon, ‘Disciplining Clean Energy Subsidies to Speed the Transition to a Low- 
Carbon World’ (n 882) 686, 690; Espa and Marín Durán (n 882) 26– 27.
 970 Daniel Puig, James Arthur Haselip and Fatemeh Bakhtiari, ‘The Mismatch between the 
In- Country Determinants of Technology Transfer, and the Scope of Technology Transfer 
Initiatives under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’ (2018) 
18 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 659, 666.
 971 Rubini, ‘ASCM Disciplines and Recent WTO Case Law Devlopments:  What Space for 












motivated incentives. The goal would be to introduce a carve- out in the scm 
agreement that has well- articulated ends for the promotion of which subsidies 
will be allowed, and also which are equally useful for both developed and de-
veloping countries. This case for legitimising strong policy imperative backed 
subsidies in general, and official export credit practices in particular, can lead 
to either calling for the reinstatement of non- actionable subsidies provision 
(Article 8)  in the agreement or proposing an entirely new formulation. The 
latter is a better option to pursue because not only is the textual formulation 
of Article 8 dated and focused more upon developed country interests,972 but 
actual revival of the provision would still not save the official export credit 
supports that are currently prohibited .973
As far as incentives promoting export of clean technologies are concerned, 
those that are transparent, bear a clear potential to address a Common Con-
cern, and consented to by the developing country recipient should be exempt-
ed from being found as prohibited or distortive under the scm agreement. 
A balance must be struck between allowing climate technology- related export 
incentives and preventing unnecessary disruption in the world market. Inclu-
sion of a necessity test is the time- tested way to attain that balance. The struc-
ture of the gatt general exception clause can serve as a guide to the design of 
a new carve- out. Within this framework, specific exemptions, e.g. trade financ-
ing across the renewable energy value chains to promote climate mitigation 
and technology transfer, can also be included.
To reiterate, first and foremost, the policy objective must be broadly in 
line with the goal of sustainable development and within that paradigm, 
may contribute to a Common Concern of humankind. Second, a form of 
necessity test must be included. Trade distortion resulted from an export 
incentive should be balanced with the level of its contribution in addressing 
a concern. The necessity test should also take into account inter alia, the ap-
propriateness of the technology in question, and the manifested technology 
need of the recipient (e.g. the technology needs assessments done under the 
climate framework). Third, resorting to the legitimate exception should only 
be available as long as such incentives are provided in a fair and transparent 
manner.
 972 For different perspectives on reforming Article 8, see, Charnovitz, ‘Green Subsidies and 
the WTO’ (n 882)  60– 69; Sadeq Z Bigdeli, ‘Resurrecting the Dead- The Expired Non- 
Actionable Subsidies and the Lingering Question of Green Space’ (2011) 8 Manchester 
J. Int’l Econ. L. 2; Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More’ (n 882) 570– 576.
 973 Article 8 was targeted only to save actionable subsidies (Part iii of the scm agreement) 






Keeping in mind that multilateral negotiation would be lengthy and com-
plex, if possible at all, an easier yet effective path to follow would be to expand 
the scope of the safe- haven to all forms of official support measures. One way 
of achieving this end is to change the safe- haven language to include pure cov-
er supports, as well as those provided at floating rates, or in a hybrid manner. 
In addition, the coverage of the special rules in the oecd arrangement on offi-
cial support for climate project should be expanded to include all lct transac-
tions, and the relevant rates relaxed as long as those transactions bring a clear 
and direct technology diffusion benefit. As highlighted earlier, influencing the 
outcome of the wto rules by modifying oecd rules would suffer from an acute 
democratic deficit. Alternatively, the key regulations on official support, along 
with flexible rules for Common Concern guided support measures can be an-
nexed to the scm agreement and then linked to the safe- haven provision in the 
illustrative list. A requirement of reporting the terms and amount of support 
provided can further ensure transparency.
Until any of the above reform efforts are concluded, a periodically renewed 
peace clause can ensure that clean technology promoting supports are not 
challenged in disputes.
C Cooperation and Homework Avenues
Once again, homework and cooperation remain at the heart of the success of 
a Common Concern inspired regulatory framework. As mentioned before, the 
range of official financial support to lct flow would be fruitful in an enabling 
policy environment and in the absence of counterproductive subsidies. These 
issues are better tackled in a cooperative framework. Within the cooperation 
narrative outlined in Chapter 3, the key task within the wto is to create well- 
calibrated and specifically focused policy spaces that can legitimise eca- led 
supports for lct exports. The foregoing sections have already addressed the 
details in that regard. Outside the wto, the cooperation at the oecd to expand 
the scope of special rules on climate mitigation projects to comprehensively 
cover lct s, as well as relaxing the applicable interest rate provisions upon the 
same is of immediate special importance.
At the domestic level, the members engaging in official export credit sup-
ports must renew the mandate of the export credit agencies (eca s) to pro-
mote lct exports, especially to destinations not served, or only sparsely served 
by the private financial markets. While more resources ought to be dedicated 
to emission- reducing activities, the same should be channelled away from pol-
luting activities, e.g. coal power plants.
Cooperation is not only important to promote official support for lct ex-




distorting subsidies from the market. The wto in general or the scm agree-
ment, in particular, cannot provide the basis to tackle all the relevant issues. 
A framework cooperation agreement in the climate regime should highlight 
the importance of the activities and assign the roles and responsibilities at dif-
ferent levels, as well as other regimes. The wto can indeed complement the ef-
forts to incentivise clean technology exports by easing the present constraints 
along the lines suggested in the previous sections. For example, access to spe-
cial rates for clean technology export finance can be made conditional upon 
supplying evidence by a member’s adequate action in rationalising domestic 
fossil fuel subsidies. Bilateral and plurilateral commitments to reduce fossil 
fuel subsidies also remain feasible. Bilateral agreements between providers 
and recipients of official support can also avoid in part subsequent challenges 
of such measures at the wto.
iv Conclusion
This chapter presented an analysis of the opportunities and challenges re-
garding official support of exports and investments involving lct s. In specific 
terms, it dealt with the obstacles posed by the wto subsidies agreement in this 
respect. Furthermore, it discussed the potential contributions by the doctrine 
of Common Concern in tackling the obstacles.
The wto and the scm agreement therein are attracted with respect to a 
portion of export credits and guarantees. Activities of the private, as well as 
international financial institutions, fall outside the scope of the rules as long 
as there are no government influences therein. Moreover, outward investment 
promotion activities, though taking the same form of those promoting exports, 
fall outside the wto purview. While this is promising for the promotion of 
green investment, there is no safeguard preventing these opportunities from 
being exploited to expand climate polluting activities.
Although the scm agreement would apply to export credits and guaran-
tees for low- carbon technologies, in the light of evolving jurisprudence it can 
be argued that not all supports will be considered a subsidy. Especially with 
the support of the Common Concern framework, it can be maintained that 
the governments can and must undertake these kinds of supports for clean 
technology export. Only because private markets do not find such transactions 
profitable, would not mean that complementary government supports are 
beneficial, and hence considerable as subsidies per se.
When considered as a subsidy, there is little in the ascm that can shelter 
the proposed measures from being considered as prohibited. Only the direct 
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export credits provided at a fixed rate and compliant with the oecd arrange-
ment rules are saved from being challenged as illegal. With the help of the 
doctrine of Common Concern, a facilitative reading of the agreement would 
be possible. But at the end of the day, it would not save the measures from all 
possible challenges. To attain the latter outcome, the ideal option would be ne-
gotiating a new carve- out clause in the scm agreement. The Common Concern 
doctrine can guide that effort. Until such reforms are successfully concluded, 
a periodically renewable peace clause can ensure that legal challenges do not 
prevent the members from promoting lct s through official supports.
The doctrine of Common Concern would again highlight the need for ad-
equate domestic action and international cooperation in this regard. With re-
spect to augmenting financial support for export and investment transactions 
in lct s, cooperation encompasses issues that are beyond the subject- matter 
scope of the wto. Therefore, ideally, efforts should be made under the aus-
pices of the climate regime to highlight the expected role of the trade regime. 
Commitments to reduce distortive subsidies promoting polluting activities 
(e.g. subsidies on coal and petroleum), made individually or different multi- 
party setting will also prove useful.
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 chapter 6
Unilateral Trade Sanctions to Secure Compliance 
with the Common Concern Doctrine
In continuation of examining different aspects of the Common Concern doc-
trine with respect to the role of trade in clean technology diffusion, this final 
chapter deals with the last and possibly the most controversial issue, i.e. uni-
lateral countermeasures to respond to unaddressed common concerns across 
borders. Consequently, the general theme is the feasibility and consequence 
of unilateral trade sanctions as per dictates of the Common Concern doctrine 
to ensure compliance with the proposed narrative of low- carbon technology 
(lct) diffusion. There are a number of issues to unpack in this regard, which 
are taken up in sequence. The chapter begins by sketching out the opposing 
views on the utility of unilateralism, especially trade sanctions. Like many 
contested areas of international law, the proponents of the approach see the 
benefit of sure compliance in sanctions, whereas the sceptics find the threat 
thereof as cooperation deterrent. To place the doctrine in the midst of the de-
bate, it would be important to clarify how it may maximise the proclaimed 
benefits while minimising the predicted challenges. Going further, the chapter 
briefly outlines the grey areas of international law regarding unilateral actions, 
third party countermeasures in particular, and discusses the advancement 
thereupon made by the doctrine. Lastly, turning to the trade domain, it is re-
called that unilateral sanctions are inherently illegal in the multilateral system, 
with some avenues to bring ex post legitimacy to actions when challenged. One 
question would be what, if any, additional benefit is brought by introducing 
the doctrine of Common Concern. Another is whether one should reconsider 
making such forward- looking suggestions in the currently unfolding geopo-
litical reality of mistrust and economic warfare. Detailed discussions follow 
hereunder.
i The Domain of Unilateral Trade Sanctions
In the vast and varied field of unilateral measures, the domain of unilateral 
sanctions is only a part. The term ‘sanction’ is used in this chapter to cover 
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“any unilateral coercive measures taken in reaction to an unlawful act”.974 In 
this sense, it also includes the legal category of ‘countermeasures’.975 All three 
words of the term used in the heading above, i.e. ‘unilateral’, ‘trade’, and ‘sanc-
tion’ indicate important features that distinguish this sub- set of actions. First 
and foremost, identifying these measures as unilateral conveys that these are 
manifestations of domestic political intent, as apart from being executions of 
internationally agreed obligations.976 Second and possibly the most discern-
ible feature of sanctions is their punitive design to realise the aforementioned 
intent.977 Sanctions operate to impose the expected change in the behaviour of 
the targeted country through economic restrictions as punishments.978 As the 
defining element, coercion is always present in any sanction irrespective of the 
objective sought to be achieved thereby. Lastly, to maintain the focus on trade, 
the examination of unilateral sanctions here cover those that are trade- related. 
Unilateral trade sanctions can entail absolute or widespread restriction on 
import and export of goods and services with the sanctioned country, as well 
as possible withdrawal of protection of the intellectual property originating 
therefrom. However, within this category, trade countermeasures taken by one 
wto member against another as a response to the breach of any multilateral 
trade obligation, i.e. suspension of concessions, remain distinct.979
The characteristics of the unilateral trade sanctions are unique when com-
pared to other trade measures with a restrictive impact, commonly grouped 
as process and production measures (ppm s). While both may be deployed in 
 974 Alain Pellet and Alina Miron, ‘Sanctions’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Online, Oxford University Press) para 7.
 975 Countermeasures are lawful, unilateral coercive measures other than use of force, char-
acterizable as a breach of obligation owed to one or more wrongdoing sates, taken as 
a response to the wrongful conduct in question. Countermeasures replace the tradi-
tional notion of ‘reprisals’ in international law. Federica I  Paddeu, ‘Countermeasures’, 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Online, Oxford University Press); 
Matthias Ruffert, ‘Reprisals’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Online, 
Oxford University Press).
 976 Perry Bechky, ‘Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries of International Economic Law’ 
(2018) 83 39; Andreas F Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press 2008) pt viii.
 977 Pellet and Miron (n 974) para 8. The focus on coercive measures leaves out responses that 
are unwelcome, but legal, i.e. retorsions. See, Thomas Giegerich, ‘Retorsion’, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Online, Oxford University Press).
 978 Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions : Law and Public Policy (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 10; 
Barry Carter, ‘International Economic Sanctions:  Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal 
Regime’ (1987) 75 California Law Review 1159.














service of the same motive, these two groups of measures would starkly differ 
in terms of immediate intents980 and therefore the methods of implementa-
tion.981 In case of relatively commonplace ppm measures, the intent to gener-
ate a specific trade effect has a close and objective linkage with the ultimate 
motive. As a result, the action taken alters when the motivation changes from 
one to another. To give an example, the motive of reducing carbon emission 
will be given effect through a ppm measure that intends to curb polluting im-
ports and achieves it through a tax. Similarly, a concern for animal welfare may 
be responded to by specific product import bans. In contrast, sanctions are 
fixed tools where the immediate effect intended, i.e. coercion, never changes 
irrespective of the varying motivations they are connected to. This is because 
of the conviction of the government that a targeted country will change its 
behaviour, in any sector whatsoever, when force is applied. For example, the 
same financial sanction can be deployed with a view to preventing gross abus-
es of human rights, or against perceived security threat, or to counter blatant 
disregard for environmental conservation.
Another distinction often- made in the literature relating to extraterritori-
ality and also having relevance for discussion on trade sanctions is the ‘out-
ward’ vs ‘inward’ direction of the measures dealt with.982 Outward- directed 
measures are those that seek to address a concern located beyond the domes-
tic territorial limits, whereas the measures inwardly directed are the opposite. 
While arguably the ppm measures are predominantly grounded on domestic 
 980 The terms ‘motive’ and ‘intent’ are borrowed from the criminal liability setting to indicate 
the two distinct mental states behind any measure. While intent is the conscious mental 
disposition to bring about a certain immediate effect, motive is the ulterior goal that is 
sought to be fulfilled by such action. See for more, Walter Wheeler Cook, ‘Act, Intention, 
and Motive in the Criminal Law’ (1917) 26 The Yale Law Journal 645.
 981 It is important to highlight this because these two categories are sometimes conflated 
in the literature. See, for example, Cirone and Urpelainen (n 529) 312– 313. The authors 
considered as sanction any measure that imposes additional costs on producers from lax 
policy jurisdictions. Such conflation is mistaken from a legal point of view.
 982 Steve Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception in Trade Policy’ [1997] Virginia Journal 
of International Law 689, 695; Sarah H Cleveland, ‘Human Rights Sanctions and 
International Trade:  A Theory of Compatibility’ (2002) 5 Journal of International 
Economic Law 133, 144– 146. With respect to human rights sanctions, Cleveland identifies 
three general characteristics – i. outward focus, ii. non- trade relatedness of motive, iii. 
difficulty to establish effectiveness. All these characteristics are relevant to our discussion 
here. See also, Barbara Cooreman, ‘The (Extra)Territorial Reach of National Measures 
under WTO Law’, Global Environmental Protection through Trade: A Systematic Approach 
to Extraterritoriality (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) <https:// www.elgaronline.com/ view/ 
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concerns (e.g. public moral standards),983 trade sanctions can only be treat-
ed as being directed outwards. This distinction bears relevance in the current 
discussion because of the possible argument that the inward or outward ori-
entation of a measure may determine the limit of the extraterritorial reach 
of the wto law. Transboundary effects of inwardly focused trade measure are 
incidental and justifiable under the existing rules.984 Whereas the legitimacy 
of truly extraterritorial trade sanctions targeting behavioural modifications 
abroad is a candidate for stricter scrutiny, even rejection.985 It should also be 
noted that the doctrinal form of Common Concern of Humankind also takes 
account of this distinction. Despite the indirect extraterritorial effect of the 
ppm s, they remain an integral part of homework aspect of the doctrine.986 
Truly extraterritorial measures, like the ones under discussion here, only come 
to play as a means of securing compliance.
The practice of unilateral trade sanctions is not scarce even though the wto 
law treats them prohibitively to a degree.987 In particular, the United States 
(US) and the European Union (EU) champion the exercise of unilateral trade 
sanctions, most often done under the banner of human rights protection.988 
Trade sanctions with respect to goods can take forms of import or export re-
strictions. For example, against Syria, the EU has put in place a range of trade 
restrictions, including the prohibition of petroleum and crude oil imports, 
 983 Barbara Cooreman, ‘Addressing Environmental Concerns through Trade:  A Case for 
Extraterritoriality Shorter Articles and Notes’ [2016] International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 229; Cooreman ibid. The author gives the example of, among others, the 
ec – Seals dispute as outward focused ppm, while the issue in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres 
was deemed as an inward focused ppm.
 984 This is addressed in Chapter 4 iii C above.
 985 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7)  s vii; Robert Howse 
and Donald Regan, ‘The Product/ Process Dinstinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 
“Unilateralism” in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 249, 249; 
Natalie L Dobson, ‘The EU’s Conditioning of the “Extraterritorial” Carbon Footprint: A 
Call for an Integrated Approach in Trade Law Discourse’ (2018) 27 Review of European, 
Comparative & International Environmental Law 75, 78– 79.
 986 See. pp. 43- 45 above.
 987 For details on the wto rules regarding unilateral trade countermeasures, see pp. 258- 262 
below.
 988 Iryna Bogdanova, ‘Reshaping the Law of Sanctions for Human Rights Violations:  The 
Potential of Common Concern of Humankind’ in Thomas Cottier (ed), The Prospects of 
Common Concern of Humankind in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2021); 
For more, see US Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control (ofac), ‘Sanctions 
Programs and Country Information’ <https:// www.treasury.gov/ resource- center/ sanc-
tions/ programs/ pages/ programs.aspx> accessed 25 October 2020; ‘EU Sanctions Map’ 














trade in gold and other valuable material, the export of telecommunication 
equipment, luxury goods etc.989 Of note can also be the recent rejection of 
the EU– Mercosur trade deal by Austria due to Brazil’s inadequate action to 
prevent the Amazon wildfires.990 Sanctions can also affect trade in services 
in different ways, e.g. prohibition of tourism, refusal of access to payment sys-
tems, or targeted sanctions against financial institutions.
One of the most controversial instances of unilateral trade sanctions is the 
US Section 301 regime. US Trade Act of 1974991 authorises the United States 
Trade Representative (ustr), upon direction from the president, to take any 
tariff or non- tariff- based retaliatory measures within the President’s capacity 
against any foreign government, when any policy or practice of the latter is 
considered to be against US commercial interests. The law itself does not 
require any prior approval or endorsement of the wto for any such action 
to be taken. Harking from a pre- wto era devoid of a compulsory obligation 
to settle trade disputes multilaterally, this law, except for very recently, re-
mained largely dormant since the inception of the wto.992 In 2018, pursuant 
to a United States Trade Representative (ustr) report,993 the US President 
imposed retaliatory tariffs on trade with China as a reaction to the alleged 
 989 ‘Restrictive Measures Agains Syria’ (EU Sanctions Map) <https:// www.sanctionsmap.eu/ #/ 
main/ details/ 32/ ?search=%7B%22value%22:%22%22,%22searchType%22:%7B%7D%7D> 
accessed 25 October 2020.
 990 ‘Mercosur Trade Deal Gives EU Leeway to Pressure Brazil on Amazon Fires:  Maas’ 
Reuters (26 August 2019) < https:// www.reuters.com/ news/ picture/ mercosur- trade- deal- 
gives- eu- leeway- to- p- idUSKCN1VG0LJ > accessed 25 October 2020; ‘Austria Rejects EU- 
Mercosur Trade Deal Over Amazon Fires’ Bloomberg.com (19 September 2019) < https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/ news/ articles/ 2019- 09- 19/ austria- moves- to- reject- eu- mercosur- 
trade- deal- over- amazon- fires > accessed 25 October 2020.
 991 Trade Act of 1974, United States Code, Title 19, Section 2411. While the actual section 301 
was repealed, the name remained. For an overview, see, Andres B Schwarzenberg, ‘Section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974’ (Congressional Research Service 2019)  In Focus <https:// 
crsreports.congress.gov/ product/ pdf/ IF/ IF11346> accessed 25 October 2020.
 992 In one wto dispute, the Panel has found that a similar provision, i.e. section 304 of the 
Trade Act allowing the ustr authority to unilaterally determine breach of trade interests, 
was prima facie inconsistent with the dsu, United States – Sections 301– 310 of the Trade Act 
of 1974 [2000] Panel wt/ ds152/ r, dsr 2000ii [7.97]. However, the provision was found 
not to be inconsistent at the end, as the exercise of ustr’s power was limited through an 
administrative declaration.
 993 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘Findings of the Investigation into 
China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Propert, 
and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974’ (2018) <https:// ustr.gov/ sites/ 
default/ files/ Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF> accessed 25 October 2020. An update was 
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Chinese forced technology transfer practices.994 So far, up to $550 billion of 
Chinese imports have been brought under the coverage of the measure in 
four phases.995 In response, China has so far launched three disputes against 
the US.996
Fuelling a growing distrust in multilateralism, recourse to trade sanctions 
are on the rise. So are actual trade disputes between countries in that regard. 
Ongoing hostilities between the Russian Federation and Ukraine have led to 
both countries imposing trade sanctions against each other. While one dis-
pute settlement panel has already looked into Ukraine’s challenge of transit 
ban by Russia,997 the latter’s complaint regarding the imposition of goods and 
services trade ban by the former is in the consultation phase.998 In 2018, Ven-
ezuela challenged the trade sanctions imposed by the United States against 
the country.999 Also recently, Saudi Arabia, uae, Bahrain, and Egypt each sep-
arately imposed economic blockade, including trade embargoes, against Qatar 
on the alleged ground of terrorism financing. As Qatar’s complaint to the wto 
shows, the sanctions imposed involve a near- complete ban on trade in goods 
and services, as well as restrictions regarding the protection of intellectual 
property rights.1000 In a further escalation of the growing trade tension global-
ly, Japan, under a thinly veiled excuse of national security, restricted export of 
 994 Andres B Murrill, ‘Tricks of the Trade: Section 301 Investigation of Chinese Intellectual 
Property Practices Concludes (Part II)’ (Congressional Research Service 2018) Legal Sidebar 
<https:// crsreports.congress.gov/ product/ pdf/ LSB/ LSB10109> accessed 25 October 2020.
 995 ‘China Section 301- Tariff Actions and Exclusion Process’ (Office of the United States Trade 
Representative) 301  <https:// ustr.gov/ issue- areas/ enforcement/ section- 301- investigations/ 
tariff- actions> accessed 25 October 2020.
 996 United States – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China i, ii, iii (ds 543, ds 565, and 
ds 587).
 997 Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit [2019] Panel wt/ ds512/ r.
 998 ‘Ukraine – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services – Request for Consultations 
by the Russian Federation’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2017) wt/ ds525/ 1.
 999 ‘United States  – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services  – Request for 
Consultations by Venezuela’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2018)  wt/ ds574/ 1. 
A Panel has been requested by the Complainant on 14 March 2019.
 1000 ‘Saudi Arabia  – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade- Related 
Aspects of Intellectural Property Rights:  Request for Consultations by Qatar’ (World 
Trade Organization (wto) 2017)  Request for consultations wt/ ds528/ 1, G/ L/ 1182 S/ L/ 
417, ip/ d/ 37; ‘Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights: Request for Consultations by Qatar’ (World Trade Organization (wto) 2018) wt/ 
ds567/ 1; ip/ d/ 40. The uae responded with a challenge of sanctions imposed by Qatar, 
‘Qatar – Certain Measures Concerning Goods from the United Arab Emirates: Request for 

















certain chemicals to South Korea.1001 The recent return of the United States to 
trade unilateralism, coupled with the absence of a functioning Appellate Body 
(ab) at the wto is further prompting countries to take unilateral courses of 
action.1002
A Arguments in Favour of Unilateral Sanctions
Unilateralism, as an opportunity, is of great value to promote compliance with 
environmental norms. As Bodansky noted, despite the existing critique of uni-
lateralism as an affront to the sense of community in international relations, 
the notion itself cannot be fully done away with.1003 According to him, instead 
of being considered as a binary choice, unilateralism should rather be seen as a 
gradient offering different possible solutions of ‘less’ or ‘more’. While unilateral 
efforts, such as implementing multilaterally agreed environmental standards 
fall on the lenient side of the spectrum, the extreme cases of sanctions attract 
most of the criticism.
Unilateral actions can and do push for the development of new rules in 
the desired direction. The aviation directive of the EU bears irrefutable proof 
of that.1004 The directive triggered the first global agreement between the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization (icao) member states in 2016 to re-
duce aviation emission and become carbon neutral over time. Dobson and 
Ryngaert trace similar development in the regulation of maritime emissions 
as well.1005 Another important contribution of unilateral action is ensuring 
enforcement of the existing commitments with the necessary degree of strin-
gency by all. With regard to climate change, renowned economists often call 
 1001 Keith Johnson, ‘Why Are Japan and South Korea in a Trade Fight?’ (Foreign Policy) 
<https:// foreignpolicy.com/ 2019/ 07/ 15/ why- are- japan- and- south- korea- in- a- trade- fight- 
moon- abe- chips- wwii/ > accessed 25 October 2020.
 1002 For example, European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) No 654/ 2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Exercise of the Union’s Rights for the 
Application and Enforcement of International Trade Rules’ (European Commission 
2019) 2019/ 0273 (cod).
 1003 D Bodansky, ‘What’s so Bad about Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment?’ (2000) 
11 European Journal of International Law 339.
 1004 The Directive 2008/ 101/ ec of the European Parliament and the Council modified an ear-
lier emission trading directive of 2003 (2003/ 87/ ec) to bring aviation emission within the 
trading scheme. Put into operation by 2012, the scheme is provisionally limited to flights 
within the eea member states to support development of multilateral rules at the icao.
 1005 Natalie L Dobson and Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Provocative Climate Protection:  EU 
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for unilateral actions that are credible and impose a big enough cost to induce 
compliance.1006
Though not all unilateral measures are essentially sanctions, the virtue of 
unilateralism, as depicted, would nevertheless empower the argument that 
sanctions can prove beneficial to enforce onerous international commitments. 
While articulating the doctrine of Common Concern, Cottier mentioned that 
unilateral trade sanctions play an important role in regimes where compli-
ance is not voluntary. As the attention of the United Nations Security Council 
(unsc) do not go so far as to take account of the long- term welfare and securi-
ty challenges arising from issues like climate change,1007 inequality of income 
and wealth, or marine pollution, these fields largely depend on unilateral prog-
ress, often through restrictive measures, to ensure regulatory development and 
avoidance of free- riding.1008 From a political point of view, unilateral trade 
sanctions can supply political currency to engage in climate mitigation in gen-
eral, as it would allow the possibility to counteract the initial cost disadvantage 
of participation by shifting the burden on the non- cooperating locations.
In light of the above, it could be said that a potentially favourable impact 
of trade sanctions for the benefit of lct diffusion can indeed be considered, 
despite the fact that the goal is best served through international cooperation 
and diligent homework. As declared in the outset of this volume, the role of 
sanctions as last resort measure to bring countries to the cooperation forum 
cannot be denied.1009 Countries that are equipped with the necessary resource 
and ability, can sanction locations where wilful inadvertence prolongs emis-
sion of greenhouse gases. The same approach may also apply to countries 
whose deliberate non- cooperation stall multilateral progress.1010 In contrast, 
in cases where a country cannot gain access to the necessary lct, appropriate 
trade sanction against the technology owning destination may expedite the 
process of coming to an agreeable arrangement regarding lct access and dif-
fusion. However, as discussed below, there are serious concerns that must be 
addressed before making any concrete proposition regarding trade sanctions 
for clean technology diffusion.
 1006 Nordhaus, ‘Climate Clubs’ (n 686) 1346– 1352; Barrett, ‘Climate Treaties and the Imperative 
of Enforcement’ (n 528) 245– 247; Thomas C Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University 
Press 2008).
 1007 With respect to climate change, the reality may be slowly changing as the issue has found 
its way into Security Council debates. See, pp. 269- 270 below.
 1008 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.7.1.
 1009 See Chapter 1 v B (iii), and Chapter 3 ii E above.












B Concerns Regarding Unilateral Sanctions
Critics of unilateralism tend to reject the approach for motives very similar to 
those that sway the proponents to prescribe the use of sanctions. While the 
sceptics also desire an effective multilateral rule system preserving common 
interests, it is highlighted that the deterrent effect of a unilateral measure 
can be inimical to the development of mutual trust in such settings, possibly 
even driving some participants away altogether from cooperation at the inter-
national level. This, in turn, would make impossible the building of a robust 
and inclusive rule system in the long run. The difficulty to obtain recognition 
of the necessity and relevance of trade- related response measures in the cli-
mate regime is a good example of that.1011 Global agreements on issues like 
climate change are complex and incremental in nature, bringing vastly 
different countries under one system of rules. In such constellations, inclusiv-
ity comes at the cost of clear and specifically assigned responsibilities. Also 
politically, agreement on situations that will legitimately draw unilateral trade 
sanctions is very difficult to strike, because most countries would foresee it 
being applied against themselves.
Specific to the climate regime, another objection against unilateral trade 
measures is that those often fail to reflect the dictates of differentiated re-
sponsibility. Even unilateral measures that are unequivocally beneficial for the 
community, can fall short in taking account of the developing country- specific 
situations. An appropriate example is the absence of such considerations in 
EU aviation directive as pointed out by Scott and Rajamani.1012 As the authors 
argue, a beneficial unilateral trade measure like the aviation directive can nev-
ertheless lack adequate design and operational specifications relating to dif-
ferentiation. On the same note, we can also recall one of our earlier conclusion 
holding that differentiated responsibility is not a first- order rule of the wto 
at present.1013 Later analysis would also indicate that respect for differentia-
tion may even become fully expendable when an apparently wto- illegal trade 
measure finds shelter under the cause of national security.
Similarly, unilateralism can indeed further fuel the acerbic North vs South 
conflicts. Biermann gave the example of the unfolding trade and environ-
ment conflict in the early 2000s when attempts to introduce environmental 
 1011 Bacchus, ‘What Is a Climate Response Measure? Breaking the Trade Taboo in Confronting 
Climate Change’ (n 3); Frank Biermann, ‘The Rising Tide of Green Unilateralism in World 
Trade Law. Options for Reconciling the Emerging North– South Conflict’ (2001) 35 Journal 
of World Trade 421.
 1012 Scott and Rajamani (n 695).
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concerns in trade rulemaking were decried by some as “eco- colonialism”.1014 
A similar conflict also prevents any meaningful clarification from being made 
regarding the role of trade- related response measures under the Paris Agree-
ment.1015 Any proposal to legitimise taking of unilateral trade sanction in 
connection with climate mitigation would intensify that conflict. Cottier has 
already noted in relation to the doctrine of Common Concern that a unilateral 
countermeasure can easily be mistaken as a neo- imperialist tool.1016
Unregulated license to move unilaterally against other states is unpre-
dictable, dangerous, and potentially destabilising for international law and 
order. The recent rise of unilateral trade sanctions and related challenges to 
the multilateral trade regime bear ample examples of that. Also, when con-
sidered in isolation, the coercion focused nature of unilateral trade sanctions 
appears unbalanced. It is true that while sanctions can be a useful threat to 
prevent non- compliance, they hardly do anything to address the root causes 
of the problem, e.g. lack of capacity to comply. Also, despite the theoretical 
availability of the measure to all states, in real terms, only a few rich countries 
can credibly deploy sanctions – being economically powerful enough to make 
good on a threat. Therefore, the unconditional legitimisation of such an ave-
nue would raise the concern of further entrenchment of power imbalances in 
international relations. Lastly, in an integrated world, sanctions run the danger 
of creating a knock- on impact on the innocent countries situated downstream 
in a global value chain.
The above arguments may also hold water with respect to trade sanc-
tions for the promotion of lct diffusion. To address these concerns, trade 
sanctions in pursuance of the Common Concern doctrine should carefully 
specify the type of infractions that shall merit such response. We must recall 
that a Common Concern of Humankind implies a threat to international peace 
and security and thus has very specific and narrow application.1017 Hence, 
the duty to act attaching to the obligation of securing compliance with the 
doctrine is limited to rare cases marked by paramount loss otherwise. The doc-
trine cannot and does not proffer unilateralism across the board.
Furthermore, it is also important to make sure that the impact of any trade 
sanction is calibrated to the specific context of the country targeted, taking into 
account the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (cbdr). In 
 1014 Biermann (n 1011) 422.
 1015 Bacchus, ‘What Is a Climate Response Measure? Breaking the Trade Taboo in Confronting 
Climate Change’ (n 3).
 1016 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.1.










addition, it should be kept in mind that the legitimacy, as well as the wider 
acceptance of a coercive compliance tool as such, would depend on its equal 
availability and utility to the developed and the developing countries alike. 
Lastly, trade sanctions should not be considered as a complete solution in itself. 
Appropriate non- forcible means of resolution must take precedence before 
any opportunity for sanctions can be legally taken under consideration. In the 
following section, we explore how the doctrine of Common Concern may take 
these issues into account while suggesting unilateral trade countermeasures.
ii Countermeasures and Common Concern of Clean Technology 
Diffusion
A Recap of the Doctrine’s Position
A well- structured response action in the form of unilateral countermeasures is 
a valuable proposition made by the Common Concern doctrine to advance the 
reach of public international law. In turning this proposition to reality, the doc-
trine recognises full well the utility, as well as the drawbacks of resorting to this 
measure for addressing a common concern of humankind. The essential core 
of the proposition is a duty to act, preventing the perpetuation of unresolvable 
common interests. This is explained by Cottier as:
The basic duty to act emerges at the heart of the principle of Common 
Concern, subject to the principles of proportionality and accountability. 
It amounts to an essential and defining ingredient of the principle. It is 
here that it transgresses traditional domains and disciplines of interna-
tional law. It profoundly adds a new dimension in general international 
law calling for a reasoned response to violations of community rights. In 
many instances, action will not be suitable and possible. But the mere 
fact that such action needs to be considered and options examined ren-
ders states accountable towards the principle of Common Concern and 
thus enhanced compliance with international law.1018
Ideally, an unresolved Common Concern entails a duty upon all involved states 
to act through unilateral countermeasures. It is a last resort option to reinforce 
cooperative attitude and ensure adequate domestic action by the free- riding 
parties. By doing so, the doctrine extends the boundary of the customary 





Unilateral Trade Sanctions to Secure Compliance 251
norms of international responsibility of states, which were considered as em-
bryonic1019 by the International Law Commission (ilc). The ilc position was 
as follows:
[T] he current state of international law on countermeasures taken in 
the general or collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse and 
involves a limited number of States. At present, there appears to be no 
clearly recognized entitlement of States […] to take countermeasures in 
the collective interest. Consequently, it is not appropriate to include in 
the present Articles a provision concerning the question whether other 
States […] are permitted to take countermeasures in order to induce a 
responsible State to comply with its obligations. Instead, chapter ii in-
cludes a saving clause which reserves the position and leaves the reso-
lution of the matter to the further development of international law.1020
Common interests, even the recognised communitarian norms often end up 
at the mercy of unilateral protection measures due to the lack of viable alter-
natives. Especially in duty centred legal regimes (e.g. climate change), compli-
ance mechanisms tend to avoid recourse to adversarial processes like dispute 
settlement and therefore fall short of effectively tackling non- performance 
and foot- dragging.1021 While multilateral sanctions are a possibility, under the 
current framework of rules, those are the prerogative of the United Nations 
Security Council, which has hardly been effective even to tackle the traditional 
security concerns.1022 The indispensability of unilateral interventions in in-
ternational affairs provides salience to the proposition made by the Common 
Concern doctrine. In line with the ilc expectation regarding further devel-
opment of international law, the doctrine is an opportunity to further build 
upon the advances already made to structure unilateral action, in particular, 
the principle of responsibility to protect (R2P).1023
 1019 International Law Commission (ilc), ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (2001) A/ 56/ 10 137.
 1020 ibid 139.
 1021 Yet again, in cop25, leaders of the world failed to agree on making ambitious enough 
pledges under the Paris Agreement. ‘On Thin Ice  – COP25, the UN Climate Talks in 
Madrid, Ends in a Sad Splutter’ [2019] The Economist <https:// www.economist.com/ 
science- and- technology/ 2019/ 12/ 15/ cop25- the- un- climate- talks- in- madrid- ends- in- a- 
sad- splutter> accessed 25 October 2020.
 1022 Nevertheless, the security aspects of climate change is gradually permeating into the 
Security Council’s work. See pp. 269, below.












Without doubt, this optimist account delineated above needs to be tem-
pered with necessary caution to tackle the related challenges of unilateralism. 
Hence, the doctrine of Common Concern should not only be seen as empow-
ering actors but also as installing important checks in the exercise of unilateral 
countermeasures. It has been regarded that the exercise of unilateral sanctions 
as part of reinforcing Common Concern must respect the well- recognised 
principles of proportionality and accountability.1024 Proportionality would re-
quire any such measures to be well- calibrated, regulating the severity of the 
impact with the importance of the goal sought to be achieved.1025 At the end 
of the day, the geopolitical hazards attached to the wanton unilateralism of the 
powerful should not be a deterrent, rather an encouragement to rally behind 
the cause of putting necessary checks on such exercise, to preserve the virtue 
in unilateral interventions. Even with respect to wto law, as argued later, such 
checks would be important to structure some of the available avenues of uni-
lateral action.
Below, the contours of Common Concern doctrine- based countermeasures 
are further specified.
B Operational Specifications
Turning to the topic of lct diffusion, the general conclusion to be drawn from 
the discussion so far is that unilateral trade sanctions will be helpful to foster 
technology diffusion in certain specific scenarios. It should be only be permit-
ted as the final straw to address the related shared concern, provided further 
that the necessary specifications are made. The foregoing discussion has re-
vealed three important aspects that must be clarified in this regard. First and 
foremost, it is necessary to specify the metrics that would determine the trig-
gering of unilateral measures. Second, in application of a unilateral measure, 
the standard of differentiated responsibility must be taken into account. Third, 
the opportunity to adopt unilateral countermeasure must be reasonably avail-
able to all the stakeholders involved, so that it is not perceived as a tool for 
only a few.
(i) Factors Triggering Unilateral Action
Unilateral trade sanctions are not the solution in itself, but they have the 
potential to drive the uncommitted stakeholders towards it. It then follows 
 1024 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.7.3.
 1025 ibid; Thomas Cottier and others, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in International 
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that the trigger for the unilateral actions would be unreasonable inactions, 
and refusals to cooperate. Under what terms these actions will be framed 
as a breach would depend on the prevailing circumstances surrounding the 
subject- matter, as well as the evolution of the doctrine of Common Concern. 
Two options can be foreseen. For one, it can be argued that non- fulfilment of 
pledges made by countries under the Paris Agreement is a trigger factor. This is 
difficult to realise for several reasons. First, the fulfilment of Paris pledges like 
the nationally determined commitments (ndc s) are voluntary in nature,1026 
purposely keeping it beyond scrutiny from other participants. Second, sub-
stantive rules in the Paris Agreement are of flexible content, which cannot be 
considered as breached in the legal sense of the term.1027 Also, the compliance 
mechanism provided for in the Paris Agreement particularly avoids punitive 
enforcement.1028
More reasonably, and subject to the proposed narrative of trade and lct 
diffusion coming into existence, persistent non- cooperation, or absence of 
diligent and relevant domestic measures to facilitate lct diffusion would call 
for taking of countermeasures. In this way, threat or taking of unilateral sanc-
tions serve as a second- tier obligation that comes into play only when the first- 
tier of actions proposed by the doctrine (i.e. cooperation, and homework) are 
not complied with.1029 However, for such a unilateral approach to take hold, 
it would also be important that the outlook towards trade countermeasures 
at the wto is shifted significantly, which at the moment is only allowed after 
prior authorisation of the Dispute Settlement Body (dsb) .
The challenges involved in the above approaches do not mean that in the 
absence of those States are prevented from championing the cause of Common 
Concern by taking unilateral actions. This may actually be the most practical 
 1026 Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement provides – “[e] ach party shall prepare, communicate 
and maintain nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve.” [emphasis 
supplied].
 1027 Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (n 271); Ralph Bodle and Sebastian 
Oberthür, ‘Legal Form of Paris Agreement and Nature of Its Obligations’ in Daniel Klein 
and others (eds), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change:  Analysis and Commentary 
(Oxford University Press 2017). Note the authors’ conclusion (p 103) – ‘[f] ew provisions 
of the Paris Agreement are prescriptive and create precise legal obligations, and these are 
primarily procedural and focused on “nationally determined contributions” (on mitiga-
tion) and a core transparency framework, plus collective obligations regarding finance’.
 1028 Article 15.2 of the Paris Agreement provides that the mechanism to facilitate implemen-
tation and promote compliance shall “function in a manner that is transparent, non- 
adversarial and non- punitive.”










outcome that can possibly be foreseen. As discussed later, any such sanction 
may then need to be squared off with the wto rules upon challenge.
(ii) Incorporating Differentiation
Common but differentiated responsibility (cbdr) is an indispensable consid-
eration to be factored into every aspect of climate action, including actions 
taken in pursuance of the Common Concern doctrine. The earlier chapter that 
outlined the new narrative of trade and low- carbon technology diffusion, also 
adequately foregrounded the importance of cbdr within that narrative.1030 
Consideration for the specific circumstances of the developing countries is 
built into the cooperation and homework aspects of the activities. As a result, 
any plausible ground for inaction by a country must be appropriately tackled 
in bilateral or multi- party settings, through supports, assistance, and acknowl-
edgement of the situation. These reasonable grounds apart, what remains are 
behaviour driven by negligence, impunity, or pure self- interest. In such situa-
tions, it is argued that the developed or developing countries alike must face 
the possibility of trade sanctions being taken against them. However, even in 
that stage, the doctrine would call for abidance by the principles of equity and 
proportionality to be met. As would be discussed below, the requirement by 
the doctrine to keep equity and proportionality in consideration is an import-
ant check that currently is not in place in wto rules.
(iii) Ensuring Equal Access to Unilateral Redress
The opportunity to adopt the path of unilateral redress of common concerns 
under justifiable circumstances would be available to all willing and compliant 
countries irrespective of their position as suppliers, or recipients of technolo-
gies. This can be foreseen to operate against developed countries when they 
unreasonably deny the impacts of climate change and refuse to engage in a 
multilateral setting (e.g. the United States), or those that refuse to bring the 
discussion on the trade front to avoid development of stricter rules (e.g. the oil 
economies like Saudi Arabia). It can also operate against the developing coun-
tries, especially when economic development is used as a façade to continue 
investing in polluting activities for the long- term (e.g. China). Although any 
countries can wield the tool of sanction, it is nevertheless true that effective 
deployment of the same would require some form of economic clout in the 
global world. In the end, it may come down to a handful of benevolent nations 
acting out of own interests as well as those of the international community 
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and putting unilateral sanctions into operation. This is not altogether new or 
deviating from the current state of affairs. The doctrine would only facilitate 
these countries’ recourse to coercive measures when legitimate, as well as pre-
vent the capricious exercise of power in other situations.
iii Position under Public International Law
This section makes a cursory analysis of the position of the proposed unilateral 
action in the background of general public international law rules. As the fore-
going section hinted, a full- fledged doctrine of Common Concern would be 
an advancement over the international legal discipline of state responsibility 
as embodied in the ilc Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts (arsiwa).1031 In particular, the improvement would 
be with regard to supplying a clearer legal justification for countermeasures 
taken by a state to  protect community interests. The reason behind keeping 
the analysis in this section limited is that despite trade sanctions are oft- cited 
in studies involving state responsibility,1032 the arsiwa has little bearing when 
it comes to saving trade measures from legal scrutiny under the wto rules. The 
exclusive jurisdiction of the wto dispute settlement process in matters relat-
ing to trade measures between its members means that the laws therein would 
claim primacy over the general body of rules.1033 Nevertheless, the discussion 
here is an ideal starting point to move subsequently to a narrower and further 
detailed study of the wto rules in this regard.
Under the current international law framework, a recourse to countermea-
sures requires satisfaction of twofold requirements, i.e. proving the existence 
of an internationally wrongful act, and as a result, injury being caused to the 
state that is taking countermeasure.1034 An internationally wrongful act is the 
 1031 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Annex to the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 56/ 83 2001.
 1032 International Law Commission (ilc), ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (n 1019); Patrick Hamilton, 
‘Counter(Measur)Ing Climate Change:  The ilc, Third State Countermeasures and 
Climate Change’ (2008) 4 McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law 
and Policy 83.
 1033 Article 23.1 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
1994 (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
unts 401); For a detailed analysis, see Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 756) 168– 178.
 1034 Article 49, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Annex to the United 











consequence of a breach of obligation attributable to a state.1035 A breach oc-
curs when state action is not in conformity with what is required of it by vir-
tue of a specific obligation.1036 A state can be considered injured under the 
arsiwa if a bilateral obligation owed to that state is breached by another.1037 
Additionally, breach of obligations of erga omnes nature may also render a 
state injured subject to the condition that it was ‘specially affected’,1038 or that 
the breach prejudices all the other parties to continue performance of the ob-
ligation in question.1039 These states apart, the opportunity to take counter-
measures remains closed to all others, including those affected by the breach 
of a communitarian norm of erga omnes nature. In the latter case, response 
options available are limited to a call for cessation, non- repetition, and perfor-
mance of the obligation in question.1040
Therefore, to make unilateral sanctions valid within the current interna-
tional law framework, the indispensable path will be to argue that the actions 
indicated in the previous section as triggering such responses are interna-
tionally wrongful, as those contravene the primary obligations arising out of 
the Common Concern doctrine.1041 This argument is hypothetical and can be 
foreseen to take place either as a breach of a treaty obligation subject to the 
doctrine being integrated into a treaty body regulating the subject- matter of 
concern. Otherwise it can also be considered as the breach of a customary 
norm of international law subject to commensurate development. Which of 
the two may actually occur would depend on the evolutionary trajectory of 
the concept. Following the above brief description of the arsiwa rules, it is 
submitted that the outcome in these two hypothetical cases may be different. 
When the doctrine of Common Concern is integrated into a treaty regime, it 
may be relatively easier for a signatory state intending to take countermea-
sure to argue that it is specially affected due to intentional non- cooperation 
or domestic inaction.1042 However, as explained in the next section, success of 
such an argument will require support from the compliance regulation in the 
respective treaty regime. With respect to the alternate course, i.e. culmination 
of the doctrine as a customary norm, a state seeking to act must additionally 
 1035 Article 2, ibid.
 1036 Article 12, ibid.
 1037 Article 42(a), ibid.
 1038 Article 42(b)(i), ibid.
 1039 Article 42(b)(ii), ibid.
 1040 Article 48, ibid.
 1041 Ahmad (n 163).
 1042 Articles 42 and 49, International Law Commission (ilc), ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility 
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establish that it was specially affected, to go beyond the confines of the ‘lawful 
measures’,1043 which as explained in the previous paragraph, falls short of ex-
pressly including countermeasures within the scope of its meaning.
Along any of the two avenues mentioned above, unilateral countermeasures 
for the breach of an identified Common Concern must count upon advance-
ment of the current state responsibility rules embodied in the arsiwa. The 
issue of whether a non- injured party can be allowed to take countermeasures 
remains highly debated.1044 As earlier noted, the ilc, despite finding some 
state practice, considered those to be nascent and not normative enough.1045 
The reason for such a conclusion can be the lack of generality in state practice 
regarding taking recourse to such measures. However, the opposing view high-
lights the growing number of third- state measures over the past decade, and 
thereupon argue that non- injured countries can and frequently do engage in 
actions that are actually countermeasures.1046 Koskenniemi holds the opinion 
that the problems of codifying third- state countermeasures have proven to be 
problematic because it is essentially the domain of international politics.1047
While a conclusive settlement of this debate may not be forthcoming soon, 
it should not mean that the relevant rules of international law are set in stone. 
The doctrine of Common Concern shows the direction in which progress is 
to be made. Being not only limited to calling for states in a position to do so 
to be allowed to take countermeasures, the doctrine also maintains that such 
actions are a matter of responsibility in themselves. This alters the existing 
narrative of entitlement to that of obligation binding the states.1048 This is, 
 1043 Article 54, ibid.
 1044 Dobson and Ryngaert (n 1005).
 1045 See, Commentary to Article 54, International Law Commission (ilc), ‘Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (n 
1019) 137– 139.
 1046 Martin Dawidowicz, Third- Party Countermeasures in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2017); Elena Katselli, The Problem of Enforcement in International 
Law :  Countermeasures, the Non- Injured State and the Idea of International Community 
(Routledge 2010); Christian J Tams, ‘Individual States as Guardians of Community 
Interests’ in Ulrich Fastenrath and others (eds), From Bilateralism to Community 
Interest : Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press 2011).
 1047 M Koskenniemi, ‘Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New International Order?’ 
(2002) 72 British Yearbook of International Law 337.
 1048 International Law Commission (ilc), ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries’ (n 1019) 116. Note the ilc commen-
tary that ‘[p] art three [of the arsiwa] is concerned with the implementation of State 
responsibility, i.e. with the entitlement of other States to invoke the international respon-














however, subject to an important qualification that in the universe of counter-
measures for an expanding variety of erga omnes breaches, only those that re-
spond to violations of Common Concerns are proposed to be responsibilities. 
In this sense, the suggestion is in parallel with the doctrine of the ‘responsi-
bility to protect’, although unlike the latter Common Concern doctrine has an 
open scope.1049 The language of responsibility also ensures that the taking of 
countermeasures does not become a tool in the hand of the rich and powerful 
states, only to be used at their convenience. The Common Concern doctrine, 
therefore, structures the unregulated avenue of countermeasures by supplying 
both enabling and restricting conditions.
iv Position under the Multilateral Trade Rules
Venturing beyond the general domain of public international law, examina-
tion of the multilateral trade rules’ position on a Common Concern inspired 
trade sanction bears special importance. With respect to unilateral trade sanc-
tions, the wto rules, especially those in the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(dsu) on recourse to countermeasures, serve as lex specialis to the customary 
rules on state responsibility.1050 Therefore, to the extent wto rules are appli-
cable, recourse to the general international law rules on state responsibility is 
not available to a member for validating unilateral trade countermeasures.1051 
Here we start from a brief account of the scope and extent of the wto rules on 
 1049 Cottier and Schefer (n 169); Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ 
(n 7) ss 1.4.3.3, and 1.7.3.
 1050 Article 55, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Annex to the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/ 83. The provision holds that the ‘Articles do not 
apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internation-
ally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility 
of a State are governed by special rules of international law’.; The European Commission 
recently came to a similar conclusion. European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EU) No 654/ 2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the Exercise of the Union’s 
Rights for the Application and Enforcement of International Trade Rules’ (n 1002) 4.
 1051 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to 
Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2003) 218– 221. Pauwelyn, 
following James Crawford (cited therein) believes that wto rules are lex specialis to the 
arsiwa as it explicitly contracts out from the latter body of rules in terms of the variety 
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unilateral countermeasures. Then we move on to assess their implications for 
sanctions taken to enforce a Common Concern of lct diffusion.
Countermeasures, known in the wto parlance as ‘suspension of conces-
sions’,1052 is a tightly regulated avenue under the wto law. The dsu provides 
that countermeasures are the last resort, temporary solutions; available only 
when the dsb recommendation and rulings from a settled dispute are not im-
plemented by the respondent member following a dispute.1053 Unlike the cus-
tomary rules on state responsibility,1054 Article 23 of the dsu prohibits unilateral 
interventions for breaches of trade commitments.1055 The provision serves as 
an “exclusive dispute settlement clause”, 1056 generally compelling all mem-
bers to have recourse to the dsu provision when seeking redress.1057 However, 
similar to the customary rules, proportionality is a fundamental condition for 
countermeasures to be granted by the dsb.1058
As mentioned above, the rejection of unilateral self- help measures at the 
wto is subject to an important qualification. It is confined to breaches of 
covered agreements. It is clear from the language of the dsu Article 23.1 that 
compels members to have recourse to the multilateral dispute settlement 
system when seeking redress of a violation of obligation under the covered 
agreements. Similarly, Article 23.2(c) compels the members to obtain dsb 
authorisation when responding to another member’s failure  to uphold trade 
commitments. Decisions in earlier disputes confirm this position.1059
 1052 ibid 229– 230.
 1053 Articles 3.7, 22.1, and 22.2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (n 1033).
 1054 Note, in contrast, Article 22 of the arsiwa, which precludes the wrongfulness of a 
countermeasure taken validly.
 1055 Article 23.1 lays down that Members seeking ‘regress of a violation of obligations’ under 
the covered agreements ‘shall have recourse to, and abided by, the rules and procedures of 
[the dsu]’. History of the provision goes back to the Havana Charter. See United States – 
Sections 301– 310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (n 995)  para 4.72– 4.73; Also, ‘Unilateralism:  An 
Unforced Error’ <https:// soundcloud.com/ user- 885686084/ ep- 29- unilateralism> accessed 
25 October 2020.
 1056 United States – Sections 301– 310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (n 992) para 7.43.
 1057 United States  – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities 
[2001] Panel Report wt/ ds165/ r, dsr 2001:ii 413 [6.19– 6.20]; It was confirmed by the 
Appellate Body, United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European 
Communities [2001] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds165/ ab/ r, dsr 2001:i 373 [111].
 1058 Article 22.4, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (n 1033). The level of suspension of concession authorised by the dsb must 
be ‘equivalent’ to the level of nullification or impairement suffered by the complaining 
Member. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates 
to Other Rules of International Law (n 1051) 234.


















As a result, the question of the legitimacy of unilateral trade countermea-
sures in response to non- wto law breaches remain open. While such actions 
may be valid under the customary rules of responsibility, the dsu remains si-
lent on the matter.1060 Pauwelyn believes that such countermeasures ‘ought 
to be’ valid under the wto law, and also liable to be found as such when the 
issue appears before a Panel.1061 Other authors alternatively hold that the only 
plausible path for the non- wto countermeasures to be legitimised within the 
existing structure of rules is through the cover of the available general or secu-
rity exception provisions.1062
Even if there is merit in the consideration that unilateral trade countermea-
sures for non- wto law breaches should be considered valid if challenged be-
fore a wto Panel, the matter is complicated by the limitations in applicable 
law and the Panel’s subject- matter jurisdiction. The applicable law in a trade 
dispute remains confined to the covered agreements.1063 While the wto is not 
a clinically isolated regime and there are many instances of taking recourse 
to non- wto rules for the purpose of finding the meaning of a provision of 
wto law, Panels have always refrained from giving direct effect to non- wto 
rules through its rulings. One reason behind is that the jurisdiction of the wto 
and its dispute settlement process only extends to settling matters arising 
under the covered agreements and not beyond.1064 So, despite the fact that a 
 1060 Bianchi and Gardoni holds that the silence cannot be construed as the wto Members 
implied derogation of their international law right to take countermeasures. See, 
Andrea Bianchi and Lorenzo Gardoni, ‘Developing Countries, Countermeasures and 
WTO Law: Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of International Law’ (ictsd 
2008) Systemic Issue Paper Issue Paper No. 5 29– 30.
 1061 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law (n 1051) 232.
 1062 Cleveland (n 982); Gabrielle Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights’ 
(2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 62.
 1063 Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights’ (n 1062) 766– 779. Marceau views 
the wto laws as a largely ‘self- contained regime’ where non- wto rules are taken into 
account only so far as necessary to give effect to the provisions of the covered agree-
ments. Note, in contrast, the view of Pauwelyn. Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (n 1051) 456– 
478. The author argued that in absence of any explicit contracting out of the general body 
of international law, wto rules cannot be viewed as a ‘self- contained regime’. As a result, 
applicable law, for a Panel, can span beyond those in the covered agreements. See in par-
ticular, p. 466 (note 82) of the cited work.
 1064 Articles 1.1, 7, 11, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes; Also see Joost Pauwelyn, Joel P Trachtman and Debra P Steger, ‘The Jurisdiction 
of the WTO Is Limited to Trade’ (2004) 98 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
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member’s measure is part of a broader affair involving non- wto laws as well, 
the Panel only entertains the questions relating to the breach of the covered 
agreement.1065 This outcome has been termed as ‘salami- slicing’ of disputes. 
It is unavoidable, as Panels cannot be precluded from the assessment of some 
aspects of the dispute just because the complete dispute involves other ques-
tions beyond its jurisdiction, however important.1066 As a result, respondents 
whoses action are legitimate due to a non- wto reason, would find themselves 
scrambling for additional cover under the exception clauses.1067
In the backdrop of the increasing trend of unilateral interventions, one Pan-
el is currently facing the question of the legitimacy of trade countermeasure 
for non- wto breaches. The written response of the United States in the trade 
dispute between itself and China regarding certain retaliatory tariffs essen-
tially argues that the tariffs are a response to issues that are beyond the juris-
diction of the wto.1068 As a result, no ‘satisfactory’ or ‘prompt’ settlement is 
possible preserving the rights and obligations of the members.1069 One claim 
made by the US in that dispute is that the Panel ought to take note of the re-
taliatory tariffs as a solution in itself that has been reached between parties 
and hence not exercise its jurisdiction any further.1070 This is similar to the 
 1065 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law (n 1051) 451– 452.
 1066 Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages [2006] Appellate Body Report 
wt/ ds308/ ab/ r, dsr 2006:1 43 [53]. The Appellate Body confirmed that a Panel does 
not enjoy discretion to avoid exercising jurisdiction in a matter brought before it. It is 
because access to multilateral settlement of dispute, under dsu Article 23, is a right of the 
complainant. European Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken 
Cuts [2005] Panel Report wt/ ds269/ r, dsr 2005:xix 9295 [7.56]. Also, United States 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, icj Reports 1980, para 36.
 1067 In the human rights context, Marceau presents this as an opportunity to mitigate con-
flicts between the rule systems through good faith interpretation. Marceau, ‘wto Dispute 
Settlement and Human Rights’ (n 1062) 791.
 1068 ‘United States  – Tariff Measures on Certain Goods from China (ds543)’ (2019) First 
written submission of the United Staes of America <https:// ustr.gov/ sites/ default/ files/ 
enforcement/ DS/ US.Sub1.%28DS543%29.fin.%28public%29.pdf> accessed 25 October 
2020. Note the opening paragraph of the submission (para1). ‘China has chosen to adopt 
a range of policies and practices to obtain an unfair competitive edge over other Members 
by stealing or otherwise unfairly acquiring their technology and intellectual property. 
Where those policies or practices can be addressed through wto rules, the United States 
is pursuing wto dispute settlement. Most of China’s practices, however, are not covered 
by existing wto disciplines’.
 1069 ibid 9– 12.
 1070 ibid 15. The claim is that, “in accordance with the last sentence of Article 12.7 of the dsu, 
the Panel should issue a report that is “confined to a brief description of the case and to 














Mexican claim against the United States in the Soft Drinks dispute, where the 
Panel was requested to refrain from exercising jurisdiction as the matter had a 
non- wto (i.e. nafta) origin.1071 However, the Panel’s inability to refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction has already been mentioned in the above paragraph. 
Several subsequent disputes will be influenced by the way the Panels address 
the current dispute.1072
Summing up this discussion, one conclusion to be drawn is that the wto 
rules, especially the obligation to take recourse to the multilateral dispute set-
tlement process would step in as lex specialis in a scenario where the proposed 
Common Concern doctrine based low- carbon technology diffusion narrative is 
integrated into the body of trade rules. Under such a circumstance, the option 
of unilateral countermeasures, taken in accordance with the existing laws, is 
impossible, unless changes take place in the legal formulation of the dsu. This, 
among others, would require tailored exceptions to be placed in the current 
exclusive scope of Article 23. Any such change, even when well- intended, must 
be cautiously approached, especially in a geopolitical setting where countries 
are seemingly warming up to mercantilist behaviour at the cost of the security 
and predictability of multilateralism.
Alternatively, trade countermeasures can be taken under a self- standing 
doctrine of Common Concern. The legitimacy of such a measure under the 
customary rules of responsibility would depend further on the details. In any 
case, countermeasure taken on the basis of a non- wto legal justification will be 
considered as a breach of trade commitments under the covered agreements, 
triggering the targeted countries’ right to seek a remedy through a dispute at 
the wto. A compromise way would be to make sure that such countermea-
sures find refuge under the available exception clauses. To what extent such an 
outcome is possible is discussed hereunder.
A Trade Sanctions under the Exception Clauses
Two forms of exception clauses taken under consideration here are the gener-
al and the security exceptions. The gatt, as well as the gats, provide for gen-
eral exceptions as Articles xx and xiv respectively.1073 These two provisions 
 1071 Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages (n 713) 22– 23.
 1072 Most importantly, the two subsequent tariff dispute between US and China (ds565, 
ds587), as well as the Venzuelan challenge of the US human rights sanctions (ds574).
 1073 While the current discussion does not extend to cover the trips agreement, for the pre-
viously detailed reasons that protection of intellectual property is not the prominent 
obstacle for low- carbon technology diffusion, as previously understood; it is neverthe-
less relevant to mention that exceptions in the trips agreement are more type specific, 
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are identical in terms of drafting, structure, interpretation, and application, 
though some details vary. The security exception clauses are there to allow 
the members greater degree of freedom to act through trade measures in re-
sponse to security concerns. These provisions are found in Articles xxi of the 
gatt, xiv bis of the gats, and Article 73 of the trips agreement. We do not 
foresee the regional economic integration exceptions coming to play to justi-
fy trade sanctions. In the following paragraph, we attempt to point out the key 
factors that would determine the outcome of any effort to justify a Common 
Concern motivated trade sanction under the general or security exception 
provisions.
There are several reasons for the conclusion that trade sanctions cannot be 
justified under the general exception clauses. Without repeating the substan-
tive details of the general exception provisions,1074 following paragraphs will 
briefly articulate those.
First and foremost, the punitive design of trade sanctions would work 
against any argument that they maintain a sufficiently close relationship to a 
specific policy goal. A close relationship, or ‘sufficient nexus’1075 is important 
to bring a putative measure within the subject- matter scope of the exception 
provisions.1076 Note that in the US – Gambling dispute, the ab opined:
extended waiver for ldc s from implementing the agreement provisions, except for the 
non- discrimination obligations, and those arising from other multilateral agreements, 
provided in Article 66.1 of trips.
 1074 This is done with respect to carbon pricing and the gatt. See Chapter 4 iii C above.
 1075 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (n 94) para 133. 
The Appellate Body famously mentioned that ‘[w] e note only that in the specific circum-
stances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endan-
gered marine populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article xx(g)’.
 1076 Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear [2016] 
Appellate Body Report wt/ ds461/ ab/ r [5.68– 5.77; 5.123– 5.126]; Brazil  – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (n 779)  para 7.40– 7.41; India  – Certain Measures 
Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (n 4)  para 5.110– 5.113; Argentina  – Measures 
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services [2016] Appellate Body Report wt/ ds453/ ab/ r 
and Add.1 [6.203– 6.205]. Note the ab opinion in Colombia  – Textiles (para 5.126) that 
“[t] he examination of a defence under both Article xx(a) and Article xx(d) requires an 
initial, threshold examination of the design of the measure at issue, including its con-
tent, structure, and expected operation. In the case of Article xx(a), a panel must exam-
ine the relationship between the measure and the protection of public morals; in the 
case of Article xx(d), a panel must examine the relationship between the measure and 
securing compliance with relevant provisions of laws or regulations that are not gatt- 
inconsistent. Thus, while the terms “to protect” and “to secure compliance” may differ, 









A panel should first determine whether the challenged measure falls 
within the scope of one of the paragraphs of Article xiv.  This requires 
that the challenged measure address the particular interest specified in 
that paragraph and that there be a sufficient nexus between the measure 
and the interest protected.  The required nexus – or “degree of connec-
tion” – between the measure and the interest is specified in the language 
of the paragraphs themselves, through the use of terms such as “relating 
to” and “necessary to”.1077
As explained earlier, a trade sanction is designed to inflict costs and as a result, 
it does not characteristically change when the policy motive is shifted from 
one to another.1078 Hence it cannot be said that the ‘degree of connection’ be-
tween the measure and the ultimate motive is so close as to be justifiable.
Second, the exclusively outward- directed nature1079 of a sanction would fail 
the test of even- handedness, also possibly the chapeau requirements. Even-
handedness is an essential requirement for measures that target conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources, which sanctions cannot fulfil as they do not 
impact domestic industries at all. Even when directed outwards, sanctions 
generally single out a specific entity, thereby adding implementational dis-
crimination to the initial breach of trade rules – something prohibited by the 
chapeau requirements of the general exception provisions.
Lastly, sanctions are unorthodox measures and not a regular policy option. 
Making them justifiable under the general exception clauses would require 
widening the latter’s scope to a degree that would allow for rampant protec-
tionism. It is also confirmed by the arrangement of the exception clauses. If 
measures such as trade sanctions were justifiable under the general excep-
tion provision, the security exception provision would be unnecessary and 
redundant.
Overall, a trade sanction cannot be provisionally justified under the general 
exception clauses. Cottier also comes to this conclusion summarily holding 
that the general exceptions would naturally cover only the product- related 
measures, i.e. those that apply to a product or process regarding which the 
public policy issue arises.1080
 1077 United States  – Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services (n 779) para 292.
 1078 See section i at the beginning of this chapter.
 1079 ibid.
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The security exceptions, identically available in the gatt, and gats, as well 
as the trips, are the ideal space for legitimising trade sanctions.1081 Compared 
to the general exception clauses, most conspicuous structural features of the 
security exception clauses are the departure of a common chapeau, and inclu-
sion of language allowing a greater degree of freedom of action to the mem-
bers. These apart, like the general exception clauses, the security exception 
clauses also supply several sub- paragraphs containing specific scenarios when 
a member can maintain wto- inconsistent trade measures. Two possible de-
fences can be foreseen. One is to hold that inadequate mitigation of climate 
change is an emergency in international relations, and the trade sanction is 
taken by a member to protect its essential security interests in that context.1082 
The other option is to argue that the sanctions are taken in pursuance of obli-
gations under the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security.1083 
After lying dormant for decades, a number of disputes have emerged where 
the respondents have sought to use the cover of the former avenue.1084
(i) Sanctions for a Climate Emergency
The relevant provision of the security exception clause (i.e. paragraph (b)(iii) 
of the respective Articles), is as follows:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed […]
 (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests […]
 (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations […]
While states’ views tend to split1085 regarding whether the subjective lean of 
the phrase ‘it considers necessary’ influences the provision so as to make it 
judicially inscrutable in toto, recently the first Panel tackling the question de-
cided to the negative.1086 After a thorough analysis, the Panel concluded that 
the provision is not beyond Panel’s jurisdiction. It was found that upon plain 
 1081 Van den Bossche and Zdouc (n 753) 619.
 1082 Article xxi(b)(iii), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n 426); Article xivbis(b)(iii), 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (n 428).
 1083 Article xxi(c), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (n 426); Article xivbis(c) General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (n 428).
 1084 For example, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (n 997).
















reading, the circumstances described in subparagraph (iii) above appear to 
qualify the discretion accorded to the member. Also, the Panel noted that the 
phrases ‘taken in the time of ’ and ‘emergency in international relations’ evoke 
temporal and factual notions that are objectively determinable. Furthermore, 
looking at the negotiating history of the provision in the context of the Havana 
Charter, the Panel found out that the original proponent of the provision, the 
United States, convinced other participants by explaining that the proposition 
will make sure of a balanced approach:
We recognized that there was a great danger of having too wide an excep-
tion and we could not put it into the Charter, simply by saying: “by any 
Member of measures relating to a Member’s security interests” because, 
that would permit anything under the sun. Therefore we thought it well 
to draft provisions which would take care of real essential security inter-
ests and, at the same time, so far as we could, to limit the exception so as 
to prevent the adoption of protection for maintaining industries under 
every conceivable circumstance. (177)
[Original footnote] (177) Second Session of the Preparatory Commit-
tee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Verba-
tim Report, Thirty- Third Meeting of Commission A Held on Thursday, 24 
July 1947, e/ pc/ t/ a/ pv/ 33, pp. 20– 21 (as corrected by Second Session of 
the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Employment, Corrigendum to Verbatim Report of Thirty- Third 
Meeting of Commission A, e/ pc/ t/ a/ pv/ 33.Corr.3, pp. 20– 21). (empha-
sis added)1087
In addition to finding that the provision in question is not non- justiciable, the 
Panel recognised that ‘some latitude’ was accorded to the members in terms of 
characterising their respective interests– 
[T] he “balance” that was struck by the security exceptions was that Mem-
bers would have “some latitude” to determine what their essential secu-
rity interests are, and the necessity of action to protect those interests, 
while potential abuse of the exceptions would be curtailed by limiting 
the circumstances in which the exceptions could be invoked to those 
specified in the subparagraphs of Article xxi(b);1088
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As a result, the import of the phrase ‘which it considers’ is limited to the con-
sideration of necessity in the chapeau of paragraph (b), coming into play only 
when any of the circumstances of the following sub- paragraphs are objectively 
determined to exist.
Returning to our issue at hand, i.e. justification of a trade sanction taken to 
trigger climate action, it would involve a two- step analysis, First, it has to be 
established that the sanction is ‘taken in time of emergency in international 
relations’. Second, the member imposing the sanction should consider it nec-
essary for the protection of its essential security interests.
The first step suggests that a specific temporal characteristic must exist, 
serving as the context of a justifiable trade sanction. The pivotal point for the 
present case would be the question of whether climate change can be con-
sidered as an emergency in international relations and if so, what would the 
implications be for the diffusion of lct s. In Russia – Transit dispute, the Panel 
considered the literal meaning of the term ‘emergency’ as well as its appearance 
in the provision in conjunction with ‘war’, and the context of sub- paragraphs 
(i) and (ii).1089 It was held that mere political or economic difference between 
countries is not sufficient to be considered as an emergency.1090 Rather, term 
emergency would apply to “a situation of armed conflict, or of latent armed 
conflict, or of heightened tension or crisis, or of general instability engulfing 
or surrounding a state.”1091 These situations are such that may trigger partic-
ular interests (e.g. of defence, security, or of maintaining law and order) of a 
member. For multiple reasons, this is a standard that the deepening climate 
crisis would be able to meet possibly now or in the near future. Recent studies 
indicate that unbridled change of global climate would not only increase the 
frequency and intensity of natural disasters, but also result in disruption of hu-
man societies, and livelihood; resulting in challenges like mass- migrations, ag-
gravation of the probability of armed conflicts in prone areas.1092 Individually, 
countries wary of climate change impact are already declaring it an emergency 
 1089 ibid 7.71– 7.74.
 1090 ibid 7.75.
 1091 ibid 7.76.
 1092 Ove Hoegh- Guldberg and others, ‘Impacts of 1.5°C of Global Warming on Natural and 
Human Systems’ in Valerie Masson- Delmotte and others (eds), Special Report:  Global 
Warming of 1.5°C (World Meteorological Organization (wmo) 2018)  244– 245  <http:// 
www.ipcc.ch/ report/ sr15/ > accessed 25 October 2020; For a comprehensive review, see W 
Neil Adger and others, ‘Human Security’ in Christopher B Field and others (eds), Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 










to push for further decarbonisation.1093 In addition, the UN Security Council 
is also increasingly getting involved in exploring the security threat aspect of 
climate change.1094 The status of climate change as a common concern of hu-
mankind would also indicate the global nature of the problem. Overall, there 
is a significant possibility that the proposed measure will satisfy the require-
ments at this stage.
The second question, amenable to good- faith demonstration of subjective 
intent, is whether a member taking the sanction considers it necessary for 
the protection of essential security interests. In Russia – Transit, the Panel ex-
pressed that essential security interests are those that are quintessential for the 
functioning of the state, e.g. territorial defence, internal law and order etc.1095 
However, matters that may constitute a threat to essential security interests 
for a member is left to their discretion,1096 which is expected to be exercised in 
good faith.1097 This subjective assessment of necessity would allow a climate- 
related sanction to pass the security exception test, while it may fail under the 
general exception. The fact that the framework of Common Concern requires 
countries to take countermeasures in appropriate circumstances will serve as 
an additional argument. Based upon the aforementioned factors that make cli-
mate change an emergency, it can be said that the essential security threats 
can arise from, for example, the risk of hostilities aggravated by climate change 
spilling over, or the risk of domestic political and societal instability due to 
intensified migratory pressure. It is expected that any trade measures taken 
in response meet a “minimum requirement of plausibility”, i.e. they are not 
implausible as measures to protect those interests.1098 Sanctions, when taken 
as a last resort measure will surely be successful to some degree to change the 
target countries behaviour.
(ii) Sanction to Maintain International Peace and Security
The relevant provision of the security exception clauses (i.e. paragraph c of the 
relevant Articles) hold that:
 1093 ‘UK Parliament Declares Climate Emergency’ BBC News (1 May 2019) <https:// www.bbc.
com/ news/ uk- politics- 48126677> accessed 25 October 2020; Joao Vitor Da Silva Marques, 
‘French National Assembly Expected to Declare “Climate Emergency” ’ euronews (24 June 
2019)  <https:// www.euronews.com/ 2019/ 06/ 24/ french- national- assembly- expected- to- 
declare- climate- emergency> accessed 25 October 2020.
 1094 See the following sub- section (ii) below.
 1095 Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit (n 997) para 7.130.
 1096 ibid 7.131.
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Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:[…]
(c) to prevent a Member from taking any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security.
Unlike the paragraph (b)(iii) discussed before, the above provision is a justi-
fication that may become plausible over time. Paragraph (c)  of the security 
exception operates to clear the way for taking trade measures commensurate 
with the sanctions regimes established by the UN Security Council (unsc). 
The primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security falls 
upon the unsc under the United Nations Charter.1099 Among others, the 
Security Council determines the existence of a threat to peace, or breach of 
peace,1100 and thereupon may recommend for, inter alia, interruption of eco-
nomic relations.1101
We consider this notion as an emerging possibility because over the past 
several years the unsc have increasingly noted the role of climate change as 
a threat to peace. In January 2019, the Council held an open debate to discuss 
the impact of climate change on peace and security.1102 Since 2017, references 
to climate change have also frequently been made in the Security Council res-
olutions adopted regarding several conflict- prone regions in the African con-
tinent. In 2017 the Council recognised with respect to the Lake Chad Basin 
region that:
[T] he adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among 
other factors on the stability of the Region, including through water scar-
city, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and 
emphasises the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management 
 1099 Article 24, Charter of the United Nations (n 536).
 1100 Article 39, ibid.
 1101 Article 41, ibid; See for example, the sanctions regime established against North Korea, 
United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1718 (2006)’ (United Nations 2006)  S/ 
res/ 1718 (2006); For a list of trade embargo that falls within the regime, see ‘Security 
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) | United Nations 
Security Council’ <https:// www.un.org/ securitycouncil/ sanctions/ 1718> accessed 25 
Octotober 2020.
 1102 ‘Climate Change Recognized as “Threat Multiplier”, UN Security Council Debates Its 
Impact on Peace’ (UN News, 25 January 2019)  <https:// news.un.org/ en/ story/ 2019/ 01/ 










strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these 
factors;1103
In 2018, the Security Council requested the UN and the government of Sudan to 
“consider the adverse implications of climate change” in relation to their ongo-
ing programs in Darfur.1104 Altogether, the unsc has so far not recommended 
disruptive action in relation to climate change. But it is not at all unthinkable 
that in the coming days the non- compliant states will be hit with economic 
embargoes. The doctrine of Common Concern can structure forward progress 
along this path.
Overall, the analysis above shows that there is a real and growing possibility 
that a trade countermeasure to promote low- carbon technology diffusion may 
satisfy the relevant thresholds of some of the security exception provisions. 
Most plausible is an argument that times of worsening climate emergency, 
a trade countermeasure taken by a wto member to protect itself from cat-
astrophic risks arising from unabated ghg emissions is justifiable. One im-
portant shortcoming in this regard is the absence of any proportionality or 
equitable considerations requirement to condition the access to and applica-
tion of such measures. As a result, there is no need to respect the principle of 
differentiated responsibility while justifying a climate minded trade measure 
through security exceptions. It may be noted in contrast that proportionality 
is a strict prerequisite for countermeasures that are granted by the dsb to en-
sure compliance with its rulings and recommendations. Similarly, attention to 
the developing country interests is a part of the process of implementing the 
dsb rulings. Developing countries can also take recourse to arbitration to chal-
lenge the level of countermeasures implemented against them. The question 
of whether the doctrine of Common Concern would influence the reading or 
application of the security exception provisions in a way that takes account of 
these considerations is discussed hereunder.
 1103 United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 2349 (2017)’ (United Nations 2017) S/ res/ 
2349 (2017); The language was then repeated in several subsequent resolutions, United 
Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 2457 (2019)’ (United Nations 2019)  S/ res/ 2457 
(2019).
 1104 United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 2429 (2018)’ (United Nations 2018) S/ res/ 
2429 (2018); The language was also repeated regarding Somalia, United Nations Security 
Council, ‘Resolution 2461 (2019)’ (United Nations 2019) S/ res/ 2461 (2019); Somewhat sim-
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v Way Forward: Influence of Common Concern
We have earlier presented an outline as to how the doctrine of Common 
Concern may address some of the common reservations regarding unilateral 
interventions while ensuring the benefits therefrom. On that basis, it has 
been proposed that the opportunity to take trade countermeasures shall be 
strictly limited to matters that merit being termed as a Common Concern 
of Humankind. Diffusion of lct s, especially to the developing countries, 
is one such issue. We propose that negligent failures of countries to coop-
erate in building the necessary rules and systems regarding facilitation of 
the trade- related aspects of lct diffusion in the wto be met with unilateral 
trade countermeasures as a response. Similarly, non- compliance with any 
future multilateral rules in that regard, e.g. neglecting homework responsi-
bilities, shall also trigger similar responses. Beyond that, countermeasures 
should not be linked to situations that fall outside the domain of the trade 
regime, e.g. non- fulfilment of Paris pledges by a member. However, members 
remain free, as always, to pursue any such avenue in practice of their sover-
eign authority.
Therefore, any language that potentially opens up an opportunity to take 
countermeasures shall be made a part of any outcome from the cooperation 
agenda previously detailed.1105 This way, it can be ensured that the scope of 
countermeasures remains limited to the issue of lct diffusion and breaches 
of commitment arising therefrom. We also recall the earlier discussion on the 
necessary checks to be applied upon the exercise of unilateral sanctions. As a 
result, requirements of proportionality, due consideration of the situation of 
the developing countries, and consistency of practice must be made prerequi-
sites to access the avenue of unilateral trade sanctions.
We recall that at present unilateral self- help measures for perceived breach-
es of the covered agreements is prohibited under the dsu. While the proposi-
tion above seeks to alter that situation, the importance of institutional check 
upon unilateral exercise of power, especially in an international political envi-
ronment where mutual trust is waning, is undeniable. As a balance, we suggest 
that recourse to countermeasures be allowed to avoid a years- long dispute set-
tlement process, but nevertheless be kept subject to the authorisation of the 
dsb. The following language can be considered as agreed outcome of any trade 
cooperation for low- carbon technology diffusion:





Notwithstanding anything else contained elsewhere in the covered agree-
ments, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a Member’s willful 
negligence in cooperation frustrates multilateral rulemaking efforts, or 
when an agreement is reached, lack of domestic implementation efforts 
by any Member frustrates the attainment of the goals set thereof, any 
other Member effectively engaged in cooperation and compliance shall 
be granted authorization from the dsb, upon application, to withdraw 
concessions in relation to the Member aforementioned. Article 22, and 
24 of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing Settle-
ment of Disputes shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to such request.
Another suggested role for the doctrine of Common Concern is to further 
structure the recourse to security exception clauses by a member seeking to be 
protected from climate- related risks. The focus is on paragraph b(iii) of the ex-
ception clauses, that being the likeliest avenue to legitimise climate motivated 
unilateral responses. Unlike the foregoing proposition, this one applies to all 
forms of unilateral measures that members take out of their independent and 
sovereign authority to enforce the Common Concern of climate change, in-
cluding that of low- carbon technology diffusion. The purpose of further struc-
turing recourse to the security exception clause is to refine the flexibly worded 
provision, which allows unrestrained power in the hands of the sanctioning 
member. It is submitted that as long as a countermeasure is deployed with a 
climate motivation, the requirements of consistency of behaviour, proportion-
ality, and differentiated responsibility must not be dispensed with.
Hence it is proposed that climate change must be endorsed as an emer-
gency in international relations. Such recognition shall remain in place until 
the aggregate global mitigation commitment rises up to bridge the existing 
emission gap. Within this context, countries that consistently discharge their 
relevant international and domestic obligations, and consider climate change 
as a threat to its essential security interests, shall have the opportunity to take 
punitive economic measures against negligent countries to correct the latter’s 
course of action. In exercise of such power, the doctrine of Common Concern 
shall turn the attributes of consistency, proportionality, and equity into prereq-
uisites. Like before, we suggest the following language to be made part of any 
forthcoming cooperation arrangement:
The Members recognize that unmitigated climate change is an emergen-
cy in international relations, so long as the aggregate level of global emis-
sion remain on a pathway that is unsafe for the planet in the long- run. 
Any unilateral withdrawal of trade concessions undertaken by a Member 
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to protect its essential security interest in this context must be propor-
tionate and considerate of the principle of common but differentiated re-
sponsibility. Moreover, all Members shall be consistent over time in their 
recourse to the unilateral modes of action.
vi Conclusion
In the realm of public international law, unilateralism is unavoidable, despite 
there being views for and against its existence. The idea and application of 
unilateral trade sanctions are not a novel phenomenon. What this chapter 
has shown is that, given the opportunity, the doctrine of Common Concern 
can structure the recourse to unilateral trade sanctions, as well as its applica-
tion in a way that maximises its virtue while minimising the vice. However, it 
is impossible to overlook that this discussion is taking place during a period 
marked by the powerful states’ increasing recourse to unilateral self- help for 
selfish ends, affecting the foundational values of mutual trust and global wel-
fare. Conclusions arrived at in this chapter, therefore, remain subject to the 
dictates of prudence, and caution.
While this chapter finds that unilateral trade sanctions can be beneficial to 
address Common Concerns, including that of low- carbon technology diffusion, 
it limits any recourse to unilateralism to specific breaches of cooperation and 
homework obligation developed within the trade domain. Moreover, respect 
for the principles of cbdr, and proportionality is also suggested as paramount 
considerations to be undertaken when seeking to facilitate climate technol-
ogy diffusion through trade countermeasures. These propositions indeed go 
beyond the current framework of public international law, as it enables states 
that are not injured in the customary sense of the term to take enforcement 
action in pursuance of the doctrine.
Within the domain of multilateral trade rules, it was highlighted that uni-
lateral self- help measures regarding breaches of the covered agreement pro-
visions are prohibited. Nevertheless, members remain free to adopt trade 
sanctions for violations of non- wto commitments. However, the limitations 
regarding applicable law and subject- matter jurisdiction prevents a Panel from 
addressing the entirety of any dispute that involves such sanction. As a result, 
under the current rules, sanctions in response of non- trade issues, even if relat-
ed to the Common Concern doctrine, has to find additional justification under 
the exception provisions. The security exceptions, especially the paragraph (b)
(iii) is the most plausible defence, albeit providing for a degree of leeway that 
is more than necessary.
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The doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind can influence the state of 
play regarding unilateralism and trade rules in two ways. To a limited and very 
specific extent, the doctrine can be used as a basis for creating a direct recourse 
to the withdrawal of concessions subject to the approval and supervision of 
the dsb. This path will be useful to engage stakeholders to create multilateral 
rules for low- carbon technology diffusion within the trade regime, as well as 
to ensure domestic implementation of the same without a lengthy recourse 
to the multilateral settlement of disputes. A second way is to further subject 
the use of security exception provision to the requirements of proportionality, 
differentiated responsibility, and consistency, when so done to enforce obli-
gations arising out of the Common Concern doctrine. The chapter suggested 
possible languages to those effects.
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Conclusion: Summary and Outlook
If, looking back, the 2010s appear as the era of multilateral disorder for trade 
and climate change, then looking forward, one must seek the foundational 
norms for a more sustainable and resilient rule- based international system. 
In the context of the failure of countries under the Paris Agreement to deliver 
sufficient pledges required to bridge the current emission gap, as well as the 
inability to create new market- based mechanisms for mitigation, the short-
coming of the climate regime is a present reality than a mere hypothesis.1106 
We are already witnessing that the progressive agenda of engaging trade policy 
to tackle climate change is shifting to unilateral gears,1107 leaving many affect-
ed countries without a forum. As conflicts regarding climate- related economic 
policies continue to spill over to the wto, the importance of effectively tack-
ling trade and climate change issues is more than ever. If there were any time 
requiring unprecedented institution building efforts and out- of- the- box ap-
proaches, it is probably now.
In the backdrop of above, there can be no doubt that the diffusion of low- 
carbon technology is a Common Concern of Humankind. To address that 
Concern, the main goal of this book has been to portray trade law and pol-
icy means to bridge the gaps between the expectation and reality of clean 
technology diffusion. In parallel, it has also been an exercise in the appli-
cation of the doctrine of Common Concern to resolve cooperation failures 
regarding transboundary public goods of critical importance. This conclu-
sion will consolidate the principal findings of the research on both fronts. 
In addition, it would also briefly point out the potential avenues for further 
investigations.
 1106 ‘On Thin Ice – cop25, the UN Climate Talks in Madrid, Ends in a Sad Splutter’ (n 1021); 
‘cop25:  Key Outcomes Agreed at the UN Climate Talks in Madrid’ (Carbon Brief, 15 
December 2019)  <https:// www.carbonbrief.org/ cop25- key- outcomes- agreed- at- the- un- 
climate- talks- in- madrid> accessed 25 October 2020.
 1107 At the forefront of the progressive push is the EU’s Green Deal. See, European 
Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: The European Green Deal’ (2019) COM(2019) 640 final; At the 
diametric opposit is the systematic, large- scale rollback of environmental commitments. 
See, Tyler Clevenger and Matt Herbert, ‘7 Ways the Trump Administration Is Harming the 
Climate’ (World Resources Institute, 21 April 2020) <https:// www.wri.org/ blog/ 2020/ 04/ 7- 
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i International Trade, Clean Technologies, and Common Concern
Ìn the context of distinct, yet related developments in the trade and climate 
change fields, technology development and transfer has found very different 
expressions. The extensive theoretical, factual, and legal stocktaking exercise 
in the first two chapters leads to a few key messages on the role of internation-
al trade rules and domestic trade policy measures for low- carbon technology 
diffusion. Those can be found below.
First of all, effective and timely mitigation of emission is impossible without 
the transfer of necessary technologies, especially to the developing countries. 
Second, although steady efforts are made within the climate regime to facil-
itate technology transfer, those fall short mainly due to the lack of financial 
resources available for the mechanisms to comprehensively address global 
technology need. Third, the key barriers to the diffusion of clean technologies, 
i.e. high price, lack of finance, and low incentives, are economic in nature, 
leading to market failures. Fourth, positive policy interventions are indispens-
able to drive the producers and consumers in the market towards adoption of 
clean technologies in all sectors. Fifth, low- carbon technology diffusion has an 
inseparable developmental aspect to it. Transfer of technology under private 
market terms is not a problem in developed countries. It is so in the developing 
nations where markets operate under different constraints. Lastly, unlike some 
widely known sectors like the pharmaceuticals, clean technology diffusion is 
not primarily or significantly prevented by the protection granted to intellec-
tual property rights.
The doctrine of Common Concern of Humankind serves the important 
function of supplying a legal form to the claim of involving the trade regime 
to the steps and processes necessary for low- carbon technology diffusion. Al-
though the doctrine’s maturity is a part of an evolutionary process, its pro-
posed normative aspects in the form of duties to cooperate, homework, and 
ensure compliance, are useful to chart a course of action within the trade rule 
system. Below are the key findings in that regard.
A Trade Cooperation for Technology Diffusion
Although trade policy measures can promote the diffusion of low- carbon 
technologies, neither the wto is currently under any mandate, nor are the 
members thereof under any responsibility to devote themselves to such goals. 
It is the responsibility of cooperation arising out of the recognition of clean 
technology diffusion as a Common Concern that serves as the ground for such 
a new claim. However, for any new claim of cooperation to be accepted by 
all members, it must conquer the traditional conflicts of views between the 
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developed and the developing countries regarding deployment of market- 
based policies for climate action. The key contribution of the third chapter of 
the book is to portray trade cooperation for low- carbon technology diffusion 
as mutually beneficial. To ensure inclusivity and sustainability, any effort made 
at the wto must take into account different interest of the parties, as well as 
be particularly attendant to the needs of equity and differentiated responsibil-
ity. Upon a formally accepted understanding of low- carbon technology diffu-
sion as a Common Concern within the wto, complementary and interlocking 
trade policy measures can be designed to be reflecting the interests of differ-
ent stakeholders. Key efforts would be required to relax market access across 
the board for the benefit of low- carbon technology goods and related services, 
also to improve domestic incentives that encourage such flows, and to adopt 
process and production measures (ppm s) that distinguish and establish pref-
erences for lower embedded emission.
B Role of Domestic Trade Policy Measures
Domestic trade policy measures sit at the heart of the trade agenda for clean 
technology diffusion. Through market opening, as well as other restrictive and 
promoting policies, governments can trigger both the in and outflow of lct. 
The book engaged in two in- depth studies of such ‘homework’ measures. These 
provide useful insights into potential strategies, benefits, and drawbacks, espe-
cially with regard to the measures’ compliance with the wto laws.
(i) Carbon Pricing
Putting an internationally agreed, in the absence thereof, a domestically de-
termined minimum price on the emission footprint of a product can be one 
of the most significant homework measures for low- carbon technology diffu-
sion, especially when it is coupled with schemes to utilise the import revenue 
for technology transfer supports to the developing countries affected by such 
pricing. Apart from highlighting a new revenue recycling aspect of carbon pric-
ing, Chapter 4 also looks at tariffs, in addition to taxation, as a medium- term 
strategy to obtain similar results with possibly lesser costs. The revenue recy-
cling is an indispensable part of any carbon pricing measure to take account 
of differentiated responsibilities, and counterclaims of protectionism. This will 
be best done through established financial mechanisms like the Green Climate 
Fund (gcf).
Carbon pricing falls under the general category of non- product related 
ppm s, which under the current wto jurisprudence, would be considered as 
discriminatory. Products are subjected to varying fiscal burden due solely on 
account of their emission footprint is sure to violate the mfn rule, and may, in 
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cases where comparable domestic production exists, contravene the nation-
al treatment (nt) rule as well. While there is ample policy room to justify a 
carbon pricing measure under the general exception provision, the revenue 
recycling part would play an essential role to ensure that the measure passes 
the final chapeau test. It is also found that the requirement of fairness under 
the chapeau is the only place where attention to differentiated responsibility 
is required to legitimise the pricing measure.
Alternatively, the Common Concern doctrine may assist in a reading of the 
non- discrimination obligation that favours the carbon pricing measures. It 
would mainly be possible if the legal analysis of discrimination is done tak-
ing into account the pre- existing distortion of competition in the market that 
necessitated the intervention in the first place. Under both the traditional and 
the proposed alternative approach, any carbon pricing measure found non- 
discriminatory before reaching the general exception provision must addi-
tionally be required to the principle of cbdr into account. It is only possible 
through giving effect to the Common Concern doctrine.
(ii) Export Credit Support
Financial constraint is a key barrier preventing low- carbon technology diffu-
sion. Public financial supports like export credits, guarantees, and insurances 
can do a lot to reduce this barrier and bring to fruition export and investment 
transactions that would not otherwise happen. Export credits, especially its 
role in spreading clean technologies to capital scarce locations do not get 
much attention in trade law scholarship. It is proposed that the export credit 
agencies (eca s) in the technology- rich geographies should extend such forms 
of support in better- than- market terms to facilitate transactions that benefit 
developing country firms.
Due to the legal linkages carried into the wto subsidies agreement from 
the gatt era, some specific forms of export credits extended at fixed rates 
in compliance with the provisions of the oecd arrangement can escape the 
general prohibition on export subsidisation (the ‘safe- haven’). While it may 
sound as good news to support clean technology outflows from the developed 
countries, in Chapter  5, it is found that the practical benefits are very little. 
The reasons are the limited scope of climate support projects in the arrange-
ment; the out of date nature of the relationship between the scm agreement 
and the oecd arrangement; also the non- democratic nature of the safe- haven 
clause itself. Apart from that, public financial supports to promote low- carbon 
technology exports in better than private market terms will be considered as a 
prohibited subsidy. Saving some of such measures can be possible by altering 
the oecd arrangement, (e.g. further relaxing the commercial interest rates for 
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clean technology related transactions) and opening up more opportunities to 
support outflows of lct s. Ideally, however, a new carve- out in the scm agree-
ment should be introduced to protect from challenge technology outflow in-
centives that are necessary, fair, and transparent.
C Utility of Unilateral Trade Countermeasures
As a last resort, the final aspect of the Common Concern doctrine, i.e. unilat-
eral countermeasures can be a useful threat against willful non- compliance. 
But such steps can prove to be dangerous, also affecting long- term coopera-
tion, when not designed carefully. In Chapter 6 it was argued that unilateral 
trade countermeasures, when prompted by the doctrine of Common Concern, 
must remain subject to the dictates of good faith, proportionality, and consid-
erations of equity. Some of the aspects of the proposition advance beyond the 
customary state responsibility rules.
To the extent a Common Concern backed unilateral action is initiated by 
a member against another involving a purported breach of the wto covered 
agreements, it falls under the category self- help measures forbidden by the 
dsu. As a remedy to this situation, modification of the dsu can be given a 
careful consideration, to the effect of creating direct recourse to the process of 
withdrawal of concessions under the dsb supervision. In any case, it would be 
prudent to avoid full- scale unilateralism – given the tumultuous turn of global 
affairs in recent times. A wto member nevertheless retains a great degree of 
freedom to take trade sanctions against perceived security threats. While un-
bridled climate change can surely be considered as a threat, it is suggested that 
use of the security exceptions avenue to legitimise Common Concern inspired 
sanction must be further tempered by providing for all to abide by the princi-
ples of proportionality and differentiated responsibility.
ii Lessons Learnt about the Doctrine
The proposed formulation of Common Concern of Humankind, as a legal doc-
trine, has guided the structure and analysis conducted in this book. As it was 
detailed in the outset, the role of the doctrine of Common Concern is to ad-
dress, ex ante, the fragmentation between trade and the climate regime on the 
issue of low- carbon technology diffusion. As the substantive conclusions pre-
sented above would indicate, the doctrine can perform that task very well. The 
normative claims made by the doctrine are idealistic to a degree, but unapol-
ogetically so. It remains, as showcased throughout this wok, firmly rooted on 




280 Conclusion: Summary and Outlook
of critically important transboundary public goods. To that effect, the doctrine 
indeed is representative of “a new and different realism”.1108
Propelled by the proven urgency of climate response, the most important 
aspect of the proposed doctrine of Common Concern is the legal impetus it 
supplies to overcome the otherwise insurmountable barriers to cooperation. 
It triggers the proposed trade cooperation narrative, which then flows into the 
other aspects of homework and compliance. The notion of ‘common concern’ 
itself is capable of being well- outlined and circumscribed using evidence, 
thereby preventing any situation of unjustifiable incursion into the status quo 
of the multilateral trade rule system. Moreover, the doctrine is a highly useful 
tool for the framing of concerted efforts responding to shared concerns. The re-
sponsibility to cooperate and homework, backed up by the unilateral counter-
measures is a robust structure that can ensure engagement and compliance 
by the stakeholders on issues of global importance. Within the trade regime, 
the utility of the doctrine goes beyond the discussed matter of the diffusion of 
lct s. It can touch upon other areas of climate change (e.g. adaptation con-
cerns), also issues of transboundary importance.
Although this research has unequivocally found the doctrine of Common 
Concern to be of important use in public international law in general and in 
international trade regulation in particular, it is admittedly still too early to 
pass judgments on its place among the different categories of international 
law sources. Development of a new norm is not a binary process of transposi-
tion from non- existence to being. It will grow in character and dimension over 
time, during which its content and purport will morph in accordance with the 
practice and usage. It will be no different in the forward journey of the doctrine 
of Common Concern. Nevertheless, this volume has treated the doctrine as 
an emerging principle of international law. The case- studies in particular have 
demonstrated the beneficial influence its normative content can exercise on 
the body of international trade regulation.
While conceptualising the doctrine in the structural form of a principle is 
useful, it will also pose certain drawbacks. A legal principle maintains general-
ity and flexibility at the cost of a strict meaning. The more principled nature a 
notion takes in law, the more it becomes a guiding thought, finding expression 
only through the intermediation of an additional layer of precise legal instru-
ments specific to a given discipline. In that sense, the doctrine itself cannot 
be seen as giving rise to rigid and identical obligations that apply everywhere. 
The positive aspect of this conclusion is that it makes the Common Concern 
 1108 Cottier, ‘The Principle of Common Concern of Humankind’ (n 7) s 1.1.2. 
 
Conclusion: Summary and Outlook 281
doctrine relevant and applicable in a diverse array of subject- matters. In 
contrast, it also would mean that the legal stringency with which the more 
forward- looking components (e.g. unilateral trade sanctions) of the doctrine 
is put into application, would vary across different legal fields. This can put 
to question the original premise of the doctrine, as it sought, in part, to rem-
edy the lack of options to enforce solutions to Common Concerns. Perhaps 
the balance would lie in the argument that while unilateral efforts are sought 
to enforce a concern, not all cases would deserve responses as stringent as 
a trade sanction. But that, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, remains 
to be congealed through practice and usage. The most useful conclusion, at 
the moment, is that the doctrine has a very useful core notion and a robust 
legal structure, which can be beneficially deployed to resolve collective action 
failures.
iii Outlook
Looking forward, there are several avenues along which the line of research 
pursued here can be taken further. In this volume, the scope of the stud-
ies remained limited to the public international law of international trade 
and domestic trade policies. Although it was indicated that other areas of 
international economic law (iel) can contribute to the overall enabling 
environment for low- carbon technology diffusion, their nature and extent 
remain to be explored. Of special importance is the role of international 
investment regulation, and domestic investment promotion measures upon 
diffusion of lct s. Similarly, the commercial terms of the agreements under 
which the technologies change hand (e.g. technology license) also deserve 
closer study.
Within the examined area of study, there are more trade policy measures 
that can be looked into for their potentially facilitative role in spreading clean 
technologies. Among those, the role of services market access is least under-
stood at present. Also, cooperation and assistance in adopting new green stan-
dards relating to products and processing deserve attention. Given that clean 
technology diffusion has a strong developmental aspect, diffusion of technical 
knowhows for changing the agricultural practices to reduce emission has spe-
cial importance, given especially that it relates to the sustainable transforma-
tion of the developing countries’ agricultural sectors and their food security 
in the long run. Last but not the least, further research can also be devoted to 
exploration of any possible obstacle posed by intellectual property protection 
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Annex – Scope of Clean Technologies
The list below is generated from the UNEP DTU partnership database on Technol-
ogy Needs Assessment (TNA). It shows technologies prioritised by 29 developing 
countries undergoing the tna process between 2011 and 2013.
Sector/ 
sub- sector
Technology class Within class varieties
Solar energy Solar power Solar homes, pv systems, Lanterns, dc 
motors for grid connected pvs
Solar heating/ 
drying
Solar dryers and water heaters
Wind 
energy
Wind power Wind turbines, Standalone and grid- 
connected systems, On- shore plants, 
Systems for water/ space heating
Hydro 
power
Hydro power Micro, small, and large hydro power plants, 
Pumps to supply water to reservoirs
Tidal power
Biofuels Biogas Biogas for cooking, heating and electricity, 
Anaerobic digester, Manure digestion, 




Biomass gasifier, Electricity and heat co- 
generation plants, Direct combustion 
technology for electricity generation, Co- 
firing of biomass with coal, Waste to energy
Biodiesel Internal combustion, Generating biodiesel 
from jatropha, soy bean and sunflower, 





Biofuel from sugarcane, Ethanol gel fuel and 
fuel- based lanterns, Bioethanol from maize, 
sugar and starch based crops, Ethanol 
production from agricultural residues
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Sector/ 
sub- sector




Nuclear Low power nuclear chp, Long- term large 
scale units, Nuclear units of small capacity
Coal High efficiency boilers, Pulverized coal 
combustion (single and double unit), 
Integrated coal gasification, Underground 
gasification, Co- firing with biomass, 
Integrated gasification combined cycle 
(igcc) units, rdf production and pyrolysis 
from coal and syngas
Natural gas Natural gas combined cycle, Fuel switch 
to natural gas at existing plants, Micro and 
mini combined heat and power (chp) 
plants






cycle (cc), and 
combined heat 
and power (chp)
Peat based igcc, Biogas based co- 
generation, Natural gas combined cycle, Co- 
generation by single combined cycle,
Energy efficient 
transmission
Supply side transmission, Transmission 









Afforestation using machines, scattered tree 
planting, improving roadside vegetation




Weed control, Change of crops, Intensive 
rice cultivation, Wet and dry irrigation
Forest 
management




Conservation tillage, Controlled application 
of nitrogen fertilizer, Fixators of free 
nitrogen, Inhibitors of volatilitization of 
urea
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Sector/ 
sub- sector
Technology class Within class varieties
Tillage 
management




Peat measurement, monitoring and 
remapping, Peat water management
redd Reducing emissions from forest degradation
Storage and 
handling
Different storage practices, Decanting, 
Filtration
Organic farming Mirco dose technique, Use of organic 





Feeding practices Controlled fodder supplements, Nutrition 
improvement through fodder processing, 
Growth hormones





Efficiency in cement industry, Using 
pozzolans
Oven and furnace 
efficiency
Autogenerating crisol oven, Induction 




Retort, Vertical shaft brick kilns
Coal mine 
methane recovery




Efficient lighting Compact fluorocent lamps, led lights, High 
efficiency lighting systems
Efficient stoves Improved stoves (charcoal, firewood, and 
biomass) for cooking and heating, Mud 
stoves, Radiation stoves, Ethanol and lpg 
cook stoves
Efficient heating High and medium power heat pumps, 
Radiant panels, Hydrogen heating systems, 
Efficient heat, ventilation, and air- 
conditioning (hvac) systems, Heat metering, 
Automatic temperature regulation
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Sector/ 
sub- sector
Technology class Within class varieties
Insulation Building thermal insulation, Wall 





Compressed stabilized earth blocks (cseb), 
Efficient coolers, Improving battery/ 
capacitors’ power factors, Efficient air- 
conditioning, Cans with paper bottoms
Building 
efficiency




Industrial and commercial end- use energy 





Transport Bus rapid transit 
system
Bus rapid transit (brt), Transport 
management system
Mass transport Electrification of railway, Integrated public 
transport, Mass transport collectivization
Efficient freight 
management
Repowering, Improved logistics for 
multimodal transport, Longer v. heavier 
trains
Modal shift in 
freight transport
Railway cargo transport, Technologies to 
increase use of freight trains














Energy efficient infrastructures, Transport 
management systems, Speed control 
of motor drives, Improved traffic signal 
systems, Improved road infrastructure, 
Electronic road pricing
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Sector/ 
sub- sector
Technology class Within class varieties
Vehicle and fuel 
technologies
Alternative fuels (hydrogen, fuel cells, 
blended fuels, cng and lng), Promoting 
import of fuel efficient vehicles, Vehicle 
emission standards, Sustainable private 
transport alternatives
Waste Composting Composting, Composting in vessel, 
Vermiculture, Mushroom cultivation
Reuse and recycle Recycling of paper and plastic solid waste, 
Waste reuse, Using organic waste for flour 






Waste to energy, Co- generation from waste 
burning
Landfill gas Methane capture from landfill, Biomass 
landfill, Low solid anaerobic digestion
Biological waste 
treatment
Mechanical- biological treatment (mbt)
Wastewater 
treatment
Biomass wastewater, Biomethanation, 
Wastewater lagooning, Anaerobic digestion
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